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Summary
This thesis looks into the possibility of assessing legislative performance and 
democratic quality using performance management frameworks and methods used 
for organisational development and change and whether measurement of this kind is 
beneficial to improving democratic quality and the legitimation of the political system 
in general. Political institutions and in particular legislatures are often immune from 
the adverse effects of poor performance due to large budget allocations regardless of 
efficacy. Furthermore a rise in efficiency is often seen as a threat to the institution's 
accountability. The literature on legislative performance is mainly confined to 
legislative policy making output which is not necessarily a sign of good performance. 
Neither is performance only about the consideration of the costs and resource 
utilisation or the behaviour of actors and individuals in the policy making process as 
dependent variables. As mentioned such considerations seem rather irrelevant to the 
performance of legislative outcomes since legislatures usually do not have budgetary 
or spending concerns as in the private sector.
This study has taken an open systems approach to legislative institutions. Any 
organisational model of this kind will doubtlessly consider the continual growth and 
improvement of performance as a major theme. Although expressions such as optimal 
growth cannot be used for legislatures, unlike other production systems, it is 
acknowledged that demands going into the legislative system from its environment 
will never cease and so the legislative organisation must be able to help the legislature 
adapt to the changes while at the same time, maintain or improve the quality of its 
work and seek better performance. This study investigates the methods and
frameworks already in use by developed legislative institutions and public sector 
organisations to assess whether these methods could be adapted to enhance legislative 
performance and democratic quality in the political system.
It is clear that not all countries respond to legislative capacity building programmes in 
the same way. It is often assumed that developed democracies culturally characterised 
through efficacy, meaningful and engaging work are associated with higher 
performance and that strong mission-based cultures perform better than those without 
or with a weak sense of mission. This study seeks to investigate this assumption and 
see whether it may be backed theoretically and proven scientifically. A cusp 
catastrophe model of democratic development and change is devised to show that 
below the certain threshold slight changes in the indicators for democratic 
development and growth may lead to large changes behavioural changes which are 
quite unpredictable using linear models of political development and change. A 
statistical analysis follows to show that the credibility of the model followed by tests 
and comparisons with other popular democracy indices to indicate its validity.
The cusp catastrophe model strengthens the idea that not all countries are suitable for 
performance measurement application. Only political systems that have passed a 
certain threshold for consolidated democracies may effectively benefit from 
performance measurement. Furthermore it is not really possible to compare the 
performance of a legislature on one side of this threshold with a legislature from the 
other side using the same measurement framework and methods. Thus only developed 
democracies, characterised as being 'active' could take advantage of performance 
measurement to avert problems relating to the legitimacy of the political system in the
n
eyes of its citizens. This work examines the problem of falling legitimacy from the 
literature to assess whether a crisis of democracy is in the making which could lead to 
problems such as the erosion of the authority of politicians; the steady reduction of 
electoral loyalty and stability of voters; the decline of public trust in political 
processes; and even an increase in law evasion. The literature suggests that developed 
democracies are not facing an eminent crisis of democracy but are faced with a 
challenge in which they must continuously improve the performance of their political 
institutions by improving responsiveness in order to maintain and improve on political 
legitimacy.
The Case studies in this work is an attempt to show how the implementation of 
performance measurement frameworks could potentially manage performance and 
continuously improve responsiveness to maintain and improve democratic quality and 
the legitimacy of the political system. The first study is of the British Parliament's 
House Services' use of the Balanced Scorecard framework to improve the 
performance of administrative services, services to MPs and the public. The study is 
also comparative and assesses the utility of different performance measurement 
systems and frameworks by comparing performance measurement in Westminster 
with other developed legislatures such as such as the Swedish Rikstag and Irish 
Houses of Orieachtas before evaluating on the success of such performance 
management in Parliament. The second case study examines the performance of the 
House of Commons in general and in particular evaluates the effectiveness of the 
modernisation agenda since 1997. This study is a self-evaluation and is narrowed 
down to include the performance of the Modernisation and Liaison Committees of the 
House of Commons based on the literature and documents available. This study finds
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that the pace of reform has improved greatly with the adoption of the performance 
management mindset and the application of performance measurement methods and 
tools. Finally the third study is an example of how ineffective it is to apply 
performance measurement to legislative institutions below the consolidation 
threshold. This study investigated the implementation of the balanced scorecard to the 
performance of the Iranian Majles Research Centre and has documented the results.
The concluding chapter sets out the parameters of a performance measurement 
framework for developed legislatures and explains how some of the parameters in 
legislative performance measurement could contrast which could be avoidable. This 
chapter also provides a suggested framework for legislative performance based on the 
Balanced Scorecard and improvement in responsiveness to enhance legitimation and 
the quality of democracy in the political system. This thesis believes that a balanced 
approach, of the kind suggested here would no doubt contribute to knowledge and 
scholarship in legislative studies as well as to enhance democratic quality in 
consolidated democracies.
Key words: Performance Measurement, Legislatures, Democracy, Cusp Catastrophe, 
Consolidation, Responsiveness, Legitimation, Balanced Scorecard, House of 
Commons, Modernisation, House Services
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Chapter one: Introduction 
1-1. Introduction
This research is an investigation into the use of performance measurement in 
legislatures and whether measurement of this kind is beneficial to improving 
democratic quality and the legitimation of the political system. Performance is 
seemingly a concern and obsession in all governance systems around the world. 
As Frederickson and Smith (2003: 208) point out, 'Accountability for conducting 
the public's business is increasingly about performance rather than discharging a 
specific policy goal within the confines of the law'. Performance measurement 
as a public management tool is generally concerned with adapting the structures 
and processes of public sector organisations so as to ensure good performance 
(Pollitt and Bouckaert 2004) and have been used vigorously by legislatures in the 
assessment of accountability and efficiency of government policy and output, 
especially in the past two decades. This research looks into the possibilities of 
adapting these tools to assess legislative performance in democracies.
Measuring performance and developing performance measurement systems, and 
especially commitment to it is subject to influence from technical, cultural and 
political conditions and is therefore contingent (Boyle, 1989, Bouckaert and 
Halligan 2008: 12). But whatever the contingencies, there is no doubt that the 
focus on performance is expanding and has become more intense. Almost all 
services in post-industrial societies use some kind of performance measurement 
system with the more developed societies placing more emphasis on achieving 
performance goals and targets. Managing performance has become the core of
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public management and has had a spill over effect on legislative and judicial 
institutions too.
l-2.The Importance of Performance Measurement in Legislative Research
Performance measurement in legislatures is a topic that is often neglected in 
political circles perhaps because performance measurement aims at long-term 
goals whereas politicians are usually seeking to find quick fixes and short-term 
solutions to social and political problems. In other words as Jackson states 'the 
length of a politician's life is not long enough to wait for long run improvements 
in performance' (Jackson 1990: 21). However, this reason alone cannot account 
for why this topic has been overlooked in legislative studies literature despite its 
popular appeal in institutional studies.
As discussed in chapter two, the main body of literature in legislative studies is 
based on reductionism and is causal only to the extent that a certain process is 
linked to a certain output or behaviour. Whereas from the perspective of 
performance management, performance is a holistic process and the relationship 
between the processes and outcome must be assessed not only through the lens 
of the legislature as a whole but also the impact of the legislature on the political 
system in general. The latter perspective adds complexity to research which is 
usually less favoured to the straightforward reductionist methodology that 
warrants conclusive results but at the price of leaving unanswerable questions 
and gaps in the literature. This study intends to fill some of these gaps by
looking at legislative performance from the perspective of performance 
management and to serve as a bridge between the studies of legislatures and 
organisations. Performance management in organisations has become more of a 
necessity than a trend and this study intends to realise this in the study of 
legislatures.
Legislative performance management has become a topic of interest among 
international organisations and agencies dealing with development and 
democracy appraisal. The implementation of parliamentary strengthening 
programmes such as the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) run 
project Assisting Legislatures is an example of such programmes which are 
usually misinterpreted in developing countries as performance management 
programmes rather than the legislative capacity building programmes that they 
really are. These kinds of programmes are usually based on historical approaches 
which tend to be less judgemental and relativistic. They also emphasise training 
and sharing of technical expertise in improving parliamentary functions by 
offering a broad range of options and frameworks for countries wishing to 
develop their legislatures.
There is no doubt that such tailor-made programmes are advantageous for 
developing legislatures as they are helped and supported to improve their internal 
technical capacity; strengthen their institutional functions such as representation 
and oversight; and improve executive-legislative relationships and build a
stronger relationship with civil society 1 . And as this thesis argues legislative 
strengthening programmes of this kind can help build the foundations necessary 
for successful performance measurement and implementation but not the other 
way around . In other words performance management programmes can only be 
meaningful once the legislature has developed the capacity for performance 
measurement based on democratic foundations.
Legislative performance is not about strengthening legislative capacities and as 
David Arter points out (2006a) the relative strength or capacity of legislatures 
does not indicate their performance. The power of a legislature to influence 
policy or work independently of the executive does not have an impact on its 
organisational performance. What needs to be considered in performance is how 
well the legislature can carry out the powers appointed to it by the institution to 
maximum benefit of the system. Legislative performance does not improve 
under conditions of rigid institutional rules and processes since these rules 
operate in equilibrium and equilibrium equals a closed system. Whereas 
developed legislatures operate in open systems where there is not a fixed 
equilibrium, but rather a stable equilibrium state.
1 The UNDP 'Assisting Legislatures' programme, is available from the UNDP website at: 
http://www.undp.org/es/documents/essential-on-assisting-leg.pdf
2 There are other potential problems arising from capacity building programmes such as this. Firstly 
progress is partial (usually ends when funding runs out) and relatively costly. Hence the programmes may 
become a burden to donor states who may decide to pull out of their financial commitments in reaction to 
slow progress and the lack of substantial development. Secondly due to the UN's political nature which is 
aimed at maintaining good diplomatic relations and avoiding animosity with regimes As a result, these 
programmes sometimes rely on the legislatures' own assessments. As a result, financial aid may be spent in 
ways which were initially unintended. Thus, such programmes may end up only indicating areas of 
weaknesses in a particular legislative system and offer limited advice by showing past experience in other 
similar institutions in managing a similar problem. Moreover, the methods used by international 
organisations and aid agencies, which are designed to bring issues of legislative development to focus, such 
as conferences and summits, can be too expensive and not as productive as initially expected (as 
productivity depends on political support and willingness from all participants). In the end it will be up to 
the national legislatures to choose whether it would like to follow the guidelines implicated and these 
programmes may end by spending lots and gaining little.
1-3. Legislative Performance from an Organisational Perspective:
Performance is not a unitary concept. The term performance means different 
things depending on the discipline that is used to describe it. Organisational 
theorists, Pollitt and Bouckeart, suggest that equating performance with a simple 
assertion as 'to run better' may be problematic as this could mean different 
things to different individuals and groups and improving performance on one 
dimension or against one objective may lead (intentionally or unintentionally) to 
a lower performance in other dimensions (Pollitt and Bouckeart 2004: 18). Thus 
performance must be viewed as a set of information about achievements of 
varying significance to different stakeholders (Bovaird 1996: 147). Talbot (2005) 
outlines the different dimensions of performance in the public sector as 
accountability; user choice customer service; efficiency; results and 
effectiveness; results and resource allocation; and creating public value. 
Performance is also used as prefatory to other activities such as auditing and 
budgeting and more diffusely to improvement, orientation and trajectories 
(Pollitt and Bouckaert 2004: 341).
A legislature may be interpreted as a social system existing and functioning on 
the one hand in accordance with its own order, and on the other hand depending 
on the conditions of the environment in a complex and changing society. 
Legislatures and the public sector share this common fact that they cannot 
perform outside society. Thus legislative performance becomes part of societal 
performance and is ultimately linked to the performance of the governance 
system as a whole. So in addition to seeking evidence about substantive
performance improvement, legislative performance measurement systems need 
to pay attention to the legitimation aspects of performance management reforms.
Legislative performance in this work is broadly defined as: 'The nature and 
consequences of service provision by legislative institutions'. The improvement 
of performance in legislatures would be an attempt to stimulate greater 
efficiency, effectiveness or higher quality or the mixture of all three at one time. 
The above definition also takes into consideration the 'chain of delegation' in 
contemporary democracies from voters and civil society to those responsible for 
the implementation and oversight of public policy' (Str0m 2000: 266, Lupia and 
McCubbins 2000). Thus the study of legislative performance would seem to be 
nested in causal relationships within the structures of delegation and 
accountability rather than the hierarchical relationships between public 
management and control which would constrain straightforward linear 
modelling, most commonly used in performance measurement of public sector 
organisations.
Such an investigation requires a change in perspective on legislative 
performance from the rigid focus on legislative institutions, and binding rules 
that constrain legislative behaviour and output, to a focus on the legislative 
organisation itself and how 'outcomes' or the results from outputs, would effect 
legislative performance and ultimately improve the democratic outcomes in 
governance systems. As the review of literature on legislative performance in 
chapter two of this work shows studies in this area are limited and mainly seem
to concentrate on the internal processes leading to outputs rather than the 
outcomes of legislative performance itself.
Despite conventional wisdom that studies of performance should consider 
outcomes rather than outputs, most empirical studies of legislative performance 
still link processes to a certain 'policy output' and mainly take into consideration 
the cost and resource utilisation or the behaviour of actors and individuals in the 
policy making process as dependent variables. However such considerations 
may seem rather irrelevant to performance of legislative outcomes since 
legislatures usually do not have a budgetary or spending concern as in the private 
sector. Furthermore the behaviour of individuals and parties are usually summed 
up in game theoretic style (win-lose situations) rather than greater consensus 
building on the most important criteria of performance in the legislature itself.
The argument made repeatedly throughout this research is a reaffirmation that 
legislative performance or organisational performance is complex and 
multidimensional. The complexity relates not only to the number of different 
dimensions of legislative performance, but also the number of different 
stakeholders which makes consensus building all the more difficult. The 
multidimensionality of legislative performance relates not only to output quality 
and quantity, but also equity, efficiency, effectiveness, accountability, probity 
and the democratic impact on the legitimacy of the political system in general.
Organisational performance involves causal relationships that may only be 
properly understood in the context of a system which is interdependent and
holistic (and nested). Robert Jervis (1997: 6) defines a 'system effect' as a set of 
units or interconnected elements where the changes in some elements produce 
changes in other parts of the system and the entire system would exhibit 
properties and behaviours that are different from those of the parts. This does 
not mean that any attempt to consider a particular element in the system without 
examining the surrounding causal factors is bound to become reductionalist. But 
as Williams points out what is important is that the level of theory in social 
sciences becomes 'human-sized', meaning that the untrained intuition must see it 
as a whole, or a 'single gestalt' (Williams, 1973: 533). Hence holism does not 
mean that everything must be considered in the system, but the important aspects 
of the interaction must not be reduced or left out.
By studying legislatures in the context of open systems, common features may 
be indicated and frameworks may be devised where efficiency can be assessed 
and strengths and weaknesses indicated. These features could provide a useful 
framework for the comparative study of legislatures. The aim is to help 
legislatures indicate areas where institutional norms could be modified so that 
interaction with the environment can become more efficient and the output of 
legislative performance may improve by improving outcomes which naturally 
extends from better outputs.
Any organisational model based on a systems approach, including this study, 
will unavoidably consider continual growth and the improvement of 
performance. Moreover, it should be noted that unlike production systems, 
expressions such as 'optimal growth' cannot be used for legislatures. The
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demands going into the legislative system from its environment will never cease 
and so the legislative organisation must be able to help the legislature adapt to 
the changes while at the same time, maintain or improve the quality of its work 
and seek better performance.
1-4. The Organisation of this Research
From the start of this work, two main research questions were designed with the 
aim of keeping the investigation within a framework of performance 
measurement:
What approaches should be adopted to measure performance in
legislatures?
What aspects of performance management influence the performance of
legislatures?
The second chapter of this work is a review of the existing literature on 
comparative legislative performance. As the literature analysis shows, there is a 
general tendency to equate legislative output capacity with performance and 
legislative performance has mainly been defined using studies of output and 
behaviour as part of the policy making process leading to legislation. This 
chapter attempts to bring together concisely the different approaches of output 
and behaviour to show how these studies have shaped studies of (comparative) 
legislatures. Most of these studies cover areas of policy making (executive-
legislative relationships) representativeness, responsiveness and the budgetary 
process and oversight.
As mentioned before, this research adopts a systemic view to organisational 
performance. The implications of this view are that in order to judge success of 
an organisation in terms of performance, it is not possible to proceed by 
assessing the success of one of the component parts. Neither is it possible to 
assess the success of each part and then aggregate the data for results on the 
performance of the whole. But what is necessary is to consider the merits of the 
system as a whole and to see how it performs to changing political tides and 
societal preferences. In this thesis performance is taken as the responsiveness of 
the institution to such changes. Yet any attempt to assess an individual system on 
the basis of such criteria will inevitably encounter problems including 
measurement and judgement, not least in relation to a comparative scale of 
legislative systems. Thus to be successful the performance measurement system 
needs to be narrowed down to include only those legislatures that can benefit 
from it.
Chapter three provides a conception of legislative performance using not only 
insights from political science but also organisational theory which regard 
legislative systems as organised wholes of various simple institutions. It is the 
organisation of institutional structures that binds legislatures as they are and 
helps them perform as they do. Using an organisational approach, the functions, 
behaviour and the performance of a legislature can be measured and assessed 
using measurement systems which would be very difficult to do if legislatures
10
are considered merely in institutional terms and values alone. This chapter also 
provides an analysis of performance measurement systems and frameworks used 
in political institutions, public sector organisations and legislatures.
From early on into the research (and from the author's personal experience of 
working on legislative strengthening projects in Iran) it was realised that not all 
legislatures can benefit from legislative performance information and 
measurement in the same way and there is a difference in legislative 
strengthening programmes aimed at capacity building and legislative 
performance measurement aimed at improving the efficiency and effectiveness 
of legislatures within the framework of their capacity to perform. Thus a theory 
had to be established to show the necessary link between legislative 
organisations and performance which could preferably be backed up empirically.
Chapter four in this thesis investigated the hypothesis that developed 
democracies culturally characterised through efficacy, meaningful and engaging 
work are associated with higher performance and that strong mission-based 
cultures perform better than those without or with a weak sense of mission 
(Putnam 1993, 2000; Brewer 2005). This chapter differs from the current 
generation of comparative research in a distinct way. Instead of adding to the 
abundance of empirical case studies, the study provided attempts to theorise the 
dynamics involved in democratic development and democracy and then back up 
the theory by statistical analysis and empirical research.
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The application of the cusp catastrophe model to democratic development and 
growth provides the central idea of this chapter: 'In order to take advantage of 
performance measurement systems, political systems must first pass a certain 
threshold (for consolidated democracies). It is not really possible to compare 
countries below this threshold with countries above it using the same 
measurement indicators and techniques'.
Political systems above the consolidation threshold face two distinct 
performance related problems. The first problem is a fiscal one and is widely 
believed that political systems need to reduce or at least moderate the amount of 
resources consumed by the government and legal systems. The second problem 
relates to the legitimacy of the political system in the eyes of the citizenry. 
Chapter five accumulates some evidence of the latter problem or the falling 
'legitimacy rating' of the political system using the literature available to assess 
whether a crisis of democracy is in the making.
If proven true then a fall of legitimacy may create various difficulties such as the 
erosion of the authority of politicians; the steady reduction of electoral loyalty 
and stability of voters; the decline of public trust in political processes; and even 
an increase in law evasion. These two problems call not only for a strategic 
response from the leaders of the political system, but also an improvement in the 
performance and responsiveness of the political institutions including the 
legislature. The evidence from the published works on this topic suggests that 
developed democracies above the consolidation threshold are not facing an 
eminent crisis of democracy which would be very plausible in countries below
12
the consolidation threshold. However developed democracies are faced with a 
challenge in which they must continuously improve the performance of their 
political institutions in order to maintain and improve on political legitimacy.
Chapter six presents three case studies where performance management 
techniques for continuous improvement of institutional performance are put to 
the test in instances of legislatures above the consolidation threshold and below 
it. The first study is of the British Parliament's House Services' use of the 
Balanced Scorecard framework to improve the performance of administrative 
services, services to MPs and the public. According to Ingraham, 
'Administrative reform ....is a subset of all policy performance, not a separable 
set of technical efforts' (Ingraham, 1997: 326, original emphasis). This case 
study provides a comparative perspective and a definitive indication of how this 
reform is rolling out in other developed legislatures. It compares and contrasts 
the utility of different performance measurement systems and frameworks not 
just in the House Services in Westminster but in other developed legislatures 
such as such as the Swedish Rikstag and Irish Houses of Orieachtas. The study 
evaluates the success of such measures in the performance of Parliament from 
interviews with key actors involved in the process and publications and 
documents from Westminster and the legislatures mentioned in the study.
The second case study looks at the performance of the House of Commons in 
general and evaluates the effectiveness of the modernisation agenda since 1997. 
This study is mainly restricted to the performance of the Modernisation and 
Liaison Committees of the House of Commons and provides a self-evaluation of
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parliamentary reform based on the literature and documents available. Reform in 
the House of Commons has followed a pattern of cautious evolution by steadily 
improving the tools that enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of its functions 
paving the way for meaningful performance measurement. The process of reform 
has been slower than some would like, due to formal and informal restrictions 
and has at times suffered an imbalance between parliamentary accountability and 
efficiency due to the nature of executive-legislative relations in Westminster. 
However the pace of reform has improved greatly with the adoption of the 
performance management mindset and the application of performance 
measurement methods and tools. With such reforms in place there is no doubt 
that the pace of continuous improvements in legislative performance will 
enhance democratic quality in the political system and the balance between 
accountability and efficacy will be maintained to assist both performance and 
democratic quality.
The third case study looks into the application of performance measurement 
tools in developing legislatures that are below the threshold of democratic 
consolidation. This study presents the results of an attempt to design and 
implement the Balanced Scorecard to a developing legislature below the 
consolidation threshold in the model presented in chapter four of this work. The 
study was carried out on the Iranian Majlis Research Centre over a period of one 
year (2007-8) and scopes the problems involved in using performance 
measurement in a legislature that has not yet built the democratic capacity for 
performance measurement systems to develop and strengthens the hypothesis in 
this research that: 'Developed legislatures with more management capacities
14
have the ability to perform better than legislatures with less developed 
management capacity and thus their assessment using performance 
measurement techniques further enhances the quality of democracy rather than 
reduces it'.
The final chapter in this research concludes this work by setting out the 
parameters of a performance measurement framework for developed legislatures. 
The chapter explains how some of the parameters in legislative performance 
measurement may contrast and create tensions at the performance management 
phase and how the parameters can be set out to avoid such a problem. Further 
difficulties include the measurement dimension of performance, in other words 
what to measure and how to measure it. Performance measurement systems must 
also be able to overcome the relativity of outcomes before indicating what 
measures legislatures could take to reduce these difficulties.
This chapter also provides a suggested Balanced Scorecard framework for 
performance measurement based on responsiveness to improve legitimation and 
the quality of democracy in the political system. This framework is informative 
and not prescriptive and does not seek to promote the Balanced Scorecard as the 
means to measure legislative performance. This study seeks rather to advocate a 
'balanced approach' to performance measurement in legislatures which would 
require legislative institutions to assume corporate identities in their structures 
and behaviour so that they can look at the threats and risks to their performance, 
such as political disengagement, in a holistic way.
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This thesis believes that a balanced approach, of the kind suggested in chapter 
seven, to performance improvement and measurement in legislatures would no 
doubt contribute to knowledge and scholarship in legislative studies as well as to 
enhance democratic quality in political systems above the threshold for 
consolidated democracies as mentioned in chapter four. Moreover, a comparative 
balanced framework of performance improvement designed to enhance 
legislative responsiveness which as suggested could lead to the maintenance and 
continuous growth of democratic quality and legitimation could innovate and 
change the study of performance in political institutions, not only legislatures.
The Balanced Scorecard or BSC is one of many performance management 
frameworks which this study finds to be the most preferable to other 
performance measurement frameworks used in organisational design and 
management. Whether the BSC will become the basis of a comparative 
performance measurement framework will depend on the political readiness and 
will to improve legislative performance. As argued here, the organisational 
readiness already exists in developed democracies but is yet to be achieved in 
developing legislatures below consolidation. Speculating on the political will for 
legislative performance measurement on such a scale of development is not the 
subject of this study and remains yet to be seen.
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Chapter Two: Review of Literature
2-1 Introduction: The Analysis of Output and Behaviour as Legislative 
Performance
The study of legislative performance has long been associated with the study of 
legislative output and behaviour as part of the policy making process and the act 
of legislation. Judging by the number of academic publications, a performance 
based legislative research design centring on legislative output or behaviour is 
less popular than any other area of legislative research since interpretations of 
legislative performance as well as what would constitute legislative outputs, are 
not as straightforward and without consequence as the study of output would be 
in other areas of political and social studies. One major problem according to 
Walke et al, (1962: 25) is the lack of 'conceptualisation of legislative output' by 
which they mean specifying the dimensions and dependent variables of 
legislative output that are related to the different consequences of that output, 
not the study of output as a consequence of performance.
Whether output relates to the production of laws and the processes involved in 
the act of legislation and is affected by divided or undivided governments; the 
behaviour and role of individuals and groups within the legislature; the 
expectations of individuals and groups from outside the legislature; the 
strengthening of democratic values and smooth running of governance systems; 
the quality or quantity of legislation passed through the chambers, the increase of 
political oversight; or changes that are external to the legislature itself but have 
potential to create swings and volatility in the economy and public mood are
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only some of the various dimensions that influence legislative output and have 
consequences for the performance of political systems as a result. However, it 
would be difficult to pinpoint a specific area of legislative output which would 
lead to higher performance of the system as a whole since legislative roles and 
relationships are often more complicated than a linear model would suggest.
This chapter is an attempt at bringing together the various perspectives (or at 
least the most important ones) into the study of legislative output and behaviour 
and show the picture so far as to how these studies have shaped comparative 
legislatures in general and the study of legislative performance in particular. Due 
to language barriers, the literature is restricted to scholarly work written in the 
English language. It is also evident from the literature that the majority of 
scholarly work dealing specifically on legislative output has been conducted on 
the United States Congress, and to lesser extent parliaments of Western Europe. 
The bulk of publications on legislative output thus relates to presidential 
systems. In an attempt towards balance, this study has chosen to focus less on 
presidential style legislatures and instead emphasise more on the legislative 
output of parliamentary systems. This exercise may also help define the scope of 
analysis in within the framework of this research. Moreover this study does not 
intend to include every single dimensions of legislative output in an effort not to 
base any assumptions on a particular political system.
The legislature is considered as a multifunctional institution and a utility 
maximising body which performs by balancing the behavioural aspirations of 
utility maximising individuals and groups from within the institution as well as
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various tiers from the environment. According to Mayhew (1974: 5) the scrutiny 
of purposive behaviour is the best route to understanding legislative outputs. 
This suggests that in order to understand legislative behaviour, not only does the 
behaviour of legislators and political actors within the institution as well as 
constituents, groups and institutions from outside matter, but also the design and 
management structure of the institution.
From a public choice perspective, the performance of democratic legislatures 
depends on two important factors, namely their governance structure and their 
representativeness. These two factors are linked very closely to each other and it 
may be difficult to distinguish them at times. Both factors must be considered in 
any assessment of democratic quality of political systems, although governance 
structures and control emphasises government stability while the second tends to 
be more relevant in assessing fairness and equal rights. This chapter attempts to 
separate the literature surrounding these two dimensions but inevitably cannot 
avoid some degree of concomitance as not all analyse of legislative output have 
treated the dimensions as discrete features of legislative performance. This 
analysis begins by a review of literature linking policy output and performance 
and its affects on legislative performance and will be followed by the analysis of 
literature on the impact of representative output on performance.
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2-2 The impacts of legislative policy making output on performance:
At the policy- making stage, legislatures maximise policy choice in accordance 
with institutional rules which matter greatly to the outcome and viability of the 
political system (Krehbiel 1991: 81). In other words, legislative output at the 
micro-policy level, is directly linked to governance at the macro-institutional 
level and improving legislative performance by maximising policy outcomes 
which as a result strengthens the democratic system. Understanding how well the 
legislature carries out these responsibilities will be critical to understanding what 
conditions enable it to act most effectively and efficiently.
At the micro-institutional level, the structures, procedures and rules become 
central in understanding the output of the legislature or any governance structure. 
These structures, procedures and rules are utilised by individuals or legislators 
who are the agents and representatives of the population or constituents at large. 
Legislators typically accept a set of rules that create a set of authority structures 
that are beneficial for producing outputs, reducing costs and improving 
governance. Although, as rational actors, legislators also understand that they 
must please those who have got them where they are, in order to stay (Shepsle 
and Boncheck 1997: 12), hence the accountability of their behaviour and 
preferences become a measure of their output or performance.
Moreover, as rational actors seeking to maximise their output, legislators must be 
able to cooperate with others on matters that will increase their outputs. 
According to Polsby (1968), the more institutionalised a legislature, the more it
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is able to separate such efforts, become professionalised and specialised 
(informative committees) and the more efficiently it will be able to serve the 
constituents. So the level of institutionalisation taken as the degree of autonomy 
from other institutions, complexity in its structures and functions and 
universalism in overall behaviour (ibid) is enough to show the performance of 
any democratic legislature. Huntington has argued that any assessment of 
institutional performance would require two further dimensions of coherence and 
adaptability on top of the three measures mentioned above and that the 
measurement of these five dimensions would give insight into the evolution of 
the institution and its outputs (Huntington 1968). These two measures reflect the 
Doctrine of Responsible Parties (Shattschneider 1942) in which political parties 
as the instruments of cohesion and unity are pivotal for government effectiveness 
and links into the argument that parties are the engine of legislative 
performance 1 . In this view elections would also become an effective way of 
predicting performance and a future legislature's output.
Moreover, if increased institutionalisation is equated with increased output then 
what is considered important in institutional performance will inevitably include 
measuring the increased speed of delivery of legislation due to increased 
professionalism. However, as Ferejohn and Baron (1989) have argued 
institutionalisation increases professionalisation and helps maintain a lower 
turnover rate of legislators which may retard the legislative output process and
1 A more recent account of the affect of responsible parties on legislative performance can be 
found in: Sundquist, J. (1988) Another similar model is the Conditional Party Government Model 
in which the ability of law making is critically linked to the majority party and their homogeneity 
of preferences. The performance of the majority party is linked to legislative output and 
performance. See Aldrich , J (1995) in bibliography.
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bring about delay as professionalised legislators are more likely to be re-elected 
in subsequent legislative sessions. Gilligan and Krehbiel (1987, 1990) have also 
shown that the ability of a committee to inform decision making diminishes due 
to the fact that the preferences of the informed committee and uninformed 
backbenches diverge more frequently and an institutionalised legislature reduces 
the speed of decision making while increasing the number of decisions that are 
not sensitive to majority preferences and as a result reduce output (ibid).
A further problem relating to institutionalised legislatures, most particularly in 
Congress, is that the institution is designed in a way that obstacles such as 
gridlock and stalemate become unavoidable. More institutionalisation does not 
necessarily reduce gridlock and hence improve performance since the 
legislature's performance has broadly been evaluated in terms of the frequency 
with which it can reach agreement with the president on major matters of public 
concern (Binders 2005, 2003: 533).
Research has been carried out to better understand and predict policy change in 
cases where the status quo policies become extreme relative to the preferences of 
the legislators (Brady and Volden 1998, Krehbiel 1998)2 in order to predict 
policy change and its effect on legislative output when the key pivots are clearly 
in disagreement. Keith Krehbiel argues in Pivotal Politics (1988) that the 
supermajoritarian nature of Congress makes gridlock equally likely under both 
unified and divided governments and that there cannot be much expectation of
2 See Brady, D and Volden, C (1988) Revolving Gridlock and Krehbiel, K (1998) Pivotal 
Politics: A theory of US Lawmaking. The pivot may be referred to as a veto player since they are 
the ones that can overturn or uphold a veto in presidential systems when the president disagrees 
with the legislature. See Tsebelis, G (1995) in bibliography
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policy change unless the equilibrium of the status quo is so extreme and far 
away from the median preferences of the incoming government. Although 
Krehbiel has based his model on institutional factors that concern party 
government (such as party control or the strength of the majority party in the 
legislature), these factors alone cannot be responsible for the passage of 
legislation. Instead it is the pivotal voters' locations, which varies with the 
decision rule and the organisation of preferences for the median voter is what 
usually shapes policy output and determines performance (ibid).
Other studies examine the relationship between the political behaviour of 
legislators and policy output in the United States Congress. For example Poole 
and Rosenthal (1977: 55) found that policy issue content, or the substance of 
legislation, does not lead to different induced preferences among legislators. 
However a critical test on the effects of legislative policy output and divided 
control of the Congress was carried out by David Mayhew (1991). In his book 
Divided We Govern, Mayhew has devised a method of identifying and 
measuring the most important laws enacted by Congress over the second part of 
the twentieth century to see whether at times of divided government the numbers 
of these laws reduced (and gridlock increased). His finding have concluded that 
in fact unified control of the Congress and the President has at times failed to 
boost legislative productivity and performance (in terms of law-making output) 
and legislative output is not specifically influenced by whether the government 
and majority in Congress are the same or whether there is a division. In order to 
do find the more important laws, Mayhew has got help from special raters 
(which were reporters from the New York Times and Washington Post along with
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specialists in Washington with inside knowledge) and compared the different 
gridlock scores over the years to create a yardstick to measure and assess 
Congress's legislative performance.
In Mayhew's view the performance of Congress is regarded as an output in 
policy making, and the political behaviour of individuals has little effect on the 
overall production of the most significant legislation (and may only affect the 
passing of less significant legislation). In this case the institution performs well 
regardless of which political party is in charge of the legislature and who 
controls the agenda. What this model and Krehbiel's pivotal politics model both 
tend to have in common is that increased institutionalisation does not necessarily 
lead to increased performance of policy output in the legislature. In other words, 
the measure of institutionalisation does shape the political behaviour of 
legislators but more institutionalisation does not necessarily produce more output 
and improved performance" .
Studies carried out on Parliamentary democracies show that legislative output in 
terms of law production is dependant on the institutional rules and norms, 
especially the rules in relation to agenda control4 . Doring (1995) argues that 
since procedural control of the agenda substantially lowers the marginal costs of 
conflictual bills, it is plausible that a monopoly government aiming at electoral
3 Sarah Binder has questioned this approach and has argued that measuring output without 
respect to the underlying policy agenda risks misstating the true frequency of gridlock (Binder 
2003: 35). She has also questioned the use of raters as a precise way of measuring policy output 
(ibid: 36).
4 Studies carried out on Western European parliaments are found in chapter contributions in: 
Norton, P. ed (1998) Parliaments and Governments in Western Europe, Doring, H. ed. (1995) 
Parliaments and Majority Rule in Western Europe. See bibliography.
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self -interest and triggered by institutional rules, will produce more general, 
significant and conflictual bills even though the total number of bills in general 
may be reduced (Doring 1995: 45-46). In this case it may also be possible to 
measure legislative output of parliamentary systems by measuring agenda 
control by the government and not only the number of significant bills passed 
(Doring 1995: 225) . The amount of agenda setting power and how it is 
distributed within the legislature is determined by the institutional rules, making 
legislative performance predictable, if internal behaviour and policy making 
output is to be considered.
However, since the method above only seems to take the more important laws 
into account and leaves out the less significant laws that are usually more 
constituency oriented, then performance as perceived by the constituents would 
probably not measure so well by solely relying on policy output (discussed later 
in this chapter). It is also important to note that both studies by Krehbiel and 
Mayhew are conducted with a view to Congress, not parliamentary systems. 
Furthermore, the studies seem to ignore the bicameralism of Congress and only 
regard policy making for the first chamber.
Theoretical work on the impact of bicameralism on policy making has been 
carried out by George Tsebelis and Jeannette Money (1997). Their study shows
5 In a cross-country analysis of 18 European parliamentary democracies, Doring has devised 
table (p.225) to show the degree of agenda control by the government by their authority to 
determine Plenary timetable. As the table shows, the parliaments of Ireland and the United 
Kingdom have the most powers to set the agenda Netherlands and Italy have the least powers in 
terms of government control. See Doring, H (1995) Time as a Scarce Resource: Government 
Control of the Agenda' in Parliaments and Majority Rule in Western Europe. In H. Doring. ed. 
Parliaments and Majority Rule in western/Euwpe-. 223-24XGiiivcrsity f
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that policy outcomes in bicameral systems are shaped by the distribution of 
policies between the two legislative chambers and that both chambers are 
important in how policies are produced, while at the same time emphasising the 
importance of specific institutional features across legislatures, and their 
consequences for legislative performance. Taking the case of the French 
Legislature, Tsebelis and Money have shown that when the Senate's uncertainty 
about the National Assembly's discount factor is high, the length of navette 
between the two chambers increases (Tesbelis and Money 1997: 129-135). 
Policy output not only increases when cohesion between the two chambers 
increases and incongruence decreases, but also when cohesiveness is strong in 
the National Assembly as this signals a strong first chamber and the second 
chamber and thus compromise would result in a shorter navette (ibid: 134). It is 
certainly right to claim that institutional factors shape policy output and in order 
to understand the true output of bicameral institutions, the interaction between 
the two chambers must be considered. However, it is questionable whether less 
navette and delay signals better performance of the legislature as the very 
purpose of second chambers is to 'Slow down the legislative process, render 
abrupt change difficult, force myopic legislatures to have second thoughts and 
thereby minimise arbitrariness and injustice in governmental action' (Riker 
1992: 101).
Veto Players according to Tsebelis are 'individuals or collective actors whose 
agreement is required for any policy change' (Tsebelis 1995: 301). They are 
significant actors in policy output because they have the potential (institutional 
or partisan) to defeat the status quo and change policy outcome. So it is natural
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to assume that veto players raise negotiation costs and as veto players increase, 
legislative output (in the form of the number of laws made) is reduced (Tsebelis 
2002). Tsebelis argues however, that if the transaction costs are significant and 
the policy change resulting from the cost is minor, then legislators will not seek a 
change in the status quo even if there is potential for change (Tsebelis 1995: 
295). Therefore in terms of policy output, legislatures will perform better when 
legislators become more consensual in nature (individually or collectively as in 
the European parliamentary models) and reduce legislative costs by having more 
effective committees. Thus in the micro policy level, the degree of policy output 
and change can be regarded as a measure of legislative performance6 .
The importance of institutional processes leading to policy output is also 
reflected in studies of the political economy in which political processes are 
explained to determine economic policies which determine the conditions for 
economic growth and the development of markets (Alesina and Rosenthal 1995, 
Swank 2002, Persson and Tabellini 2004, Bernhard and Leblang 2006). These
6 It is worth mentioning here that a major problem of Polsby's study of the institutionalisation of 
legislatures (1971, 1978) is due to the limitation that his classification offers in comparative 
studies He has eliminated all 'other' legislatures which he considered as belonging to closed 
political systems and legislatures that he considers within an 'open system' but with an 
unspecialised government activity. Thus, only legislatures which he calls 'open with specialised 
government activity', are worthy of classification. Firstly it should be clear that no political 
system, not even the most undemocratic and isolated, is a closed system as all social and political 
systems must maintain some sort of interaction with its internal and external environment in 
order to survive (otherwise it could not be considered as a living system but merely a mechanical 
or dead system). Secondly, if as Polsby suggests, institutionalised legislatures can be applied only 
to countries with modernised legislatures that have accepted the cultural values of developed 
cultures and have approximated the operations of institutionalised legislatures, which in Polsby's 
view is either the United States Congress or The British Parliament (Polsby, 1971), and that the 
degree to which all institutionalised legislatures perform, would be characterised by them having 
universalistic forms and complex structures and functions well bounded from their environment 
and how much it resembles one of these two types of institutions. Whereas open systems need to 
interact and are shaped by their environments and it can well be argued that no environment is a 
carbon copy of another but has evolved along its own needs and interests.
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studies implicitly link economic performance to economic policy output, which 
are in turn affected by the internationalisation of markets (macro-level policy 
making). The focus on institutional performance, as embedded in the 
institutional structures and rules are intertwined with the behaviour of 
individuals and quality of representation inside those institutions. In such studies, 
the policy outcomes of legislatures are not only dependent on the party (or 
parties) that holds majority in the legislature but also on how strong parties act 
within the framework of institutional rules and processes. Thus the actual details 
leading to policy outcome, which are determined by the constitution and 
institutional rules, become if not the most important factor in studying output 
and future performance and may be predicted by assessing past policy making in 
the institution. Persson and Tabellini explicitly state that constitutional rules 
regarding the forms of government and electoral rules systematically shape both 
the micro and macro economic policies of a state (Persson and Tabellini 2004: 
76).
According to the arguments made by political economists and new 
institutionalists, since legislatures foster distinct norms, values and behaviours 
that are so fundamental in the shaping of policy processes, it would be relatively 
easy to predict particular political outcomes, especially those affected by the 
market. Hence it may be possible, in theory at least, to measure the performance 
of legislatures (at least in terms of economic policy making) by measuring 
economic performance and vice versa. As a result it should also be possible to 
assess legislative performance in a comparative perspective by assessing how
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different constitutional features affect economic performance of a political 
system over a time period or in comparison to other political systems.
However, in order to assess institutional performance by reducing the whole 
process to certain elements within the constitution and linking it to the larger 
economic performance there needs to be absolute certainty about economic 
events and that is made difficult as the impact of the environment must also be 
taken into consideration since the financial markets do not act on their own 
account but rely heavily on the environment in which they interact. Furthermore, 
within institutional constraints, the behaviour of individuals and groups cannot 
simply be reduced to the desire of retaining office as the next section of this 
chapter will elaborate. Political actors are more complicated to be predicted 
simply by forecasting the market and unpredictable legislative performance 
measured in terms of policy output will not necessarily lead to depressed 
economic performance. It is inconceivable that legislative gridlock in developed 
democracies would create volatility in and inefficiency in the markets even 
though they may be responsible for bigger budget deficits (Alensina and 
Tabellini 1990).
In a comparative study to link macro-institutional output of legislatures to 
democratic performance, Arend Lijphart compares and assesses democratic 
performance in thirty-six countries. Lijphart does not attempt to measure the 
actual performance of legislatures but rather emphasises on the policy output of 
the entire political process and assesses the overall democratic performance of 
political systems to give an evaluation of the degree of democratic quality among
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countries with majoritarian and consensus style legislative systems. According 
to this study, consensus democracies are of a kinder and gentler kind to 
majoritarian models.
In chapter 16 of his book Patterns of Democracy, Lijphart examines several 
measures of the quality of democracy and democratic representation and 
concludes that consensus democracies score higher than majoritarian. He also 
argues that consensus democracies are more successful in macro-economic 
management because of independent central banks and lower budget deficits. 
Consensus style systems can control inflation, and appear to have less strikes, 
hence they are more efficient and effective at carrying out macro-economic 
policy (ibid: 263-270). Lijphart also argues that consensus democracies are also 
better at controlling violence which makes them better decision makers and 
policy makers. Consensus style democracies also have a higher level of 
democracy7 and score better on other factors leading to a rise in democratic 
quality, namely the representation of women, political equality, electoral 
participation, satisfaction with democracy and government-voter proximity and 
have more accountability and less corruption. Hence, consensus democracies 
perform better and raise the quality of democracy leading to better governance.
In order to show this, he uses Dahl's Polyarchy scale8 and illustrates that 
consensus democracies have a good correlation with this rating of democratic
7 According to Lijphart the degree of democracy in a country is the degree to which a country 
approximates 'perfect democracy (Lijhpart 1999: 276). Chapter 4 explains why perfect 
democracy does not exist.
8 The Polyarchy scale consists of 114 countries that are placed in 31 scale types from the highest 
type of democracy to the lowest type of non democracy as in 1964. See Dahl (1971: 231-45).
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quality and the difference between the two models is more than three points 
(Lijphart 1999: 278). While it can be argued that Dahl's definition of democracy 
is biased toward consensus democracies because it ranks multiparty countries 
better than two party systems, this research will show in later chapters why all 
countries grouped in his work as majoritarian democracies cannot be compared 
as they are at very different stages of democratic growth. Similarly consensus 
democratic systems cannot be grouped together as for example Switzerland 
(which Lijphart frequently uses in his examples of the consensus mode) has a 
very different political system from the other consensus models and cannot be 
boxed together with countries such as Spain, Germany, Italy and Japan (none of 
these countries function in the same way).
Apart from the ambiguity a far-reaching model of governance such as this 
produces, it seems striking that Lijphart had already decided on the results of his 
findings well before writing the book as he has selectively chosen the assessment 
framework. In such analysis results can be controlled depending on how one 
conducts correlation analysis, and the choice of regression analysis can be made 
to bring about certain results and to bring about a predetermined conclusion 
(which in this case is that consensus democracies perform best, bring about 
superior democratic quality and strengthen democratic governance as a result).
In his latest book Thinking about Democracy, Lijphart has added countries such 
as Afghanistan to the list of consensus democracies (Lijphart 2008). It would 
seem strange to suggest that political systems such as Afghanistan or even Iraq 
(also consensus democracy according to Lijphart's characteristics) can produce
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better policy outputs and outperform majoritarian systems such as the United 
States or the United Kingdom (the fourth chapter of this research will elaborate 
on this idea further). What Lijphart has done is to take the legislature's law- 
making power as the measure for its performance and equate legislative strength 
with the institution's overall efficiency and effectiveness which cannot be right.
It is obvious from different studies, some of which have been mentioned in this 
work, that differences exist between legislatures in terms of their capacity to 
affect the policy outcome. The difference is not only limited to the comparison 
of presidential and parliamentary style political systems but also within each of 
these categories of legislatures. Even though the relationship legislatures have in 
terms of constraining the government is basically the same, all legislatures differ 
in the extent to which they can actually constrain the government (Norton 1998: 
3). Hence the strength and degree to which legislatures affect policy output will 
not be a suitable measure for assessing performance.
Furthermore, to link the strength of policy making with the quality of democracy 
and stereotyping legislative systems as Lijphart has done, cannot be as straight 
forward as he predicts. As this research intends to show in chapter four, 
democratic quality cannot be assessed using the same tools and indicators for 
developed and developing democracies. If it were possible to assess democratic 
performance as Lijphart suggests, then surely all countries could by applying 
certain institutional features, to their systems improve democracy. However 
experience suggests that it is certainly not as simple as the literature sounds
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particularly for developing countries9 . Furthermore, if as Lijphart repeatedly 
mentions, proportional representation systems are superior in comparison to the 
majoritarian plurality and are linked to a higher degree of democratic quality, 
then why should a democracy such as Italy decide by referendum to abandon a 
system of pure proportional representation for a mixed electoral system which 
includes plurality votes for three quarters of seats in each House in 1993? 10 
Performance in legislatures has to be influenced by democratic outcomes rather 
than outputs.
2-3 Legislative Output and Responsiveness
The previous section touched on the relationship between policy output and 
economic performance and that the economy matters for legislative performance. 
Political institutions are designed to help the government manage the economy in 
order to avoid the social and political consequences of bad economic 
performance since the economy is one of the factors with which the public assess 
the performance of their political institutions in terms of responsibility and 
accountability. Thus citizen satisfaction with the government must be included in 
any form of legislative performance assessment of responsiveness (as output)
9 Refering to author's personal experience of working as a liaison officer for a UNDP project 
Strengthening legislatures in Tehran 2000-2 and as a researcher in the Iranian Parliamentary 
Research Centre.
10 In December 2005, the Italian Government changed back to an electoral system of proportional 
representation with a majority prize to the coalition that obtains majority rule. The change is 
mainly seen as an attempt by the governing party to improve its own gains and maximize its 
policy- making output. Though the change is recent and not much work has been published that 
assesses the performance of the Italian legislature, but it has generally not been regarded as a 
success in terms of democratic performance. See Ortona. G, Ottone. S and Ponzano. F (2008)
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and as legislatures are regarded as representative institutions, satisfaction with 
the performance of the representatives will reflect on the institutional 
performance rating. Hence understanding legislative roles becomes central to 
understanding its performance.
Within the neo-institutional framework, legislative roles are derived from a set of 
behaviours, norms, functions and motivations of the institutions (Searing 1991, 
1994) as well as the rational choice tradition in the form of legislator 
preferences. In this context, the legislative roles become routines that are driven 
by reasons or preferences and at the same time constrained by institutional rules 
(Str0m 1997: 158). So in theory, the more institutionalised the legislature, the 
better the performance of legislative roles and inevitably the higher the 
perception of legislative performance among the citizens.
Linking the role of individual legislators and parties to their preferences as 
rational actors seeking their own goals was suggested by Anthony Downs in 
1957 before the rational choice tradition and game theoretic models deriving 
from it became as popular as it has become today. In An Economic Theory of 
Democracy, Downs argues that political parties are entirely selfish meaning that 
they seek the rewards of office but in order to do so, they need to first achieve 
office and maintain it by bidding for favour before the public (Downs 1957: 18). 
In his view legislative representatives appear only as modest 'intermediaries' for 
their parties and the roles of those on the governing party would be to gather 
information on grassroots preferences and relay it to the government and then try
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to persuade constituents back home that the government is doing a worthy job 
(ibid: 88-90).
The above description of the role of legislators as solely and tirelessly 
advocating their relevant parties' positions is probably too crude even for many 
parliamentary democracies, as legislators are usually regarded to be in pursuit of 
their own re-election than anything else whether that would mean occasionally 
crossing the party line in pursuit of their own preferences and appealing to 
voters. Even legislators operating in parliamentary systems with highly 
disciplined parties such as Germany, are increasingly seeking to spend more time 
with their constituents and regularly representing local interests. This is despite 
the fact that members of the Bundestag enjoy a low turnover rate and high 
degree of professionalisation as a consequence of the traditional belief system 
which makes higher performance and strong governance structure to be a result 
of strong disciplined parties and the fact that their electoral system will afford to 
get them re-elected despite leaving the core of constituency service to the 
members of the Landtag (Patzelt 2003, 2007, Saalfeld 2002). Performance in 
terms of representational output will be increased with rising institutionalisation 
and specialisation within the German legislature not only because of the type of 
institution (including electoral rules) but also due to cultural norms as German 
citizenry clearly dislike an enduring lack of parliamentary party discipline 
(Patzelt 2003: 111). Even though professionalism is a consequence of 
partisanship and party discipline within the Bundestag which is in effect shaped 
by the institution, but as Patzelt argues it could become a dependant variable for 
measuring legislative performance since German legislators see themselves
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firstly as 'advocates of public interest' followed by 'representing people's 
interests' and then consider themselves as voting in the interests of their parties 
(Patzelt 1997: 36).
However, as Hibbing notes, the popular desire in many countries, including the 
United States is for a more citizen-based and less institutionalised legislature 
(Hibbing 2002, 39) if institutionalisation is to be equated with more 
professionalisation and increasing partisanship as Polsby (1968) and others have 
suggested. Charles Mahtesian (1997: 18-20) studying the relationship between 
professionalisation and higher performance of legislatures has compared the 
democratic performance of highly professionalised and nonprofessionalised state 
legislatures in the United States and has concluded that increased 
professionalisation may produce damaging consequences for the quality of 
democratic governance such as the lack of comity, extreme partisanship, the 
unwillingness to compromise and ineffectiveness. This argument that increased 
partisanship in a legislature is a worrying consequence of professionalism has 
also been noted too by Fiorina (1994).
In pluralist legislative systems, the behaviour of legislators become more 
individualistic and the relationship with the citizens are significantly higher as 
legislators aim for re-election. The role of policy advocacy becomes more 
conditional, as legislators will tend to chose and pick the policies that will affect 
their incumbency. According to Mayhew, Congressmen are likely to go about 
building and sustaining legislative institutions and making policy when there are 
appealing goals for them to do so. Since the most important goal for legislators is
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re-election which they are 'single mindedly' in pursuit of (Mayhew 1974: 5) and 
the spotlight is on the individual rather than parties, the thought of re-election is 
what establishes an accountability relationship with the electorate (ibid). 
Mayhew prefers to use the term 'Representative Assembly' rather than a 
legislature when looking at performance in regards to this relationship between 
the institution and voters (ibid: 7).
Taken from this perspective, it would also seem fair to characterise developed 
legislatures, and in particular Congress as an assembly of professional politicians 
spinning out political careers. The job of a representative would offer good pay, 
high prestige and there is no want of applications for them as long as they can 
successfully get re-elected (ibid: 15). In this regard, legislators need to find a 
way to secure their incumbency even if it involves separating themselves from 
the party at times when policy making is weak or the economy is doing badly. In 
Congress such separation is more frequent than in Parliamentary systems. In 
1975, Richard Fenno questioned why Congress did so badly in the public view 
while the Congressmen were regarded as performing well? According to him the 
answer was in the fact that 'representatives run for Congress by running against 
Congress!' (Fenno 1975: 277-287)
In The Personal Vote, Cain, Ferijohn, and Fiorina (1987: 2) have defined 
representation as the 'general policy response of representatives articulating the 
policy position or ideologies of the constituents'. They distinguish three types of 
responsiveness which taken together will determine the representativeness of a 
legislator. The first type is Policy responsiveness or symbolic responsiveness
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which reveals to constituent how faithfully the representative responds to the 
public's wishes in words and deeds. Allocation responsiveness shows whether 
the representative is working to ensure that his or her district gets a fair share of 
government projects programmes and expenditures. The third type is Service 
responsiveness which assesses how assiduous the representative is in responding 
to individual and groups request for assistance in dealing with the government 
bureaucracy (ibid: 78-80). The authors argue that service allocation has 
increasingly become one of the most important components of the 
representational relationship and is changing the nature of representation since it 
is a way of earning personalised support and reward from the constituent for 
doing a good job. Votes become less dependant on party but more on the 
individual. Service allocation is one way of ensuring the incumbent keeps his or 
her seat even at hard economic times when the government gets the blame.
In such systems, because of the electoral rules, each individual voter becomes a 
judge of performance. The surveys published by Cain, Ferejohn and Fiorina 
show that people generally rate an incumbent Congressman's performance as 
very good while they rate Congress's performance as very bad (ibid: 200). The 
same surveys show that while in the United Kingdom, Parliament as a whole 
performs reasonably well compared to Congress, but the MP's individual 
performance is nearly three times more favourable than the performance of 
Parliament, whereas this ratio is fifteen to one for Congress. The authors of this 
study give the main reasons for this discrepancy in single member plurality 
systems as the independence of legislators to take policy positions that may be 
different to the overall position of the institution, legislators not having to share a
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partisan label with the majority, and the constituent's ability to apply different 
standards to assess performance of the individual and institution (ibid). Thus 
measuring the performance of representative output for individual legislators 
cannot be taken for the representational output of the institution as a whole.
Thus far it has been established that the institutional design of legislatures (along 
with the political structure, culture and history) determines how different systems 
view incumbency which will define how the responsibility relationship (in terms 
of accountability) between the voters and the legislators vary. Institutional 
factors also determine the level of professionalism necessary for the job of 
representation. The institution of legislatures has evolved over the years to 
accommodate further the representational role of legislators in regards to the 
external relationships with the environment and has facilitated institutional and 
behavioural change in order to increase representativeness (Searing 1994, Norton 
1997). Legislators increasingly aspire to play the role of policy advocates, 
influencing policy and providing service to their constituencies than they were in 
the past (ibid).
The institutional changes made to facilitate the evolution of legislative roles and 
behaviour occurs at different levels and strengths in countries around the world 
and will be dependent on the internal structures and features of the institution as 
well as outside pressures. For instance accountability, as an outcome of 
representation, is stronger in majoritarian democracies than consensual systems 
because it is generally easier to see who is responsible for policy. It is also 
stronger in countries with a distinct separation of powers than in parliamentary
39
systems where the separation of powers is weak, as the framework of checks and 
balances will improve accountability and motivate legislators towards good 
behaviour. Taken in this light it would seem that presidential democracies would 
in theory be more responsible and accountable to the public than parliamentary 
models resulting in legislators becoming more constituency oriented and 
specialised within the organisation of such legislatures, which is different to 
becoming professionalised within the institution.
For instance while politicians in Congress may not be interested in taking 
advantage of minimum coalitions like parliamentary democracies as they would 
not have any interest in votes that they cannot claim personal benefit for, they 
will work hard to maintain the organisation and prestige of the legislature 
hoping to spend long careers. As a result professionalising within the 
organisation of the legislature becomes an individual aspiration as well a 
collective good. In this context of the organisation of Congress, legislators are 
'responsive to those who control their future careers' and this relationship 
determines their behavioural output to a big way (Moncrief 2002: 65). 
Legislative organisation according to Krehbiel, is 'the allocation of resources and 
assignment of parliamentary rights to individual legislators or groups of 
legislators' (Krehbiel 1991: 2). So in order for legislators to perform well, they 
must professionalise within the structure of their organisation which is not the 
same as professionalism in the context of institutionalisation.
Within Parliamentary systems, the Parliaments of the United Kingdom and 
Ireland have the highest accountability while consensual governments such as,
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Italy, Portugal and even hybrid systems like France are less accountable (Norton 
2002:180-187). One of the most obvious reasons behind this difference in 
institutional features relates to the nature of their electoral systems as 
constituency-based electoral systems which inevitably increase the contact level 
between legislators and their constituents and as a result raise standards and 
demands made by the constituent, whereas list-based systems lower the need of 
such contact and decrease expectations and standards as a result (ibid: 11-12). In 
Portugal and Italy for example due to the absence of the constituency activity on 
the part of legislators who have been chosen from party lists, people's perception 
of parliamentary performance or individual member performance will not be 
affected as it would in strong constituency-based systems Thus it would be 
problematic to base a performance measurement system on this relationship and 
attribute measurement to the perceptions for the voters.
Another reason for this variation among countries in legislative accountability 
and constituency work that also stems from the institutional features is the fact 
that constituency work and voter expectations from their MPs are usually much 
higher in unitary systems than in Federal systems. For example Germany is able 
to maintain high accountability even though members of the Bundestag consider 
themselves less case workers than executive watchdogs since members of the 
Landtag spend more time following up grievances and making contact with the 
constituents (Saalfeld 2002). However as Norton notes, this rule does not hold 
even when developed democracies only are considered as countries like 
Portugal do not have any tradition of constituency service (Norton 2002: 181).
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Hence this measure would also be problematic in a comparative study of 
legislative performance.
The measure of the personal vote as discussed above is considerably lower in 
parliamentary democracies than presidential systems. The electoral benefit of the 
personal vote in Parliamentary systems is arguably not much more than 500. 
(Norton 2002: 12). Philip Norton argues that, contrary to the conventional belief 
that personal voting would be more significant in marginal constituencies, there 
does not seem to be a significant link between marginality and constituency 
work and the correlations are not exact (ibid: 182). Furthermore, in the event of 
large swing voting, the effect of the personal vote will count as nought (ibid: 12).
However constituency service seems to help legislative performance as 
legislators are helping to strengthen the link between the institution with the 
citizens and restore confidence in representational behaviour of the system and 
their own representational behaviour as part of it. The consequence of this 
increase in representation for the legislator is increased legislative specialisation 
and professionalisation as mentioned before in the case of presidential 
democracies. In order to strengthen these link legislators would have to rely 
more on the effective organisation and the efficient information flow to and from 
the system. This increases the need to improve legislative organisations, not only 
political organisations like parties. Within these frameworks, legislators realise 
that for them to succeed and attain their goals, it is an impediment for legislative 
organisations to perform well.
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As parliamentarism or representative democracies in the broader term implies 
collective delegation, and this delegation has to be controlled within the 
framework of parties in order to contain agency problems, this group of 
legislatures require strong parties. It is the performance of such parties, through 
their cohesion that would be a determinant of the performance or 
representational output of the legislature, rather than the performance of 
individuals (Str0m et al, 2003). Party cohesion and redistributive goals are 
reinforced through partisanship, but increased partisanship is a danger to policy 
outcome and performance as is seen through the eyes of the electorate in 
representative democracies (Lupia 2003: 35-35 Str0m 2000: 262). However 
increases in party professionalisation and institutionalisation seem to suggest that 
political parties are becoming less stable and reliable instruments of popular 
control and may be the reason why voters have become increasingly less loyal 
and committed in their support for a single party, to a varying extent, in 
parliamentarian systems (Str0m et al, 2003: 657-658).
As a result, finding the right balance between delegation and performance in 
terms of policy output becomes central to any assessment of legislative 
performance which considers representational behaviour as a dependent variable 
of legislative output, not just an increase in delegation. And it is obvious that this 
balance will be different across countries as principals and agents have different 
perceptions of what a desirable output would contribute despite sharing similar 
patterns of delegation. The following section will also look at delegation, this 
time from a different angle of legislative-executive relationships and the 
implications it has legislative output.
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2-4 Legislative-Executive Relationships:
Although aspects of the executive and legislative relationship focusing 
specifically on legislative output in regards to the policy making process was 
touched upon previously in this chapter, this section will focus only on the 
specific relationship between the two branches through the literature and the 
implications of this relationship in assessing policy outcomes and performance. 
As mentioned the existing legislature is mostly centred on developed legislatures 
in Western Europe and the United States. Although the nature of legislative- 
executive relationships are quite similar, there are significant differences among 
different legislative institutions and their dealings with their executives not just 
in terms of institutional arrangements and activities but also in how much 
capacity they have to influence or affect the policy making process.
In parliamentary democracies, as mentioned above, voters delegate their elected 
representatives to represent them in parliament and delegate policies in their 
interests to unelected executive agencies (Str0m 2000, Str0m et al, 2003). 
Government accountability, in addition to legislator accountability, becomes the 
measure which voters use to assess the performance of the representative 
legislatures. However in all parliamentary systems, with differences in degrees 
of action, a government majority in Parliament (not necessarily reflective of 
public majority) will get its way and there is little scope for the legislative 
institution to stop the majority from achieving its goals (Norton 1998). As a 
result, legislative output in representative democracies as judged by voters will 
suffer due to this accountability problem, even though much of the
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accountability, actually stems from factors external to the legislative institution 
such as the constitutional and executive structure, executive decision-making 
level, electoral systems and constituency opinion, rather than the internal 
organisation of the legislature itself or its policy attributes (Olsen and Mezey, 
1991: 19, Norton 1998).
Thus in comparative legislative studies of legislative-executive output, the most 
significant problem will be finding significant indicators that will be conducive 
to legislative output in cross country analyses since different legislative systems 
require indicators relevant to their individual relationship. Furthermore in 
studying the relationship between the legislative and the executive branch, as 
when studying the relationship between legislatures and their constituents, it 
becomes apparent that there are many different levels to the relationship and 
different forms as a consequence. There is no one single straightforward 
framework to assess. Anthony King (1976) has proposed in studying the 
legislative-executive relationship of any political system, whether parliamentary 
or presidential, a number of specific relationships should be investigated instead 
of just one general relationship between the two branches. The number and 
nature of these relationships will differ not just among countries (as King has 
shown by comparing three countries, the United Kingdom, France and 
Germany), but also within the way each system is structured and functions. The 
basic patterns of relationships within the legislatures can be summarised as 
between parties (whether in coalition form or as between government and the 
opposition), within parties (to what extent the government or opposition has 
control over its party and how much influence it has), the strength of opposition
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parties (and how they can affect legislative behaviour) and the extent of cross- 
party activity (by which he refers to the development of specialised committee 
systems). Each of these relationships and the subsequent relationships they 
produce would be differently structured not only according to internal and 
controllable features of the institution, but also the external features that are not 
controllable (or less controllable). Thus the assessment of legislative 
accountability would require incorporating a number of relationships which will 
be defined by the institutional features of the legislature and government in each 
case.
Jean Blondel and associates (1970) have argued that in order to assess 
legislature's behaviour comparatively, an indication of the structures involved in 
law-making is more important than the indication of individual law maker's 
attitudes. To assess the legislature's role in the process of law-making, they 
introduce the concept of 'Viscosity' as a measure of the capacity of legislatures 
to resist or withstand government pressures. According to this measure, where 
legislatures are very compliant, bills pass very quickly with very little time spent 
on debate, but as the legislature become freer from government constraint, then 
the time spent on bills increases and amendments are discussed before the 
passage of legislation (Blondel et al, ibid: 200).
The effect that viscosity has on legislative-executive relationship is that it raises 
government accountability leading to better policy making output. Constraint, as 
far as viscosity is concerned, is not a veto and does not prevent the government 
from policy making, but only has influence on the effect of the output.
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Constraints involve subtle effects that allow amendments to pass with 
government consent (ibid: 201). In parliamentary democracies where the 
opposition knows that they are unlikely to defeat government incentives, 
viscosity has the effect of making the executive defend its proposals. Michael 
Mezey suggests that by forcing governments to take responsibility of their 
actions, the opposition not only fixes accountability for the government's 
actions, but also puts itself in a better position to assess the political cost for 
government actions at the next general election (Mezey 1998: 784).
Thus the number, nature, fate and debate time spent on amendments become 
indicative of the viscosity of the policy-making process. Viscosity will inevitably 
be lower in consensual parliamentary systems than plurality systems and very 
low in authoritarian legislative systems. External features, as well as internal 
features of the institution determine the level of viscosity which will vary in 
degree across legislatures as institutions try to adapt a balance of viscosity that 
will strengthen their governance in the system. For instance it has been argued 
that government controlled committees through disciplined parties will reduce 
viscosity in parliamentary systems. Though as Thomas Saalfeld explains in the 
case of Germany, this problem is overcome as parliamentary parties have 
specialised working groups parallel to the committee structure with overlapping 
memberships which allows committee deliberations to feedback directly into 
intra-party discussions making it less likely to reflect the preferences 
unrepresentative of all parliamentary parties and floor majorities (Saalfeld 2000: 
367). Developed legislatures do seem to have adapted different ways of ensuring 
committees increase viscosity rather than reduce it.
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However, there is no perfect balance for viscosity and naturally parliaments must 
find the measure of viscosity that works for them. Moreover, there is no 
indication how amendments alone will account for improving policy making 
output. Even Blondel argues that there is no evidence that more amendments in 
the short-term account to greater influence of the legislature any more than does 
the persistent nagging of government in debate (Blondel et al, 1970: 203). He 
also admits that cross-national index of legislative viscosity would be too 
complex an accomplishment due to the many indicators and the different weights 
they are given by individual legislators.
Where viscosity does help in comparative legislative studies is its emphasis and 
focus on the mechanisms that are available to parliaments with regard to 
legislative-executive relationships and how each mechanism may be used and 
improved to influence the actions of governments which will lead to policy 
output in terms of accountability. For example, while it has already been said 
that committees reduce viscosity, there is a lot of evidence in country studies of 
legislatures to suggest that specialised committees actually improve policy 
output and increase viscosity (Norton 1998: 9). However, there is still little 
cross-country research that focuses on the aspect of improved accountability as 
an incentive for representatives to increase viscosity or reduce it as interest will 
depend not only on who holds power in the legislature at any single time and 
whether the individual or party holds executive or opposition roles, but also 
features that are external to the institution (ibid).
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In order to determine a legislature's strength with regards to policy making, 
Philip Norton's classification (1984, 1990: 178) is very helpful. Norton puts 
legislatures into three distinct groups, based on their policy making capacity. A 
Policy-making legislature has the power to formulate and influence policy 
proposed by the government. A Policy-influencing legislature can only modify 
or reject measures put forward by the government, and legislatures with little or 
no policy impact are neither able to modify, reject nor generate policy. Although 
countries in each classification will vary in their capacity, and many legislatures 
(which include parliamentary types) are of the policy-influencing kind, studies of 
Western European parliaments show that legislatures with more specialised and 
professionalised committees have more influence on the government measures 
leading to policy output 11 . Naturally committees are the most specialised in 
policy-making legislatures and the least specialised in legislatures with little or 
no policy impact.
Some research has based the policy-making strength of legislatures on the power 
and performance of their committees. According to Jewell and Paterson (1973: 
219) the two most important functions that committees perform are 'the making 
of decisions with regard to legislation and the authorization of oversight of 
administrative actions'. The difference in legislatures would be in the degree that 
committees are able to implement these functions and this will depend on 
factors, as mentioned before, both internal and external to the institution. The 
prerequisite for implementing these functions is first and foremost the autonomy
11 Norton, P (1998) and the country contributions in this volume specially Thomas Saalfeld's 
chapter The German Bundestag: Influence and Accountability in a complex Environment' pp.
44-72.
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and discretion of the committees with regards to the government and access to 
specialised information (from the government or independent of it) in order to 
carry out adequate oversight. Strong committees improve committee functions 
by reducing the imbalance in policy expertise between the government as agents 
and the legislators as principals (Saalfeld 2000: 367). The reduction of 
information asymmetry between parliament and the government improves the 
parliament's autonomy and its ability to hold government accountable for its 
actions and to foresee potential problems with government policy.
Certain characteristics of committees strengthen their functions which according 
to Norton include permanence, agenda setting power, evidence taking power, 
jurisdictions parallel to government departments, extensive resources and small 
and informed membership (Norton 1998: 7-12). As these characteristics 
institutionalise, viscosity is strengthened, the legislature exercises and improves 
its oversight function and the policy output is improved and the legislature is 
better able to monitor the government. Whether building capacity in committees 
is tantamount to performance is another matter which shall be discussed later. 
West and Cooper (1989) have argued effective oversight by the legislature is 
beneficial for the political system for two basic reasons. First of all oversight will 
contribute to the eventual improvement in the quality of government policies and 
programmes. Secondly as the policies are ratified by the legislature, the 
executive actions will acquire legitimacy. Legislative oversight is probably 
considered most important when it comes to the budget process and controlling 
government fiscal spending which will be considered below.
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2-5 Legislative Budgetary Oversight
The role of the legislature's budgetary oversight in most countries is to scrutinise 
and authorise revenues and expenditures and to make sure that the national 
budget has been properly spent and is a means of expanding democratic 
legitimacy in any political system. Although part of the policy making cycle, 
legislative oversight has its own dynamics that is not solely derived from other 
variables in the policy process. The patterns of budgetary oversight cannot be 
simplified and reduced or grouped into say, consensus and majoritarian 
democracies (Lijphart 1999) as variations within these grouping are too large to 
ignore (for instance the difference in budgeting process and in terms of 
budgeting strength between Congress and Westminster is too great to consider in 
one group).
Legislative oversight in general and budgetary oversight in particular, is seen to 
occur in different stages of the legislative-executive relationship within different 
political systems. Legislative oversight is said to be Ex-ante when it is 
performed before the government becomes engaged in policy making, while it is 
Ex-post when oversight is performed after policy has been properly implemented 
(Saalfeld 2000, Stapenhurst et al, 2008). Legislatures differ in the type of 
oversight that they use and the tools which they apply. However, an Inter- 
Parliamentary study into the oversight of legislatures, shows that legislatures are 
relatively uninvolved during the preparation of the Budget and legislative 
oversight occurs towards the end of the policy making process during the 
implementations stage of laws. The study claims that presidential systems are
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just as uninvolved as parliamentary systems since there is a direct link between 
legitimacy and outcomes. It seems that the greater legitimacy accorded to the 
institution, the more disposed the legislatures (legislators) to accept the outcomes 
of policy as authoritative 12 .
Budgetary oversight can be performed by employing a variety of tools depending 
on whether the oversight occurs before or after the implementation of the budget. 
Erik Damgaard (2000: 8) notes these tools as ombudsmen, committees of 
inquiry, auditing institutions, specialised parliamentary committees, public 
hearings and interpellations. Other tools may be added as oral and written 
questions and requests for documentation. Parliamentary systems tend to have a 
bigger variety of oversight tools which could be taken as more oversight 
potential. However, the effectiveness of these oversight tools is another matter 
and it cannot be said that a parliament performs more effectively simply by 
having more oversight tools at their disposal. Although a study by Pelizzo and 
Stapenhurst (2004) show that a clear relationship exists between the number of 
oversight tools and the state of development in a given country. Legislatures 
which were defined as low-income countries had on average five and a half 
oversight tools whereas middle-income to high-income countries had on average 
six and a quarter oversight tools. High-income countries used interpellations far 
more than middle income and low-income countries, while the use of 
ombudsmen and committees of inquiry are more in middle-income countries 
compared to legislatures of countries with a high-income and low-income (ibid).
12 IPU(2001)
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Oversight tools are necessary for the efficiency of the budgetary process but not 
sufficient for effective oversight. Mark Shephard reviewing the improvement in 
oversight tools in the budgetary process of the Parliament of the United 
Kingdom, contends that despite important changes and successful reforms 
leading to the improvement in the efficiency of oversight, it has not ensured the 
effectiveness of procedures in terms of policy output (Shephard 2008). Effective 
oversight, in addition to oversight tools, would depend on additional conditions 
and features that are specific to the institution like whether the legislature has the 
ability to modify legislature (Lowenberg and Patterson 1979, Norton 1998) and 
whether legislatures (and legislators) have the power to acquire proper 
information (Jewell 1978, Krehbiel 1991), the role of the legislators, committee 
chairs and other kinds of institutional constraints such as term lengths 13 .
Effective oversight is also dependent on features that are external to the 
legislature such as the organisation of parties, the role of the media and public 
opinion, and the role of the economy and markets. Even supranational 
organisations may have a constraining effect on the budget regardless of 
legislative oversight. For example in Europe, the scrutiny of national budgets are 
exercised by the European Commission, with a view of conforming to the 
Maastricht Treaty and imposes general limits on government deficits and debt 
(Lienert 2005: 13).
13 An example of term lengths would be Mexico's constitution that prohibits incumbency that is 
seen to limit professionalisation. Mexico does not have a dedicated budget committee which is 
seen as a barrier to the development of legislative budgeting expertise. Meyers, R 'Legislative 
Budgeting in Mexico: Aspirations and Choices' Conference Paper presented at Reform of the 
state: budget and public Spending. Mexico city (Jan 2000) available at 
http://userpages.umbc.edu/~meyers/mexico.pdf
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Some authors have shown that the increase in the number of veto players in 
legislatures can increase the size of fiscal deficits and reduce the efficiency of 
budgetary oversight (Tsebelis 1995, Tsebelis and Money 1997, Heller 1997). In 
the case of second chambers with budgetary powers, Heller argues that it would 
force governments to include more spending in the budget than it would need to 
if the budget was passed in only one chamber making way for higher deficits 
(Heller 1997: 487).
In unicameral legislatures, the nature of veto players affects policy outputs and 
becomes subject to the power relationship among the political parties. Writing on 
the Portuguese Parliament's budget process, Leston-Bandeira (1999) indicates 
that the amount of de facto, rather than de jure influence of the legislature is 
largely determined by political majorities. If the legislature is composed of 
several parties with weak disciplines, the executive will need to assemble a broad 
coalition of support for the budget increasing the potential influence of the 
legislature on the budget. However, if there is a strong and dominant party and 
strong discipline, the legislature's influence on the budget is weak. The party 
composition in such parliaments is not the only force of influence and even 
informal caucuses, such as women's groups may affect the budgeting process 
(ibid). Though it must also be stated here since the budget determines economic 
strength and prosperity, parties will not necessarily see it in their interest to use 
their veto power to decrease the legislature's influence on the process. For 
example the Swedish Rikstag managed to turn its fiscal deficit into a surplus in 
the 1990s, despite the presence of political parties with considerable veto power 
(Leinert 2005).
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It has arguably been said that the power of the legislature to amend the budget is 
the most important measure of performance and institutional strength which is 
fundamental to legislative-executive relationships and a determinant of the role 
of legislatures in public finance (Wehner 2006). Based on cross country analysis 
of legislative budgeting power in regards to the constitutional design of each 
country, Wehner has created an index of legislatures' budgeting power based on 
a joint OECD and World Bank survey in 2003 of twenty-five developed 
countries, which measures variables of institutional structure and constitutional 
design of each consecutive country (OECD 2003, Wehner 2006). It would be 
questionable whether these results would indicate anything more than the 
relative influence of the legislatures on the budgetary process, not absolute 
legislative capacity, since as mentioned before, while there are some common 
basic institutional features and variables in the relationships between a 
legislature and its executive, there are also distinct features that characterise the 
relationship and features that are external to the institution and which cannot be 
controlled by it. An index is useful as far as it will show relative strengths and 
weaknesses (on what is generally perceived as strengths and weaknesses) not 
accurate and definitive measures of legislative budgetary capacity.
2-6. Conclusion: Performance and Output
The literature on legislatures shows that there is a general tendency to equate 
legislative output capacity with performance. Michael Mezey's (1979)
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classification of legislatures in terms of policy making strength has generally 
become the first point of reference for any work that wishes to study 
performance in terms of policy making output. Although Mezey's classification 
of legislatures has credit for offering the systemic analysis (the first of its kind) 
of the comparative assessment of legislative outputs for a large group of 
countries, it was not until 2006, when The Journal of Legislative Studies had 
published a special edition on comparing and classifying legislatures by 
analysing legislative performance, that there has there been much interest in 
separating policy capacity and performance and to construct conceptual 
frameworks for a common comparative research on legislatures. This neglect or 
shortcoming cannot be traced to a simple cause but as David Arter suggests 'is 
basically that of legion' (Arter 2006: 247).
As Arter has pointed out (2006a) legislative strength or the capacity of 
legislatures does not indicate legislative performance. The power of a legislature 
to influence policy or work independently of the executive has a very small 
impact, if not any impact at all, on its organisational performance, and indeed on 
the overall governance of society. Legislative performance would be the 
indication of how well the institution carries out the powers given to it to 
maximum benefit of the system not to dispute how much power of its output 
with regards to institutional rules and features.
Hence, a legislature with little or modest policy affect will not perform any 
worse than a legislature with strong policy power. Also the policy-related 
attitudes and behaviour of legislators will not affect legislative performance any
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more than the policy-related attitudes of its citizens. So institutional rules 
effecting electoral rules will not be an indication of how well the legislature 
performs and how effectively and efficiently the legislature can deliver its 
functions (outputs) and produce favourable outcomes for the system as a whole.
As this chapter has also pointed out using the literature on organisational 
behaviour and output, representational quality and the behaviour of the 
legislature (and legislators) alone cannot be taken as an indication of 
performance and would present problems of evaluation. Saalfeld has noted 
(2002: 44) that all legislative systems simultaneously play a number of different 
roles within their representational responsibilities and represent various 
principles, each with their own preferences and expectations which would 
require certain behavioural output on part of the legislator. Furthermore, the 
asymmetrical information distribution among the principals and agents lead to 
considerable scope for agents to hide information on the true nature of 
preferences (ibid).
The literature on legislative oversight also shows that this tool cannot be taken as 
an indication of performance of the legislative system. As mentioned before, 
oversight affects policy making output only as far as to revise policy. Even 
though, the budgetary function is measurable and provides a tangible means of 
assessment for oversight, it does not mean that parliament's legislative 
performance is a subset of its oversight activities or even to equate the 
legislative function of parliaments to their oversight function and conclude 
performance based on its oversight capacity.
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Rather than focusing on legislative institutions, and binding rules that constrain 
legislative behaviour and output, the focus of this research is the legislative 
organisation itself and how 'outcomes' or the results from outputs, would effect 
legislative performance and ultimately improve the democratic outcomes in 
governance systems. Keith Krehbiel has identified three stages that must first be 
met in order to assess performance in legislatures (Krehbiel: 1991: 261) which 
are as follows:
- Explicit performance criteria
- A theory that links legislative organisation with legislative performance
- Empirical support for such theory
The survey of literature in this chapter shows that there are no definitive 
performance criteria without constraints. The aim of this study is to find a 
performance criterion that could be explicit to democratic legislatures. The next 
chapter will look at performance from an organisational theory and whether 
theories of organisation may become applicable to legislatures and used to 
measure performance.
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Chapter Three: The Concept of 'Legislative Performance
3-1 Introduction: Legislative organisation and institutionalisation
In chapter two, legislative performance was looked upon from a comparative 
perspective of the existing pool of literature on legislative studies. Most of the 
literature indicates the popularity of quantitative assessments of legislative 
output reduced to measurable indicators of institutional structure, function or the 
behaviour of individuals and groups within the legislature. Evaluating 
institutional performance on policy output is quite common in comparative 
politics in which each regime type is considered as a distinct set of institutions 
combined into a whole according to whichever kind of institutional logic that 
makes sense (March and Olsen 1989). The main difference among institutional 
approaches is the amount of emphasis placed on institutional elements as 
independent or dependent variables.
In the case of rational choice institutional perspectives, the term 'institution' is 
without exception defined as rules that are looked upon as constraints within 
which actors may maximise their utility and self-interests. Under such 
circumstances, the individual's strategic calculations are of central concern to 
legislative performance even though institutions may set the frameworks and 
parameters for them (North 1990). The shortcoming of this approach is probably 
this overemphasis on individual choice at the price of ignoring institutional 
preferences in interaction with the environment, thus undermining the important 
role of culture, society and organisational identity (Powell and DiMaggio 1991). 
Secondly, if rules are seen as constraints (as in rational choice), then actors may
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wish to work around the rules in order to maximise their own preferences at the 
cost of reducing the performance of the institution as a whole. Even if individual 
actors, political parties and various interests interacting with the legislature could 
be reduced to self-maximising rational choice actors, the institution of a 
democratic parliament may not.
This study is more interested in historical institutionalism and its holistic 
approach to institutional performance (Hall 1986, Skocpol 1979, 1987 and 
March and Olsen 1989) in which rather than emphasising output, the outcome of 
preferences is considered as a product of the interaction among various interests, 
groups and institutional structures. Unlike rational choice, preferences are not 
fixed but emerge and evolve within the institutional context which according to 
March and Olsen (1989: 21) are the 'rules of conduct in organisations, routines 
and repertoire of procedure'. March and Olsen have defined political 
institutions such as legislatures as:
'Collections of interrelated rules and routines that define appropriate actions 
in terms of relations between roles and situations. The process involves 
determining what the situation is, what role is being fulfilled and what the 
obligation of that role in that situation is' (March and Olsen 1989: 160)
Since institutions shape behaviour, they are able to give legitimacy for their 
conduct, thus allowing for performance to be assessed. This approach is based in 
organisational theory and becomes very useful in the analysis of institutional 
development and policy making in which the outcome becomes the main focus,
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not the output. Although there is recognition of the role of individuals in shaping 
outcomes, this role is fairly bounded compared to rational studies of institutions.
However it must be stressed that social and political institutions do not act alone 
in formulating outcomes. Scott (1991: 147-8) argues organisational choice is 
influenced by cultural fields (or institutions) that define concepts such as 
fairness, equality, democracy and efficiency 1 . These choices are reflected in the 
structures, functions and goals of the organisation as well as the rationality of 
individuals within it. So institutions cannot act alone in shaping outcomes but do 
so by interacting with systemic factors that are sometimes external to the 
institution. Furthermore, it must be recognised that outcomes are not one- 
dimensional but identify various macro aspects like public consumption, 
expenditure, level of welfare, democracy, political change and political growth. 
Unlike outputs which are relatively stable over time, outcomes tend to change.
This chapter, as the title suggests, intends to provide a conception of legislative 
performance as seen from a political science perspective. From a holistic point of 
view, legislatures as political institutions are 'wholes' that consist of simpler 
institutions which may be coupled into a system (Lane and Ersson 1999: 5). In 
other words, institutions are organised wholes of various simple institutions and 
it is the organisation of institutional structures that binds legislatures as they are
1 In this work the terms Organisation and Institution are interchangeably used as formal 
organisations consist of institutions and large institutions are usually an organisation of simpler 
institutions. Institutions are usually either referred to as 'rules' or 'organisations'. This ambiguity 
can be seen in all analysis and discussions about institutions including theories about the design 
of institutions and constitutional engineering (Satori 1994). Political bodies such as a parliament, 
government or Supreme Court are usually referred to as institutions because behaviour in such 
bodies tends to be heavily institutionalised. However any established parliament is clearly an 
organisation that follows certain rules.
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and helps them perform as they do. Organisational theorists such as Selznick 
(1949) and Meyer and Rowan (1977) have defined institutions as systems of 
meaning and that their behaviour and the behaviour of individuals within it 
depend on the meanings incorporated and the symbols manipulated from them 
or, in other words, their organisation. In this regard legislative performance 
may only be measured and assessed if taken from an organisational theoretical 
point of view. Organisational theory does not look towards distinguishing 
organisations from institutions, but rather works to reconcile these two terms. 
Moreover, when institutions are taken as an organisation, the meaning of the 
word is much wider and more flexible than when institutions stand as a norm or 
a rule. This allows for the macro analysis of performance in terms of outcomes.
The term 'Institutionalisation' is unavoidable in the process of political 
development and is generally regarded as:
'The extent to which the entire polity is organised as a system of interacting 
relationships, first among the offices and agencies of government, and then 
among various groups and interests seeking to make demands upon the system, 
and finally in the relationships between officials and articulating citizens' 
(Pye, 1973:51).
Institutionalisation is frequently conceived as a subdivision of organisation 
theory. Patterson argues that organisations are the structural properties of 
institutions and that there can be no institution without an organisation, although 
the opposite is also quite possible in the case of informal organisations (Patterson
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1995). It is generally perceived that institutionalisation occurs when 
environmental factors move the organisation into a certain direction of greater 
complexity, boundedness and standardisation (Hibbing, 2002: 31). In order to 
institutionalise, there must be an organisation or a group of individuals bound by 
some common purpose to achieve objectives (North, 1990: 5) which then needs 
to be enriched with certain values and principles over time. Although the 
members become rationalised as these norms and values are incorporated into 
their behaviour, in the case of legislatures these norms and values are mainly 
established from the constitution without the need for an institutional build-up2 .
Traditional institutional theorists consider the process of institutionalisation as 
structural and linear whereby a political structure becomes more specialised 
within an organisation having a clear boundary from its environment, and 
becomes more operational in accordance with the rules and procedures (Polsby 
1971), which in turn enables a more established, regularised and predictable 
pattern of behaviour in the institution. It is also considered as a process whereby 
organisations and procedures acquire value and stability (Huntington 1968: 12). 
Institutionalisation in this sense refers to the 'development of norms and explicit, 
as well as implicit, codes of conduct or rules in the institution and signifies the 
routinisation of certain political procedures and the prevalence of certain 
principles over others' (Kamrava, 1993: 4).
2 The differences between institutions and organisations are considered so small, that organisational 
theorists such as Scott (1987, 1995) and institutional theorists such as Jepperson (1991) have preferred to 
ignore distinguishing between the two and referring to them as an interchangeable phenomena.
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Taken in the above sense, firstly all constitutional systems must be in some stage 
of institutionalisation. As routines and norms become more established and gain 
greater meaning, the degree of institutionalism within these structures increase, 
thereby improving the performance of outputs. Secondly, the degree to which a 
system is institutionalised does not necessarily have to depend on the extent it 
corresponds to democratic rules and practices but to how much it manages to 
penetrate into the society and the degree of compliance it faces from the society, 
either voluntarily or by coercion and threat (Kamrava 1993: 2). Thus the Chinese 
National People's Assembly, the Saudi Consultative Assembly and Zimbabwe's 
Parliament cannot be considered as uninstitutionalised in a comparative 
perspective, though their degree of institutionalisation inevitably differs from 
developed institutions.
Since new institutionalists are more concerned with the behaviour of 
organisations within the framework of their institutions, stronger emphasis is 
placed on the norms of the institution as a way of understanding their function 
and how they determine or shape individual behaviour (Peters 1998: 19). In 
order to assess legislatures, not only internal factors, but also external factors 
influencing legislatures need to be considered along with the content and type of 
public policy issues (Norton and Olsen 1996). Hence the study of institutions 
becomes non-linear and systemic, whereby structures, properties, functions and 
the behaviour of the organisations are regarded in interaction with the 
environment.
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The environment of a legislature is (in post-modern terms) a complex system 
itself, which is characterised as being unpredictable. So it must be assumed that 
any change in the environment must also affect the legislature it interacts with. 
Or, the legislature must at least adapt to its environment in order to survive 
(Parsons 1960, Almond and Powell 1966). This implies that legislatures would 
behave in unpredictable ways allowing them to de-institutionalise when 
necessary (Eisenstadt 1965, Hibbings 2002) and runs contrary to the reductionist 
concept of institutionalisation, which would require a stable, regularised and 
predictable system. Eisenstadt has used the context of bureaucratisation instead 
of institutionalisation and assumed it as a reversible process that changes with 
environmental patterns. This idea brings institutions and organisations closer in 
terms of functions and behaviour patterns and indicates that organisational 
solutions can be used to solve institutional problems.
Although this study seeks an alternative approach to the commonly accepted 
rational choice institutionalism, performance analysis of the organisation does 
not necessarily contradict institutional performance based on rational choice. 
Douglas North, a rational choice institutionalist, provides the distinction between 
institutions and organisations by comparing organisations to teams playing a 
game and institutions as 'the rules of the game' (North 1990: 4). According to 
this rational institutional view organisations are formed to participate within the 
institutional environment. This example could be used outside economic 
institutions and applied to political institutions such as a legislature to be an 
organisation within the broader institutional environment of the constitution and 
rules of the political system as a whole. Taken in this perspective, the functions,
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behaviour and the performance of a legislature can be measured and assessed 
using organisational methods, whereas it would be very difficult to do the same 
by considering the institution as norms and values alone which cannot provide a 
distinct and clear measurement system.
Moreover, an empirical analysis of legislatures using only structural variables 
cannot provide adequate explanations of the institution as a whole. In an 
analysis of the institutionalisation of the legislative and judicial systems in 
America Schmidhauser, using Polsby's and Huntington's institutional maturation 
indices3 , underwent a chronological comparison of these institutions and showed 
that legislatures are declining in strength (Schmidhauser 1973: 134-5) by 
indicating the negative correlation between the attributes of institutionalisation 
and growth. While this study may be a further indication that legislatures, as 
institutions, are changing towards becoming more like previously regarded 
political organisations, it may also point to the fact that nominal analyses of this 
kind cannot be used alone in the assessment of the institution as a whole.
It needs to be stressed that different approaches to institutions have all started 
off by looking at the structures in one way or the other. They differ in the way 
these structures are dealt with and incorporated with other elements of the 
institution. For instance March and Olsen (1984) have used a predominantly 
normative approach. Their emphasis is on the development and transmission of 
norms among the members of the institution or organisation as a unit of analysis,
3 The indices were taken from Polsby (1968) institutional maturation index and Huntington (1968) Political 
maturation indicators. Schmidhauser, J. 'An Exploratory Analysis of the Institutionalization of Legislatures 
and Judiciaries'. In Korenberg, A. ed. (1973) Legislatures in comparative Perspective,
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to the extent that members' interpretations of norms and how they perceive the 
rules may vary. Whereas behaviourists such as Giddens (1979) have argued that 
institutions inevitably shape the behaviour of individuals within them and as a 
system of meaning convey a sense of how members should behave. This 
approach is cognitive and deals with trying to explain the manner which 
members become habituated to accept the rules and norms of the organisation or 
institution (Peters 2002: 107) taking consideration of how structures affect 
behaviour within an institution.
In this case, the assessment of institutional structures, functions and behaviour 
could also be done in a similar ways to performance measurement in 
organisations. Like organisations, legislatures can be considered as open and 
adaptive systems in (direct and indirect) interaction with their environment. In 
this respect a model or framework may be able to assess the performance and 
quality of legislative outputs and outcomes. In order to devise such a model it 
would be necessary to analyse performance in the framework of legislative 
functions. Though, it must be noted that indicators used to evaluate performance 
will differ according to the nature of the organisation. For instance reducing the 
time and increasing the production of an output would be taken as an indication 
for higher performance in manufacturing organisations while it may not be 
necessarily so in the case of legislative institutions (in the case of an 
authoritarian legislature the legislative cycle is reduced considerably but the 
performance of the system in terms of outcome is not necessarily high). Thus 
indicators would need to be modified to suit the performance of a particular 
model of legislature, not merely a law-making institution.
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Finally, it should be noted that constitutions as an institution of legislatures 
provide important opportunities for democratic growth in societies. It is the role 
of the legislative system to take advantage of these opportunities and as they do, 
alter the system within which they are a part of so as to facilitate the growth and 
demands of the interacting environment and provide the needs for a continuous 
interaction between systems. This is done via their symbiotic relationship 
between legislative institutionalisation, organisation and the feedback that they 
receive from their environment. Thus performance is a dynamic and constant 
product of ongoing cooperation and interaction among the environment and its 
institutions and organisations, within the context of the political system. The 
following section takes a closer look at conceptions surrounding performance in 
political science and institutional/organisational theory.
3-2 The Conception of Performance in Political Institutions
Simply put, performance is the purposive actions that institutions take in order to 
achieve their goals. The analysis of performance is a crucial step in the 
assessment of institution as a whole. To perform well, any institution would 
need to perform both effectively and efficiently. It is important to make the 
distinction between effectiveness and efficiency at this stage. Cameron and 
Whetter (1983: 17) have characterised effectiveness as 'doing the right thing' 
while efficiency is 'doing things right'. An institution is judged as effective when 
it can provide minimal satisfaction to their external (and internal) constituencies.
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The same institution will be judged as efficient if it is able to run with precision 
and minimal waste.
Buscher (1994: xi) has generally defined effectiveness as the ratio between the 
'outcome' and the target, while efficiency is generally regarded as the ratio 
between the 'output' and the resources being used. In other words, the measure 
of effectiveness is an answer to whether an institution achieves the results (or 
values) it initially sets out to achieve whereas efficiency is an answer to 
whether the same institution is doing the right internal processes and is managing 
its goals in a cost-effective way. Efficiency has more to do with the allocation of 
the organisation's resources (in terms of time and costs) and internal processes. 
Performance cannot be addressed by only regarding outputs, since efficiency and 
effectiveness are inadvertently linked. Moreover, outputs cannot be properly 
addressed without addressing outcomes which compels organisations to pay 
attention to factors from the environment before meaningful performance 
measurement can take place.
Conceptualising performance or performance measurement for political 
institutions, and legislatures in particular by means of literature is quite difficult. 
Firstly, there have not been as many studies allocated to political institutions in 
comparison to economic institutions and management agencies. Government 
performance is usually confined to evaluating and controlling the budget and 
oversight of government agencies as a way of promoting legitimacy and 
improving accountability and governance. Secondly, effectiveness and efficiency 
may not necessarily be linked so closely for all political systems and legislatures
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in particular despite the clear relationship between output and outcome in 
organisational theory. A legislature may be considered as efficient in terms of 
passing swift legislation but not considered to be effective by democratic 
standards. Equally significant, a legislature may be considered to be relatively 
effective by producing the right outcomes but at high costs (low efficiency). In 
this sense it would be a mistake to consider a political institution to be 
performing well only if one of the dimensions of performance is met.
In politics, legitimacy is usually perceived as a natural consequence of 
performance and is the ability to instil support for the system. Performance in a 
political perspective has generally been regarded as a dependent variable of 
legitimacy and is taken as the effectiveness of government actions leading to 
support for the political system as a whole. In Lipset's Political Man first 
published in 1960, a definition of legitimacy has been provided which has 
become a commonly accepted concept of this term in political studies. 
According to Lipset (1981: 64) legitimacy is: The capacity of a system to 
engender and maintain the belief that existing political institutions are the most 
appropriate ones for the society'. Huntington in The Third Wave (1992) has 
reiterated this belief and maintains that authoritarian systems, where there is less 
to no legitimacy, must rely heavily on performance and getting things right, 
whereas democratic systems, which are high up on legitimacy, become less 
dependent on performance legitimacy. In democratic countries where citizens' 
allegiance for the political system is strong, failure in performance is blamed on 
the incumbents rather than the system and the ouster and replacement of the 
incumbent help to renew the system in terms of legitimacy (Huntington 1991:
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18). In such circumstances performance outputs will be a matter of rational 
choice institutionalism and legitimacy will only suffer in sustained systematic 
failure in the long run which is highly unlikely.
Lipset's concept of legitimacy is based on the legality of the performance system 
in a representative democracy, in which the outputs of the performance system 
are in line with legitimacy. However if the legitimacy of a regime were to be 
based on the people's subjective acceptance of the rightfulness of the political 
order of a system rather than the system's capacity to engender and maintain 
support, then conceptualising legitimacy would not necessarily imply good 
performance or effective and efficient governance. Legitimacy may, in theory, 
coexist alongside an ineffective and inefficient governance system. This 
conception of legitimacy and performance is particularly prevalent in non- 
homogenous and decentralised societies (Gagnon and Erk 2004: 319-321).
In political science despite a certain amount of ambiguity regarding how 
performance is conceptualised with regards to legitimacy, the majority of texts 
see performance as a component of legitimacy. For instance in the context of the 
European Union, performance has been regarded as central in all of the 
narratives that have legitimised the European Projects from their inception 
(Bikerton 2007: 2). The requirement of performance legitimacy is that a 'value 
added' contribution be established in the relevant policy area which is focused 
on effectiveness and achieving results (ibid). In this sense, the concept of 
performance is all about reaching certain policy outputs, meeting expectations,
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satisfying citizens, and therefore maintaining legitimacy. Performance is 
assessed through the success an institution has at reaching these outputs.
In political organisational studies, the idea of performance as a dependent 
variable for legitimacy has become quite acceptable. In comparative politics it is 
widely acknowledged that for development purposes, organisations should seek 
to emulate the successful performance of other organisations as a whole or in 
part. This practice has become institutionalised in many political institutions 
around the world and in the activities of international organisations involved in 
performance appraisal and institutional development. Hence the idea that 
performance may be measured, predicted, understood, and shaped becomes 
acceptable and bears some resemblance to some studies of organisational 
strategy building even though organisational performance may not be given 
primary focus as they are likely to in the study of organisations.
Some critics of governance performance measurement, including Moe (1984, 
1990) and Shepsle (1986) argue that due to the different nature of politics, 
organisational theories do not and cannot have much influence beyond 
economics and sociology. Moe insists that public bureaucracy cannot bear much 
resemblance to rational organisations of the new economy as they are too bound 
up in politics and 'are not intrinsically motivated by effectiveness, efficiency, 
coordination, management or any other design criteria that might limit the kind 
of bureaucracy they are willing to create' (Moe 1990: 142). In this regard public 
bureaucracies cannot be understood as having a governance structure as unlike 
business firms, they are not motivated by certain criteria, such as reducing
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transaction costs or improving production. Thus they are not able to implement 
their motives into their design, introduce rules, procedures, and monitor 
mechanisms and enforcement tools.
Though it is true that politicians, including legislators, are motivated by factors 
such as re-election which would influence their political decisions and 
behaviour, Moe's argument that legislators in established democracies have 
'strong incentives to only do what interest groups want and in the absence of 
explicit demands, to take entrepreneurial action in representing group interest' 
(Moe 1990: 139) cannot be generalised. Legislators must also have an interest in 
reducing their transaction costs and improving production (maybe not all 
committed to improving production in terms of outputs at the same time, but this 
cannot equally apply to outcome production). First of all, in civil societies with 
a high degree of public awareness and knowledge, demands coming from the 
environment, whether from the constituents or interest groups, do not necessarily 
coincide. Secondly the rationality of legislators in such societies would not 
simply imply that they act in their own best interests, but also to the interest of 
the whole institution. Even though maximising self-interests are among aspects 
of legislative work, it arguably cannot necessarily take precedence in democratic 
societies.
Whereas in economic organisations actors are inclined to think of maximising 
their utility and working toward increasing the output for their stakeholders, 
rationality may sometimes give priority to other internal goals such as the desire 
to stay on the organisational ladder regardless of the main intention of the
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organisation. Economic actors may also be influenced by outside pressures and 
interests instead of their own customers and not present a result that is in the 
long-term economic interest of the organisation. Therefore, the dissimilarities 
between economic and political organisations may not be as much as it first 
seems. Political and economic institutions are both involved in the production of 
output and services to their respective fields. On top of that, they both need to be 
able to deal with their environments (internal as well as external) which are not 
always predictable, and include elements that do not always act rationally.
Another major aspect of understanding performance in institutions which one 
needs to take into account, most particularly when dealing with performance in 
legislatures, is not to confuse legislative capacity with legislative performance 
(Arter 2006b). Such confusion may lead to false conclusions of mistaking 
legislative strength or its potential power to produce output from its performance 
or systematic delivery of outcomes. Thus it is important to emphasise that policy 
power is not definitive of legislative performance (Arter 2006a). What is at stake 
is not whether the legislature has the power to make or influence political 
decisions but rather how it can optimise its already existing potentials and 
maximize outcomes through its performance and whether its outputs are 
contributing successfully in reaching the institution's goals and improving the 
quality of democracy. This is considered to be the aim of all democratic political 
systems regardless of age, constitutional structure and institutional design.
It is important to note too that the key tenet of contingency theory in 
organisations is also applicable to established democratic systems in which the
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organisation strives to maximise efficiency by adapting to the environment and 
achieving some king of fit between the environment and its structure, functions 
and behaviour (Scott 1987, Meyer and Zucker 1989). In order to appear effective 
organisations are also required to legitimise their actions to their dominant 
constituencies which could come at the price of damaging efficiency. Thus, the 
main aim of a performance system is to maintain legitimacy and not lose out on 
effectiveness or efficiency. As institutional theories assume, the primary 
determinant of organisational structure is the pressure exerted by internal and 
external constituencies on the organisation to conform with a set of expectations 
and gain legitimacy, which will inevitably lead to the long-term survival and 
securing vital resources toward this aim.
Yet assessing institutional performance in political institutions usually takes a 
narrow form that is potentially very similar to institutional studies that assess the 
degree of institutionalisation and is basically internal in approach. Meyer and 
Zucker have argued that generally speaking, performance may be defined to the 
extent that 'elites dominate an organisation, a high degree of professionalism 
exists, and the organisation performs a technical function, outputs of which are 
measurable' (Meyer and Zuker 1989: 111). However, performance will be 
construed much more broadly, by contrast, to the extent that, 'the norm of 
participative democratic governance operates, sometimes in the formal structure 
of the rules of the organisation, the interests of multiple constituencies are given 
recognition, and the organisation's function is non-technical and outputs elude 
measurement' (ibid).
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Considering the above assumption from institutional theory, it is pertinent that 
performance in political democracies is institutionally defined and institutional 
factors, both internal and external, determine the interests being pursued by 
organisations aiming to gain legitimacy in continuous interaction with the 
environment. It is inevitable that performance will be dependent on factors such 
as institutional design, constitutional structure and the cultural differences of 
each political system. For instance a presidential system will not perform with 
the same variables as a parliamentary system, or a proportional representation 
electoral model will not bear the same outcomes as a first past the post voting 
system. In order to reduce the complications of any comparative performance 
framework, the model would first have to be slightly narrowed to consider only 
the main role of democratic legislatures in achieving good governance, system 
maintenance and gradual improvement (which will be examined in the next 
chapter of this work).
3-3 Performance Measurement in Institutions:
Measuring performance is one of the most problematic issues in the field of 
organisational theory (Zammuto, 1982). Even though there are a number of 
different approaches to assessing performance, as this chapter will point out, 
there is little consensus as to what constitutes a valid set of criteria. It is 
generally understood that when assessing internal processes to determine 
efficiency in an institution, it is more difficult to measure outputs as compared to 
inputs. This is especially the case in service providing organisations because the 
outputs tend to be more qualitative than quantitative. Taken from this
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perspective, it would seem that legislatures do not need to be assessed the same 
way as other profit-making organisations since they will receive financial 
resources or a budget regardless of their performance. Perhaps this is one of the 
reasons there has not been the need for a programme to systematically assess 
performance in these bodies.
On the other hand, since effectiveness is more likely to be observed in the 
environment as the tip of the iceberg, it has usually been assessed and measured 
with regard to certain standards, norms and values that are external to the 
institution. In order to measure effectiveness an overall understanding of the 
institution's functional responsibilities is first required. Organisational 
effectiveness shows the extent to which an organisation is able to fulfil its goal 
and complexity arises when an organisation is multi-functional and carries out a 
multiple of goals. In such a situation a consensus must be reached by those who 
are associated with the organisation's performance and have more knowledge 
and experience in its functions and effects.
This section looks at the significance of performance measurement in 
institutional studies. Measurement has been a key operational management tool 
in indicating the success and failure of institutions. Garvin (1993: 78) writing in 
the Harvard Business Review has stated 'if you can't measure it, you can't 
manage it' and this sentence has been quoted frequently in organisational texts as 
an undeniable fact. However, the more traditional quality management experts, 
such as Edward Deming (1986) considered as the founder of the Japanese quality 
movement, are opposed to measurement and have declared performance
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measurement as 'the most inhibitor to quality and productivity in the western 
world' (quoted in Gabor 1999: 43).
Performance measurement systems (especially from the late eighties up until 
today) have been recognised as playing an important role in the efficient and 
effective management of organisations. Every modern organisation has 
developed some form of performance measurement framework by either 
applying one of the available methodologies or tailor making a measurement 
system according to its own structure and culture. Andrew Neely and colleagues 
who have developed a performance measurement model called the Performance 
Prism (Neely et al. 2002) define a Performance Measurement system as a 'set of 
metrics [or indicators] used to quantify both the efficiency and effectiveness of 
actions' (Neely et al. 1995: 3). Neely and associates (Neely et al, 1996: 14) give 
five reasons for implementing any kind of performance measurement system:
Monitor performance
Identify the areas that need attention
Enhance motivation
Strengthen accountability
Improve communication
Performance measurement must not be confused with performance measures 
when identifying organisational performance. According to Sinclair and Zairi 
(1995: 53) performance measurement is concerned with determining how 
successful organisations have been in attaining their objectives, whereas
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performance measures are the numerical or quantitative indicators that show how 
well each objective is being met4 . A performance measurement system is 
composed of various performance measures that are linked to performance 
management through the setting of goals, standards and targets for improving 
performance in the organisation (Buxon and Ward 1998: 2). In other words, 
measures are only a means to an end. In situations where multiples measures 
exist, meaningful measurement can only take place if the relative weight of each 
measure is known.
Although performance measures are partly constructed by changes in the balance 
of power or influence within the organisation (Hassard and Parker 1993), 
nothing can impact performance in organisations as much as the setting of clear 
goals which represent positive resources for the organisation around which to 
organise its activity and set priorities (Perrow 1970: 49). Organisational goals set 
out the framework that gives direction to organisational performance, motivate 
members and staff and build trust. An organisation cannot perform without first 
having a clear goal or set of goals. For evaluation purposes, quality techniques 
can be adopted more clearly, widely and successfully when goals are clearly 
defined (Berman and West 1995).
There is a positive relationship between goals and performance as organisations 
that have clear goals usually perform better. That is why it is important that 
measurements indicating performance should represent the real goals of the
4 Sinclair, D and Zairi, M. 'Effective Process Management through Business Measurement: Part III- an 
integrated model of total quality-based performance measurement'. Business Process Re-engineering and 
Management Journal, 1995 1: 50-65
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organisation not short-term targets. It is also important that measures do not out- 
weigh one aspect of performance in comparison with others (Kaplan and Norton 
1992). The goals of an organisation may be better defined through an 
examination of the behaviour of its various parts, in particular the environment 
or the society at large as organisations obtain resources from the society and seek 
to convert them in certain ways in order to obtain some sort of market for their 
output. So by observing the input-output process, one can establish the goal of 
the organisation or the needs that the organisation must satisfy in order to survive 
(Rice and Miller, 1967: 88-95).
An organisation cannot be considered as having a goal unless there is an ongoing 
consensus between members about the purpose of their interaction (Etzioni 
1960). As organisations get more complex, the agents interacting within the 
organisation become more diverse and demanding. Diversity and demand from 
the environment generate a whole new set of behaviour with which the 
organisation must learn to adapt itself in order to evolve and survive. In other 
words, the organisational system is maintained by constantly adapting to new 
conditions around it and coevolving with the environment. Such behaviour 
would inevitably affect organisational short-term goals which may need constant 
re-evaluation and adjustment with the environment. A performance measurement 
system should also be able to detect such environmental changes and adapt with 
them in order to survive. Not surprisingly some organisational analysts (Jones 
1996: 161) define organisational effectiveness as goal achievement5 .
5 Organisational goals were traditionally realised as static. Once a goal has been reached, it would cease to 
be the guiding image for the organisation and is assimilated to the organisation or its environment (Etzioni, 
1964: 6). However, considering the dynamism of the environment, one can only assume organisational
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According to Bititci and colleagues performance measurement systems provide a 
'closed loop model of organisational strategies' and a structured framework that 
allow 'relevant information to be fed back to the appropriate points in order to 
facilitate the process of decision making and control' (Bititchi et al. 1997: 524- 
5). The information fed back must correlate with the expectations from the 
system and the measures must be designed to improve the outputs and outcomes 
of organisations. Hence performance measurement emphasises strongly that the 
results from processes involved in output delivery should match the expectations 
of the system and also become a tool for controlling outcomes.
Traditionally, performance measurement was seen as a means for monitoring and 
controlling performance, checking progress and identifying areas that need 
attention (Neely et al, 2002). These methods set about only to identify key 
performance indicators or the key ratios. Such assessment which is usually 
referred to as 'benchmarking' (used in audits) compares the key indicators of 
performance in regards to a certain aspect (or the whole) of a business with a 
corresponding number of other similar units or with itself overtime. The major 
advantage of these methods of performance measurement is the transparency 
involved and the fact that performance indicators may be analysed and tested for 
validity using statistical methods.
Despite transparency and providing a structure for measurement which aids 
systematic improvement in performance, the problem with traditional types of 
measurement is that they are usually based on costs and benefits only and are
goals to be flexible, requiring constant revision and alterations in order to meet with the demands from the 
environment.
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driven solely by quantitative measures. Traditional performance measurement 
systems leave out qualitative measures in their assessment, as they are usually 
more difficult to implement. Moreover, traditional performance measurement 
systems do not consider the external environment and no future strategy is 
considered. Thus it is very difficult to derive at predictions about environmental 
change and its impact on the performance of the organisation as the empirical 
study of past performance does not provide any kind of clear and effective 
strategy for performance management.
Current measurement approaches to performance appraisal of public sector 
organisations and political institutions mainly use a combination of qualitative 
and quantitative indicators in their approach to assess governance 
structures6 . Quality methods have been used by organisations for defensive 
purposes to ensure the survival of the organisation in hostile and mainly 
unpredictable environments. They have also been used for tactical purposes, 
which are to ensure the satisfaction of customers and to ensure that the 
organisation can acquire the necessary capacities to develop suitably in the future 
as it is generally believed that improving performance in the organisation will 
lead to better performance in the environment and vice-versa. Since the interest 
of public sector organisations is in line with the common interest of the society,
6 For instance the Total Quality Management (TQM), a popular method used in governance performance 
measurement, is quite similar to traditional models in the sense that it also requires some kind of adherence 
to a standard similar to the certification schemes (such as the international standards organisation ISO 
certificate) with the added feature that organisational performance also takes the behavioural complexity of 
systems into account. Organisational results are almost always evaluated and analysed as intra- 
organisational performance. Often, comparable measures are used to find inter-organisational performance 
(such as the indexes used by developmental organisations such as the World Bank).
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the study of performance has in the past used a positivist approach even in the 
overall evaluation of quality. However, positivist quality methods become quite 
difficult to assess in environments that are more complex, dynamic and fractious. 
This state is made more difficult when there is a fragmentation of interests inside 
as well as outside the organisation and there is an 'ambiguity of intention' from 
the environment (March and Olsen 1978: 250).
3-4 The Quality Movement and Public Institutions
Work to improve quality in organisations by introducing methods, techniques or 
values and standards has become very popular since the 1970s and has been 
gaining speed with the growth in international trade and globalisation. There has 
been a substantial legislative interest for performance measurement in the last 
fifteen years resulting in a growing focus on performance audits and evaluation. 
Quality and reputation have become more and more synonymous to the point 
that all organisations have tried to incorporate quality as part of their 
organisational culture. Although this trend was initiated in the private sector, 
public sector organisations have tried to follow and make organisational changes 
towards higher quality service and performance. For example in the United 
States most publications on the management of government organisations since 
the late 1980s include a section on the principles of quality management and 
their application in the public sector. In addition, the more broadly aimed 
management books on quality, such as Milakovich (1995) and Oakland (1989) 
have chapters on the public sector.
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The current focus on performance measurement at all levels of government and 
non-profit organisations reflects citizen demand for evidence of programme 
effectiveness (Wholey and Newcomer 1997: 92). According to a survey by the 
United States Council for Excellence in Government in 1997, nearly three 
quarteres of Americans believe performance in public sector organisations could 
be improved by bringing private sector values and practices into government7 . 
This indicates the growing understanding about the relationships between 
resources, goals and results.
It has generally become prestigious for public sector units to win a national 
quality award (Kettl 1997). The focus on performance in the public sector was 
given a statutory base in the Clinton administration with Congress passing the 
Government Performance and Reform Act and in 2001 the Bush administration 
promulgated a management agenda with 'Budget and Performance Integration'
o
as one of the five central elements for government improvement . Following 
from that the US administration introduced a programme assessment tool in 
2002.
The quality movement in public sector organisations which started in the United 
States about two decades ago has had a spill-over effect in Europe and the rest of 
the world. For instance in Britain, John Major writing in the Conservative Party
7 This research was carried out by the American organisation ' Trust in Government'. The 1997 poll carried 
out on the public's perception of performance measurement in the public sector is available from their 
website at: www.trustingov.org/research/council_poll.htm
8 Featured in the Testimony of Patrica Me Ginnis, president of the council for excellence in government 
before the committee on government reform, House of Representatives' September 18, 2003
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Manifesto of 1992, pointed to the 'quality revolution' taking place in British 
government that was 'leading a drive for quality throughout our public services' 
(Quoted in Tuckman, 1995: 77). The following New Labour government has 
since been emphasising quality in all aspects of the British public sector with the 
use of performance measurement especially noticeable in local councils, schools 
and the National Health Service (NHS)9 reflecting the general quality adage that 
local government should provide 'value for people as well as value for money' 
(Sanderson, 1992: 21). The Gershon report has been a key driver in turning 
public sector organisations in Britain toward performance management. The 
report identified twenty-one billion pounds of efficiency savings to be made in 
the public sector by 2007-2008 (Gershon 2004: iv). Quality in the public sector 
has taken a more open systems approach by arguing that quality should be 
measured in terms of 'strategic direction' rather than in terms of service delivery 
alone (Wilkinson, 1998: 94) and there has been a shift in focus from the service 
to the public who receive such service.
Most methods of performance evaluation in government focus on performance 
after-the fact (not before) and requires past performance to be compared to the 
present (or more recent past) performance with some kind of standard. 
Performance information has been used for audit and evaluation of government 
programmes and departments and helps the formation of the budget. 
Performance management of the government has been aided in this regard by a 
number of awards, frameworks, and software. An analysis of all these would
9 The UK Government has been adapting and encouraging techniques from Total Quality Management 
(TQM), the International Standard Organisation (ISO) awards series, and more recently the European 
Foundation of Quality Management (EFQM) Excellence model into almost every area of the public sector.
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require a whole chapter and will probably distort the nature of this research. 
Instead the most popular quality evaluation tools used in public sector 
organisations is briefly mentioned below.
The most popular evaluation benchmark for public sector organisations has been 
the 'ISO 9000'cetrification awards, presented by the International Standards 
Organisation (ISO). The ISO 9000 was a series of quality standards set by the 
European based International Standard Organisation. It gained significance as all 
firms wanting to do trade within the European Common Market were legally 
required to be ISO 9000 certified. Organisations were assessed according to a set 
of process standards as was stipulated in one of the standards that:
'[The] processes affecting quality must be monitored and 
controlled...objective evidence must be provided that the product received and 
delivered is inspected or otherwise verified'. (Gasko, 1992: 368)
A third party would evaluate the processes only once the organisation has 
announced its willingness to be evaluated using the standardised instruments 
used to determine the scoring of the evaluations. In other words the assessed 
party would know beforehand what level they are required to achieve. However, 
there is a disadvantage to having a fixed set of standards and measurement as it 
would imply that organisations will not see the need for continuous improvement
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and this allows them to exploit the system. An organisation can always go back 
to its previous ways after it receives the certificate 10 .
The quest for an evaluation model to assess and reward excellence and 
continuous performance in organisations has led the European Foundation for 
Quality Management (EFQM) to present a nine-scale framework of quality 
assessment. This model has become very popular among organisations of all 
sizes as a relatively costless 11 method of improving quality management and 
customer satisfaction. Like the total quality method (TQM), the excellence 
model focuses on the final product as well as the processes leading to the 
product.
The EFQM model has become as popular in the public sector as private 
organisations and EFQM has been giving out various awards and prizes to 
organisations (regardless of sector), which have managed to achieve the 
excellence model. The EFQM website offers a list of many organisations, public 
and private sector alike, across the world. Winning an award is seen not only as a 
sign of excellence but also prestige and recognition 12 . Since 2004, EFQM has 
also set up a 'local and regional government prize' that it gives to local and 
regional governments which demonstrate outstanding contributions to pursuing 
excellence principally in design and implementation of e-government solutions.
10 The chairman of one quality consulting firm has even said 'Currently 80-90 percent of the companies 
going through the ISO certification are just wasting their money' (quoted in Fouhy et al. 1992: 42).
11 The EFQM is not costless in large organisations however since only managers need to be involved and 
not everybody working in the organisation (as is the case with TQM), then it is less of a time and cost 
constraint.
12 Full details of the award and processes leading performance growth is given on the EFQM website 
at:www.efqm.org. The website features the names of many public sector organisations in its list of award 
winners. Local and regional governments have also adopted the excellence strategy as the EFQM has set up 
programmes to help these organisations improve performance using the techniques mentioned.
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3-5 Performance Measurement in Legislative Institutions
There has been much debate surrounding the usefulness of a strict methodology 
for comparing effectiveness among political institutions. Arturo Israel (1987) on 
behalf of the World Bank Institute (WBI) argues that such comparison is neither 
necessary nor possible and all that is required is a ranking or an ordinal 
measurement system that can be defined in general terms (ranking has been the 
preferred method of WBI since). While it is very difficult to provide correct 
comparisons among institutions, WBI methodology cannot be considered 
flawless as it makes qualitative predictions of institutional effectiveness based on 
quantitative values.
However, the WBI methodology does take into consideration two significant 
factors in comparative analysis. Firstly, it is generally very difficult to improve 
the overall effectiveness and efficiency of any individual institution as it would 
often require changes to the internal culture (if not the structure) and such 
changes will not be easy to implement particularly in larger and older 
institutions. Secondly, in order to improve performance, it is necessary to 
compare institutions that are alike only (systems that can be assessed through 
similar measurement methodology).
As discussed before, it is very difficult to implement overall change especially to 
institutions such as legislatures that are multi-functional in nature, while it 
becomes relatively simple to implement change in single purpose organisations
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where a single factor (such as financial profit) dominates. In the private sector, 
the means and yardstick to measuring successful performance are more limited 
and more universally accepted. However, it becomes quite challenging when 
multiple measures which have a certain degree of value and controversy, are 
involved. In situations where multiple measures are considered as equally 
important and the priorities for assessing performance are not so clear, 
performance systems can appear complicated and the outcomes may become 
vague and even conflicting. The need to set practical limits on the functions of 
parliaments is very important to bear in mind when trying to find an effective 
model for performance in legislatures. Any feasible performance measurement 
system may be too costly, difficult to maintain, and inevitably lead to 
information overload if too many measures were to be assessed.
But is it possible to reduce legislatures to a single main function and then 
generalise performance for all institutions of the kind? Philip Norton argues that 
legislatures are multi-functional bodies with a range of political consequences 
for their respective political parties in which 'law making' is not necessarily the 
most important consequence of parliaments as some consider it to be, but instead 
the main function of these democratic and representative bodies is legitimising 
law making by assenting to binding measures of public policy (Norton 1990a: 1, 
1990b:4, 2004). However, for measurement sake, if a performance framework 
were established to rank legislative performance solely by looking at their output 
capacity of assenting to measures from the executive, then probably less 
democratic parliaments with lower accountability would outperform the more 
democratic and transparent ones, as it could be argued that democracy is relative
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and not absolute. Thus, performance models based on limited quantitative 
measures alone cannot be indicative of legislative performance and legitimacy of 
the whole institution.
Packenham (1970) who has devised a qualitative model for assessing functions 
in legislatures, uses the term 'consequence' instead of functions referring to 
outcomes and consequences that each function has for the political system at 
large. According to Packenham, different political systems do not share the same 
political consequences and this affects the relative importance of the functions in 
legislatures. In his view, when we characterise a certain function as the most 
important, it usually means that it is the process or a set of processes for which 
the legislature has the most consequences and the highest impact for the political 
system (Packenham 1970, 1990: 86). As a result, the political consequences of a 
certain piece of legislation do not have the same impact in parliamentary, 
presidential or hybrid style legislatures. In this respect, even if legislatures 
perform the same functions, they do not act in the same way and do not 
necessarily require the same consequences for their actions. Norton has also 
pointed this out in the introduction of Legislatures (1990a: 12):
'The realisation that legislatures are multi-functional bodies, and that 
those junctions and the capacity to fulfil them vary over time and from country to 
country, has meant that it has been possible to think not in terms of a legislature, 
but in terms of different legislatures'
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So in order to establish any kind of performance assessment model for different 
legislatures using one kind of measurement approach, one has to bear in mind 
that different purpose and values will require different types of measures. There 
is no single magical measure or a set of measures that will definitely serve all 
these purposes (Behn, 2003). If there is to be a performance measurement model 
for legislatures, it would either have to consider the identical (or near identical) 
purpose of legislatures or there would have to be an exclusive performance 
measurement model designed for each individual institution
Another important factor to bear in mind when designing performance systems 
in political institutions such as legislatures is that whatever number of measures 
or values are chosen, there must be some kind of consensus on performance 
measures among the members of that institution on what constitutes 
performance in the first place. If the members of an institution or organisation do 
not agree or do not share the same view on performance, actions cannot be 
coordinated and resources may be wasted (Neely, 2002: 73).
Finally, it should be emphasised that no organisation likes to be evaluated in the 
first place. Evaluation becomes necessary only when different organisations of 
the same kind start competing for bigger budgets, more grants, better recognition 
and customer satisfaction. However, since parliaments receive an allocated 
budget regardless of their performance and in most cases, the common way of 
assessing performance of a legislator or a party has been through election results 
(which cannot by itself be a very effective method for assessment) as long as 
legislators are incumbent, they are not keen on being evaluated or ranked.
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As discussed before the assumption that legislatures are political in nature may 
cause difficulties in performance assessment. Some researchers (Brunsson 1995) 
even question the use of the term decision in politics, which can lead to 
unpredictable consequences and political (as well as social) outcomes for the 
political system as a whole, compared to decisions of rational choice used in 
strategic management. For instance, the criticism of legislative oversight 
historically has been that it is not focused on the extent to which programs have 
achieved their objectives, but used to draw attention to politically sensitive or 
high-profile issues. Me Cubbins and Schwartz (1984: 721) have argued that the 
Congress engages in 'fire alarm' oversight, where high profile issues get 
attention as opposed to 'police patrol' oversight where agencies or programs are 
looked at in detail in an effort to determine what works and what does not.
Moreover, there has not been much initiative from these institutions to provide 
a method of ranking or evaluating legislators in parliaments and the only 
instances are usually after initiatives have been set and from outside such as the 
media or the public 13 . So for any performance measurement method to be
An example of such initiation is the website htlp://ww\v.they workforyou.com that assesses legislators and 
their work. This website provides free and easily accessible records of democracy as they are practiced by 
the British Parliament and was set up in 2004 by a group of 'unpaid civic hackers' (as they quote 
themselves on their website). Users of this website can enter their own postcodes and they will immediately 
be linked to a record of all the contributions made by their MP in parliamentary debates. These records are 
provided using Hansard documents which are publicly available and easily downloadable. The ranking 
system uses indicators like the number of times an MP takes part in a debate, vote or written answers 
making use of the number of times their names appear on the Hansard documents. However, an article in 
The Times wrote of how MPs had become obsessed with 'gaming the system' by making short and 
unnecessary interventions in debates to have their names included in the count and tabling pointless 
questions for the sake of improving their ranking ("The MPs who can't stop talking' The Times, 27th 
February 2007).
The website's organisers do admit that this method cannot be taken of a measure of a parliamentarian's 
actual performance and does not measure the quality of a Member's full contribution. Despite the fallbacks 
of this performance method, the website receives many hits every day. Some MPs have even started taking 
advantage of the system by point-scoring, that is intervening in debates as many times as possible to get a 
higher place in the ranking system. The fact that some MPs are going into the trouble of gaming the system 
to their advantage can only mean two things: Firstly MPs are becoming more aware of being watched by 
the public and of the need to improve performance (whether properly or by cheating the ranking system).
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implemented within the system, it would have to appeal to the insiders 
(legislators) as well as those outside the institution. In the past (and even today in 
many cases) the introduction of such models would probably have resulted in it 
being sidestepped and/or not taken too seriously. However, as parliaments play 
the role of safety valves for public opinion (Norton 1993: 10) and as the public 
are becoming more demanding and aware of processes, they need to show that 
they are interested in performing better. Some of the methods which are already 
being used by legislatures, at the local and national level, to assess organisational 
performance include Reform Programmes, Audits, Corporate plans (using Total 
Quality Management method), the Balanced Scorecard (or scoreboard), EFQM 
(European Foundation of Quality Management) to name a few. These methods 
are briefly discussed below:
3-5.1 Audits and Benchmarking
Almost all legislatures have been using auditing techniques to various extent, to 
measure performance in parts of the political system, in particular the budgeting 
process. These assessments usually come in reports prepared and used by 
working groups, commissions and committees in parliaments (usually in
Secondly Parliament has been urged to get more involved with public initiatives and see the importance of 
constantly improving performance.
The British Parliament, realising the significance of such performance tools, has got involved and held 
meetings with the they\vorkforyou.com bloggers. Parliament recognises such websites should be considered 
as inevitable partners in any kind of quality assessment and performance improving scheme. The website 
has in return made adjustments to make its indicators fairer and be open to suggestions by Members of 
Parliament. For instance one area of the ranking system which was debated is the fact that the indicators 
ignored the amount of work done in constituencies or in committees. The website has now agreed to use 
more generic indicators as a measure to make the system fairer. It is important to mention that this 
agreement only came about after all participating groups (the assessed and the assessing) came together and 
discussed proposals for the improvement of the system. This goes to say that it is impossible to be able to 
improvise any kind of ranking system or performance measurement system without including all the parties 
to the measurement or at least involving their demands.
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budgeting, reform and modernisation capacities). In theory the result of audits 
should feed into the formulation of the budget of the subsequent year but this 
method of audit usually appears with a significant time lag, because by the time 
the budget results or report has been made known for a fiscal year, the budget 
preparation phase may be underway for a fiscal year or two years after that 
(Joyce 2007: 59). Moreover, audits are strongly shaped by the internal 
institutional environment of the assessor (and the assessed). Reforms are usually 
slow, conservative and not very effective despite the strong rhetoric they 
generally offer.
The preferred method of audit reporting and performance measurement in 
governance structures has been the use of benchmarks. In this process, 
performance indicators are compared against each other, to established standards 
of performance set by the law or certain rules and norms or to themselves over 
an established period of time. The logic of benchmarking in organisations is to 
find the 'best practice' and then to see how well it is or can be applied elsewhere. 
The assumption is that gathering and reporting comparative information creates a 
powerful incentive for improvement and learning for others and assumes what 
works in a certain organisation can easily be transferred to another without any 
risk involved (Thomas 2006). This method is comparative in the sense that only 
successful efforts are considered and gives an inadequate account of the 
particular circumstances in different organisations. It does however bring 
managerial attention to important issues and ideas and helps improvement if only 
minor adjustments.
94
Auditing and benchmarking are very similar in application and are sometimes 
used interchangeably in the assessment of strengths and weaknesses of political 
institutions against specified democratic standards. Audits have been commonly 
used to assess legislatures in European and commonwealth countries 14 and many 
countries have long established traditions of auditing executive organisations. In 
addition to the use of evaluation in a case specific mode, this method has also 
been used in comparative studies of governments and ranking systems of 
performance in development reports.
Audits and benchmarks are extensively and successfully used by legislatures to 
evaluate performance in various intuitions and programmes, but have seldom 
been used by others to evaluate legislatures. One example of using audits to 
assess performance in a legislature is study by John Uhr (2005). This study 
assesses the Australian Legislature using the four performance standards devised 
for the Australian Democratic Audit to rank the Australian Parliament along a 
scale of high, medium and low. These four standards derive from the 
contributions legislatures make to strengthening and promoting the following:
Political equality (democratic citizenship) 
Popular control of government (public accountability) 
Civil liberties and human rights 
Public deliberations
14 some examples of parliamentary audits can be found in: Peterson. O et al (1999) 'Democracy and 
Leadership: Report of the democratic audit of Sweden' Stockholm; Beetham, David et al (2005) 'The IDEA 
Handbook on Democratic Assessment', IDEA; Henderson, J and Bellamy, P (2002) 'Democracy in New 
Zealand' University of Canterbury; Beetham, D et al (2003) 'Democracy Under Blair: a democratic audit of 
the UK, Politico; Docherty, D (2004) 'Legislatures: Canadian Democratic Audit series, Univeristy of British 
Colombia; Uhr, J (2005)
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Measurement in this method is relative, not absolute. For each standard, Uhr 
offers a comparative assessment of what he considers to be high, medium and 
low performing legislatures. The assessment is comparative because the only 
way to consider high performance is to look at high performing legislatures and 
to do the same with others to get an idea of the other two levels (medium and 
low). Once the levels of these standards have been indicated, any legislature can 
be assessed, the level of performance can be decided upon and areas of 
improvement can be recommended.
In the audit of the Australian Parliament, it has been concluded that although the 
Australian Parliament does measure up to high standards in some instances, it 
falls short of the democratic potential in some other areas (i.e. the popular 
control of government). Once the weaknesses have been indicated, 
recommendations can then be made as to how to strengthen performance in those 
certain areas.
This sort of relative reporting is suitable for political institutions since it 
involves no kind of overall grading and an institution is likely to be as praised 
just as much as it is criticised (an institution can have as many practices at the 
high end of the audit as it does on the lower end). Another advantage of the audit 
method is that is does not necessarily have to take a holistic approach to 
performance. Audits can be carried out in the institution as a sub-entity or they 
can be carried out for each separate legislative chamber (in the case of bicameral 
structures) or any individual committee. Hence the use of audits allows for areas 
of strengths and weaknesses to be identified and worked on. The results of audits
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are not intended to (and must not) be taken as the overall performance in the 
system as a whole.
One particular problem with this method is that audits are quite subjective and 
can be conducted in different ways depending from which angle one looks at the 
institution. An audit report written or commissioned by a ruling government may 
contain different results from a report undertaken by the opposition or non- 
government organisation. Also with regard to methodology, an audit can only 
take past data and observation into account. Thus it can only say how an 
institution has performed up to a certain point. It does not have an eye for the 
future and cannot be used to predict future performance (strategy formation), 
whereas performance models need to be predictive and dynamic. Uhr's report of 
the Australian Parliament recognises that both formal powers and informal 
practices shape the performance of the institution but because formal powers 
cannot be altered, 'any judgement of performance needs to be sensitive only to 
the conventional dimensions making prediction unwise' (Uhr 2005: 4). However, 
it must be noted that no performance measurement system can claim to be 
successfully one-sided. Performance systems must include the leadership and 
management of the organisation in its assessment just as much as it involves 
others. Also it is important that performance models are able to formulate 
strategies and predict future directions for the organisation. Past performance 
data alone is not enough to make such predictions. Though to be fair, Uhr does 
mention in his paper that his method of assessment is not very scientific and has 
room for improvement.
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A major problem with audits is that they only use output measures and thus are 
good at reporting on how much a product is produced or a service is delivered. 
Performance systems based on output measures only will not usually result in 
significant improvements in performance, as outputs are necessary for account 
giving and performance reporting but insufficient for performance improvement 
(Callahan 2007: 42). It is only when outcome measures are included that the 
quality of the service is revealed and improvements in performance can be 
realised. The following performance system, the Corporate System, is 
exclusively outcome based.
3-5.2 Corporate Plans
Some smaller (and more recent) legislatures in Western Europe and North 
America are building on the reputation of 'working parliaments' and are 
extensively looking at ways to run their institution like modern, service 
providing corporations. For instance the Scottish Parliament has devised its own 
corporate plan which is available on the Scottish Parliament website. 15This 
corporate plan gives details of the Parliament's goals for the period 2007-2010 
based on the four founding principles of the Scottish Parliament that include, 
access and participation, power sharing, accountability and equal opportunity 16 .
15 The Scottish Corporate Plan can be downloaded from the Scottish Parliament Website at: 
http://www.scottish.parliament.uk
16 Shaping Scotland's Parliament' The Report of the Consultative Steering Group (CSG), The 
Scottish Parliament, December 1998. p.4
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The plan then gives details of the areas of performance measurement and the 
indicators required to meet its performance targets which include:
Support the successful running and continuity of business in the
Parliament including its committees
Support the successful performance by members of their parliamentary
and representative functions
Increase awareness and understanding of the Parliament
Widen opportunities for engagement and participation in parliamentary
activities.
These aims have been measured using three main indicators:
Parliamentary Business 
- Parliamentary Support 
Engagement
The Scottish Parliament's corporate plan is an eclectic approach to parliamentary 
performance management. It has taken from the Total Quality Management 
(TQM) approach in which quality is defined in terms of the needs of the 
customer, not necessarily excellence (crucial in EFQM) and balance (Balanced 
Scorecard). It has also put separate emphasis on two management techniques, 
'The Best Value Framework' and the 'Business Continuity Approach', which are 
more internal in nature and to a certain extent deal with excellence in the system 
in regards to continuous improvements (as in TQM) within a defined timescale 
and budget. There is mention of performance measurement in the plan, which is
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an inseparable part of all performance management techniques, using the 
indicators above. Performance is measured using benchmarks and published in 
annual reports. The results are quantitative and there is not a lot of transparency 
into how the measurements are applied and implemented into the corporate 
model.
One area in which the Scottish Parliament is keen to focus its performance 
programme is improved participation and outreach as a measure of improved 
performance of Parliament. The Scottish Parliament has set up a series of 
processes and procedures designed to encourage people's participation and 
outreach, the most important of which is the Public Petition System 17 . Civil 
participation in the policy making process is supposed to be ensured through the 
role assigned to the Public Petition Committee of the Scottish Parliament, its 
powers and working methods. The Public Petition Committee sees itself as 'The 
gateway for public involvement in the parliamentary process' 18 or alternatively 
as the 'principal avenue by which the people of Scotland can become involved 
with the work of the Parliament' 19 .
It is difficult to evaluate the success of the system in terms of outreach and 
enabling individuals. It is even more difficult to evaluate the successful 
performance of an institution based on benchmarks and indicators external to the
17 Other examples of services set up by the Scottish Parliament corporate plan to encourage participation 
include education services, the partner library network and the parliament website itself which is user- 
friendly and provides a great deal of information and links. The Scottish Parliament also co-organise 
events with civil society partners such as the Scottish Civic Forum aimed at opening up parliament and 
encouraging dialogue with civil society.
18 public petition committee, 1 st report 2002 'annual report of the public petitions committee for the 
parliamentary year 12 may 2001-11 may 2202, SP paper 633
PPC, 1 st report 2003, annual report of the PPC for parliamentary year 12 may 2002-11 my 2003, SP 
paper, 802
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institution. Since the Scottish Parliament uses the TQM approach in its 
assessment of performance, customer satisfaction and customer behaviour is core 
to its performance. Even though the public petition committee has helped the 
overall performance of the Scottish Parliament in terms of encouraging 
participation, external benchmarks may not be so optimistic. For example the 
conclusion of the Carmen report (2006)20 while establishing that a majority of 
the petitions submitted to the Public Petition Committee were initiated by 
individual members of society, indicated concerns that the system was mostly 
used by those people who were already politically active and that therefore it had 
failed to connect with the people usually excluded from the democratic process. 
The emphasis of TQM to measure performance from the outside, at the price of 
ignoring internal attitudes to performance is fine for institutions that are 
exclusively service based such as hospitals and schools but probably less 
effective for democratic representative legislatures.
However the corporate management system of the Scottish Parliament is 
definitely working well and is suitably adapted for the institution and it is still 
too early to make judgements in terms of its performance (as the three-year 
corporate plan will end in 2010). In order to be effective, any type of 
performance plan must first indicate the core purposes and values of the 
organisation which are to be evaluated. The Scottish Parliament not only 
provides this through their website but also separates the purposes of Parliament 
from the purpose of its staff organisation. It also gives a list of the values it seeks 
to achieve and improve. It would be fruitless to try and evaluate any kind of
20 Carman, C 'The Assessment of the Scottish Parliament's Public Petition System 1999-2006', Public 
Petition Committee Report, Scottish Parliament Paper 654, October 2006.
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institution if it cannot provide definite goals and values. Moreover, no 
comparative performance measurement plan would be meaningful if the 
organisations involved did not share purposes and values of some kind. 
However, the problem with corporate planning for parliaments is that it stresses 
the financial aspects of performance measurement just as much, if not more, as 
the non financial ones. It may be a good idea to apply financial indicators and 
cost-benefit analysis to certain public sector organisations, but not to legislatures.
3-5.3 The Balanced Scorecard Approach
The Balanced Scorecard or the Balanced Scoreboard is a method in performance 
measurement created by Robert Kaplan and David Norton in the nineteen 
nineties (1992). The principle of this method is to give a holistic view of the 
organisation by simultaneously looking at four major performance areas: the 
stakeholders and finance; the customers; the internal processing; and innovation 
and continuous learning in the organisation. There is an emphasis on aligning 
long-term strategy with performance (Kaplan and Norton 1996). hi order to 
assure long-term survival, there needs to be a balance between the four 
dimensions of performance.
Due to its flexibility and relative simplicity in producing performance data, 
implementing and updating the data, the method quickly became very popular 
with managers seeking improvement in the performance of their organisations. 
In 2000 between 40%-60% of large US firms had adopted the method (Neely 
2002: 43). As with all performance management methods, the Balanced
102
Scorecard was quickly adopted by public sector organisations and adapted to suit 
multi-purpose systems as well, and to covered accountability issues as well as 
managerial techniques and has been used in state governance projects21 .
The underlying theme of the BSC that needs to be emphasized here is that no 
single measure can provide a clear performance target or focus and that a 
balanced presentation of all measures (financial and operational) are needed. 
These attributes and advantages of the method can be summarised as (Kaplan 
and Norton 1992, 1996, 2001):
The BSC provides a mixture of financial and non-financial measures to 
assess performance
The framework provides information on the four perspectives 
simultaneously, so as to combine the disparate elements of an organisation's 
agenda in one report. These groups have been identified as: Financial, 
Customer, Internal Processes and Innovation and Learning 22 .
21 For instance, the Bush administration has included a 'management scorecard' in its fiscal year 2005 
budget and assigned federal agencies a green, yellow or red light based on how well they are implementing 
the new management agenda (Brewer 2006: 38). The US government has also adopted a 'Government 
performance project' (a joint project among the US government, Syracuse University and the Pew 
Charitable Trust) that has released a 'report card' based on the performance of individual states. Each state 
is graded in four areas: information, infrastructure, money and people. Each of these indicators are then 
assigned an overall grading of A to C (ibid: 37-38).
22 The original four perspectives mentioned by Kaplan and Norton in 1992 were changed in their later paper 
(1996) as: Financial, Customer, Internal Business Process and Learning and Growth. Though it seems that 
the previous perspectives are more fitting in the case of legislatures
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The framework limits the number of measures so as to prevent information 
overload whilst concentrating on the few success factors23 only. The 
measures are chosen in relation to each goal with usually one measure for 
each goal (and each perspective not exceeding five goals)
The framework guards against sub-optimism by forcing managers to 
consider all key operating measures together and how improvement in one 
area may be at the expense of another. It supports strategic communication 
and information flow
The framework is forward-looking. Unlike other methods which rely on past 
data, BSC looks at present data in order to make predictions about future 
performance.
The framework necessitates the involvement of all operational managers 
facilitating cross-functional integration. It is consistent with team work and 
other initiatives of performance management such as continuous 
improvement
The method emphasises cause and effect relationships. It also puts strategy 
and not control at the centre of performance evaluation.
23 The measures in Kaplan and Norton's 1992 paper were around 15 and later (1996) increased to 
around 20 (about four measures for each perspective). Adding too many measures is seen as 
redundant.
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The Balanced Scorecard is mission focused. In other words every perspective 
of the framework is focused on the main mission of the organisation. There 
should be a strong cause and effect linkage between the issues to show the 
relationship between the objectives and the activities leading to performance. As 
a result the relationship can be mapped out showing the activities of the lower 
sections of the BSC linked to the higher goals and objectives that inevitably lead 
to the mission. There is also a focus on the internal activities that are crucial to 
the better performance of the system as a whole. Most activities can be easily 
measured using targets based on actions and their goals.
The BSC is a very flexible and 'needs-led' approach to performance 
measurement (Bourne et al, 2000: 25). It is neither an audit-led, nor a model-led 
approach24 and can only be successful if there is internal consensus among the 
management within the organisation. As Kaplan and Norton propose (1996) in 
order to be able to create a business model using BSC, facilitators from outside 
the institution are required to lead and ensure consensus from within the 
organisation. These facilitators are necessary to keep the organisation focused on 
BSC vision and encourage managers in the implementation of their strategy by 
constantly asking about and maintaining consensus on the objectives to be 
achieved and how they intend to achieve it.
Chapter six will discuss this method in more depth and focus on how the 
balanced Scorecard has been established and adapted by legislatures to measure 
their performance. Since the application of this framework for political
24 A model led approach uses mathematical models to prioritise objectives and measures in order of most 
important to least important. Hence the Analytical Hierarchical approach ( Saaty 1980, 1988).
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institutions is still in very early stages, there have been no practical conclusions 
about the effectiveness of this method. This chapter will instead look at how a 
project carried out by the Canadian Parliamentary Centre, in collaboration with 
the World Bank Institute (WBI) has used the Balanced Scorecard to assessed 
comparative performance of developing legislatures. The objective of this 
programme has been to 'providing parliamentarians, parliamentary staff and 
others who study parliament with practical means to evaluate parliamentary 
performance general standards adapted to the circumstances of each country' 25 .
The parliamentary report card has been designed to test performance in four key 
areas of activity namely:
Legislation
Budget 
Oversight
Representation.
These four areas of legislative services have been evaluated using five 
performance tests:
Level and range of activity 
Openness and transparency
- Participation
- Accountability
Policy and programme impact
25 Quoted from the Canadian Parliamentary Centre website at www.parccnt.ca/indicators/indcx c.php. In an 
attempt to find out more about the programme, I have tried to contact the head of the programme in various 
ways. However, I never got any response (the administrative staff did not respond to my emails either) I 
could not get more information on the programme apart from what they had presented on their website in 
2005 (the website has not been updated since)
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In order to evaluate each area of legislation using one of the performance tests in 
the form of a scorecard, indicators have been developed. The Canadian 
Parliamentary Centre and WBI developed these indicators using a written 
questionnaire which had a total of thirty-seven question (a question for each 
indicator). Each test sheet has been broken down to seven questions (with the 
exception of the second test titled 'openness and transparency' which has nine 
questions). These questions deal with a wide range of issues from parliamentary 
processes and internal performance to the interactions with the external 
environment, including government and non-government organisations, the 
media and the public or constituents.
The resulting scorecard questions have been specifically designed to test 
legislative performance in the budgetary process only. The scorecard has so far 
only been tried out on the Cambodian Legislature and only to the extent of 
analysing the results of the questionnaire (which at best only gives a general 
impression on the current level of performance in the budgetary performance of 
the Cambodian legislature). A total of six respondents have been chosen to 
represent the Cambodian legislature. They include two senators, three members 
of the national Assembly and one representative from the civil society. These 
respondents had to rank the Cambodian legislature using a five point scale. 
'Zero' would indicate that a particular indicator was not present and 'Five' 
would show a strong presence of an indicator. The sum of averages taken from 
all indicators was then applied as the overall assessment of performance in each 
field of parliamentary performance.
107
According to this analysis, the average overall score for performance in the 
Cambodian legislative system is 1.7 which is below the score for an effective 
parliament (the score 2.5 has been considered to be average). This report then 
continues to give a holistic picture of performance in the relation between the 
legislature and the environment and making predictions for future development.
The major problem with this scorecard approach (not a balanced scorecard) is 
that the measures and questions have not been decided on by consensus from 
those who are within the system but jointly decided on by experts in WBI and 
the Canadian Parliamentary Centre. There is no explanation about the scientific 
justification for choosing certain indicators and most importantly the choice of 
respondents to these sets of questions. There is no indication of what kind of 
issues were considered in choosing the participants and what the basis for their 
choice was.
Furthermore, there is no indication as to the choice of the individuals, or scorers, 
and what role they actually played in the management of parliamentary affairs. 
Whether they were chosen because they had in-depth knowledge of workings of 
the Cambodian National Assembly and the Senate (specially in the area of 
budgeting which this performance assessment is said to have emphasised) or 
because these legislators were more available (they had more time to spare, were 
keen to take part in the study or maybe had proficiency of English as the 
questionnaire were written in English). There is also the possibility that 
participants may respond subjectively on the basis of their partisanship. In
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developing legislatures it is more obviously the case that a member of the ruling 
party would rank parliament better than a member of the opposition parties.
Another problem with the scorecard in this project was that a single 
questionnaire, indicative of institutional performance as a whole was sent to both 
members from within the legislature and representatives from the civil society 
(using the same measures). Performance measurement deals with the workings 
of the legislature as an organisation. A BSC model has to be assessed by people 
from within or people, considered as authorities on the subject, with a strong 
knowledge of the functions and activities of parliament (both formal and 
informal) whereas this project chose otherwise. In BSC, the management of the 
organisation should also be involved in performance assessments. Even though 
the public or the customers view on services is strongly considered as one of the 
four perspectives of performance, the question of how the public sees the 
institution should be put to the members of the organisation (as how they think 
that the public sees them). Furthermore, members of the civil society or certain 
interest groups are usually biased towards their own interests and will only see 
parliament performing well if it manages to act on the issues they want to see 
performed. Instead of using a representative from the civil society, this 
assessment would have done more justice to get help from the academia and 
specialists on the Cambodian Legislature with a moral obligation to stay 
scientific and unbiased.
Despite the issues raised here concerning the Canadian Parliamentary Centre's 
flawed use of the Balanced Scorecard to assess developing legislatures in a
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comparative perspective (the problem of comparative legislative performance 
will be elaborated further in the next chapter), the Balanced Scorecard remains 
the most appropriate and most quoted method in the field of performance 
measurement and management. The framework has been designed with an eye to 
help managers measure and improve organisational performances and unlike 
some other performance methods, the balanced scorecard does not give specific 
targets for performance levels. There also is no explicit method for successful 
implementation of performance measurement making the method highly flexible 
based on consensual approval from within the organisation itself on what works 
best in specific circumstances and measures for specific improvement areas can 
be assigned.
- 3-5.4 The EFQM Approach
The European Foundation for Quality Management or EFQM has been the 
European answer to the American Baldrige Awards26 . Both of these two 
performance measurement systems aim at self-assessment in organisations and 
help organisations realise the gaps in the management of organisations and 
simulate solutions. The EFQM model takes a holistic approach to performance in 
the whole of the organisation which is unlike the scorecard method that is 
holistic but at the same time can be broken down to smaller parts of the whole 
and used to measure performance in one specific part only. As a result, the 
framework makes it possible for all the organisation and its environment to be
26 The American Baldridge awards or the Malcolm Baldridge National Quality Awards, are presented 
annually by the US National Institute of Standards and Technology. The website address of the NIST is
http://www.nist.gov
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included in the assessment. EFQM is also a non prescriptive method and leaves 
each organisation to find its own solutions for sustainable excellence using its 
own resources and the framework only as a guide27 .
The procedure starts off with verbal descriptions of the different criteria for 
performance management, which is then translated to numerical grades and then 
combined with the weighted averages (as the method is largely based on self 
assessment of a unit, the comparisons use the unit's own performance figures). 
The chosen criteria are closely linked so that results are caused by enablers and 
enablers receive feedback from results to help improve the overall 
performance28 . In this method, there is a strong emphasis on continuous 
improvement and organisational learning. There is also a clear focus on 
customers (or the users of the system) and the environment. EFQM is a results- 
oriented method which clearly puts pressure on management to reach targets and 
produce results (in business organisations results mean keeping the stakeholders 
satisfied while in public organisations results are more to do with public 
satisfaction).
There has been a fascination with the idea of excellence and the EFQM, not only 
in Europe but all around the world. Not only are business firms and companies 
adapting the model and competing with each other for EFQM's Excellence
The model is based on a nine-criteria framework. The EFQM apportions a total of 100% among these 
nine graded factors: leadership (10%), policy and strategy (8%), people management (9%), processes 
(14%), resources (9%), people results (or satisfaction, 9%), customer results (customer satisfaction, 20%), 
impact on society results (6%) and business results (15%). Five of these criteria are called 'enablers' which 
deal with what the organisation does and four criteria are called 'results' which deal with the outcomes
•JO ____
The EFQM model is basically made of nine criteria, five of which are called 'Enablers' and four are 
'Results'. Enablers cover what the organisation does to achieve its results. 
http://www.efqm.org/default.aspx/tabid=35
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awards (which is considered very prestigious in the business world) but also 
many public organisations, agencies and even schools and hospitals have been 
using the model. As an example, the EFQM has been used by the British 
Government's 'Modernising Government Agenda' programme29 and it has been 
promoted by the public sector benchmarking project that is now better known as 
the 'public sector excellence programme' (Hansard 2000)30 . EFQM has been a 
used as another method of performance evaluation and oversight in Westminster 
as quoted from the documents of Hansard^.
Despite the growing popularity of EFQM in some federal legislatures and use
"^0
among local authorities and government organisations, the British Parliament 
has only stated interest so far as the performance of other organisations are 
involved, not the legislative system itself. The British National Audit Office, 
which scrutinises public spending on behalf of Parliament is also an advocate of 
the EFQM technique and encourages local authorities to use the model to 
improve performance92 . The British Cabinet Office also has a Performance and 
Innovation unit that is set up to help government and non-government 
departments, organisations and agencies adapt the EFQM model.
29 The Modernising Government Agenda is available from the Cabinet Office website at: 
http://www.cahinctofrice.gov.uk/moderngov/pccrrcvicw 4.htm
30 Part of a quote from Mr. lan Me Cartney in Hansard, 20 June 2000 (column 170W)
31 One quoted example in Hansard regarding the use of EFQM in all business units of the Rural Payment 
Agency (RPA) mentions: 'Assess current enabler's ability to deliver required targets and outcomes agreeing 
change to Action Plans by 31 March 2003'.Quoted from the Hansard. 24 July 2004 (Column WA93)
32 For example Warwick local authorities have long been working towards receiving the EFQM public 
sector excellence awards. Full details of their programme carried out in 2002 and how well they scored is 
available from the Warwick local authority website at: http://warwickdc.gov.uk/NR/rdonlvres/B04 
92 Publications from the Audit Office include ' Aiming to Improve: Principles of Performance 
Measurement' (June 2000) www.audit-commission.gov.uk/ac2/Pifirst.htm and 'On target: The practice of 
performance indicators' (June 2000) www.audit-commission.gov.uk/ac2/Pifirst.htrn
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There has been a growing interest in EFQM especially among Northern 
European countries which according to OECD reports on public management 
reforms (PUMA) have a relatively bigger public sector as a proportion of their 
GDPs (OECD 2000). The framework has been very popular, especially in 
places that deal with the budget such as ministries of finance (or treasuries). The 
excellence model has also been used in assessing technological performance of 
the Parliament of Finland (Kaivo-Oja et al 2005: 36). But despite a clear 
commitment to creating a balanced performance measurement system to assess 
performance in all aspects of legislative work, not even the smaller, 'working 
parliaments' of Northern Europe have started to adapt an excellence performance 
measurement model to assess performance in their parliaments as a whole. It 
remains to be seen whether an excellence model will ever take off in such 
institutions.
Adapting the EFQM in legislatures may prove problematic for two main reasons. 
First of all, this method is very time consuming. Since all criteria leading to 
performance need to be assessed together for an indefinite period, a team of 
analysts need to gather frequently and discuss issues and solutions on a 
continuous basis. The bigger and more multifunctional the organisation, the 
more difficult and time consuming it becomes to implement the model. The 
second problem is that even though the method is a relatively low cost way to 
improve performance in profit making organisations, it is still considered as 
rather expensive for organisations feeding from the public purse. Especially
33 OECD/PUMA. 2000. Connecting Government and the Citizens. Document available online at: 
http://www.oecd.org/puma/citizens/aboutwork.htm
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since all changes are of a prescriptive nature and results are seen in the long term 
performance of the institution.
Some organisations see EFQM to be prescriptive as well as prescriptive. The 
Excellence award is quite like the ISO (International Standards Organisation) 
awards with the difference that updating ISO, has become more or less an 
essential requirement of organisations, whilst the EFQM is mainly seen as a 
prestigious status and frequent updating has not become a requirement. 
However, in the case of big corporations and organisations, the award would be 
seen as compulsory as in the case of not having one would mean banishment 
from the excellence community34 .
With these problems it would seem that legislators don't have the time or would 
feel it a waste of taxpayers money to have performance models to assess 
excellence in their institutions. Getting the excellence awards for a legislature 
would mean hard work, institutional changes and commitment to change not 
only from the management but also from all involved parties and groups. 
However, since many developed parliaments already have the facilities to 
conduct such long-term research in areas of their performance, it would seem 
appropriate if some of the techniques used in this method could be tailor made to 
suit certain legislatures with similar performance. Such research would 
definitely benefit comparative legislative performance research.
34 For instance IBM had estimated that in preparing the document that led to its Rochester plant winning 
the Malcolm Baldrige Award in 1990; it took many man-years of effort. Something that only few 
companies can afford (Brown 2006)
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3-6 Conclusion: The Performance of Legislatures as Organic Institutions
In order to determine whether performance measurement is beneficial for 
legislatures and what type of methods could work better to assess quality in 
democratic institutions, it is necessary to understand the place of such 
institutions in relation to their ability to perform. Burns and Stalker (1961: 1 IP- 
121) give a simple typology of organisations which is specifically relevant to 
auditing bodies. In their view organisations are either mechanistic or organic. In 
mechanistic (hierarchical) organisations, positions are specialised and 
differentiated according to the tasks with each functional role having a precise 
definition and a concentration of knowledge at the top of the pyramid. While in 
organic organisations there is a continual redefinition of the content of positions, 
and positions are designed according to special knowledge35 .
Accuracy in mechanistic organisations is important, not benchmarks. It is 
generally agreed that the right amount of input, and the right kind of processing, 
will lead to the precise output. Hence, output can be controlled from the start 
(Deming 1986). Performance measurement is not considered necessary as 
quality improvement in such organisations is about getting each individual part 
right from the start and by building trust, loyalty, good leadership and training 
but not to work toward targets and quotas as they only create adversarial 
relationships and cause low quality and productivity (ibid). Furthermore,
35 Mechanistic organisations are typical of traditional bureaucracies or production firms in a stable 
environment, whereas organic forms are typical of non-hierarchical organisations surviving under unstable 
environmental conditions. The mechanistic types of organisations are control-based and do not require input 
from the environment, except for controlled input that it is provided manually (Burns and Stalker 1961).
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optimisation and improvement of some areas may come at the price of 
worsening performance in others (closed systems).
The problem with mechanical organisations is because environmental factors are 
ignored (or reduced) they cannot give a realistic outcome and so performance 
measurement systems such as TQM cannot be applied. According to Rood even 
when more parts are considered in mechanistic organisations, there is the danger 
that they are all viewed from the same perspective (Flood, 1993: 14). Also 
authority or the leadership at the top of the hierarchy cannot be the sole 
determiners of effectiveness in organisations as it tends to prefer measuring 
short-term effectiveness and targets at the price of long-term efficiency. 
Effectiveness needs to incorporate whether the will of the people (the 
environment) is satisfied and this is an expression of 'well being' (Beer 1981: 
808).
The organic or horizontal approach to organisations portrays measurement as a 
crucial part of business solutions and argues measurement to be the only 
reasonable way of knowing what is happening in complex organisations. These 
organisations are more interactive and rely on improved cooperation and 
linkages between internal parts as well as external customers (as in the case of 
manufacturing and service providing) by encouraging systemic benchmarking to 
evaluate performance, the measures and methods used are conducted towards 
finding efficiency in the different parts of the organisation separately against 
external comparators or standards.
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Organic organisations follow a less controlled and more flexible approach to 
organisational performance. Members and staff are given more individual 
freedom. The ability of the institution to enforce behaviour is more limited and 
employees see themselves as individuals first and then part of a group. There is 
also the sense that members are part of the environment and thus a consideration 
of environmental factors becomes more crucial than in mechanistic 
organisations. Members in organic institutions can even create their own work 
quotas (based on their own professionalism). Therefore, efficiency can only be 
reached if there is consensus among members of clear goals and a sense of 
responsibility toward the organisation is maintained. This, in addition to the 
individual pursuits of members, needs to be in line with the environment it
serves.
Rather than placing legislatures into one distinct group of mechanistic and 
organic organisations or the other, it would be more accurate to see legislative 
institutions as being a continuum from one organisational form to the other. 
Where each individual legislative entity stands on this continuum would be 
related to different factors which are not the aim of this chapter. While it is right 
to claim that some legislatures have more features related to mechanistic 
organisations which would not see a need to performance measurement systems, 
the more established legislatures have moved toward the organic type of 
institutions in which performance measurement would be a sign of telling 
whether there is cohesion between the overall structure and whether the 
connections are firm enough to improve the overall legitimacy of the system in a 
changing environment. This idea will be elaborated further in the next chapter.
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The general problem with the concept of performance is it being a social 
construct, indicating that most measures of performance will be subjective. 
Research on organisational performance has shown that this concept is also 
multifaceted. For instance Boyne (2002) has put organisational performance into 
five categories of outputs, efficiency, effectiveness, responsiveness and 
democratic outcomes. Even in the case of a single entity such as a legislature 
looked at from different angles by different individuals, it becomes obvious that 
each individual will define performance terms differently depending on the angle 
that they have used to look at the institution. An outsider would probably be 
looking at it using general indicators which will not have much to do with the 
actual workings of the organisation.
An insider, by contrast, will model performance based on variables from within 
and the final outcome of the analysis may be completely different from an 
external observer. It is important to note that the concept of performance as 
defined by the insiders of an organisation is more likely to have a unique, 
although many-faceted definition (Lebas and Euske, 2002: 73). If the members 
of a single organisation cannot share the same view on their organisation's 
performance, they cannot coordinate their actions and any exercise of 
performance measurement will be a waste of time and resources. The advantage 
of (democratic) legislatures compared to other organisations is that since those 
inside the organisation represent the public, they are much more aware of the 
views from outside of the organisation.
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So in order to perform well, an organisation needs to have a clear purpose (or set 
of goals) which should be generally agreed by all those who operate from within 
it. It is acceptable if there are slight differences over secondary purposes and 
actions but there must be total agreement on the sole purpose or the most 
important goals of the organisation. In the case of the legislature, all legislators 
(regardless of party) and those involved in the running of parliamentary affairs 
must in principle agree on the general purpose of the institution. The internal 
stakeholders or the legislators will obviously have different opinions on the 
indicators for realising the goals of the institution, but the general goals are the 
same and would be so in all democratically developed legislatures36 . The public 
need only judge on the outcomes that involve them. However, this does not take 
away the significance of the oversight power of the public and other external 
sources of information and research which are necessary for keeping the 
legislature on its toes and performing well in order to give the results that are 
being required from it.
The next step after consensus on the purpose and goals is to find performance 
indicators and targets which is the most challenging part and requires expertise 
from insiders and experts on legislatures 37 . Individual measures should be able to
36 External stakeholders may have differing views on the purposes and measures of performance (probably 
more similar to the financial-based indicators). As they can only judge legislatures from the outside and are 
not in a position (or have no interest) to judge the internal workings of the institution, the external 
stakeholders are only in a position to assess the final legislative outcomes or results (such as decisions or 
services) and the quality of the results.
37 Data collection in this step may be carried out using the three methods available: questionnaires, 
interviews and the study of secondary sources. However, as organisations vary in the extent to which 
performance targets can be precisely described and valid and objective performance indicators are available 
(Smith 1999), there is no guarantee that the results are valid and as objective as possible. For optimal results 
validity tests may be carried out using statistical analysis. But even so, there may not be much consensus 
among different results, however as the next chapter intends show, the similarities are quite significant 
among certain countries and thus there is the possibility of using performance measurement systems for 
their legislatures.
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combine to assess the performance of the organisation as a whole (Neely 2002). 
They should be able to work with other measures in a framework that provides a 
balanced picture of the organisation as a whole. There is no point of working on 
the assessment of an individual measure if it does not contribute to the overall 
performance of the system. The Balanced Scorecard method is probably the best 
method designed so far, which can create a balance in the whole of the system 
while emphasising the parts that need improvement. This performance 
framework will be analysed further in chapter six along with case studies of 
legislative application of BSC.
In conclusion, the idea of using quality methods to measure performance in 
legislatures would create concern and criticisms similar to the concerns that have 
been raised for the use of quality methods in evaluating public sector 
organisations. Some of these concerns and measurements have been mentioned 
in this chapter and as Fredrickson (1993: 5) argues in the case of the American 
government, since policy decisions drive performance:
'The real problems of American government have little to do with management
or administration. Public administration is usually done rather well. The
problems of government have mostly to do with the failure of political will, the
power of interest groups and the weakness in conduct of statecraft by elected
leaders'.
Although it is accepted here that legislatures are not production units, and that
political will is the most important factor in the successful application of any
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kind of legislative performance measurement, the next chapters will first focus 
on determining legislative systems that are more ready to take advantage of 
performance measurement and whether the application of such tools actually 
improves the quality of democracy and enhances the political will to be assessed.
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Chapter Four: Environmental Conditions
4-1 Introduction:
This research uses a system-theoretic approach in the study of legislative 
performance, whereby maintaining and improving system legitimacy is of key 
importance to improving the democratic quality of the system. It is clear that in 
order to understand the performance of legislatures as a subsystem of the polity, 
parameters such as the system (regime) type and stability cannot be ignored. It is 
also clear that these types exist within a spectrum of political systems extending 
from developed democracies to non democracies (Beetham 1992, 1993) and that 
while some systems have already made the achievements necessary toward the 
higher ends of this spectrum, there are many countries that are still in the process 
of reforms. There are also countries that have struggled and failed to incorporate 
institutional changes to improve democratic performance in addition to some 
others that may not have much intent on improving their democratic performance 
as it stands.
The problem with this third group of countries is not to do with the structure of 
their democratic institutions, as many of them have well established 
institutions which often emulates one of the advanced types of legislative 
institutions in form (whether presidential, continental or Westminster style 
legislatures). However, instead of moving towards a functional and open 
democratic system, their legislatures behave merely as a rubber stamp of the
122
authoritarian establishment or are mired by the lack of organisation and control 
in the state. In such cases, democratic reform may not necessarily be a step 
towards improving performance in the legislature and the quality of democracy 
as a whole. In other words democratic growth and development are not aligned 
and in some instances may act as a destabilising force adding to system 
breakdown or anarchy rather than democratic transition.
This chapter has been divided into three parts. The first part is a literature 
analysis of the democratic development and behavioural changes of political 
systems in movements towards democracy and consolidation. This is an effort to 
understand why some legislatures have not managed to evolve as their 
democratic counterparts despite having seemingly similar structures and roles. 
In the second part a Cusp catastrophe model of democratic development and 
change will be presented based on the parameters of democratic development 
argued in this work. This model will be followed by a cross-country statistical 
analysis of the democratic development of political systems to establish the 
validity of the cusp and estimation of the democratic threshold based on 
indicators for the two parameters. In the third part, more statistical tests and 
regression analysis will be carried out in an effort to compare the new data with 
standard datasets used in political research.
The advantage of using non-linear systems, such as the cusp catastrophe, is in 
their dynamism and ability to show behavioural change, discontinuity and 
uncertainty that would not be detected, or be rather vague and difficult to 
determine under a linear system. Catastrophe models also provide for a
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conceptualisation of a threshold (or singularity line) below which the 
relationship between variables are unstable and may lead to a dramatic change 
from one qualitative behavioural form to another (referred to as a 'bifurcation'). 
In order to gain stability, political systems must be able to pass this threshold. It 
is extremely difficult to pin point an exact threshold for each individual political 
system and what is attempted here is an approximation based on the literature 
analysis on democratic development and consolidation and the singularity point 
estimated in the statistical analysis of the Cusp Catastrophe model. To test the 
validity of this model a cross-country statistical analysis of the variables using 
measurements will be carried out with the idea of establishing a new index of 
democratic development aligned to the cusp catastrophe model. The credibility 
of this index is then further tested by correlation analysis and regression analysis 
with standard indices and datasets to strengthen the claim made in this chapter.
Up to now, no model has been provided to show how sudden changes in the 
behaviour of political systems may obstruct their gradual movements towards 
democracy and democratic consolidation (and the application of democratic 
values). Although studies have focused on the theories of development leading to 
democracy as a continuum from non-democracy to democracy, there are slight 
differences over whether democracy is an all or nothing affair (Lipset, 1959, 
Huntington 1968, Dahl 1971, Linz and Stepan 1996) or whether it is possible to 
have degrees of democracy (Przeworski and Limongi 1997, Sen 2001). These 
differences, as explained later, are mainly to do with differences over basic 
definitions of terms such as democracy and the location of a relevant threshold. 
Most of these studies tend to look specifically at the relationships between
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development - usually defined by economic growth - and democracy by 
indicating the dimensions involved in the process and the requisites for linear 
transitions towards democracy. The following section is a brief analysis of the 
most influential research in this field.
4-2 Part One: Transitions to Democracy
Probably the first, most important and controversial research into economic 
development as the precondition of democracy was carried out by Seymour 
Martin Lipset (1959) who compared twenty-eight European and English 
speaking countries with twenty countries of Latin America. He divided the first 
group of countries into two groups of stable and unstable democracies (or 
dictatorships) and the second group of countries into unstable and stable 
dictatorships using his definition of democracy as:
'A political system that supplies regular constitutional opportunities for 
changing the governing officials. It is a social mechanism for the resolution of 
the problem of societal decision making among conflicting interest groups, 
which permits the largest possible part of the population to influence these 
decisions through their ability to chose among alternative contenders for 
political office' (Lipset 1959: 71)
This definition has served as a rough threshold for his analysis, indicating 
whether a country has the potential to be regarded as a democracy or not based
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on factors such as its constitutional stability, social cleavages, democratic history 
and development. In order to compare democratic development, Lipset used a 
range of quantitative indicators based on economic development and the quality 
of life which included measures of wealth (GDP per capita), education and 
urbanisation. The averages of these indicators are then compared leading to 
results that claim to be subsumed under the conclusion that 'economic 
development carries the political correlation to democracy' (ibid: 80). Lipset 
has also argued that the 'more well to do a nation, the more likely it will sustain 
democracy' (ibid: 75). Although he does not go as far as stating that economic 
development causes democracy, which is the theme of modernisation theories 
(Lerner 1958), he establishes a correlation between the two which paves the way 
for a succession of later comparative studies of democracy and development 
(Cutright 1963, Huntington 1968, O' Donnell 1973, Lipset et al 1993, 
Przeworski and Limongi 1997, Przeworski et al 2000, Diamond 1992, 1999, 
Lane and Ersson 1994, Inglehart 1997, Inglehart and Welzel 2005).
Data from comparative studies linking economic development to democratic 
growth have provided strong support for economic development being the main 
driving factor for a rise in the quality of life and political emancipation at the 
mass societal level which leads to democracy. This theory naturally concludes 
that poorer authoritarian countries with lower GDP per capita have less prospects 
of democracy and so the exclusion of civil society (often seen as an impediment 
of growth) must be tolerated at the price of economic growth. As Lipset has 
argued economic development leads to the eventual rise in civil society by 
reducing social cleavages and will eventually bring about a favourable
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circumstance for democracy to be embraced by the majority. So certain 
requisites must first function in a linear mode before democracy can flourish.
Lipset decided to exclude rich authoritarian countries (such as the Middle 
Eastern oil rich states) stating inadequate data as the main reason which limits 
the all-inclusiveness of his argument. Whereas O'Donnell and Schmitter (1986: 
33) see it as highly unlikely that regimes which they call 'Sultanistic' will 
change towards democracy unless there is an armed insurrection from within a 
professionalised military. Huntington (1968, 1984) studying the transformations 
from authoritarian to democratic regimes suggests that it is perhaps easier for 
relatively stable authoritarian countries to evolve into democracies than countries 
that have regularly oscillated between despotism and democracy as the former 
have developed a broad consensus accepting authoritarian norms which can be 
displaced by a broad consensus on acceptance of democratic ones (Huntington 
1984: 210). While Ulfelder and Lustik (2007) argue that development improves 
the prospects of democratisation in all states including authoritarian countries 
that have attempted democracy before.
In criticism of the mechanical, one-way flow of development leading to 
democracy, Rustow (1970) has pointed to the fact that positive correlations 
between economic growth and development must not be mistaken for causality. 
Causality at best provides 'clues to some sort of connection without indication of 
its direction' (ibid: 342). Rustow provides examples of America and Europe in 
the last century of states considered as democracies despite undergoing
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economic growth 1 . For him a process of democratisation can only start with 'a 
deliberate decision on part of the political leaders to accept the existence of 
diversity and unity, and to that end, to institutionalise some crucial aspect of 
democratic procedures' (ibid: 355). Thus establishing democracy is basically a 
process of learning and creating trust between parties and confidence in 
democratic institutions. In other words, the threshold for democracy cannot be 
limited to a range of economic development without other variables intervening 
and that economic growth may be very helpful towards this end, but cannot be 
considered as the main cause2 .
Much of the new research into the relationship between development and 
democracy tends to focus increasingly on finding any intervening variables that 
may be used to explain the varying significance and strength of the relationship. 
Diamond, Lipset and Linz (1995) believe that development enhances (not 
causes) democracy because it enhances certain crucial intervening variables 
which according to them are: 'Capacities for independent organisation and 
action in civil society.... a more equitable class structure (with reduction of 
absolute poverty) and a less corrupt interventionist seeking state' (ibid: 24). 
They believe that where economic development far outstrips the deeper 
structural and cultural changes, the level or the probability of democracy will be 
much lower than expected from a country's level of economic development. But
1 Dahl has added to the debate by pointing out that when Tocqueville had written about 
democracy in America in the 1830s, the country was not economically developed in terms of 
GDP(Dahl, 1971:70).
2 The debate over economic development and growth has been very controversial issue. For 
instance Leftwhich (1996) argues that democracy is not conducive to development, as 
interpreted in economic growth and improvements in the quality of life. He argues there may 
even be a negative relationship between the democracy and growth and has supported his claims 
by referring to the developments in South East Asia.
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in places where these intervening variables emerge through different historical 
processes and traditions, the level and probability of democracy will be much 
greater than what would be predicted merely from the countries GDP per capita 
(ibid). This argument seems to suggest that unlike Lipset's previous argument 
(1959) development and democracy cannot be considered as a straightforward 
and linear process for all countries.
Other scholars such as O'Donnell and Schmitter (1986) and Przeworski et al, 
(2000), Inglehart and Werlzel (2005) also demonstrate that in addition to 
democratisation being a multidimensional process of human development, there 
is a positive, non-linear and a gradual relationship between development and 
democracy3 . These scholars also believe that economic factors alone cannot be 
responsible for transitions to democracy but they act as facilitators once the 
conditions for such transitions are ripe. Przeworski has called this type of 
relationship 'Endogenous' (Przeworski 1991: 101). According to these scholars, 
other factors leading to human development should also be considered which 
will include, but are not dependent on, economic prosperity. In other words 
democracy should not be seen as the end but as a means towards human 
development4 . Such views make way for models to predict transitions and the 
evolution into developing democratic systems, and to bring about the idea of a
3 This study distinguishes between liberalisation and democratisation using O'Donnel and 
Schmitter (1986) definitions of the two terms. Accordingly, liberalisation marks the beginning of 
the democratic process. Liberalisation can exist without democratisation and democratisation 
must be preceded by liberalisation (ibid: 10). These terms seem to suggest that democratisation is 
non linear even though liberalisation is a linear process. Furthermore, liberalisation is a reversible 
process whereas once established, a democracy becomes irreversible.
4 Developmental democracy is discussed in Skar, R. 'Towards a Theory of Developmental 
Democracy'. In Leftwich, A (ed) Democracy and Development: Theory and Practice, 26-46
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qualitative threshold that political systems need to pass before transforming into 
democracy becomes a reality.
Behavioural scientists searching for the factors that underlie democratic 
development have mainly been interested in the politics of transition and the 
dynamics of authoritarian to democratic change and democratic breakdown. 
Transition as it has been known to political scientists is usually considered as the 
'interval between one political regime to another' (O'Donnell and Schmitter 
1986: 6) and 'centres around the establishment of the formal, minimal criteria of 
a democratic regime' (Plasse, Fritz and Ulram 1998: 8). Transitions are 
considered to be complete once free elections, universal suffrage and basic rights 
and liberties are formally respected and secured and an elected, unconstrained 
government is in office or in other words Robert Dahl's concept of Tolyarchy' 
(Dahl 1971). However, this level of democracy does not imply that the 
democracy is efficiently and effectively functioning and as O'Donnell (2001: 
113-115) has argued studies of Latin American countries show that despite 
having institutionalised elections and respecting basic freedoms and coming 
under the umbrella of polyarchies, the distinct variations within the countries 
(that are empirically and normatively evaluated) are likely to effect their 
survival prospects. This argument hints at the reassignment of the commonly 
perceived cut-off point or threshold for democracy that not only includes 
polyarchies, but stable and consolidated democracies.
The tendency to focus on transitions as a process of regime change from non- 
democratic to democratic forms within a specific amount of time (Huntington
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1991: 15) or the breakdown from democratic to non democratic regimes, has 
caused scholars to ignore a substantially large number of transitions that take 
place and mainly consider only two factors, namely the prior regime type and the 
initiator of the transition (Linz and Stepan 1996) to be in place for the successful 
movements towards democracy. However, one example of transitions that are 
often ignored by scholars are political or military coups that present a substantial 
discontinuous change in the behaviour of a system though it may not affect the 
form of the regime type. A good example of a country facing such discontinuous 
transitions is Thailand which is generally regarded as a continuous democratic 
regime despite having a succession of eighteen military coups since the end of its 
absolute monarchy or authoritarian regime in 1932 (Economist 2006)5 .
This study seeks a broader definition of transition and does not limit the term to 
regime change only but a general process of change. The Encarta Dictionary 
(2001: 1534) defines the term transition as 'A process or period in which 
something undergoes a change and passes from one state, stage, form or activity 
to another'. Transition in this study will signify a period or state of change in the 
behaviour of a system, regardless of a change in the regime. As the catastrophe 
model will show there will be a change from one equilibrium state to the other. 
This type of change is usually ignored in other studies and is regarded as 
continuous. For example Przeworski and Limongi (1997) do not differentiate 
between successive authoritarian regimes and have stated "If president Videla or
5 'Thailand's Military Coup: Old soldiers, old habits' The Economist, Sep 21, 2006, 
http//economist.com
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even ayatollahs succeed a shah, we treat it as one continuous spell of 
dictatorship' (ibid: 160, footnote 12).
The independent variable that is usually considered in studies of democratic 
transitions and development is the stability of the system or the persistence and 
durability of democratic regimes over time. Diamond, Linz and Lipset (1989: 
xviii) define a stable regime as 'one that is deeply institutionalised and 
consolidated, making it likely therefore to enjoy a high level of political 
legitimacy'. In other words, these studies all indicate the existence of a certain 
threshold from which a democracy functions effectively and efficiently and 
contributes to the legitimacy and performance of the system of governance by 
maintaining stability. The bulk of these studies provide evidence and support to 
the contention that once democracy becomes consolidated5 , maintaining positive 
economic performance contributes to democratic stability and legitimacy. Thus
5 The concept of 'Consolidation', like democracy, is contestable and there have been various 
definitions given. Linz and Stephan (1996:4) define consolidation to take place when democracy 
becomes the 'only game in town' behaviourally, attitudinally and constitutionally. That is when 
no significant political group seriously attempt to overthrow it; when even in the face of sever 
political and economic crisis the overwhelming majority of people believe that any further 
political change must emerge from within the parameters of democratic formulas; and 
constitutionally when all actors in the polity become habituated to the fact that political conflict 
will be resolved according to the established norms and that the violations of norms will be both 
ineffective and costly (ibid). Diamond (1994, 1995) equates consolidation exclusively with the 
attitudinal dimension by emphasising the creation of legitimacy and terms the behavioural aspect 
of Linz and Stephan as 'Democratic Deepening'. Przeworski (1991) on the other hand builds his 
concept of consolidation using the behavioural aspect and the survival of the democracy. 
Schmitter (1988: 57) sees consolidation as a sum of partial regimes(such as parties, organised 
groups and civil society) which influence the quality of democracy. In order for democratic 
consolidation to be achieved, he believes that these partial regimes must have emerged, but not 
necessary completed. Di Palma (1990, 1991) equates consolidation with an agreement on the 
implementation of democracy, signally the end of democratic transition. Whitehead (1989) also 
views consolidation as a process following transition, even taking up a generation after the 
transition to complete. Valenzuela (1992) insists that consolidation only takes place once the 
formal procedural aspects of democracies change before negative consolidation takes over. 
Despite differences between concepts, one thing that the majority agree on is a period of stability 
following democracy. The length is not really an issue (though it is probably right to say that the 
longer the more consolidated) but the time should be enough for democracy to become 
institutionalised.
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not only does economic development logically precede democratisation and 
shape democratic transitions as modernisation theory purports, but socio- 
economic development is also necessary for a system to pass a threshold toward 
democratic consolidation and stability. Once the threshold is passed, the 
probability of negative consolidation (Valenzuela 1992) becomes less likely as 
the effective democracy has been achieved and democratisation becomes 
irreversible.
Ulfeder and Lustik (2007: 353) have argued that cross-country comparative 
studies that group political systems by regime types are in effect an exercise to 
model the likelihood of states being required to cross a qualitative threshold 
representing the presence or absence of the minimal conditions necessary for 
democracy. A threshold usually refers to a minimum point or a starting point, 
and for a country to be considered a democracy, it has to achieve a certain 
minimum level of indicators that are accepted as the minimum criteria for 
democracy. Diamond (1999: 29) has estimated that at the start of the new 
millennium, sixty percent of the countries in the world were considered to have 
surpassed the threshold for 'procedural democracy', although the number of 
countries that have institutionalised democracy cannot be as large. According to 
Vanhanen (1997: 41) the reasonable minimum threshold for democracy with 
regards to competition and participation, would probably be around thirty 
percent competition and fifteen percent participation. Though he later argues that 
many countries that are just above this threshold are not really democracies and 
political systems just below the threshold are not much different democratically 
from those that are slightly above the threshold (ibid). These two different
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thresholds represent the ambiguity and vagueness that exists in defining and 
measuring a threshold for democracy and the problem of finding a universally 
accepted threshold will be just as hard as finding a universal definition for 
democracy.
However, if a threshold for consolidated democracy could be found, then with 
the passage of this threshold, a political system's overall improvement of the 
quality of democracy becomes the key issue of its performance. Linz and Stepan 
(1996; 14-16) have addressed the issue of a consolidation threshold by arguing 
that toward the end of the twentieth century, a growing number of countries as 
well as developed democracies had completed their democratic transition and 
were now attempting to consolidate their democracies. Once consolidated, these 
democracies may be placed on a continuum from low quality to high quality 
democracies and the main task ahead would now be how they could attempt to 
improve their performance by means of moving up on this continuum. Thus it 
would seem that a consolidation threshold would not only sound more logical, 
but it may also be easier to locate a minimum criteria for consolidation that is 
more universally accepted. This idea will be discussed further later in the 
chapter.
Despite differences in the distinction of the threshold, the idea of gradual 
movements toward democracy has been mentioned by scholars from different 
viewpoints. While some like Sartori (1987) see a distinct line between 
democratic and non-democratic states, others like Dahl have a more evolutionary 
view of democracy, which makes the distinction of a precise threshold fairly
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difficult to achieve. In the transition to democracy, Dahl, along with Bollen and 
Jackman, have referred to a mid-area between democracy and non-democracy. 
They suggest that: 'Many significant changes in regimes involve shifts within, 
into and out of this important area' (Dahl et al., 1989: 615). Perhaps they are 
referring to a qualitative threshold with the mention of 'shifts' to and from this 
contested area.
It should be pointed out here that to pinpoint an exact line that transforms 
political states into two very different concepts of democracy and non- 
democracy is probably not doable and is undesirable. As Przeworski et al (2000) 
claim, placing regimes on one side or the other of a dichotomy distinguishing 
democracies from dictatorships can only result from bad rules or insufficient 
information. However, this does not rule out the existence of a threshold that 
marks the sustainable development of institutionalised or consolidated 
democracy. In Democracy and the Market, Przeworski (1991) has hinted that 
above a certain point of democratic development there can only be one 
equilibrium state, which is generated by a compliance between the institutional 
rules and behaviour or as he has assumed 'the equilibrium of decentralised 
strategies of all the relevant forces' (ibid: 71). The advantage of using a 
catastrophe model here is not just to offer help on locating a new threshold point, 
but due to the existence of two equilibrium space below singularity, to show and 
at best offer predictions on how premature attempts of democratisation can 
potentially end up if the necessary elements to sustainable democracy are not in 
place. In the following section a description of this model and its control factors 
will follow after a brief introduction of catastrophe theory and its uses.
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4-3 Part Two: Catastrophe Theory
In this part of this research a cusp catastrophe model will be used to show that 
democratic development may only be considered as linear once above the 
consolidation threshold. Below this threshold sudden movements and changes in 
some indicators or factors of democratic development may lead not only to 
discontinuous change but also stunt democratic growth towards consolidation. 
This theory has been used in this work to essentially justify the differences 
between legislative systems on either side of the consolidation threshold or 
singularity which allows this study to explain why measurement frameworks to 
assess performance in legislatures may be successfully implemented for some 
legislatures and not all.
Catastrophe theory offers a new non-linear approach to the analysis of 
behavioural change in movements toward democracy and is particularly useful at 
predicting discontinuous change in structural forms. Despite linear models 
proving to be a very useful in dealing with scientific empirical analysis, there has 
been a steady rise in deterministic non-linear and qualitative approaches in social 
scientific thinking and more specifically the use of Chaos and Catastrophe 
theories in addressing dynamic continuous behaviour and discontinuous change7 .
7 Chaos and Catastrophe theories in particular are increasingly used to treat interactive political 
behaviour within diverse masses and conflict analysis. These two theories are joined together by 
the fact that they are both non-linear and deterministic and dynamic (as opposed to static) 
models. However, the two are also very different as a chaotic process is random and has an 
irregular cycle, whereas in catastrophe theory the change is controlled by the parameters and the 
transformation from one form to the other will only occur after a parameter value change. 
According to Courtney Brown (1995a: 69) Chaos and Catastrophe theories are both suitable in 
situations in which there is one case and many time points as for instance in changes or 
behaviour over time. However, Chaos theory cannot be used there are many cases but only one or 
a few time observations like a cross-country analysis over a definite time period. As the analysis
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A catastrophe is described as 'Any violent or sudden change representing a 
discontinuous response of a system to smooth changes in the external condition' 
(Arnold 1984: 2). In a broad sense, a catastrophe is any discontinuous transition 
that occurs when a system can have more than one stable state, or can follow 
more than one stable pathway for change. In other words a catastrophe is a 
'jump' from one state or pathway to another (Woodcock and Davis 1991: 42). 
The transition is considered to be discontinuous not because there is no other 
pathway or state, but because none of those states are stable.
A dramatic change from one qualitative behaviour to another is referred to as a 
Bifurcation which is central to catastrophe theory. A bifurcation is also described 
as an event that occurs in the evolution of a dynamic system in which the 
characteristic behaviour of the system is transformed (Brown 1995a) and occurs
o
when an attractor , or a specific point on the system, changes in response to 
change in the value of a parameter. Thus, the fundamental characteristic of a 
catastrophe is the sudden disappearance of one attractor, combined with the 
dominant emergence of another attractor. (Ibid: 53)
in this chapter will be of the latter kind, the use of chaos theory is redundant. Chaos theory has 
been used in analysis of electoral change over periods of time (Weisberg 1998) who argues that 
electoral time is discontinuous. Hence the amount of change found in a series depends on the 
frequency of measurements. Me Burnett (1996) has also used Chaos theory to show how poll 
predictions for Mondale in 1984 nominating campaign was so unsteady that his likelihood of 
winning the nomination was unpredictable. More examples of the use of chaos theory in social 
sciences are available in the chapters Chaos Theory in Social Science, (Kiel and Elliot 1996) 
which bring evidence of chaos theory used in studies on behavioural behaviour, game theory, 
axiomatic choice theory, decision making and conflict analysis.
8 Another difference between chaos and elementary catastrophe theory is that the attractor in 
chaotic systems are dynamic and irregular, whereas the attractor in the catastrophe model is a 
static point (Brown 1995a)
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Catastrophe theory was created in the late 1960s by French mathematician, Rene 
Thorn and was viewed by some to be just as important as for instance the 
discovery of calculus by Newton (Kilmister 1973: 32). The idea of discontinuity 
and qualitative change is found in all fields of science such as chemistry, 
biology, psychology, linguistics, sociology and economics. The theory became 
very popular in the 1970s as a revolutionary approach to qualitative change and 
predictions . In sociology, it was famously applied to model institutional 
disturbances and prison riots (Zeeman, 1976) 10. In political science, catastrophe 
theory was applied to predicting trends and changes in political behaviour and 
understanding political turmoil, revolutions, swings in public opinion and voting 
behaviour. For example Brown (1995b) has used the model to suggest that in the 
1980 US presidential election voter feelings for the Democrats declined 
gradually and at some point voters rapidly abandoned support for Carter and 
changed their views on Reagan.
Catastrophe theory has been criticised for the difficulty it presents in quantifying 
the parameters used in its models which as a result limits its predictions and 
forecasts (Bird, 1997: 143). It has also been said to lack mathematical foundation 
and also that its statements about abrupt change just confirms general
As Catastrophes are considered as extreme examples of non-linear phenomena, endless 
examples of such chance may be found in nature. A simple kind of catastrophe would be 
particles and grains of sand aggregating into a sand pile. As every grain of sand is added, the pile 
gets higher and higher and eventually they reach a critical point after which any additional 
particle is likely to produce, periodic avalanches (meaning catastrophes of sand down the side of 
the pile). The simple addition of sands to the pile may be considered linear but the avalanche 
cannot be linear process but a profound discontinuity in the aggregate behaviour of the pile (Bak, 
Chen and Creutz, 1989). The famous example of a cusp catastrophe model is the observable 
changes in a dog's behaviour from an attacking mode to a fleeing one by gradually increasing the 
levels of rage or fear in the animal (Zeeman, 1977).
10 This article was commissioned by the British Home Office and published in the British Journal 
of Mathematical and Statistical psychology, Volume 29, 1976, pp.66-80.
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knowledge9 (Sussman and Zahler 1978). From the point of view of some 
observers, catastrophe theorists were loosely associating all phenomena that 
contain some element of rapid change to one kind of catastrophe model. To 
avoid this type of criticism this chapter will back up the argument made by using 
the relevant algebraic structures and statistical analysis to form the cusp using 
measurements and strengthen the claims made 10 . Even though measurements 
can be applied to indicate exact locations, the theory does not attempt to replace 
empirical, quantitative studies. Instead this theory intends to demonstrate the 
conditions under which a qualitative change may occur and to bring awareness 
about the probabilities of such predictive change 11 .
In catastrophe theory there are three states of equilibrium: stable, semi-stable and 
unstable. As in any open system, the stable equilibrium is in no way static but 
more resistant to change in comparison to the other two equilibriums (it is 
similar to a spinning gyroscope and or the concept of 'potential energy' in 
physics) Thus, a catastrophe occurs when there is a sudden shift in potential 
energy that causes an unstable equilibrium to transform into a stable state which 
is illustrated in figure 4-1.
Q
In fact, Thorn wrote in a student magazine of the French Mathematical Institute in 1973 that 
although any phenomena could be explained by a suitable model from catastrophe theory, but 'a 
theory that explains everything was actually explaining nothing!' indicating that he was aware of 
the limited value of theoretical models compared to a quantitative law of physics on an 
experimental trial (Quoted in Woodcock and Davis, 1991: 39).
10 It must be stressed that catastrophe theory is in some ways similar to a map without a scale. In 
other words, while the theory can tell us about the locations but it cannot give the exact 
distances or the size. Hence the use of algebraic structures and measurements are important to 
prove statistical validity.
11 Thorn believed that since quantitative methods are statistical, they could not satisfactorily 
explain complex processes. In his view the qualitative stability of a process is more important 
than its quantitative complexity as a clear-cut result can always be reached under considerable 
quantitative variation but the important fact is that the process should maintain its qualitative 
stability despite quantitative change. This process has long been used in science as 'homeostasis' 
meaning the ability to preserve (Waddington, 1972).
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Unique Minimum
I
Point of Inflection
Local Maxima
Figure 4-1: Catastrophe or a sudden transformation in potential energy 12
The illustration above is a simple transformation or catastrophe using five 
energy graphs. The application of energy to the first from the left, leads to a 
succession of change from a stable equilibrium (or unique minimum) towards a 
complete change in the state of equilibrium as seen in the final graph. These 
changes make way for the unavoidable change in potential energy leading the 
ball to jump to its new equilibrium state. The only way that can prevent the 
catastrophe is to prevent the formation of the second equilibrium point. In other 
words, the qualitative shape of the curves in the patterns is important and can 
change up to a certain point. However, once that certain point is reached by 
creating a new equilibrium, which in effect destroys the old equilibrium, the 
catastrophe is inevitable. The graphs can be reversed with a change in potential 
energy leading to a 'Hysterics Cycle' (Zeeman, 1977).
If the above graphs were in a three dimensional space, one could imagine a plate 
or a surface instead of the lines. In place of the curve, there would be a fold
12 This illustration has been taken from Zeeman (1977: 11). Zeeman's version consists of seven 
graphs. However as the purpose of bringing these graphs is to explain the Cusp Catastrophe 
which does not require two local minima (as with some of the other models), only five of the 
original graphs sufficed.
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(figure 4-2) which enables a catastrophic jump from one surface to the other 
surfaces and the concept of a dynamic equilibrium to be better understood. In 
this case any variation in the potential behaviour or v would depend on the 
combination of the two values x and z. The two latter lines effect the elevation 
of the curve on the surface and as a result the nature of the fall. Thus the two 
variables x and z are considered as the 'Control Variables' and are essential for 
a Cusp Catastrophe model. 13
Control Factor x
Control Factor z
t
Behaviour 'v'
Figure 4-2: A Cusp Catastrophe Model (Zeeman 1977)
It must be emphasised that small changes in the parameters of the catastrophe 
system do not necessarily lead to catastrophes, but normally produce small 
changes in a trajectory's or attractor's dependent variable. Zeeman has referred 
to type of change as a Divergence (Zeeman 1977: 18). A catastrophe is a drastic
13 There are seven elementary catastrophe models: the fold, the cusp, the butterfly, the swallow 
tail, the hyperbolic, the elliptic and the parabolic. However as the last three are five to six 
dimensional, they are considered as 'Umbilic catastrophic graphs' and are seldom used.
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form of behavioural change when an attractor reaches the cusp or the catastrophe 
point in the non-linear system resulting in an oscillation or transformation in 
behaviour that would not have been predictable in a linear system. As mentioned 
there are many examples of the phenomena in different areas of social science 
one of which (Zeeman 1977) is presented below and is a cusp catastrophe model 
to predict the behaviour of nations at time of war. 13 The control variables in this 
example are costs and threat and the state variable represents the type of policy 
to be adopted by each nation and ranges between the aggressive or hawkish 
mode on one side and the appeasing or dovish mode on the other side of the 
scale.
Figure 4-3: A Cusp Catastrophe model of political 
Decision-making (Zeeman 1977)
13 This model was widely used at the time of the cold war in predicting the behaviour of cold 
war adversaries. More examples of models based on Catastrophe Theory, can be found in 
Zeeman (1977), Woodcock and Davis (1979,1991) and Saunders (1980,1995)
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The first path in this figure represents a hawkish country, which initially judges 
the treat and cost of war to be low. It therefore has an aggressive policy (or if at 
war can afford to escalate it). However, if the threat remains the same but the 
costs increase beyond a certain point (represented by C) there would be 
catastrophic jump toward a less aggressive and more appeasing policy. The 
second path represents a country facing a high cost and low threat. The chosen 
policy would be to avoid military action even if the threat is increased. However 
if the threat gradually increases up to a certain point (represented by D), there 
would be a sudden jump in the behaviour toward aggression and war, regardless 
of high costs.
4-3.1 A Cusp Catastrophe Model of Democratic Development and Change
It is possible to use a cusp catastrophe model to explain behavioural changes of 
political systems in transitions to democracy and consolidation. The model 
consists of two control variables, resulting in three control spaces that determine 
the behaviour of the political systems used in the following analysis and to 
indicate whether the continuous changes affecting each attractor would lead to a 
catastrophe (discontinuous change in their equilibrium states) 14 . The behavioural 
variables (shown in figure 4-4) range from anarchic to authoritarian with
It should be noted that this model would show generally behavioural changes of the political 
system in the movement towards democracy not predicting legislative behaviour which would 
require a different model (a historic analysis of a single legislature is not the intention of this 
study, nor a cross country study of legislative systems). However, as legislatures are major 
institutions in any political system, any behavioural changes in the system would inevitably 
affect the legislature just as much.
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democratic behaviour in the centre and above the fold 15 . If the equilibrium state 
of an attractor is closer to the cusp or the edges of the fold, then its behaviour is 
more likely to represent one form of extreme non-democratic behaviour. In this 
model the various forms of authoritarian behaviour is to the right of the cusp 
(the right hand side of the surface G) and any form of anarchic behaviour will be 
to the left of the cusp (on the right hand side of G).
Authoritarian behaviour in this model is used to refer to all the different kinds of 
political systems ranging from various types and degrees of authoritarian 
behaviour. Authoritarian behaviour suggests a continuum and ranges from 
complete autocracy, despotism, personal dictatorships, totalitarian, military rule, 
theocracy, and single- party rule to milder levels of centralised bureaucracies 
(Linz 2000), hybrid and semi democracies (Diamond 2002), illiberal democracy 
(Zakaria 2003), competitive authoritarian (Levitsky and Lucan 2002) up towards 
majority rule and capitalism (market rule) in the space above the cusp 16 .
The term 'Anarchism' usually denotes chaos and disorder, even though (like 
authoritarianism) it has many levels and degrees. In The Politics of 
Individualism Susan Brown (1993: 106) writes:
15 The area under the fold is technically a grey area involving uncertainty and stochastic 
processing. Thus this study has decided to avoid the complications of analysing this area and 
shall refer to it as inaccessible.
16 Some of the different forms of this type of equilibrium state are found in Linz, J
(2000)Totalitarian and authoritarian Regimes, O'Donnell, G and Schmitter, P (1986) 'transitions
from authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions about Uncertain Democracies' Diamond, L.
(2002) 'thinking about Hybrid Regimes' Zakaria, F (2007) The future of Freedom: illiberal
democracy at home and abroad', Levitsky, S and Lucan, A (2002) The Rise of Competitive
authoritarianism'.
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'While the popular understanding of anarchism is of a violent, anti-state 
movement, anarchism is a much more subtle and nuanced tradition than a simple 
opposition to government power. Anarchists oppose the idea that power and 
domination are necessary for society, and instead advocate more co-operative, 
anti-hierarchal forms of social, political and economic organisation'
Anarchism, like democracy, is an abstract term and, even though full anarchism 
can never be achieved, anarchic behaviour is quite apparent at higher levels of 
consolidated democracy. Similar to authoritarian behaviour, anarchic behaviour 
is also presented as a continuum of having different forms and strengths 
ranging from the worst 'rule of the jungle' to feudalism, tribalism and warlords, 
on to civil anarchism and liberal democracies as they move further up from 
singularity of the cusp model. In addition, the type of democratic behaviour a 
state has and the level of democracy it chooses to apply would determine its 
location from the edge of the fold and whether it is to the right or the left of the 
graph 17 . One thing that experience has shown is that democracy cannot be taken 
merely as the rule of the people whose will is determined by representatives the 
majority elects. The reason being is that such rule can easily be manipulated and 
abused by non-democratic regimes and passive or drifting societies.
Figure4-4 is an adaptation of a simple cusp catastrophe model for changes in 
democratic behaviour of a state. The two control factors in this model, x 
represents the levels of Human Development in a country as (the arrow points
17 The types of democracy may include, 'radical democracy, social democracy, liberal 
democracy, guided democracy and consociational democracy'. These terms have all been taken 
from the book 'Democracy in the Third World' by Robert Pinkney (2003)
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towards increased human development) and z shows the degree of the 
decentralization of political control signifying political freedom and the free flow 
of information as the second parameter for democratic governance (again arrow 
points to increase in democratic governance). D represents the unique 
equilibrium or total democracy 18 . According to the cusp catastrophe model, this 
point is seldom or never reached due to the flux in the control factor z.
According to this model democratic states should fill the upper section of the 
graph close to D and the amount of democratic behaviour of each state will be 
indicated with the proximity to this point. In situations where the level of 
democratic development is quite low but there is a relatively high degree of 
political centralisation in a state, another kind of unique equilibrium will exist (to 
the right of the graph below singularity). This equilibrium would indicate some 
kind or non-democratic authoritarian rule. There would also be a unique 
equilibrium state if the first parameter remains low but the second parameter 
increases. This equilibrium state reflects a type of anarchic behaviour, which 
under the point of singularity could reflect uncontrolled violence or any other 
form of chaos. If the level of human development is low but it is in balance with 
the second control parameter, it is possible to have two types of equilibria. 
Below singularity, the political behaviour is volatile and can swing between two 
equilibrium states. Figure 4-4 illustrates this situation on plate G which has been 
divided into two surfaces via a fold. The upper and lower sheets are projected by 
two threshold lines (indicated in the figure). These lines separate the two
18Total democracy is an abstract term as no practical system of government can ever be 
considered as completely democratic. According to Skar, every system is 'an Aristotelian 
mixture of democracy in terms of power to the people and oligarchy, or the rule of the few'. 
(Skar, 1996: 27-28)
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equilibria. The width of the threshold depends on the level democratic 
development. In this model, the lower the level of human development, the more 
drastic the change would be from one type of equilibrium to another.
As shown in the last example, it is possible that all attractors diverge and pass 
the democratic threshold without necessarily going through a catastrophe. A 
catastrophe is the most drastic change that occurs only if the control factors do 
not rise or fall in accordance with the changes required. Moreover the 
observation of changes to levels of the control factors makes the prediction of 
catastrophes easier. In this model, if the two control factors increase smoothly, 
then usually an equilibrium state can transform continuously without the need for 
a catastrophic change. Paths a and b represent two equilibrium points (in two 
different environments) that transform to democratic states without any need to 
undergo a catastrophe. The control and splitting factors and the measurements 
used in this model, along with the reason for the choice of measurements, will be 
explained below.
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A 6
Figure 4-4: a cusp catastrophe model of democratisation
4-3.2 Determining the Parameters of the Cusp Catastrophe Model
As mentioned a cusp catastrophe model requires two sets of control parameters 
one of which (the normal factor) represent a continuous range of potential 
values. The catastrophe results from a rapid or sudden change in the second 
control parameter forcing the trajectory to pass over the lip of the cusp and 
relocate to the upper or lower portion of the fold. The first control parameter in 
this model as mentioned is the level of democratic development is taken as the 
sum of socio-economic modernisation and the creation of a democratic culture 
that is most important bringing about effective democracy and strong 
governance. This research is of the opinion that the common denominator for
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such socio-economic development towards consolidation is human 
development19 . The enhancement of human development is a universal goal for 
development and democracy, where democracy is not seen as the target for 
development but as a means for development, thus, raising the threshold of 
democracy from formal standards of democracy to consolidation and efficiency 
through democracy.20
The Human Development Index (HDI) will be used as the comparative rankings 
of indicators used for measuring the degree of democratic development. This 
index is published annually in the Human Development Report (HDR) by the 
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)21 and was developed in the 
1990s by a group of prominent economists led by Mahbub Ul Haq. Although the 
theme of this index is development, it does not only rely solely on economic 
development and is based on four essential components of Equity, Sustainability,
19 The idea that the components of Human Development contributes to the rise of democracy is 
not new and has been promoted by socio-economic scholars of democracy and modernisation as 
mentioned before. Diamond, Lipset and Linz (1995: 24-25) summarised the overall relationship 
between development and growth as,
'Development enhances the prospects of democracy because it enhances several crucial 
intervening variables...capacities for independent organisation and action in civil society...a 
more equitable class structure (with the reduction of absolute poverty) and a less corrupt 
interventionalist seeking state. Where economic growth far outstrips these deeper structural and 
cultural changes, the level or probability of democracy will be much lower than expected from a 
country's level of economic development. But where these intervening variables have emerged 
through different historical processes, the level or probability of democracy will be much greater 
than that which would be predicted merely from a country's per capita GDP' 
The Human Development Index was created in the 1990s as a result of those arguments and as a 
result for the need to promote individual choice along with development (Vanhanen 
1997).Scholars generally agree that economic development is associated with predictable 
changes towards increasingly rational, tolerant, trusting and self-expressive values that emphasis 
democracy and is a measure of human development. However, the argument of human 
development as 'choice' or the capacity of humans to choose the lives they want as an ultimate 
measure of social progress has been raised by a number of scholars in the past decade and has 
been promoted by scholars such as Sen, A (2000) ' , Welzel, Inglehart and Klingemann (2003) 
The Theory of Human Development: A cross-cultural analysis' as well as Inglehart (2003) 
'Human values and social Change'.
20 Amartya Sen has famously quoted that 'A Country does not have to be fit for democracy; 
rather it has to become fit through democracy' (Sen 2001: 4)
21 These reports can be accessed freely from the UNDP website at http://hdp.undp.org/global
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Productivity and Empowerment (Mahbub ul Haq 1996: 16)22 . The Human 
Development Index is usually considered as the most original and best known 
composite index of human development. It is a summary measure of a country's 
average achievement in attaining (HDR 2008: 2):
- A long healthy life (measured by life expectancy at birth)
- Access to knowledge (measured by two indicators of adult literacy rate 
and the combined gross enrolment ratio in primary, secondary and 
tertiary education 
A decent standard of living (measured by per capita GDP) 23
However, the HDI is not faultless as like all other ranking systems. The UNDP 
admits to the difficulties in using statistical methods to measure cultural liberties 
and the fact that in some instances, the report relies on individual countries to 
provide some of the data (some countries may find it in their interests to hide and 
distort some figures). This problem has been adressed over the years as the 
UNDP now uses data from international organizations and agencies as well as
22 The first Human Development Report in 1995 worked out the concept of Human Development 
and its measurement. It explored the relationship between economic growth and Human 
Development showing that growth is necessary but not essential. The Basic arguments of the 
report were:
- Development must put people at the centre of its concerns
- The process of development is to encourage all human choices, not just income, so that the 
Human Development concept focuses on all society not just the economy
- Human Development is concerned with expanding and ensuring the full use of these 
capabilities (through enabling processes)
- The Human Development approach defines the ends of development and analyses the options 
for achieving them (Human Development Report 1995: 122)
23 The Report also take into account the state of a country's health and nutrition, knowledge and 
literacy, security, human freedoms (political, cultural an economical) and participation. Thus, 
HDI can also be used to indicate the trend in governance in a country.
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government sources, and governments have become more open to information 
and information techniques have improved considerably.
A second criticism of the HDI is the argument that the index is really not much 
different from a cross country measure of GDP per capita. Wolfers (2009) has 
claimed that since the correlation between HDI and GDP is 0.95 and a scatter 
plot of one against the other looks like a 45 degree line plus measurement error24. 
The first problem with this claim is that it fails to acknowledge that any two 
indexes which measure democratic development and use a large number of 
samples (HDI has 179 sample countries) is bound to have a high correlation 
score as will be discussed later in this chapter. Diamond (1992: 100-2) has 
compared his Combined Index of Political Freedom with HDI and GDP and has 
found that the correlation between HDI and his index (0.71) is considerable 
higher than with GDP (0.51), hence concluding that 'the contribution of 
economic development to democracy is substantially mediated through 
improvements in physical quality of life' (ibid: 107). A similar argument to this 
claim has been made by Lane and Ersson (1994). A study of the correlations 
between HDI and GDI over a period of time from 1990 to 2006 shows a much 
lower correlation of 0.43 between the two indexes which seems to indicate that 
changes in health and education appears to be different to GDP25 .
24 Wolfers, J (2009) 'What Does HDI Measure?' Freakonomics Blog, The New York Times, May
22, 2009 http://freakonomics.blog.nvtimes.com/author/justin-wolfers/
25UNDP (2009) 'What Does the Human Development Index Really Measure? Human
development Reports, Media Centre, UNDP, 1 June 2009.
http://hdr.undp.org/en/mediacentre/announcements/title.18792.en.html
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Apart from the general acceptance of the Human Development Index being the 
best systematic source of information of the overall state of development in 
nations and the trend of democratic development, the fact that the index 
formulation and data collection are carried out by the United Nations also adds to 
its objectivity, credibility, and reliability. Hence the advantages of using HDI 
outweigh the disadvantages as a basis for comparative developmental studies.
However, the main reason for the choice of this index in this research is that 
country rankings cannot change considerably from one year to the next as two of 
its most important indicators, namely adult literacy and life expectancy, are slow 
to change2 . This means that even if a country is able to boost its GNP, 
politicians cannot use GDP alone to claim short-term political gains and need to 
build long-term structural policies with an eye for future development in the long 
term. This condition is perfect for the cusp catastrophe model since one of the 
control parameters, or the normal factor, must be relatively stable and unlike the 
second parameter, or the splitting factor, its indicators cannot make sudden 
changes. The HDI ranking is more or less stable and will not notice massive 
change in its rankings despite continual growth or decline in certain variables. 
Because of this stability there is no need to collect data (apart from some 
economic data) annually. The 2006 HDR has used the same data collected in 
2004 HDR from certain indicators such as life expectation and the percentage of
26 As stated indicators such as life expectancy at birth, adult literacy and gross enrolment for 
primary, secondary and tertiary education require long term planning and do not change in the 
short term. Although indicators such as gross enrolment and average incomes may vary from 
year to year, but when expressed as national averages, they still will not correlate much with 
policies that raise enrolment among illiterate communities or tackle income poverty among the 
most deprived. See Human Development report 2004. http:^dr.undp.org/global/2004
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people in secondary and tertiary education27 . So despite some difficulties facing 
the HDI, its advantages outweigh the disadvantages as a basis for comparative 
developmental studies.
The splitting factor, or second control parameter of this model will consider the 
amount of political freedom and decentralisation of political power. In simple 
terms, decentralisation is the transfer of powers, resources and responsibility 
from higher to lower levels in a political system which entails various types of 
powers including political, fiscal and administrative. In order to decentralise 
politically, a democracy should be able to credibly guarantee the prerogatives of 
subunits, and must possess a strong media that can freely defend the rights of the 
subunits. The classical argument for decentralisation is that it increases the 
efficiency and responsiveness of government (Musgave and Musgave 1973: 80- 
81, Oats, 1972); reduces poverty; increases participation; delivers pubic services 
( Sen 1999, 2001, Fritz and Menocal 2006); and impacts directly on good 
governance (Hayek 1939, Mckinnon and Nechiyba 1997).
The United Nations Capital Development Fund (UNCDF) has stated in its 1999 
evaluation report that 'There is no simple one dimensional, quantifiable index of 
the degree of decentralisation in a given country' (UNCDF 1999: 167). Since 
there is no consensus on the precise definition and the outcomes of 
decentralisation, it becomes very difficult to apply a comprehensive approach to
27 With a view to the stability of this index, data from the 2004 HDI index will be used 
throughout this study (this data appears in appendix 1).
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measuring the concept28 . However, since the type of decentralisation considered 
in this model is in the form of political power and the increase in political 
freedom (as the factor distinguishing democratic and non-democratic 
development) the existence of a free and independent media plays a pivotal role 
in the process of political decentralisation and strengthening democracy, good 
governance and human development. A catastrophe model is able to predict 
whether the balance between the degree of media freedom and the level of 
democratic development in a political system is at a healthy equilibrium or not. It 
would be highly unlikely that those systems which cannot maintain a healthy 
balance between these two control factors can make gradual changes in their 
behaviour towards a more sustainable democracy.
A free press contributes to human development by addressing the right of 
freedom of expression, strengthening responsiveness, transparency and 
accountability of governments and providing a plural platform and channel of 
political expression for different groups and interests that is essential for the rise
28 The complexities of assessing decentralisation can be seen in the case of China for instance, 
which is categorically centralised but may also develop forms of decentralised planning. On the 
other hand a federal state, like India, may carry out centralised policies. Another example can be 
seen in an OECD study that has shown a country like Denmark (where central government 
tightly regulates virtually every aspect of local government finance) as more decentralised than 
the United States (Joumand and Kongrud 2003). Thus the actual degree of decentralisation isn't 
central to democracy, but it is the appropriate balance between centralised and decentralised 
policy that is important to providing strong management to human development and in a 
transparent way.
Another important factor to bear in mind in assessing decentralisation is that different types will 
involve different measures. All political systems, irrespective of their democratic credentials, 
have allowed for some degree of decentralisation in their economy, finance and administration. 
This has to a certain extent allowed them to maintain stability without the need to decentralise 
politically leading to the idea that development may not necessarily lead to democracy. Tiersman 
(2000) has even argued that while some types of decentralisation have improved governance, 
other forms have impaired it. So it is fair to say, that while some aspects of decentralisation are 
strongly related to democracy and human development, other aspects are not as strongly related 
and in the case of economic policy, a strong regulation of a central democratic power may even 
be more beneficial to the rise of human development
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of an active society, democratic consolidation and better institutional quality 
(Etzioni 1968, Sen 1999, Przeworski et al 2000, Islam 2003, Morris 2008)29 . By 
serving as watchdogs, a free press improves democratic governance by 
informing on policy agenda, decreasing corruption and poverty. According to 
Sen, the independent press 'Enhances the voice of the poor people and generates 
more informed choices about economic needs and priorities' (Sen 1999: 26)30. 
Sen has argued that political freedom has a constructive relationship with human 
development since the former can help define the substantive content of the latter 
(ibid).
Norris claims that where the media has failed to act as a civic forum, democratic 
consolidation has been hindered and even reversed (2008: 190-191) and the 
quality of democracy remains limited in places where there is considerable 
control or state monopoly over media, effectively reducing accountability and 
responsiveness. In her book, Driving Democracy (2008) Norris has argued that 
the structure and independence of the mass media (which she, in common with 
other writers, calls the 'fourth estate') is one of the four fundamental building 
blocks and institutional features of consolidated democracies. In a case study, 
she compares Uzbekistan with Ukraine, which had shared common political
29 The Declaration of Dakar (UNESCO 2005) marking World Press Freedom day has 
emphasised the contribution of a free press towards good governance by ensuring 'Greater 
participation by citizens in democratic processes, the rule of law, the fight against corruption, 
respect for separation of powers and independence of judiciary, transparency, accountability, 
access to information, poverty reduction and human rights' and notes that the respect of these 
principles among nations is crucial for increasing human development.
30 This argument has been backed empirically in two separate case studies on India. Burges and 
Besley (2001, 2002) have found that regions of India where the media are freer and active, are 
least likely to suffer from famines during droughts. This is because regions with a better media 
have a greater reach and are also areas where voters are more informed about their political 
choices. Political leaders in these areas know that their performance will be monitored and have a 
affect on their incumbency, so they become more accountable to voters.
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histories under the Soviet Union and had attained roughly the same amount of 
human development (poverty, education and literacy) and shows there is a 
significant contrast in their press freedom rankings3 'which is why Uzbekistan 
has failed to make a democratic transition whereas Ukraine has been relatively 
successful (Norris 2008: 198-204).
Thus the free press can safely be a control parameter of a catastrophe model of 
democratic development and the indicators of free press can be expected to 
improve the broader indicators of human development towards consolidation. 
Press freedom has been measured in different ways. For instance the World Bank 
uses indicators from the freedom of information laws and the Transparency 
Index (Islam 2003). But this research believes that although freedom of 
information laws and the mention of press freedom in constitutions is a 
significant measure of democratic culture, they are not significant as in many 
instances the rights and legislation are not implemented by authorities32 . The two 
indicators that measure actual press freedom are the Freedom House Index of 
Press Freedom and the Worldwide Press Freedom Index of Reporters without 
Borders.
For the purpose of this study, the best index which can serve as the splitting 
factor for the cusp catastrophe model is the Worldwide Press Freedom Index
31 In 2007, Uzbekistan ranked 189 out of 195 nations by the Freedom House press freedom index 
and 158 out of 164 countries by Reporters Without Borders press freedom index. While in the 
same year, Ukraine was ranked 112 by Freedom House and 105 by Reporters without Borders 
(ibid: 202-204)
32 For example three of the articles in the Constitution of Iran are devoted extensively to freedom 
of the media and all forms of communication and information flows. Article 24 specifically states 
'The media and press are free to express all and every kind of opinion unless regarded as a 
threat to Islam and civil rights'. However, this constitutional right is very frequently ignored by 
the authorities. So whether free press has been mentioned by the constitution is not a very good 
indicator for actual political freedom.
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(PFI) which is published annually by Reporters Without Borders. PFI has been 
inspired by article 19 of the 1948 Universal declaration of Human Rights that 
states "Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression and the right 
to seek, review and impart information regardless of frontiers' 33 . This index not 
only shows the amount of democracy and freedom of expression in a state, but 
also how much influence the central government has on such liberties34 . And it is 
not limited to journalists and the media, but also researchers, academia, groups, 
free speech and censorship in general. It focuses on how TV, radio, print and the 
internet are controlled by the central power and whether opposition groups have 
access to such media. A strong media is generally regarded as a defender of 
decentralised subunits, making it one of the constituents of a sustainable 
democracy.
PFI has been criticised by some governments of partiality as Reporters without 
Borders receives a considerable amount of funding from western governments 
and organisations, which in turn are dealt with more sympathetically. This 
criticism could be made for all non-profit organisations which rely on donations 
for their research. However, PFI does imply a fair degree of justice and donor 
countries are not always high on the rankings (for example the United States has 
been falling in ranks since the state of the invasion of Iraq. In 2007, the country 
was ranked 53 which implies the degree of pressure and influence central power
33 The 1948 Declaration of Human Rights was adopted and proclaimed by the General Assembly 
Resolution 217, A (III) on 10th December 1948. For more information go to: 
www.un.org/overview/rights.html.
34 For instance measures include account of countries such as Saudi Arabia, China and Syria and 
Iran where there is a monopoly of state government control on the media and the internet and 
actively enforce strong monitoring of information are considered in this index. Information on 
the compilation of the Press Freedom are provided on the RSF website at 
www.rsf.org/article.php37id article= 19391. The questionnaire used to compile the measures 
involved is also available on the website at www.rsf.org/article.php37id article=!9390
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has put on society even though the country is considered politically 
decentralised).
A second criticism of PFI is the fact that the rankings fluctuate with changes in 
political behaviour of the state and are viable to change, whereas the Freedom of 
the Press Index published by Freedom House or the World Bank governance 
indicators stay relatively constant. The Freedom House Index puts countries into 
three groups: free, not free and partly free35 . There are methodological problems 
with this type of grouping as the boundaries are fuzzy and not easily defined, 
leaving the researcher with limited freedom to work with as the thresholds have 
already been defined. Despite the methodological difference, there is a 
significant correlation of 0.75 between the Freedom House Index and PFI which 
reveals that the two indexes have more or less similar judgements about the 
concept of press freedom and democracy (Norris 2008: 193-194).
This study does not disregard the Freedom House Index, but prefers to use PFI as 
the indicators fit better with the cusp catastrophe model. The PFI is less 
subjective than Freedom house and provides a cleaner slate for the researcher to 
work with (only listing in order of their achieved press freedom ranks rather than 
a predetermined grouping). Unlike the Freedom House index, PFI does not put 
countries into groups or boxes, making it possible for rankings to fluctuate at 
times of political change. Furthermore, PFI fluctuations are necessary for the 
construction of the cusp catastrophe as this model should be able to show how
35 A full list of Freedom Charts and grouping of press freedom in countries in 2007 is available 
from the Freedom House website: www.freedomhouse.org/uploads/fop/2007/pfscharts.pdf
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certain changes in one control parameter can lead to a catastrophic change in the 
behaviour of trajectories. It needs to be said that sudden changes in the splitting 
factor would not necessarily lead to catastrophes in countries that have a high 
HDI ranking and are above the singularity point. Only countries that are ranked 
below the average in terms of HDI may observe a catastrophic jump to the other 
side of the cusp. The abruptness of the jump would depend on the position of the 
state from the cusp.
4-3.3 A Statistical Analysis of the Cusp Catastrophe model of Democratic 
Development
As mentioned, the data used in this model for the splitting factor hav been taken 
from PFI (2006) and the data used for the control factor is HDI (2004). Table 1 
(appendix 1) shows the original data of these two indices for 150 countries. The 
third column denotes the country category and is used only to facilitate locating 
countries on the cusp diagram. This column is not included in any of the indices 
mentioned and has been created here purely to help spot patterns in country 
types along the cusp instead of writing each individual country (obviously not 
doable since it is not possible to clearly write all 150 countries in one small 
diagram) and does not have scientific significance outside this context. The 
countries have been put into four regime categories with the help of existing
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literature, datasets (Polity Project Vanhanen Index, Freedom House and 
Democracy Taskforce) and views from a group of experts in the field36 .
According to this categorisation, thirty-four countries were agreed as established 
democracies and put into the first group. The second group of thirty-five 
countries were considered as developing democracies which are going through 
the consolidation of democracy or very close to it. The third and fourth groups 
are the developing democracies with less or the least amount of democratisation 
(i.e in the initial stages of democratising or below). These countries are either 
undergoing some kind of autocratic regime or are faced with some form of 
anarchy, disorder (or even some form of chaos). In the case of autocratic 
behaviour, countries are put into the third group and the countries with some 
form of anarchic behaviour, are put into the fourth category37 . It is emphasised 
again that these groups are not accurate and do not serve any other purpose 
outside of this research.
To better understand the parameters involved, analyse the indicators and 
establish relationships among the four groups a series of six histograms are 
produced using Minitab and the results are illustrated in figure4-5 (histograms
36 By experts I have used the help of my former classmates, lecturers and professors at the 
Department of Politics and International Relations, Tehran University. A group of 9 (three MA 
holders and 6 PhD) was used. The list was reviewed in two sessions (two hours each) and the 
ranking was decided by consensus and with the help of available data.
37 Although this research has taken other democratic rankings into consideration, there are some 
difference in the results. For instance, countries such as Kenya, Botswana and Lesotho are 
counted as democracies in Polity and Instability taskforce reports. Here they are put into group 4 
which (anarchic behaviour). These countries may have the democratic institutions criteria, 
needed by those reports, though they are in fact tribal structures and tend to act differently in 
times of crisis to the first group of countries. Examples include Lesotho in 2001, where chaos 
was only managed after the intervention of the South African Army or the Kenyan 2008 election 
crisis.
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1- 6). It is hoped that this analysis may provide information about the threshold 
(singularity) in the model.
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Figures4-5 Analysis of Data from Control Parameters
The first histogram corresponds with information taken from indicators relating 
to PFI. As indicated, the distribution of these indicators ranges from 0.5 and 
98.5. The box plot under the histogram shows some indicators with '*'. This 
refers to the outlier indicators which represent countries that have a PFI of over 
75. These countries have a bad ranking of press freedom and do not follow the 
natural trend.
The statistical mean in the histogram for the measure of press freedom is 25.67, 
but this number still shows a large degree of variance among countries. Instead 
of using this figure, the median (18.15) is used which is a better representation of 
the mean value of press freedom among countries. In this histogram the 
confidence intervals for the mean and median are estimated at 95% in this 
distribution.
To indicate the type of distribution among the parameters the Anderson-Darling 
statistic is used. This statistic is used to measure the goodness of fit test. The 
Weibull distribution (histogram 2) is fitted to the data on press freedom (the 
shape of the parameters is estimated at 1.147 and the scale is estimated at 26.96). 
This figure fits closely with the median of press freedom, which was estimated at 
18.15.
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Weibull Distribution:
a= the scale parameter, J3 = the shape parameter.
The third histogram shows descriptive statistics relating to the data on HDI. One 
can observe that this parameter ranges from 0.311 to 0.965. Unlike the press 
freedom index, no outlier data is observed in HDI. The average HDI in the world 
is considered at 0.7076 and the variation of data for the parameters is relatively 
good. But the histogram shows that there is no one-fit-all distribution that can be 
considered to cover for all the data. Instead, there seems to be three separate 
patterns representing the distribution of HDI. The first pattern represents 
countries with a HDI of over 0.9 and is generally considered that of developed 
countries. The second pattern covers all countries with a HDI of between 0.6 and 
0.9 that are generally regarded as medium range developing countries. Finally, 
all countries with a HDI of below 0.6 are generally regarded as least developed 
and low level (low income) developing nations.
The last three histograms show the probability distributions fitted to three 
proposed groups of HDI. Histogram 4 shows the probability distribution for 
countries with a HDI of less than 0.6. A total of 44 countries are grouped in this 
distribution and correspond to a Weibull scale of 0.488 and shape of 7.828. 
Histogram 5 shows the probability distribution for countries with a HDI between 
0.6 and 0.9. There are 79 countries in this group that are considered to have a 
medium range HDI. These countries follow a Weibull distribution function of 
three parameters that are: shape (5.638), scale (0.3443) and threshold (0.4495).
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Finally, histogram 6 is a representative of the distribution of developed countries 
with a HDI of over 0.9. There are 27 countries in this group which again follow a 
Weibull distribution function of three parameters. It should be noted here that the 
P-Values related to the credibility of the goodness of fit test in the histograms are 
all above 0.3. In other words, all of the distributions fit well with the existing 
data.
3-parameter Weibull
x-A
a= the scale parameter, j3 = the shape parameter, and /l= the threshold parameter
Using the results from the histograms above, the data from the two indices can 
be normalised37 . Although it is not necessary to normalize the data in this 
instance, it is preferable since the mean of the new variable is equal to zero, and 
the distribution of the measures along the coordinates are homogenous and equal 
to an individual unit, (Var(z)=l). Using the mean and standard deviation from
37 The two main reasons for normalising data include, making the measurements scale-less and 
helping the range so that measures are not scattered too far from the mean. Minitab has been used 
to normalise the data which facilitates the algebraic process in which basically the original data 
for each indicator is subtracted from the mean and then divided by its standard deviation as 
shown below:
n 
Then:
n-1
Finally:
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the histograms, the normalized coordinates are calculated as below. The list of 
the normalized measures can be seen in Table 2 (appendix 2).
PF -- m/ _HDI -0.70762 
22.487 MDlz ~ 0.18355
Before writing the standard cusp equation, the data from the four categories are 
further analysed to test their appropriateness in relation to the normalised data 
using Analysis of Variance test (ANOVA)38 . The results from the analysis of 
variance for PFI of the four country categories can be seen in Table 4-1.
Source DF SS MS F p
Category 3 41151 13717 58.57 0.000
Error 146 34194 234
Total 149 75345
S = 15.30 R-Sq = 54.62% R-Sq(adj) = 53.68%
Individual 95% CIs For Mean Based on
Pooled StDev 
Level N Mean StDev ---------+---------+-,---__--+..___..._+
1 34 6.13 5.30 (--*---)
2 35 18.74 10.93 (._*___)
3 42 50.55 23.46 (--*..)
4 39 22.14 13.23 (--*__)
15 30 45 60 
Pooled StDev = 15.30
38 ANOVA is a one-way variance measurement technique used to test for differences among 
three or more independent groups.
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Table4-1: Analysis ofPFI among the four categories
In this table, p-value=0.00. This shows that the four categories of countries have 
different levels of press freedom. The four levels shown at the bottom of this 
table indicate the mean and standard deviation for each category of countries 
which has been calculated with a confidence level of 95% based on a pooled 
standard deviation. These figures show that the most deviation belongs to the 
third category of countries and the least standard deviation is observed in the first 
group of countries. In other words, the degree of press freedom among the first 
category of countries is more homogenous. Moreover, the study of press freedom 
among the four groups of countries, recognised here clearly shows that the first 
group has the highest amount of press freedom and interestingly enough the third 
group, not the fourth group, has the least press freedom in the world. The second 
and third groups of countries have a more or less homogenous degree of press 
freedom (less standard deviation is observed in these groups).
A similar claim can be made in the analysis of the HDI among the four country 
categories. Table4- 2 below uses ANOVA to measure the means and standard 
deviation of the four groups. In observing the four groups, one can clearly see 
the difference in HDI among the categories. The best HDI belongs to the first 
group and followed by the second, third and fourth groups (there is a smooth 
descending pattern from one to four). Like the previous analysis, the same 
confidence level of 95% has been considered for the means based on a pooled 
standard deviation of 0.1119. However, unlike the previous analysis for press 
freedom, this table shows that the standard deviations for the third and fourth
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group are significantly higher than those of groups one and two. This indicates 
the significant fall of HDI in developing and under developed countries 
compared to the more developed countries.
Source DF SS MS F P
Category 3 3.1921 1.0640 85.00 0.000
Error 146 1.8277 0.0125
Total 149 5.0198
S = 0.1119 R-Sq = 63.59% R-Sq (adj) = 62.84%
Individual 95% CIs for Mean Based on
Pooled St Dev 
Level N Mean St Dev +-_-_-_--_+-_---_-__+___--_-_-+___-----_
1 34 0.9154 0.0634 (--*--)
2 35 0.7853 0.0509 (--*__-)
3 42 0.6486 0.1532 (--*--)
4 39 0.5204 0.1302 (--*--)
0.48 0.60 0.72 0.84 
Pooled St Dev = 0.1119
Table4-2 Analysis of HDI among the Categories
Figure 4-6 shows the distribution of all the normalized distribution of parameters 
for each country on a coordination axis. The horizontal axis represents press 
freedom and the vertical axis indicates the range of HDI among nations. Each 
small number represents a normalised country indicator (appendix 2); and each 
country is given a grade from one to four as mentioned before. The four numbers 
in bold font represent the areas were there tends to be a densest distribution of 
each group of countries. The broken lines in this diagram form the primary cusp. 
These two broken lines have been drawn using the countries highlighted in the
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country data in the appendices39 . Each highlighted country marks the 
classification line separating the different groups of countries. In other words, 
they are furthers away from their median.
' V-
Figure 4-6: Normalised Distribution ofHDI and PFI on Cusp Diagram
However, as the figure shows, this cusp does not represent a standard cusp as 
was illustrated in the cusp catastrophe examples for two reasons. Firstly the two 
parameters of HDI and PFI are not independent variables as there is a coefficient 
correlation of 0.31 between the two. Secondly the indicators for these parameters 
are not accurate enough to form a perfect cusp. Neither can HDI, PFI, nor any 
other set of indicators claim to be the perfect indicators for democratic 
development (even though they are probably the best indicators suited to this 
model). To create a standard cusp, the data needs to be rotated.
39 These countries have been marked with star sign * to their right. Countries belonging to group 
four (Kyrgyzstan, Nepal and Srilanka) are marked with three stars and countries belonging to 
group three are (Morocco, Angola, Mongolia and Niger) are marked with three stars.
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The only way to create a standard cusp is to rotate the data and transfer the new 
measures on to new coordinates. Before any rotation can take place, the angle or 
amount of rotation needs to be measured using the following equations:
6 represents the necessary angle to rotate the coordinates into a standard cusp. 
In this model, the best amount for 9 is such that can act as a mean for the first 
two categories of countries in the new coordinates on the y axis. After measuring 
6 the two curves representing a standard cusp need to be identified (these curves 
should be placed so that groups three and four are separated along with a 
separate area where groups three and four are at its densest). This was done by 
identifying three parameters namely, the cusp equation coefficient (&), and the 
new coordinates (a and b). Using the Least Squares method, these three 
parameters can be estimated in a way that the function below can keep to a 
minimum:
^^^ i £^ ^  J new -^/ifvi'( '
*,. sin(0) + y, cos(0) + b) 2 -k(xt cos(0) - y, sin(0) + a) 2/3 ] 2
In this function /' represents countries that are considered on the separation line. 
To minimise error any optimisation software can be used. The optimisation 
process will inevitably lead to the Standard Cusp Equation: y = k x2n
Coming back to the cusp model, using the least square method, the best 
optimised measure for the rotation angle 9 is -0.655 (radian) and the new origin
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coordinates for a and b are estimated as 0.026134 and -0.63525 consecutively. 
By placing the optimised values in the formula below, the standard measures for 
PFI and HDI parameters (HDIz and PFIz) are obtained as follows: 
PFIz= 0.8365PFIz + 0.5479HDIz + 0.026 
HDIz= 0.8365HDIz - 0.5479PFIz - 0.635
2r
4 4 -' 4 44
4 3
3 2 '
0 1
Centralization
Figure 4-7: Standard cusp catastrophe model of Democratic Development
Using the rotated data new indicators are formed in table 3 (appendix 3) and a 
new cusp catastrophe model can be drawn which resemble a standard cusp as can 
be seen in figure 4-7. This model confirms:
HDIz = -1.5 (PFIz)2/3
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Countries close to the cusp are in an unstable position and may oscillate of the 
behavioural types with the slightest change to the splitting factor. The countries 
further from the cusp are in more stable equilibrium states, which can only mean 
that they will be more or less subject to the one dominant type of behaviour 
depending on the type of regime. These countries can either move toward the 
cusp (thus face a catastrophic jump), or they may diverge by liberalising and 
pulling away from the cusp toward singularity (democratic threshold). However, 
in order to do so a country must strengthen the foundations necessary for such a 
passage. Any attempt to democratise before this point is reached would probably 
not succeed40.
It should be noted that the origin of the cusp equation fits with the mean for 
countries in the second category. This indicates that the threshold for democratic 
consolidation is roughly about 0.7853 of HDI (2004). This threshold is higher 
than Vanhanen's threshold (5.0) in his Index of Democracy which he states is 
roughly at a HDI of 0.3 in 1990 (Vanhanen 1997: 78-9) 41 . The threshold 
estimated here is also higher than Przerowski et al (2000) $6500 per capita GDP, 
which they recognised as the minimum for democratic survival and is more
40 What this model shows is partly, a confirmation of modernisation and neo-liberal views of 
democracy and development. However this model intends to go a step further by claiming that 
the spread of democracy cannot happen over night; an autocratic regime will not transform into 
democracy despite economic development and more importantly, unless the factors contributing 
to democratic growth are ripe, no effort to bring democracy to a state will succeed. This model 
also implies strongly that democracy cannot be imposed from outside either by military invention 
of liberal intervention. Democratisation requires the gradual growth in factors controlling 
democracy, which in this model are human development and freedom of the media. Just as 
human development cannot be improved over night, nor can we consider that any country can 
reach democracy in a short space even if the economy grows rapidly and efficiently.
41 For instance in according to Vanhanen's Index of Democracy, Yemen passed the threshold in 
1993 and became a democracy. However, following the civil war of 1994, Yemen stopped being 
a democracy (the process of democracy stopped) (Vanhanen 1997: 124-5). Vanhanen's threshold 
is rather ambiguous as democracy is not like a button that can be switched on and off!
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representative of a consolidated democracy which has been argued to be a point 
where democracy cannot be stopped or reversed (Diamond 1999). To test the 
new threshold, the new indicators of democratic development HDIz will be 
compared with other standard datasets in the following section.
4-4 Part Three: Testing the Validity of the Cusp Catastrophe Model
Many datasets and indexes have been constructed to measure democracy out of 
which three datasets, namely Polity, Poliarchy (or Vanhanen's Democracy 
Index) and Freedom of the World Index (Freedom House) appear more 
frequently in academic studies 42 . These three studies claim to have a high 
correlation of between 0.85 and 0.92 among themselves (Casper and Tufis 2003) 
which suggest that they have used identical data and/or have generally coded 
countries in very similar ways. Political scientists have usually tested their 
models and validated their findings by finding correlations with either of these 
measures (although correlation with the Polity dataset has been the most 
favourable)43 . In this section, the results from the cusp catastrophe model of 
democratic development, HDIz will be tested against the Polity IV dataset. A 
good correlation between the two sets of country scores will strengthen the 
validity of the cusp catastrophe model, as there already is a high correlation
42 Marshall, M and Jaggers, K, Polity IVDataset and User's Manual; Political regime 
characteristics and transitions 1800-1999 (at http://www.bsos.umd.edu/cidcm/polity). 
Vanhanen, T. The Poliarchy Dataset: Vanhanen 's Index of Democracy (at
http://www.svt.ntnu.no/iss/data/vanhanen). Freedom House, Freedom House Country Ratings (at 
http://www.freedomhouse.org/ratings/index)
43 However, it must be emphasised that any correlation does not necessarily imply 
interchangeability, as different measures lead to different results. Correlation is merely a sign that 
the new model is valid and should not be rejected at face value.
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among the various democracy databases mentioned above and would imply that 
stability is a characteristic of the threshold in this model44 . The two terms 
democratic threshold and singularity will be used interchangeably as they 
indicate the same point.
A disadvantage of the Polity score is that its lack of emphasis on democratic 
participation. Hence, this study will also compare the results from the 
catastrophe model with the Participation Enhanced Polity Score datasets 
(PEPSi, PEPS 2) developed by Bruce Moon and colleagues (2006) at Lehigh 
University. The PEPS datasets have been designed to enhance the role of 
participation on democratic development and to add more significance to the 
measures used by the Polity datasets. Hence a correlation between the results 
from the cusp catastrophe model with PEPSi and PEPS2 would strengthen the 
validity of the model even more. However, as shall be discussed later, the PEPSi 
and PEPSi datasets are not without flaws and the very reasons that the authors of 
PEPSi and PEPSi bring to advocate their model may be used against it and 
further stress the fact that countries above the democratic threshold and those 
below it need to be assessed differently. In order to test the threshold in the cusp 
model, two sets of regression analysis between HDIz and PESPSi.2 are carried 
out. The first set among countries below singularity in the cusp model and the 
second for countries above this point. The results from the correlations reveal 
distinct behavioural patterns between the two areas which are significant.
44 Though as it will be discussed later, the type of stability used in the Polity studies cannot be 
necessarily applied to countries with the same strength. Stability in the form of the strength of 
political institutions is not an adequate measure of democracy for countries around the point of 
singularity and below it.
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Finally to show the direct relationship between government performance, 
political stability and the democratic consolidation, correlations will be made 
between two of the World Bank's Governance Indicators (government 
effectiveness and political stability indicators) and HDIz. Since only 35 countries 
have been used in the correlations, which are mainly countries above the cusp, 
this is not a thorough investigation of the parameters linked to democratic 
development in the world. Due to the insufficiency of valid data from all 
countries, some extent of subjectivity will be inevitable in claims made of 
countries below singularity. However the limited study of 35 countries does 
reveal interesting results for consolidated democracies which further strengthens 
the arguments in this chapter.
The advantage of the cusp catastrophe model of democratic development 
compared to Polity and almost all other democracy measurement systems is its 
capacity to account for discontinuity in democratic behaviour and group 
countries accordingly, whereas the Polity Index, along with Vanhanen Index and 
Freedom House database and PEPS only see countries in a continuum from 
authoritarian to democracy. This study will try to point out the inaccuracy of the 
latter type of classification for countries below singularity by bringing examples 
from developing countries and as a result strengthening the main argument that 
growth and development are not aligned in countries below singularity and 
disagreeing with the assumption made by most democracy datasets that if a 
country shows signs of democratic growth, it can be placed among functional 
and developed democracies.
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4-4.1 Comparing HDIz with Polity IV
The Polity Project has become the most widely used measure of democracy, 
which according to Jaggers and Gurr (1995: 471) is based on:
'...three essential and independent elements of democracy as conceived 
of in Western liberal philosophy. The first is the presence of institutions and 
procedures through which citizens can express effective preferences about 
alternative political policies and leaders... [A second is] the existence of 
institutional constraints on the executive power... [andfinally] The guarantee of 
civil liberties to all citizens in their daily lives and in acts of political 
participation'
The Polity dataset originated from a study of political system persistence and 
change (Gurr 1974) and has had measures of institutionalised characteristics 
gradually added as the dataset developed (Jaggers and Gurr 1995). The idea was 
initially to study the authority patterns of a social unit (a political system) and 
measures indicating the degree of executive constraints, competitiveness of 
executive recruitment, trade regulations or openness and competitiveness in 
participation have been among the variables used to construct an eleven point 
index of institutionalised democracy and an eleven point index of autocracy.
This study is particularly interested in one of the indices that Polity has used to 
indicate the sum of each consecutive regime type. This index is the result of 
subtracting each country's autocracy score from its democracy score and has
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been called the democracy minus autocracy score. This score has been used as a 
general index of democracy and is a continuum of twenty-one points (-10 to +10) 
going from full autocracy (-10) to full democracy (+10) in any given state. These 
data are consistent not just with the state of democracy, but also the regime type. 
Depending on their score, countries are divided into full democracies, 
democracies, partial democracies, autocracies and full autocracies. Although the 
data are purely institutionally based, and do not directly give measures for 
political liberties or human rights, they claim to be consistent with other 
measures and indices of governance, political liberties and human rights 
practices (Bates et al, 2005).
Table 4 (Appendix 4) provides the measures from this dataset together with the 
two sets of indicators from the cusp catastrophe model45 HDIz and PFIz. A 
comparison of these measures has been carried out for each country. As the 
results show, there is no significant correlation between PFIz (the rotated 
measures from Press Freedom Index) with any of the Polity scores. This 
indicates that the press freedom indicators in the cusp model do not have much 
significance in the democratic state of a country. This is expected since unlike 
the cusp catastrophe model, Polity distinguishes regime types, not behavioural 
types (in terms of anarchic and authoritarian). In the cusp catastrophe model, 
PFIz is regarded as a splitting factor and only decides the relative place of the 
trajectory with regards to its anarchic and authoritarian behaviour (there is no
45 Polity IV has a total of 192 countries but only 141 countries will be compared as the Polity 
scores do not include all the 150 countries used in the catastrophe model as countries such as 
Afghanistan, Iraq, Bosnia and the United States are not included in the Polity dataset.
176
homogeneity among the countries below singularity in press freedom as 
illustrated in table 4-1). This factor is not recognised in Polity.
HDIz, on the other hand, has a rather significant correlation with the Polity's 
democracy - autocracy score (0.55) and DEMOC or Polity's democracy score (0.65). 
The second correlation in particular indicates a significant relationship between the 
two datasets and would have been greater if a smaller sample of homogenous 
countries (as in table 4-2) were examined, or a number of exceptional and irregular 
countries in the cusp model were taken away46 . The correlation between HDIz and 
DEMOC is even higher (0.69) if countries with HDIz below -0.6 (mainly countries in 
the fourth category) are excluded. There is a negative correlation between the 
Autocracy score (AUTOC) and HDIz (-0.35). This indicates the fact that there is no 
significant relationship between autocracy and democratic development.
However, it must be noted that the measures used in the Polity dataset suffer 
from limitations, the most important of which is that it places too much 
emphasis on institutional arrangements and civil liberties at the cost of 
recognizing the importance of citizen participation, which is one of the main 
features of an active democracy. For example South Africa had a Polity score of
46 As with all models, there are small exceptions observed. The first is India, which had been 
grouped alongside other established democracies in the first category. However because of a 
lower Human Development ranking, the model has placed India in the area below singularity (in 
the area mainly dominated by states with anarchic behaviour). Also, three countries that 
definitely belong to group three due to their autocratic nature, namely Kuwait, Qatar and the 
United Arab Emirates, are seen in the area above singularity. These countries are all very rich in 
natural resources, mainly oil, and enjoy a high GDP from oil, investments and low population 
levels despite lacking the democratic values shared among countries above singularity. However, 
according to this model, these three exceptions are in a better position to democratise smoothly 
than the other resource-rich states below singularity. Though that would still depend on whether 
the conditions (internal and external) for transition are ripe which is out of the scope of this 
research.
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+4 (democracy 7, autocracy -3) from 1910 to 1989 despite the fact that 90% of 
the population did not have voting power (the black population of South Africa 
could not participate in political decisions). Polity does include 'competitiveness 
of political participation' as a measure of democracy, but according to Paxton 
(2000) and Moon et al (2006), the threshold to identify restricted participation is 
too low.
The second problem with this measure is that it only sees countries in terms of 
democracy and autocracy regardless of democratic development. For example 
countries such as Kenya or Lesotho both have a democracy score of 8 
(democracy 8, autocracy 0) which is the same as the democracy score of 
Argentina and only one point below France. According to Polity, these countries 
are seen as functioning democracies and do not suffer from electoral chaos or 
instability47 . Colombia and Haiti despite instability (and chaos) both have a 
democracy score of 7 and autocracy score of 0 on the polity scale. It is difficult 
to imagine these two countries on an equal level of democracy as Turkey, Russia 
and Ukraine, which also score 7 on the polity scale.
The case of Kenya in the event of its presidential elections on 2007 is a clear 
example of the problem with Polity48 . Kenya is considered by Polity as a model
47 It is difficult to regard these countries or countries such as Botswana (Polity 9), Bangladesh 
(polity 6) and Sierra Leone (polity 5) as functioning democracies despite having low human 
developments and political freedoms and to consider them at the same level of democratic 
development as countries above singularity on account of their stability or electoral laws but 
disregarding factors such as tribal loyalties and heavy reliance on intervention from outside to 
help settle disputes
48According to Michael Holden reporting for Open Democracy 'Kenya's much vaunted 
presidential election on 27 December 2007 has turned from what could have been a trailblazing 
exercise in democracy into a catastrophe' Holden M ' Kenya: chaos and Responsibility' (3 rd Jan,
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for democratic stability and tolerance in Africa and a pattern for democratic 
development and change in the region. However, the aftermath of the Kenyan 
elections in December 2007 was a stark contradiction to this image and has 
provided an example of how democratic behaviour under singularity and around 
the cusp may bring about unpredicted results. Within two weeks after the 
contested election results Kenya's Red Cross Society reported that around 575 
people were killed and more than a quarter of a million people were displaced 
(Associated Press 2008)49 . The death toll rose dramatically with wide spread 
ethnic cleansing, amounting to final reports of killings of at least twelve- 
hundred people and over three hundred people displaced by the end of February 
2008 (The Economist 2008)50. These results have prompted some analysts to 
write that western-style democratic theory is not suited to Africa and is the root 
for such disasters (Associated Press 2008).
The conflict started after 'democratic' presidential elections were held with 
claims from the opposition of vote rigging and electoral fraud from the 
incumbent president's supporters. President Kibaki belongs to Kenya's largest 
ethnic group the Kikuyu while the leader of the opposition, Raila Odinga belongs 
to the Luo which is the second biggest tribe in the country. The violence started 
with ethnic clashes and soon scaled up towards ethnic killings, looting, and 
economic unrest. However to say that tribal loyalties and corruption were the 
sole elements in the crisis is to miss a vital element in democratic development 
which is present in the Kenya Human Development Index and Press Freedom
2008), Open Democracy at: 
(www.opendemocracy.net/article/where_does_responsibility_for_kenyas_chaos_lie)
49 'Chinese Writer: Democracy Hurts Africa' (Jan 14 2008), Associated Press
50 'Looking More Closely at the Killings' , The Econnomist, (May 15th 2008)
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levels. Kenya's Press Freedom was at 30.2 and its HDI was at -0.91 in 2005 
(appendix 1) which is too low compared to any developed democracy. Its rise in 
GDP was not parallel with the wide gap between the rich and poor in the society 
and the majority of Kenyans were living below the poverty line.
Using the cusp catastrophe model, the Kenyan crisis may be explained as 
follows: Unlike Polity's score (Democracy 8, Autocracy 0), Kenya has been put 
into group three in the categorisation phase of the cusp catastrophe model for 
democratic development. Countries in this group are all considered to be below 
singularity and have some form of authoritarian rule (be it central authority from 
the government, centralised planning and autocratic rule). Kenya is thus placed 
somewhere on the right of the cusp. Since independence, Kenya has had only 
three presidents. Kenya's first president, Jomo Kenyatta was an authoritarian 
ruler in favour of his own tribe the Kikuyu. Kenya's second president, Daniel 
Arap Moi, who according the BBC, was the last remaining big man in Africa' 
(Phombeah 2002)51 , and ruled Kenya for 24 years. However, his powers started 
to recede from the 1990s as he came under pressure from the United States and 
the international community to hold multi-party elections (Barkin 2004)52 . The 
Kenyan African National Union or KANU could no longer legislate as Moi 
pleased and new alliances were shaping in defiance of the president (ibid). 
Despite mismanagement of the economy and widespread corruption, Moi's
51 Phombeah, Gary ' Moi's legacy to Kenya' , BBC website, (Monday 5 th August 2002). Moi's 
authoritarian methods were similar to all autocratic leaders, demanding absolute loyalty and 
repressing signs of dissent and criticism. He would reward members of the legislature with 
ministerial positions or big sums of money in return for their acquiescence and like many 
repressive autocracies, the legislature was a rubber stamp.
52 Barkan Joel D 'Kenya After Moi' Foreign Affairs, Jan/Feb 2004
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weakened rule still managed to keep the country and its tribes united (Kenya 
remained firmly in group three).
In December 2002, Mwai Kibaki (who was from the Kikuyu tribe, a minister in 
Kenyatta's government and vice-president to Moi) took office. Kenya's place on 
the cusp diagram has now moved leftwards, though still on the right of the cusp. 
Kibaki's method of governing was a contrast to Moi's micromanagement. He 
decentralised power to his ministers and encouraged them to pursue their own 
agendas resulting in further mismanagement, corruption and confusion53 . 
Kibaki's leadership style, in addition to his support for his own tribe (at the 
expense of whole population), helped push Kenya closer toward the cusp. 
Unequal economic growth with the average annual income per person at one 
dollar a day (Phombeah 2002) and inadequate civil society made way for the 
catastrophe to happen at the 2007 elections and Kenya to jump towards anarchy 
and chaos. In the cusp catastrophe model, the only way that Kenya can move 
from anarchy would be to resume some form of authoritarian rule or a jump back 
to its previous form. In earnest, Kenya could not have been a functioning 
democracy as the Polity project and other similar studies had pictured it in the 
first place, and it is strange to think that any scientific database would ignore 
such vivid facts.
53 According to Japsen and Wallis, during this period Kibaki was an 'absentee leader' who was 
famous for his ' sleepy and laid back style and his fondness for Nairobi's Muthaiga golf club!' 
B and Wallis, W The Financial Times' 23rd December 2007
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4-4.2 Comparing HDIz and the Participation Enhanced Polity Score (PEPS)
Democratic participation enhances the moral legitimacy of a democratic system 
and is paramount to any index of democratic quality. Since Polity does not give 
enough emphasis to participation as it does to other institutional factors for 
democracy, Bruce Moon and colleagues at Lehigh University, Pennsylvania, 
have incorporated participation into the Polity results to create the 'Participation 
Enhanced Polity Score' or PEPS which measures the breadth of political 
participation by studying the voting records and the creation of a variable called 
'Voter Turnout Scalar' or VTS. This variable is measured by multiplying the 
number of votes (in a certain country over a certain period) by the total of the 
adult population. A good correlation between the results of the cusp catastrophe 
model and this index will further strengthen the cusp model.
Naturally no democratic country has a 100 percent VTS54apart from a few 
exceptions of assisted electoral turnout as recorded by the International Institute 
for Development and electoral Assistance (IDEA). Moon et al have included 
these exceptions in their study and believe that compulsory voting legislation in 
some countries, such as small fines, is relatively light and should be considered 
as incentives rather than a requirement (Moon et al 2006: 10)55 . However, 
countries with no voting record or one-party states with a notorious authoritarian
54 Countries that have been identified by an IDEA study to have compulsory voting such 
penalties and possible imprisonment (only Fiji is cited as including imprisonment) have been 
eliminated from the PEPS dataset. (Source: International Institute for Development and Electoral 
Assistance IDEA (2003) http://www.idea.int/vt/index.cfm
55 Their studies show that countries with strongly enforced voting have an average of 1.1 percent 
lower voting rates whereas those with weak enforcement laws averaged around 11 percent higher 
rates (Moon et al 2006: 11).
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behaviour are coded as missing data or void. Zero turnout implies that their 
PEPS score is not much different from their Polity score. Thus, no truly 
democratic state and certainly none of the thirty-one countries, which have a 
Polity score of +10 (appendix 4) can score 10 (no country can have 100 percent 
turnout). As Table 5 (appendix 5) shows, a country such as the United States 
with a turnout of 49 percent in 2003, will have a PEPS score of 4.93 despite 
having a Polity score of 10. So even though the PEPS] score is a modification of 
the Polity score, it gives prominence to electoral participation as a requisite for 
effective democratic institutions. PEPSi is calculated as below: 
PEPSn,, = (VTS i,t * Polity Democracy Score iit) - Polity Autocracy Score ijt 56
Since PEPSi does not carry any weight when the polity data is missing or the 
VTS score is zero, the score has very little impact on overall levels of democratic 
behaviour at low levels of democracy. As mentioned, in such cases the measures 
do not differ from polity in a certain number of countries. In order to make the 
measures fairer without harshly prejudging the character of participation in 
autocratic countries, the authors have computed the PEPSa index. In PEPS2, the 
VTS 0-100 score has been scaled down to match Polity's -10 to +10 score thus 
providing a more equal weighting and allow for more differentiation among 
countries with low levels of democracy (not high levels of democracy) than 
PEPS] (Moon et al 2006: 14): 
PEPS2J ,, = (((VTSi.,/.05)-10) +Polityiit )/2
56 The letter i denotes a certain country and t denotes a certain time or period (Source Moon et al, 
2006:12)
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Table 5 (appendix 5) lists VTS, PEPS] and PEPS 2 of all countries in 2005 along 
with the Polity score of the same year and HDIz in the column to the right57 . 
Countries with zero turnout or those without VTS scores (also given zero) only 
have a PEPS 2 score. Pearson correlations between PEPSi, PEPS2 and HDI'x for 
all countries in this table are not very significant. Between PEPSi and HDI'x 
the correlation is 0.54 and the correlation between PEPS 2 and HDI'x is lower at 
0.45 (while the correlation between PEPSi and PEPS 2 is 0.94). Figures 4-8 and 
4-9 illustrate the distribution of the countries in regards to their HDIz and PEPS] 
and HDI'x and PEPS2 respectively. As the figures and the regression analysis 
show, there cannot be a perfect line to link all (or most) points. The regression 
equation for HDIz and PEPS] (figure 4-8) out of the 125 cases used is: HDIz = - 
0.838 + 0.112 PEPSI, 58
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Figure 4-8: Regression Analysis using data from HDIz and PEPS 59
57 In Moon et al (2006) the table identifies VTS, Polity, PEPSI and PEPS2 for 153 countries. 
Since some of the countries covered in the last chapter are missing in this list and vice versa, only 
144 countries will be used in this analysis. PF'x scores have not been included as previously 
stated.
58 Only 135 countries could be used in the comparison since not all had comparable data . Out 
of the 135 countries used in the analysis, 9 had missing values and had to be deleted.
59 Regression equation: HDIz = - 0.838 + 0.112 PEPSI,, the means for PEPSI, = 1.8941, 
PEPSI2 =2.7040 and HDIz = -0.65734
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Figure 4-9: Regression Analysis Using Data from HDh and PEP$2 60
In figure 4-8 there are a number of outliers (a total of nine countries have been 
identified as having the largest standard residuals in this observation). These 
countries are as follows: Kuwait (28), Qatar (40), UAE (42), Bangladesh (108), 
Lesotho (117), Senegal (124), Mozambique (135), Sierra Leone (143) and Niger 
(144). Table 4-3 below gives the details of these countries along with their 
residuals and standard residuals (these countries all have large standard residuals, 
which distance them with other countries in the diagram). In this table, the 
countries are represented with a number which is the same as in table 5 
(appendix 5). As observed all these countries have a large difference between 
their HDIz and PEPSi. Qatar, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates have a 
relatively good HDIz (due to their oil wealth) compared to their Polity (-10) and 
participation rates, whereas Bangladesh, Lesotho, Senegal, Sierra Leone,
60 Regression equation: HDIz = - 0.882 + 0.0956 PEPSI2
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Mozambique and Niger have good ratings of PEPS] (as they did in Polity) but 
low democratic consolidation61 .
Country PEPSL HDIz Fit SB Fit Residual St Residual
28 -7.0 0.3210 -1.6224 0.1565 1.9434 2.09
40 -10.0 0.1730 -1.9585 0.1960 2.1315 2.31
42 -8.0 0.1630 -1.7344 0.1694 1.8974 2.04
108 4.5 -2.6240 -0.3318 0.0897 -2.2922 -2.44
117 4.8 -2.3080 -0.2993 0.0916 -2.0087 -2.14
124 3.3 -3.5410 -0.4696 0.0836 -3.0714 -3.26
135 3.6 -2.4540 -0.4382 0.0847 -2.0158 -2.14
143 4.4 -2.4140 -0.3407 0.0892 -2.0733 -2.20
144 3.9 -2.3590 -0.4068 0.0860 -1.9522 -2.08
Table 4-3: Unusual Observations from Regression analysis in figure 4-8
In an attempt to improve the correlation between the PEPSi, PEPSa and HDI'x, 
the six Arab members (Middle East and North African) of the Organisation of 
the Petroleum Exporting Countries or OPEC62 have been taken out of the 
correlation analysis. These six countries (not including Iran and Iraq) all have 
relatively high GDP scores and low population levels. They include: Kuwait, 
Saudi Arabia, Qatar, United Arab Emirates (UAE), Algeria, and Libya. In the 
standard cusp model, three of these countries, Qatar, Kuwait and the UAE, 
could be observed above the cusp, alongside countries belonging to group one
61 These results show that PEPS, and Polity datasets have more in common than suggested and 
this is due to due to taking the same political considerations in addition to the use of similar 
measurements. Hence, the example of Kenya's Polity result would also apply to PEPS, and 
PEPS2 .
62 OPEC consists of twelve members: Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Venezuela (5 establishing 
members), Algeria, Angola, Indonesia, Libya, Nigeria, Qatar, United Arab Emirates (7 joining 
members)
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and two63 . As explained before, these countries have an irregular rise in their 
HDIz figures due to high economic growth even though their levels of press 
freedom are far from good. It may be argued that high GDP rates, will eventually 
allow these countries to democratise more smoothly compared to countries with 
the same level of authority but lower growth, though that does not diminish their 
status as non-democratic (Kuwait, Qatar and the UAE have Polity scores of -7, - 
10 and -8 respectively).
The PEPSi and PESPa scores given for these countries are also negative as can 
be seen in table 4-9. Once these OPEC countries have been deducted from the 
list of 141 countries, the correlations between HDIz and PEPSI and HDIz, 
PEPS2 improve significantly (though the correlation between PEPSi and PEPS2 
remain the same). Using Minitab, the results of Pearson correlations (excluding 
OPEC members) between HDIz and PEPS] is 0.618 and PEPS 2 and HDIz is 
0.54 which is an improvement on previous attempt (0.54 and 0.45 respectively). 
The correlation between PEPSu have stayed the same as before (0.94).
A further analysis of PEPSi, PES2 and HDIz reveals more interesting findings. 
First an analysis of the correlations with the exception of all countries with 
PEPSi scores below zero was made64 .There is again an increase in the 
correlations between PEPSi>0 and HDIz (0.65) and PEPS 2>0 and HDI (0.6)
63 These countries have been noted as part of the exceptions in footnote 43. Despite belonging to 
the third category of countries (authoritarian developing countries) they appear above the cusp 
alongside countries belonging to categories one and two.
64 Although countries with a PEPSi score of over zero do not exactly correlate with the countries 
above the singularity line, they do include all of those countries in addition to some countries 
around the point of singularity.
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while the correlation between PEPSi and PEPS2 stays about the same (0.90). 
However, the same correlations between the three indexes give very different 
results when only PEPSi below zero (roughly all countries in the cusp model that 
are located around and below the singularity line) are considered. As predicted 
the correlation between PEPSi<0 and HDIz (-0.19) is far too low to be 
considered significant and the correlation between PEPS2<0 and HDIz is even 
less significant. The correlation between PEPSi<0 and PEPS2<0 is lower than 
previous correlations, but remains significantly high (0.83) which again shows 
that similar data has been used for both indexes. This finding further strengthens 
the chapter's claim that below singularity, the voter scalier index cannot be a 
significant indicator of democratic development as suggested by the authors of 
PEPS, and PEPS 2 .
These results strengthen the main argument in this chapter that in order to 
democratise, countries must pass a certain democratic threshold and that it is not 
really possible to compare countries below this threshold with countries above it 
using the same measures and measurement techniques. Even if the 
measurements used to make the HDIz index are not adequate in the measure of 
democracy, they are sufficient to show that countries must reach a certain degree 
of democratic activeness before the quality of democracy can be assessed 
through the performance of their democratic institutions. The results from the 
correlations above also indicate problems in the PEPS model in addition to 
having the problem relating to subjectivity (mentioned for the Polity score in 
relation to some countries) since PEPSi is really a take on the Polity score. The
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next section of this work will look at another major problem with the PEPS 
index.
4-4.3 The Problem with PEPSi and PEPS2
Despite the its claim to be different from Polity due to its emphasis on voter turnout 
and participation, the PESP indexes are in many ways similar to Polity as the same 
data and measures (with the exception of the VTS) have been used. Thus the 
measurement problems of Polity (regarding countries such as Kenya) would also 
apply to PEPS] and PEPSi. However, the PEPS indicators have another problem 
which has become apparent in the regression analysis of correlations for PEPSi, 
PEPS 2 and HDI'x. Figure 4-10, is the regression analysis for HDI'x and PEPSi>064 . 
The diagram shows the distribution of the countries around the regression equation : 
HDI'x = -2.13 + 0.345 PEPSi
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Figure 4-10: Regression Analysis for PEPSj>0 and HDI'x
64 The reason for using PEPS1>0 instead of PEPSI (to cover all countries) is to reduce the 
number of countries or points in the regression diagram and to make them easier to distinguish
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Using Minitab 9 countries may be identified as 'outliers' or 'unusual observations' 
which are as follows: Tanzania (130), Malaysia (48), Estonia (34), Senegal (124), 
Switzerland (11), Sierra Leone (143), Bangladesh (108), Lesotho (117) and 
Mongolia (91). The data from these countries may be observed in table 4-5.
Country PEPS. HDI'x Fit SEFit Residual St Residual65
30 0.59 -1.4180 -1.9241 0.2386 0.5061 0.61 X
48 0.98 -0.1090 -1.7896 0.2223 1.6806 2.01R
34 2.32 0.6270 -1.3276 0.1686 1.9546 2.30R
124 3.29 -3.5410 -0.9931 0.1336 -2.5479 -2.98R
11 3.75 1.0200 -0.8345 0.1191 1.8545 2.16R
143 4.44 -2.4140 -0.5966 0.1017 -1.8174 -2.11R
108 4.52 -2.6240 -0.5690 0.1001 -2.0550 -2.39R
117 4.81 -2.3080 -0.4690 0.0953 -1.8390 -2.14R
91 9.70 -0.5600 1.2170 0.2135 -1.7770 -2.12R
Table 4-5: Unusual observations from Regression Analysis PEPS;>0 and HDI'x
Similar results can be observed in the analysis of correlations between PEPS2>0 and 
HDIz. Again the diagram showing the distribution of countries around the regression 
equation ' HDIz = - 2.10 + 0.312 PEPS 2 ' in figure 4-11 below:
65 R denotes an observation with a large standardized residual X denotes an observation whose X value gives it large influence.
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Figure 4-11: Regression Analysis for PEPS2>0 and HDIz
Minitab has again identified nine outliers or unusual observations as it did with 
PEPS] which are illustrated below. These countries again show the biggest 
inconsistencies between HDIz and PEPS2- Despite slight differences with the 
previous observation, there are quite a number of repetitions which shows the 
similarities between PEPSi and PEPSj. These outliers are as follows: Haiti (122), 
Comoros (103), Estonia (34), Senegal (124), Switzerland (11), Bangladesh (108), 
Niger (144), Sierra Leone (143) and Malawi (134).
Country PEPSZ HDI'x Fit SEFit Residual St Residual
122 0.05 -2.3670 -2.0891 0.2381 -0.2779 -0.31X
103 0.27 2.3590 -2.0205 0.2298 -0.3385 -0.38X
34 2.74 0.6270 -1.2502 0.1429 1.8772 2.04R
124 3.12 -3.5410 -1.1317 0.1314 -2.4093 -2.62R
11 3.75 1.0200 -0.9353 0.1144 1.9553 2.12R
108 5.53 -2.6240 -0.3801 0.0921 -2.2439 -2.43R
143 6.38 -2.4140 -0.1151 0.1002 -2.2989 -2.49R
144 6.62 -2.3590 -0.0402 0.1045 -2.3188 -2.51R
134 8.00 -1.7380 0.3902 0.1404 -2.1282 -2.32R
Table 4-6: Unusual Observations for Regression Analysis PEPS2>0 and HDIz
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In the first regression analysis (using data in appendix 5) Mongolia is seen as 
having the highest Participation Enhanced Polity Score (9.70) out of all 144 
countries involved in the PEPSi analysis, despite having a negative score on HDIz 
index (-0.56). Moreover the results from both the regressions analysis, show 
Switzerland as an outlier due to the inconsistencies that exists between HDIz with 
PEPSi and PEPS 2 . In the first analysis, Switzerland has a PEPSi score of 3.75 
despite scoring very high on the HDIz index. The regression analysis of PEPS2 
also reveals very strange results. Switzerland is observed among the outlier 
countries and its democracy score has been placed behind countries such as 
Bangladesh, Sierra Leone, Niger, and Malawi. These four countries precede 
Switzerland's democracy score in PEPS 2 despite all having negative HDIz scores. 
Either there is a problem with Swiss democracy or with PEPS. The authors of the 
PEPS have pointed the finger at Switzerland's poor turnout rate. Switzerland's 
voter turnout rate used in the calculations of PEPS, which have been based on the 
2003 report from the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral 
Assistance66 , is estimated at 38 percent (Moon et al, 2006). The reason for this low 
turnout, according to the authors of PEPS is due the institutional structure of its 
collective executive which:
'Diminishes voter motivation by minimising the significance of election 
outcomes.... surely such a system is regarded as less democratic than one in which 
most citizen's participate in elections and actually make a difference in leadership 
and policies'
(Moon et al 2006: 7)
66 The 2003 figures are available from the International Institute for Electoral Assistance (IDEA) 
website at; http://www.idea.int/vt/index.cfm
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The authors of PEPS seem to have ignored the fact that the political system in 
Switzerland is quite different to any other system in the world. The above 
statement would have been true had there been a Westminster style or 
representative government functioning instead of the system of direct democracy 
that Switzerland is. In a direct democracy people (by referendum or initiative) 
vote directly on a large number political issues effecting them and their 
surroundings. Switzerland may not have direct executive elections and its seven- 
member Executive Council is not directly chosen by the people (but by the 
legislature). However, as Wolf Linder notes, for more than thirty years, the 
council has been composed of a successful coalition between the same four 
parties which represent 70 percent of the electorate (Linder 1998: 4). So in 
addition to outstanding political stability, voter satisfaction is quite high67 .
Voter turnout in federal elections have declined over the years, though that does 
not reflect a passive public. Voter turnout has been high on issues that have been 
important to the public. For instance on the referendum for membership of the 
European Union in 1992, the turnout was 78.3 percent and in 1989, 68.6 percent 
of the population turned out to vote on whether the Swiss army should be 
abolished. Kris Kobach put the decrease in turnout at referendums down to voter 
exhaustion rather than passivism (Kobach 1993: 79). A decrease in voter turnout 
may also be due to the fact that Swiss voters know that their votes will not have
67 In Switzerland all constitutional amendments, popular initiatives, and some international 
treaties have to be approved by popular vote. The Swiss people have the final word on 
parliamentary decisions and so the legitimacy of the institutions comes from the people. Even 
though the people have little impact on elections, they have a great deal of influence on 
constitutional policies and their government actions. This kind of civil authority is not seen in 
other democratic system. For instance the Swiss government could not have invaded Iraq as 
easily as other democracies did in 2003.
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any direct effect at the national level on the composition of the executive68 . The 
reduction in turnout can also reflect that voters are generally happy and satisfied 
with the status quo and do not need to make their voices heard. Thus it is a 
mistake to presume low voter turnout in Switzerland points to lower democracy 
levels69 .
It is not intended here to assess the merits of direct democracy in Switzerland or 
how well the Swiss system is living up to its standards. What is important is to 
identify the flaws in the PEPS indices in relation to Switzerland having been the 
most obvious example here. One can also point to other strange observations 
such as Mongolia which has the highest PEPSi score (9.70) of all countries with 
a turnout of 97 percent followed by Uruguay (9.47) with a turnout of 95 percent. 
Assuming the turnout rates are without flaw, could these two countries be 
considered more democratic than the rest? Or, as the cusp model and the 
correlations between PEPS and HDIz (for countries above and below singularity) 
have shown, countries above, around and below the point of singularity cannot 
be assessed in the same way using the existing democracy indexes such as Polity 
and PEPS. In order to explain this point better, a final correlation analysis will be
68 As the executive council decides on the composition of the executive using a so called 'magic 
formula' (Linder 1998). The representative at the national level, in turn does not have much say 
on policies at the local level (Switzerland being one of the most devolved democracies in the 
world).
69 Feld and Kirchgassner (2000) argue that in a direct democracy such as Switzerland, citizen's 
are more informed about public policy than other democratic systems, since they need to collect 
information and awareness before the discussion process preceding a vote. Secondly, citizens are 
also able to control and sanction their legislators and the government which in effect reduces 
inefficiency of the system and improves voter relationships with their representatives. Thirdly the 
open and strong discourse between citizens and their representatives, leads to constant evaluation 
of policies and government performance on issues of self interest and common interest alike. 
This inevitably improves satisfaction.
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made using Government Effectiveness Index, Government Stability Index and 
HDIx.
4-4.4 Comparing Government Effectiveness, Political Stability and HDIz
The comparisons have so far shown a significant (positive) relationship between 
participation and democratic development HDIz in consolidated democracies 
(above singularity). The purpose here is to see whether there is also a positive 
link between HDIz and government effectiveness and political stability among 
countries above the democratic threshold. Due to the lack of data, this section 
can only consider the countries of the European Union, plus OECD states (35 
countries)70 whose data are more or less uniform.
The two indicators used to show political stability and government effectiveness 
has been taken from the World Bank's Governance Indicators 2006 (Kaufmann 
et al 2007). The World Bank Governance Indicators is an aggregated dataset that 
ranks countries on six criteria71 by combining data from twenty-five different 
credible data sources (8 public sector data providers; 9 multilateral non- 
governmental institutions; and 8 commercial business providers). These data are
70 The list of countries studied here is not an accurate picture of countries above the singularity 
but it does preset a fairly good picture for the purpose of correlation making. For countries below 
the threshold, the same problems and limitations mentioned before (and below) would be 
apparent plus the fact that not enough consistent data exists to carry out comparisons.
71 The six criteria are: voice and accountability, political stability, government effectiveness, 
regulatory quality, rule of law and control of corruption (Kaufmann et al, 2007). Like all other 
datasets and indexes, there will inevitably be substantial amounts of subjectivity used in devising 
the scores and thus, correlations between these indicators and other scores (for example 
Freedom House's Freedom of the World indicators) will be significantly high.
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recalculated every two years and are also based on opinion from experts, citizen 
surveys and credible research (and such as Freedom House, the Economist 
Intelligence Unit and the Global Competitiveness Report).
The authors of the Governance Report admit that limitations will exist, but 
limitations are universal as over sixty percent of all cross-country comparisons 
result in highly-significant differences in their indicators (Kaufmann et al, 
2007: 24). However due to the aggregation of data from different sources, errors 
are less likely to be systematic and are likely to raise the quality of the work72 . 
The aggregation of several datasets to reduce the problems of poor quality (at the 
expense of conceptual precision), has been the strategy used for measuring 
global governance at World Bank.
'Datasets appear to be unreliable individually, although the various 
subjective ratings of quality of governance obtained from different sources tend 
to rank countries similarly, the discrepancies are large enough that we cannot 
make confident conclusions'
(Knack and Manning 2000: 11)
On the plus side, the Governance Indicators give a generally good coverage of 
all countries and the Governance Project has been gathering data for more than a
72 Moreover, the number and types of sources on which these scores are based may differ among 
countries. For example the government effectiveness indicator may measure slightly different 
things in different countries and so there may be discrepancies in what the data actually stands 
for. Therefore it may not be very reliable to use the data alone in cross-country comparative 
research, other than to give a general comparative view of how well a government is functioning 
in relation to the rest, which is what is necessary for correlation purposes.
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decade which makes it a reliable source in development studies, especially as it 
is done by a reputable international institution. The data are very transparent and 
the data procedures, quality assessments and the data are very easily accessible 
(Van de Walle 2006). For the purpose of this research, the World Bank provides 
a good and well balanced set of indicators for government effectiveness and 
stability for countries above the threshold. The problems mentioned about the 
precision, subjectivity and reliability of the collected data would mainly apply to 
countries below singularity.
Government Effectiveness is a measure of the quality of public services, the 
quality of civil service and the degree of its independence from political 
pressures, the quality of policy formation and implementation and the credibility 
of the government's commitment to such policies (Kaufmann et al 2007:4). 
While political stability and government effectiveness are in a way related, the 
political stability indicator of the World Bank, adds the measure of the likelihood 
that a government will be destabilised or overthrown (ibid). It is obvious that 
these indicators cannot escape subjectivity and rely heavily on perceptions and 
opinions (however impartial and professional they may be). The aggregation of 
systematic data is in fact an advantage only projects such as the World Bank can 
afford. However, since the methods of data collection are disputable for 
countries below singularity, those countries will be taken out in an effort to 
eliminate outliers in the regression analysis.
Table 6 (appendix 6) includes the data using the World Bank's Government 
Effectiveness and Government Stability indicators for all EU and OECD
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countries in 2006 (35 countries). The World Bank scores range from -2.5 (the 
lowest) to +2.5(the highest) in each category. Since only developed countries are 
brought here, negative scores are very rare (only government stability scores for 
Turkey and Mexico). The column on the right is for HDIz. If there is significant 
correlation among the scores in the three groups, then there is evidence that there 
is a positive relationship between the rise of active society, government 
effectiveness and political stability for countries above the consolidation 
threshold.
The Pearson correlation between political stability and HDIz is very significant 
at 0.813. This stresses the fact that there is definitely a positive relationship 
between political stability and HDIz for countries above the threshold. There is 
also a significant relationship between government effectiveness and HDIz for 
the thirty-five countries in this analysis (0.715). This too stresses the positive 
link between the rise in the quality of government functions and democratic 
development of consolidated democracies. Since the definition of government 
effectiveness as given by the World Bank implies government efficiency (quality 
includes efficiency and effectiveness), and since effectiveness and efficiency 
together implies performance (chapter 2), so it can be concluded that there is a 
positive link between government performance and the rise in HDIz73 .
73 The correlations between political stability and government effectiveness are not as significant 
as the correlations between PEPS and Polity indexes and PEPS) and PEPS 2 . The reason may be 
that the World Bank has not used the same datasets for measuring political stability and 
government effectiveness which is a plus side for the World Bank Governance Indicators. This is 
not to say that a good correlation between political stability and government effectiveness does 
not exist. In fact there is a significant relationship between the two, indicating that a rise in 
political stability in countries above the singularity line leads to a rise in government 
performance. Though, the link is not strong as was the case in the above mentioned indices.
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4-5 Conclusion:
This chapter partly reaffirms Upset's classical argument (1959, 1960) on 
development and growth and the position of modernisation theories regarding 
causal dynamics involved in the rise and consolidation of democracy. Debate 
into development and democracy has triggered the vast literature in comparative 
studies of political systems using empirical methods and quantitative analysis 
while efforts of theorising democratic development has been mainly left out. 
This chapter differs from the current generation of comparative research in 
distinct ways. Instead of adding to the abundance of empirical case studies, this 
study has made an attempt to theorise the dynamics involved in democratic 
development and democracy and then back up the theory by statistical analysis 
and empirical research.
Unlike Lipset's argument on the linearity and continuity of the causal 
relationships between development and growth, catastrophe is a non-linear 
model and the cusp catastrophe model of democratic growth is a non-linear 
model which in addition to showing continuity, also shows discontinuous 
behavioural changes in transitions to democracy. The threshold for democracy 
is not at a minimum requirement for transitions to democracy, but the minimum 
for democratic consolidation (where democracy becomes institutionalised 
providing the minimum for effective and efficient democracy). And finally, the 
parameters of democratic growth are human development and democratic
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freedoms, not economic growth (although human development will not rise 
without economic growth).
Democracy is a consequence of various developmental factors. The empirical 
classifications and analysis of the cusp catastrophe model has been based on the 
most important of these factors, namely, human development, political freedoms 
that lead to stability and efficiency, effectiveness and a rise in democratic 
quality. The analysis is confirmation of the basic argument in this study that 
countries below and above the democratic threshold cannot be assessed for 
democratic performance in the same methods and measures74 and neither should 
their legislatures. Only consolidated democracies are suitable for performance 
measurement. Countries below must focus on building and strengthening the 
institutions that are detrimental to their passing singularity. The singularity or 
consolidation threshold has been estimated although it must be emphasised that 
this is an estimation based on the quantitative assessment and is not an accurate 
or definitive figure.
74 Part three of this chapter not only strengthens the cusp catastrophe model but also the fact that 
different indicators must be used in assessing democracy in countries above and below singularity. 
Moreover, democratic reforms without development in the active society, is not possible and an active 
society cannot be achieved without economic development. This idea is illustrated in the example of 
three democratic revolutions (so called by the media): the Velvet revolution of Czech Republic (above 
singularity); the Rose revolution of Georgia or orange revolution of Ukraine (close to singularity); and 
the Saffron revolution of Burma or green revolution in Iran (below singularity). In Burma, since the 
foundations for the active society were not present nor was the conditions for development ripe, any 
attempt to change the authoritarian regime would produce a catastrophic jump into anarchy which can 
only be stable again under authoritarian rule. In Georgia, despite lots of foreign aid and financial 
investment, the rose revolution has been very fragile with frequent unrest and police crackdown. Only 
the Czech revolution can be truly referred to as democratic, with a smooth transition and rise in the 
quality of democracy due to the existence of an active society at the time of transition.
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What is the relevance of these findings to the study of comparative legislatures? 
The findings in this chapter combined with Abraham Maslow's75 Hierarchy of 
Needs, produces a simple model called the 'Legislative Performance Pyramid' 
from which legislative performance measurement may evolve. If a legislature is 
to perform well, it must have first managed to maintain the environmental 
conditions and benchmarks of democratic governance. These benchmarks are the 
'foundation' of any system of democracy regardless of cultural or historical 
differences. A consolidated system cannot be built without the proper 
foundations and capacities in place (sometimes referred to as the failure of 
democratic transitions). Figure 4-12 is a simple legislative performance pyramid 
model influenced by Maslow's work and the argument put forth in this chapter.
Performance
Organisation
Foundation
1 1 '
1
I
QI
Figure 4-12: Legislative Performance Pyramid with Focus on Continuous 
Maintenance and Improvement
75 Maslow's 'Hierarchy of Needs' has been widely used in psychology, education and 
management. According to this model, the human being as an entity has a set of physiological, 
safety, belonging and esteem needs which he must satisfy before reaching self-actualisation. Not 
all humans are able to reach this final stage of human development; but those who do, have first 
managed to fulfil all the lower needs before moving toward the final goal of 'self actualisation' 
(Maslow 1998: 10-19) The claim made by Maslow's model is interestingly similar to claims 
made in systems theory which states that in order to create change in any system, there needs to 
be a change in all elements or organisations leading toward that change. More significantly, 
Maslow's model focuses on the idea that 'the prerequisite to full realisation of achievement is 
that nothing higher can happen before the lower needs get satisfied' (Maslow,1998: 39). In other 
words, in order for a system to be able to reach its full potential and performance, it must first 
make sure that the requisites for such performance are satisfied.
201
The pyramidal framework also takes into account one of the fundamental factors 
of any organisational performance model, 'the focus on maintenance and 
continuous improvement' which has been adapted from the Japanese Kaizen 
model of quality control (Imai, 1986). This framework assumes above all that 
democratic performance cannot be assessed properly unless there is an 
organisation to perform the functions required by the institution. In other words 
before a system can perform satisfactorily, all of the requirements (or at least 
most of the requirements) of the organisation must be met. But perhaps what is 
most important in this framework is the fact that an organisation that does not 
have the proper foundations built in place, cannot be expected to perform 
adequately as its organisation has not been established to meet the needs of a 
performance system. In the case of legislatures or any other democratic 
institution, no performance model can adequately assess the democratic 
performance of the organisation unless the foundations for such organisations are 
in place. In other words, before any democratic performance measurement model 
can be properly established, the foundations for democratic development must be 
present and institutionalised. Naturally, as with any other form of stable 
structure, foundations cannot be built overnight. Nor should one assume that an 
organisation that has first been built without the proper foundations can perform 
in the same way as a faultless structure76 .
76 This model can be interpreted in another way to show that if a legislative system has 
established the structures necessary for organisational performance, but the foundations of that 
system are not necessarily those required to build a democratic legislative system, then 
organisational behaviour would persist and functions could still be analysed although the results 
are not on a comparative level as legislative systems above singularity. But as long as legislative 
institutions below singularity aim towards system maintenance and gradual improvement then 
the measurement of performance can be conducted, and there may be improvements to 
institutional performance though not necessarily democratic performance since the democratic 
foundations are non existent or too weak. In this case, the mission, vision and values of such an 
institution would be significantly different from that of their counterparts in democratic societies.
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Since the main aim of legislatures is to promote and enhance democracy, a 
democratic performance measurement system can only include democratic 
legislatures occupying the space above singularity in the cusp catastrophe model, 
which are more or less homogenous. For other legislatures, as the cusp 
catastrophe model of democratic development shows, becoming democratic is a 
gradual process and requires a state to pass a certain threshold first. Legislatures 
that have not yet developed the foundations for democracy and democratic 
performance require capacity building measures to strengthen their foundations. 
It would be futile to assess the quality of democracy in non-democratic 
institutions. The pyramid model does not require all legislatures above 
singularity to replicate structures or functions before being considered in a 
comparative performance framework (just as there are bound to be differences in 
organisational structure and culture among all well performing institutions). It 
would be significant if legislatures manage to meet most requirements but they 
must all have the foundations of consolidation and the organisational capacity 
required to perform above the democratic threshold.
Focusing on organisational theories in the study of legislative institutions, will 
allow us to account for the interdependencies between the institutional and 
environmental factors together with the organisational structures that affect the 
legitimacy of a political system as well as its governability, representativeness 
and rationality of the whole system under study (Olsen 1983:9). In this way, it 
becomes easy to see how any model that plans to assess performance in
Even though non-democratic institutions may also function as organisations, their functions and 
behaviour would be different from democratic organisations and so the performance should be 
assessed using different indicators and methods.
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legislatures should bear similarities with organisational models first. 
Organisational theory also takes into account the constant interaction between 
the organisation and its environment in an effort to remain an equilibrium state. 
A performance model should allow an organisation to be flexible and dynamic to 
pick and choose those factors that are strongly related to the maintenance and 
improvement of the system that is in constant interaction with the environment. 
The following chapter will focus on the external legislative environment and 
how its interaction affects the performance of the legislature.
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Chapter 5: Assessment by Citizens
5-1 Introduction:
Following on from the previous discussion on democracy and development, this 
chapter will consider only political systems that are above the threshold for 
consolidated democracy 1 (or singularity in the Cusp Catastrophe model of 
chapter four). One of the advantages of considering this group of countries is that 
there is often more (time series) credible data available on them which has 
frequently been analysed in peer reviewed research. The research carried out on 
these countries mainly show that these countries share more common core 
democratic features and functions than the ones below the threshold for 
consolidated democracies. Political systems belonging to the first group of 
countries have successfully managed to meet the requirements of active 
democracies (which is to say not all of them necessarily are) and their 
differences lie mainly in the balance achieved between active citizens and 
political institutions, within the structural and cultural boundaries of each nation.
A political system may be considered as a pattern of feedback relations 
regardless of having any type of supra-unit centripetal mechanism (Etzioni 1968:
1 As mentioned, the purpose of this research is not to investigate democratic prerequisites of 
consolidated democracy. Such work would require a large project with involving many 
researchers and man hours which cannot be done in the scale of this research. The intention is to 
extend the idea of democratic threshold to reveal the (broad) difference in democratic 
performance different countries on either side, and to show democracy is a gradual process and 
democratisation forms a continuum requiring gradual and continual development. This 
continuum does not determine any kind of benchmark or standard to point to a 'good' or 'bad' 
democracy. It has a beginning but not an end.
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66). Stable consolidated democracies are in a steady state of equilibrium due to a 
continuous process of feedback relating to inputs from the citizens, outputs of 
governors, and the response that citizens make to government outputs (Easton 
1965). To maintain the state of equilibrium, the political system must become 
responsive to the feedback it receives. Some definitions of democracy identify 
responsiveness as a fundamental feature of the system. For instance Michael 
S award defines democracy as the 'Necessary correspondence between acts of 
governance and equally weighted interests of citizens with respect to those acts' 
(Saward 1998, 51). In this definition, responsiveness of the central political 
power system to the interests of the people is of central importance for 
maintaining stability in the system and is a top-down reaction to the bottom-up 
concerns of active citizens2 . Responsiveness serves by not only empowering 
citizens and acting as a qualitative transformation of different forms of 
subjectivity, but also by quantitatively increasing the strength and capacity of 
governance (Dean 1999). The issue of legitimacy becomes pivotal for the 
survival of the system and its performance. If the system operates without 
reflecting the interests of the people, then it risks losing the confidence and trust 
it needs to work democratically.
2 Non-democratic countries may also be responsive and usually respond very quickly to any form 
of expression from the subunits (sometimes violently) if they do not manage to block dissent 
before it surfaces. However, they do not seem to be flexible like democracies and cannot afford 
not to use coercive power to rule. In order to achieve activeness, along with modernisation, these 
societies must reach consolidation by becoming more representative, reducing state control (less 
police control and more civil rights) and allowing for consensus formation within its political 
groups. Etzioni believes that if these countries manage to make such reforms, their transitions to 
democracy are more smoothly achieved once other conditions are ripe (Etzioni 1968: 520-524). 
There are many examples to support this claim as in South-East Asia and Eastern European 
countries in recent history.
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The legitimacy of the political system is a direct reflection of support for its 
institutions which according to David Easton (1965) and Michael Mezey (1979) 
lend certain predictability to policy making strength and political stability within 
the democratic system. Mezey defines support as 'Attitudes that look to 
legislatures as a valued and popular institution' (Mezey 1979, 1990: 156)3 . Both 
Mezey and Easton believe that conceptual attitudes and values are an important, 
if not the most important, source of legitimacy of the regime and regime support. 
Hence legitimacy derives from:
'the conviction on the pan of the member that it is right and proper for 
him to accept and obey the authorities and to abide by the requirements of the 
regime....[legitimacy] is not contingent on specific inducements or rewards of 
any kind, except in the very long run...if there is a strong inner conviction of the 
moral validity of the authorities or regime, support may persist even in the face 
of repeated deprivations attributed to the outputs of the authorities or their 
failure to do so'
(Easton 1965: 278)
This type of 'diffuse support' 4 or ultimate support allows a system to 'weather 
the many storms when outputs cannot be balanced off against the inputs of 
demand' (Easton 1965: 273). For Easton (1975: 448) legitimacy and trust are
3 Mezey, M 'Classifying Legislatures' Comparative Legislatures. Pp. 21-44. Reproduced in 
Norton, P. Ed (1990) Legislatures: 149-176
4 Diffused Support according to Easton's definition 'is a kind of support that a system does not 
have to buy with more or less direct benefits for the obligations and responsibilities the member 
incurs...the outputs here may be considered psychic or symbolic and in this sense, they may offer 
the individual immediate benefits strong enough to stimulate a supportive response' (Easton 
1965:273)
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two types of diffuse regime support that contribute to system maintenance and 
the persistence of democracy. However it is obvious from the previous chapter 
that many legislatures cannot be very effective as instruments for active system 
maintenance and their performance could not be sufficient for the persistence of 
democracy. Even though they may contribute to support, they do not signal the 
legitimacy of the regime. Thus as Mezey (1979) suggests, diffuse support for 
political institutions such as the legislature contributes to the broader kind of 
allegiant political culture which can only be built with long term support and 
confidence in the legitimacy of successive policies. In other words only 
established democracies with a history of gradual build-up of diffuse support 
could enjoy high levels of congruent and allegiant attitudes towards the political 
system as a whole. This claim will be examined throughout this chapter.
Since diffuse support is a behavioural and cultural phenomenon that is nested 
within a set of supportive attitudes toward all political institutions that make up 
the political system, it is important to have an idea of the structural 
characteristics of these principles in addition to cultural values and norms of the 
system. Diffuse support will increase only if citizens perceive these structures as 
commensurate with their generally accepted values and norms. Inevitably the 
congruence between citizens and the state and the support given to the state by 
citizens will differ and be of various sources, even among consolidated 
democratic systems. However, these levels should be systematically related in a 
manner which is crucial to the functioning of democracy in any country and is 
the core to the maintenance and improvement of legitimacy and democratic 
quality of system as a whole.
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Thus the prerequisite of legitimation and democratic stability of a system is that 
its citizens accept the (culturally embedded) values by which it is legitimised. 
This prerequisite does not exist in many political systems below singularity of 
the cusp catastrophe model in chapter three, since there is often a lack of 
congruency between the structures and the cultural values held by the citizens. 
The prerequisite of a successful legitimisation process is that citizens accept the 
values upon which the system is legitimised.
Furthermore, a political system becomes more legitimate, and more stable, when 
there is greater congruence between structure and culture (Almond and Powell 
1978, Fuchs 1989, 1995). Naturally then, the rise in human development and the 
quality of democracy among developed democracies should increase legitimacy 
for representative political institutions. Mezey has argued that diffuse support 
over the long run, is related to specific support since successive policy making 
over an extensive period of time produces diffuse support and the continuation of 
this support with regime persistence will engender supportive attitudes among 
citizens toward the system as a whole (Mezey 1979). But on the other hand many 
empirical studies, particularly of developed democracies tend to suggest the 
opposite or a crisis following a downturn in political support among citizens. 
This paradox will be investigated in the next section and throughout this chapter.
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5-2 Active Citizens and their Support for the Political System
Consolidated democratic norms expect more active involvement from the 
citizens than non-democratic order because democracy includes the aggregation 
of public preferences into binding collective decisions. Almond and Verba 
believe that such an aggregation necessarily requires an active citizenry because 
it is through interest articulation information and deliberation that public 
preferences can be identified, shaped and transformed into collective decisions 
that are considered as legitimate (Almond and Verba 1968, 1989: 13). A 
participatory political system of this kind also requires a political culture that is 
consistent with it. Almond (1980: 28) uses Easton's (1965, 1975) analysis of the 
political system to define its culture:
'The system culture of a nation would consist of the distributions of attitudes 
toward the national community, the regime and the authorities to use David 
Easton's formulation. This would include the sense of national identity, 
attitudes toward the legitimacy of the regime and its various institutions and 
attitudes toward the legitimacy and effectiveness of the incumbents of the 
various political roles.'
This definition contains citizen attitudes towards the political community as well 
as the relationship among themselves. Hence congruence with the regime 
structure and a commitment to democratic values within the democratic system 
is pivotal to the persistence of the political system and its legitimacy. 
Furthermore the political culture must be derived from the attitudes of citizens
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on a normative basis (not coercion) following an internalisation of democratic 
processes within society.
The Civic Culture uses a broadened concept of political culture through which 
the 'relationship between attitudes and motivations of the discrete individuals 
who make up the political systems and the character and performance of political 
systems may be discovered systematically' (Almond and Verba 1968, 1989: 32). 
The theory is a product of democracy (Barry 1978: 51-52) and provides 
implications for the performance and stability of the political system once 
democracy exists. It presupposes that subjectively oriented citizens are 
necessarily active (Almond and Verba 1968, 1089:190) and participation is the 
result of a sense and ability to participate along with the individual's allegiance 
to the system and is a reflection of the evaluation of the legitimacy and 
effectiveness of the system (ibid 191). The assumption is that those who 
participate in decisions will be more satisfied with political decisions and will be 
more supportive of the system. The system responds to inputs from the citizens 
and produces beneficial outputs that in turn lead to more effective outcomes in 
terms of satisfaction and system support. Hence from the point of view of active 
participants the system becomes effective and legitimate. The active citizen in 
democracies has satisfaction and trust in individuals and institutions. Trust at this 
level reflects satisfaction with the legitimacy of the system and to use Easton's 
analogy, refers to the qualities (not performance) of the people occupying 
authoritative positions at a certain time (Easton 1975: 449).
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In this view, active citizens are intrinsic elements of the democratic system who 
have knowledge and awareness to state their positions on an autonomous basis 
without submitting themselves into relationships of dependence or becoming 
patronised. Active citizens have been described by Judith Shklar (1991) as 
citizens who:
'Keep informed and speak out against public measures that they regard as 
unjust, unwise or just too expensive. They openly support politics that they 
regard as just and prudent. Although they do not refrain form pursuing their 
own and their reference groups interest, they try to weigh the claims of other 
people impartially and listen to their arguments...they are public meeting goers 
and join voluntary organisations who discuss and deliberate with others about 
politics that will effect them all.' (Shklar, 1991: 5)
Compared to inactive or passive citizens who, according to Almond and Verba, 
have low subjective competence, active citizens are regarded to be self-confident 
who follow and discuss politics, are active partisans though likely to be more 
satisfied with their role in society (Almond and Verba 1968, 1989: 205). Most 
significantly active citizens are regarded as being more favourably disposed 
toward the performance of the political system and generally having more 
positive orientations towards it. Although activists are usually portrayed as not 
having a favourably disposition toward political decisions, Almond and Verba 
have argued this is because satisfaction generally takes three different types. 
Satisfaction is towards the structure of political influence; satisfaction to the 
structure of governmental output; and the more diffuse type of satisfaction or the 
diffuse orientation to the political system as a whole (Almond and Verba 1968,
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1989: 192). However, while the first and second types of satisfaction would vary 
with system performance, the third type is relatively stable and unrelated to 
specific output in the short run. The diffuse orientation is argued to enable the 
system to weather a crisis in its performance and survive. This is not to say that 
dissatisfaction with government performance over time will not lead to a decline 
in legitimacy of the political system, but as Easton suggests (1965), under such 
conditions and over time, the regime and the political system as well as the 
society it sustains could be threatened.
Another characteristic of the active citizen is personal efficacy which Holdon 
(1988: 327) calls an 'inherent virtue' of democracy. Citizens, who are more 
competent, knowledgeable, skilful and efficient, tend to evaluate politics using 
more demanding standards. A core element of this efficacy is the individual's 
self-image as an active and influential participant in the society. Politically 
efficacious citizens are seen as comprehending, controlling and mastering their 
political environments (Gabriel 1995: 359). Hence the concept of political 
efficacy relates to the input component of the political system, regarding citizens 
as able and willing to participate.
Inglehart (1977, 1990) believes that there has been a shift in citizen attitudes and 
values as the result of human development in advanced industrial democracies 
and post-modern or post-material changes even though the political structures 
have remained the same. Post-materialists are more politically active, more 
articulate and are able to increasingly make demands to the system which require 
responsiveness. Whereas materialists generally perceive all political institutions
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to be more responsive to their interests, post-materialists fault dominant social 
actors for rejecting their alternative values. This shift has made the position of 
political elites difficult as mass publics become increasingly critical of their 
political leaders and increasingly likely to engage in elite challenging activities 
(Inglehart 1999: 250).
Inglehart (1977, 1990) maintains that changes to post-materialist citizens as the 
natural consequence of economic development and the development of the 
modern welfare state in developed democracies, has led to increased citizen 
interest in new values dealing with the quality of life. Individuals have become 
less concerned with material wealth and more concerned with issues such as the 
environment and the pursuit of personal interests. Previous satisfaction with the 
responsiveness of democratic institutions creates a ratchet effect with citizens 
demanding more responsiveness and satisfaction to individual needs. If 
institutions cannot adapt quickly to deal with the demands or lack resources, then 
there is a rise in dissatisfaction with the government and other political 
institutions, hi other words, post-materialists increasingly take the older values 
for granted bringing 'new, more diverse and demanding standards to the 
evaluation of political life and confront political leaders with more active, 
articulate citizens' (Inglehart 1997, 297-8). Such demands put a strain on 
political institutions to perform.
In consolidated democracies, active citizens require active political institutions. 
Modernisation is not sufficient for activeness (Etzioni 1968: 5). So on the one 
hand, active citizens or post-materialists in developed democratic states appear
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to resist control from government. On the other hand, they want a strong political 
structure capable of being decisive, responsive and flexible to their demands. In 
this regard resistance does not necessarily take a negative form indicating any 
kind of immediate threat or crisis. Rather it reflects the need to include broader 
citizen involvement (engagement) in political issues (policy making) and is 
considered as the strength of a developed democracy. Democratic states are 
strengthened through their interaction with the society by persuading (not 
coercing) active citizen without losing legitimacy and support. Etzioni (1968: 
513) argues that a high level of political flexibility creates a close 'fit' between 
the distributions for political and social power. Political power is control over the 
state and other macro-level political organisations, whereas social power is 
distributed among active citizens and groups.
In Etzioni's view a transition to an active society requires a closer 'parallelism' 
between society and state, a more flexible and responsive polity which in turn 
allows societal guidance to be less centralised and to decrease greatly the 
reliance on coercion as compared to the situation in post-modernist states 
(Etzioni 1968: 517). New values are adopted through the interaction between the 
state and the active citizens. The direction of this interaction between the 
political institutions and active citizens is indefinite and changeable. However, it 
can be assumed that the causal direction of this transfer moves top-down in more 
established democracies where people's orientations are shaped in a sustained 
way by socioeconomic forces from above (Ingelhart 1977, 1990). Whereas in 
newly established democracies and democratising system which have a growing 
involvement of civil society, the causal direction is more likely to move from
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below (Mishler and Rose 2002). The quality of democracy itself in developed 
post-industrial societies depends on the active balance between the autonomous 
sub units in the society and political structures. The causal model below depicts 
the interaction between the active citizen and the legitimacy of the state through 
the performance of political institutions, and in particular the legislature.
figure 5-1: Legislative performance in active democracies
The figure above shows the linkages between active performance of a collective 
political institution, in this case the performance of the legislature with the 
individual performance of active citizens and how the relationship leads to 
diffuse support in the political system as a whole. The allocation of 
responsiveness appears as the most important concern for legislative 
performance in developed democracies. Legislative responsiveness has been 
linked directly to the quality of democracy and rising confidence in the system
216
that ultimately leads to the main goal of system support and the maintenance and 
gradual improvement of legitimacy.
Responsiveness of the legislature is enhanced through its main functions or 
intrinsic democratic values: equality, representation, accountability and efficacy. 
These values are linked to other values of an institutional nature and are 
eventually linked to personal or psychological values that are also intrinsic to 
democracy though from the perspective of active citizens. As mentioned there 
are no arrows to show the direction of these linkages because in post-modern 
established democracies their relationship is not strictly top-down (Dahl 1971) or 
strictly bottom-up (Cohen 1989, Fishkin 1991). Indeed it is possible to have 
simultaneous top-down and bottom-up relationships due to the flexibility of 
political institutions and the unpredictably of the environment.
According to this framework, support for active legislatures in developed 
democracies cannot be maintained only using Mezey's three indicators of 
support, namely institutional continuity; public attitudes towards government 
leaders and elites; or corruption (Mezey 1979, 1990: 157-8). Neither is support 
for active legislatures maintained by account of their policy power (capacity to 
legislate) or how they perform budgetary obligations, provide oversight, and 
ratify international treaties as no doubt all developed legislatures are capable of 
all such things. Rather performance in such legislatures should be measured by 
how well they manage to maintain and improve on responsiveness, the quality of 
democracy, and confidence in the institution which builds legitimacy and 
support for the system as a whole. In an ideal scenario, the active citizen would
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have personal satisfaction with his/her performance (psychological value) and 
satisfaction with the performance of democratic institutions leading to rising 
democratic quality and inevitably to system legitimacy and support for the 
system as a whole which adds to the stability and persistence of the system 
(Easton 1965, 1975).
5-3 The Threat to Support in Democracies
A number of scholars investigating the cause of declining trust and confidence in 
the political system have identified the decline in the performance of 
representative democratic institutions as a main reason for the loss of trust 
(Easton 1975, Putnam, Pharr and Dalton 2000, Katzenstein 2000). The cause and 
effect linkage model of legislative performance (figure 5-1) shows that 
performance is not an independent value and the fact that the two values at the 
top and bottom of the framework are linked together through a set of other 
interrelating values shows the significance of each value for the whole of the 
system. In other words each value has to be met before moving up or down to the 
next value indicating there must be good, if not significant, correlations among 
the dimensions of support.
But as Mezey has pointed out, studies show that there is either a very small or 
insignificant correlation between the dimensions of support, specifically, voting 
turnout and support; efficacy and support; or voting duty and support (1979, 
1990: 162). In Easton's terms (1965) such weak correlations could be caused by
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using inappropriate measurements or because institutional confidence as a 
measure of support for the political regime is more important for our 
understanding of political stability than measures of support for authorities 
which are volatile. Mezey also believes these inconsistencies are the result of 
measurement problems since the concept of diffuse support is too abstract a term 
to measure and because it measures support in terms of people's reaction and 
perceptions to hypothetical situations (ibid). To avoid this problem, Mezey 
suggests making a distinction between expectations and diffuse support. 
Expectations are basically public views about the performance of institutions, 
hence being more concrete and empirically measurable.
Some of the more recent studies of democracy and support also stress 
distinguishing between trust in people and confidence in institutions (Giddens 
1990: 83-8, Newton 2007: 344-345). This line of reasoning has become 
acceptable since one can observe that citizens in democratic societies are 
increasingly trusting people around them whom they have personal knowledge 
about, but do not trust political institutions as such. Whereas trust or confidence 
in institutions such as parliament or political parties is not static and usually 
based on how citizens perceive their performance at a given time. Legislatures 
for instance, are based on rules and procedures within the political sphere which 
carries with them greater risks and unpredictability compared to the face-to-face 
relations of personal (social) trust. Newton (1999: 179) argues political trust is 
thinner than social trust because of increasing risk and unpredictability of 
political trust and it is getting more so under the pressures of modern political
219
life. Thus trust and confidence in political institutions are not stable but 
changeable depending on the responsiveness of the institutions themselves.
Since post-materialists are more active than before, in order to survive, political 
institutions and politicians have reacted by becoming more responsive to keep up 
with this demand. In spite of this, studies carried out in developed democracies 
using world values data shows that post-materialists do not have high levels of 
trust because they consider their political leaders unresponsive (Gabriel 1995: 
375). The reason for this according to Newton (1999: 180) seems to be that 
social and political trust are related to different sets of social, economic and 
political variables. His empirical analysis of a number of developed democracies 
has suggested that indicators such as age, education and income are often related 
to variations in social and political trust (though results vary from country to 
country). Moreover political distrust could trigger a lack of political support for 
politicians and organisations5 . And despite a feeling of personal efficacy, the 
active citizen could become less engaged and participative. Inglehart (1990: 306) 
has expected 'the impact of post-materialism to be weakest on voting 
behaviour....and relatively strong support for social change'.
A study by Kulmin (2007) on the relationship between satisfaction with the 
performance of welfare institutions and political trust in fifteen European 
societies has shown that dissatisfaction with public health services and education 
is negatively correlated with political trust, but is unrelated to general welfare
5 Political support according to Easton (1975: 436) 'refers to the way in which a person 
evaluatively orients himself to an object through his attitude'
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state support. This phenomenon has caused, in several cases, a significant impact 
on voting behaviour and the probability of voting for a government party. 
Dissatisfaction at the political level does not undermine the general support for 
civil society. In other words political dissatisfaction in advanced democracies is 
not because people want a change in the political system as a whole but shows 
that they are not happy with the way it performs and require higher quality of 
democracy (Dalton 2004; Klingemann and Fuchs, 1995; Norris 1999; 
Thomassen 2007).
Since active citizens have more self confidence in their personal efficacy7 and 
wellbeing, and as economic development increasingly shifts interests from 
previous collective issues toward new issues dealing with the individual's 
quality of life (Inglehart 1990, 1997), it is argued that the modern voter apart 
from pursuing his or her own interests (issue voting rather as opposed to package 
voting) is becoming more disengaged and disconnected with political 
institutions, and as a result has become more demanding and critical of the 
performance of political institutions and demands higher standards of efficacy 
(Norris 1999, Halman 2007). Incompetent and inefficacious political institutions 
have often been cited as the primary reason for the decline in democratic 
performance and the disparity between public expectations of government 
performance and the actual ability of the state to perform due to political and
7 The concept of political efficacy was introduced into empirical research by Campbell, Gurin 
and Miller (1954: 187) with this definition: 'Sense of political efficacy may be defined as the 
feeling that individual political action does have or can have, an impact upon the political 
process, i.e. that it is worth while to perform one's civic duties. It is the feeling that political and 
social change is possible and that the individual citizen can play a part in bringing about this 
change'.
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economic pressures (Crozier et al, 1975, Korenberg 1993, Weisberg 1996, Miller 
andListaug 1999).
While this kind of dissatisfaction is very high in developing countries and as 
McAllister (1999) shows that developed democracies do not rate government 
incompetence as badly, there is a modest, but constant relationship between 
support for political institutions and subjective economic satisfaction. The more 
that post-materialists perceive political institutions to be inefficient and 
unresponsive, the more critical they become of such institutions, while at the 
same time becoming less attached to them. Less attachment in developed 
democracies does not signal passiveness (as it would in countries below 
democratic consolidation) but more critical and active citizens. Unlike the 
unconsolidated democracies, the overloading of the state by citizen demands in 
consolidated democracies would not indicate any immediate crisis as 
dissatisfaction with the democratic process will not be generalised to apply to the 
structures of democracy itself. As Klingemann and Fuchs (1995: 6) note, 
'Western democracies have a reserve of legitimation at the structural level which 
provides a significant buffer against the shortfall in performance at the process 
level'.
However this is not to say that legitimation is not threatened by performance 
shortfalls, and constant dissatisfaction with political processes in consolidated 
democracies, but that a catastrophe would be highly improbably (but not 
impossible) and require long-term shortfalls in institutional responsiveness and 
incongruence between institutional values and the shifting preferences of the
222
post-materialist value priorities. Thus low levels of confidence in political 
institutions should be read as an indicator that something is going wrong but it 
does not necessarily reflect a threat to the legitimacy of the system. Legitimacy 
would be threatened only if the public was losing trust and at the same time 
should start increasing support for alternatives to existing institutions which is 
doubtful since no such viable alternative exists (Klingemann and Fuchs 1995, 
Listhaug and Wiberg 1995). The threat of performance deficit is examined 
further below.
5-4 Performance Deficit and the Crisis of Consolidated Democracies
Since the performance of political institutions in representative democracies, and 
parliaments as the key institutions of representative democracies in particular, 
depend so much on satisfaction from below, then it is believed that 
dissatisfaction and distrust in the performance of parliament and its 
representatives would in the long-term pose a threat to the legitimacy and 
support for the democratic system in general (Crozier et al, 1975). Evidence 
from comparative studies of representative democracies suggests that despite the 
fact that evaluations of regime performance and trust in individuals vary 
substantially from one country to another, it can be generally assumed that 
political support for the core institutions of representative democracy (parties, 
parliaments and government) has fallen (Morris 1999). The challenge for 
consolidated representative democracies is not about replacing existing 
institutions for higher performing institutions (as alternatives are not available)
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but according to Fuchs, Guidorossi and Svensson (1995: 325-6) 'to reform and 
enrich them through forms of direct democracy in favour of the active citizens'.
According to Easton, a political system can persist only if stress8 is kept under a 
critical rate through improving performance of the elements within the system. 
This could only be manageable via feedback loops linked to the system from the 
environment. Easton believed that by controlling its endogenous stress the 
political system is able to become predictable and persistent. Stress to a system is 
produced by increase in demands from below which could lead to a lack of 
political support (Easton, 1965: 127-8). However stress is not always prevalent 
but as Easton maintains under the conditions of stable democracies, citizens 
distinguish that their institutional structures and their values correspond with 
each other in their country and thus develop strong support for the system or a 
sense of legitimacy which contributes to a 'reservoir of good will' (Easton 1975: 
444). This leads citizens to accept performance deficits for a while but in the 
long run could cause a crisis for diffuse system support (Easton, 1975: 445).
The idea of a potential crisis in democracy as a result of intrinsic and 
endogenous threats and challenges to the political system is a theme also shared 
by Crozier, Huntington and Watanuki (1975), who also blame the performance 
deficit of political institutions as a result of them becoming overwhelmed with so 
many diverse demands from citizens; weak political leadership; and 
incompetence in failing to effectively plan for economic and social development.
8 Stress to a system was produced by demands and a lack of support from the environment. The 
way that the system could respond and reduce stress would depend on the quality of information 
coming into the system and the system's determination to act upon it (Easton, 1965: 128).
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The limited capacity of the state to respond and select between citizen demands 
in addition to structural features of representative democracies which encourage 
an often unnecessary party competition aimed at disqualifying policy for no 
other reason than partisanship also becomes a threat to the legitimacy of the 
system and may produce dissatisfaction with the system of representative 
democracy. Furthermore they argue that such intrinsic threats are unavoidable 
as the system becomes more democratic. Hence democracies must learn to avoid, 
moderate or live with the contextual challenges facing them by educating the 
citizen about the structures and processes of the state (Crozier et al, 1975: 8).
Yet as already mentioned, the political system is not as predictable as Easton or 
Crotzier and his colleagues have assumed. Moreover as Norris (1999) argues, 
active democratic citizens do manage to distinguish between the different levels 
of the regime, and are often seen as strongly supporting certain democratic 
values while becoming highly critical of the way the democratic government 
works in practice. Contrary to arguments of crisis, Norris sees no evidence that 
prolonged government deficit in developed democracies has created a loss of 
diffuse system support over a lengthy period of time. Rather, the active citizens 
are able to make clear judgements about different institutions within the regime 
and express confidence in a certain political institutions whose performance 
seems adequate while at the same time show distrust in other kinds of 
institution and still maintain confidence in the system as a whole (ibid). Hence 
the performance deficit of political institutions such as parliaments poses a 
challenge to diffuse support rather than a crisis.
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Both ideas of crisis or challenge to democracy are centred on the assumption of 
performance deficits in political institutions of developed democracies to be the 
result of inadequate responsiveness of the political institutions of the state to 
general or specific demands from the citizens in those systems. Fuchs, Guidorosi 
and Svensson (1995; 326-327) believe that such deficit is affected by three 
factors:
Dissatisfaction - The more intense the dissatisfaction, and the 
longer its duration, the more likely it is generalised. 
Effective Government/Opposition - Effectiveness depends on 
whether the dissatisfied may assume that at least one opposition 
party might perform better than the ruling party or parties and 
that this opposition party has a real chance of participating in 
the government in the foreseeable future. 
Legitimation - System legitimacy based on fundamental values 
of democracy to the extent that its citizens believe that the 
structural arrangements correspond with fundamental 
democratic values.
According to Fuchs et al (1995: 325), despite a slight threat to the erosion of 
legitimacy of Western democratic institutions, a crisis or challenge to democracy 
has never materialised because there is no credible alternative to democracy. 
This central theme that the changing of citizens' values in developed 
democracies has resulted in the erosion of respect and legitimacy for authority by 
reducing public confidence in political institutions has been mentioned by many
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authors (Inglehart 1990, 1999, Van Deth and Scarborough 1995, Dalton 2000) 
and is the central idea in all contributions to the Crisis of Democracy (Norris 
1999). In such societies there is general agreement that post-materialists or active 
citizens are increasingly showing more social confidence in fellow citizens and 
civil society institutions while becoming more sceptical of the functions of 
hierarchical political institutions, or as Dalton (2000: 261) puts it, 'legitimacy 
based on inclusion is replacing legitimacy based on hierarchical authority'. 
However, as results from studies of political satisfaction in developed 
democracies show, more than three quarters of the public in such countries 
accept that democracy is the most legitimate form of government and support 
democracy as an ideal (Dalton 2000: 262-3).
A study of public dissatisfaction in the 1980s carried out by Fuchs et al (1995) 
reveal that the problem was less to do with an overload of government 
responsiveness to certain demands but the result of post-materialist value change. 
They argue that representative democracies in the West were not structurally 
able to process new citizen demands adequately generating dissatisfaction and 
that structural reform proposals which could be regarded as a credible alternative 
may also constitute a challenge to the system (ibid). Using Eurobarometer data 
from the 1970s and 1980s, they show that 90% of the respondents (95% in most 
countries, including newer democracies) in Western democracies support the 
idea of democracy in general and the principle commitment to the idea of 
democracy is almost universal. Although active support for democracy as a form 
of government is only 70% which is slightly lower, it is nowhere near a crisis 
level, but a cause for concern.
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Putnam, Pharr and Dalton (2000: 23-24) present a model for explaining the 
change or decline in public trust in developed democracies. They believe that 
public satisfaction with representative institutions is a result of information that 
is exposed to citizens and is the criteria by which the public evaluate 
government, politics and the actual performance of the institutions. According to 
this model, the decline in public satisfaction depends on three variables. Firstly 
changes to the accuracy and comprehensiveness of information on political 
institutions as a result of modernisations and the public become increasingly 
better informed. Secondly changes to public criteria for evaluation of politics and 
government which poses a challenge to institutions to catch up and adapt to 
evolving public standards. Thirdly there may be an actual deterioration of 
performance in representative institutions which will depend on how 
performance is assessed and objectively measured.
Studies of political support in developed democracies usually take into 
consideration three sources of public dissatisfaction or disillusionment: 
politicians, political parties and political institutions. Although these trends vary 
in developed democracies depending on the culture and history of the system 
which influences how the public view their politicians, political parties and 
institutions, there is an overall declining pattern of public trust and confidence in 
all these countries (ibid).The overall assumption is that the more disparity that 
exists between citizens' support for democracy and their moral assessment that 
they give to their politicians, parties and political institutions, the less support 
there is for the political community and dissatisfaction with its performance.
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Dissatisfaction with political elites, although quite prevalent in developing 
democracies, is not necessarily viewed as a sign of dissatisfaction with the 
performance of democracy in developed democracies (although variations in the 
levels of trust exist among developed democracies, active citizens tend to 
separate elite mismanagement or corruption from the democratic system). The 
evaluations of individual politicians or support for particular political parties is 
the most specific and short-term measure of political support (Dalton 1999: 59). 
Post-materialists generally do not show a high level of trust in politicians and 
political leaders and elites whom they mainly regarded as unresponsive (Gabriel 
1995: 375). Although a decline in trust in politicians does not indicate a 
definitive decline in trust for political institutions, particularly many of the 
western European democracies, it would be more related to declining trust in 
representative institutions and has serious implications for support for political 
parties and the government, especially at times of economic crisis and 
uncertainties.
The decline in party identification and partisanship and party membership in 
post-industrial democracies (Dalton 2000, Scarrow 2000) as well as a decline in 
cleavage-based voting (Franklin et al. 1992) and electoral participation 
(Wattenberg 2000) are also taken to be the result of modernisation (Inglehart 
1990, 1999) and cognitive mobilisation (Dalton 2000) in the society which 
indicate systematic and enduring structural change in the relationship between 
citizens and political parties in contemporary democracies.
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The decrease in partisanship is generally greater among post-material citizens 
who are (compared to previous generations) younger, better educated, 
knowledgeable and politically sophisticated and who are interested in the 
political process but remain non-partisan and prefer to vote on issues rather than 
party platforms. According to Dalton, dissatisfaction in this regard does not 
imply dissatisfaction toward democracy and so cannot be systematically related 
to the weakening of party ties (Dalton 2000). Scarrow (2000) also cautions 
against signifying the general decline in party membership to weak party 
organisation (performance) since organisation does not need active membership 
and there is no factual evidence of a decline in party performance. Evidence of 
better party organisation is also central to Katz and Mair's (1995) notion of cartel 
parties (discussed further in chapter six) where the parties within the legislature 
are strengthened by institutionalising government support (financial, electoral 
and organisational) at the price of insulating themselves from the public and 
weakening accountability.
It is argued that partisanship contributes to democracy by stabilising predictable, 
individual voting behaviour and a downturn in partisanship improves the 
electoral prospects for new parties contributing to the further fractionalisation of 
party systems but tends to complicate efficacy of government formulation 
process and coalition building (Schmitt and Holberg 1995: 100). From the 
citizen perspective, partisanship may contribute to the mobilisation of citizens in 
conventional political participation and strengthen individual party choice. It also 
seems to promote beliefs about legitimacy (depending on support for 
government party and its performance) and help integrate citizens into the
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political order (ibid: 102-104). Participation in political campaigns and activities 
is generally higher when partisanship is stronger (Verba et al 1978) and the 
weakening or erosion of parties has usually been generalised into a hypothesis of 
partisan dealignment in developed democracies (Dalton et al, 1984; Dalton 1984, 
2000; Inglehart 1990). This downturn in public dissatisfaction with parties does 
not indicate dissatisfaction with democracy, but rather evolving forms of 
democratic politics such as direct democracy and other forms of public influence 
in the policy making process ( Fuchs et al. 1995).
The process of cognitive mobilisation as a result of declining participation in 
developed democracies allows citizens to become more active, increase their 
political sophistication and ability to deal with the complexities of politics 
(Dalton 2000: 32) and demands parties to adapt themselves to these changes to 
survive, similar to other service providing organisation. In this analogy voters are 
becoming more like savvy customers and instead of aligning themselves to a 
specific brand and regularly display their dissatisfaction with products through 
their process of selection.
5-5 Political Dissatisfaction with the Performance of Legislatures
The third source of political distrust and dissatisfaction as indicated by Putnam, 
Pharr and Dalton (2000) is the dissatisfaction with the performance of political 
institutions. In representative democracies, the most prevalent political 
institution is the legislature which links citizens and elites and maintains the 
balance between authority and responsiveness in developed democracies through
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its accountability function. In order to assess the level of support for legislatures, 
one usually looks at the attitudes towards the institution from citizen surveys and 
polls. The performance of the legislature is influenced to some extent by the 
performance of the other two sources of dissatisfaction mentioned earlier 
(political elites and parties), but a drop in satisfaction for the legislature is 
generally considered to bring about a potential crisis to the democratic system as 
a whole.
For Mezey support for legislatures is linked to support of the policy-making 
process. This kind of support is a type of specific support which Easton (1965: 
273) explains 'flows from the favourable attitudes and predispositions stimulated 
by outputs that are perceived by members to meet their demands as they arise or 
in anticipation'. Mezey believes that increase in specific support over the long 
run will increase diffuse support. But as mentioned before, active citizens are 
also increasingly critical citizens and tend to show dissatisfaction with policies 
by reducing specific support, though not diffuse support.
From a political culture view (Almond and Verba 1963, Easton 1965) trust in 
institutions such as the legislature is a relatively stable characteristic of society, 
reflecting the socialisation of citizens into its dominant and prevalent norms. But 
this view of institutions is static and tends to exclude factors which might 
contribute to a change in the confidence levels of the mass public. Post-material 
priorities on the other hand are not static and relate to 'physical sustenance and 
the quality of life' (Inglehart 1990: 60). Thus support for political institutions 
such as parliaments, depends on the attitudes and values of individuals while
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confidence in them will depend on ideological orientations of the public as well 
as the performance of the institution itself which Mezey defines as expectations 
(Mezey 1965, 1990: 163). According to Listhaug and Wiberg (1995: 301) as the 
economic role of the government expands in all sectors, it is likely that mass 
support for public institutions - parliament included - becomes increasingly 
sensitive to public expectations and an performance evaluations. This hypothesis 
is supported in empirical analysis of the more affluent OECD states by lan 
McAllister (1999) who observes a modest decline in public confidence in 
parliaments and the civil service from 1981-1991.
But if the erosion of trust in the efficacy of political institutions, including the 
legislature, is inevitable with modernisation as Inglehart suggests, then the trend 
in dissatisfaction with performance in developed democracies is probably 
unstoppable since the growth in economic well being, education, health and 
other factors relating to human development is less likely to take a downward 
trend and so dissatisfaction will always persist to some extent depending on how 
institutions manage to adapt themselves to new demands. Empirical research 
directed at the analysis of the impact of education on trust by Doling (1990, 
1992) show that this indicator bears only an indirect relationship and that higher 
education may not breed cynicism towards all types of institutions. Doring's 
research contends that the higher educated will show an overall inclination 
towards low confidence in institutions, but they might 'place confidence in those 
institutions that criticise or punish rulers in case of breach of trust; the judiciary, 
the press, and possibly the parliament' (Doring 1992: 128). So Inglehart's theory 
is probably less helpful in the study of legislative performance of long
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established and persistent democracies, than it would be in explaining 
democratic performance in newly established democracies and democratising 
systems. Studies of the performance of the core political institutions of 
established democratic regimes, especially parliaments, show that they are 
adopting and evolving to meet the new challenges of the society rather than 
declining (Norris 1999).
At the micro level there is a significant indirect relationship between social trust 
and trust in parliaments in developed democracies. According to Newton and 
Norris (2000: 62) social trust helps build social capital and social capital in turn 
helps strengthen political institutions, the performance of which may improve 
citizen confidence. Though it is possible to imagine a government performing 
unsatisfactorily in spite of good institutions; it is difficult to imagine satisfactory 
government performance without effective institutions for making and 
implementing policies. Thus confidence in institutions is a good standard to 
assess regime performance. However their analysis of confidence in parliament 
in trilateral developed countries, shows that it has not fallen indicating concern 
but no crisis to democracy (ibid: 71) the reason is that although the relationship 
between social trust in government performance and the performance of 
legislatures is significant, it is weak. At the macro level, confidence in 
parliament is negatively related to political and economic measures such as 
government instability, inflation and unemployment (Listhaug and Wiberg 1995: 
320).
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Norris (1999) has studied the relationship between constitutional design and 
institutional trust in developed democracies and in particular whether certain 
types of constitutional arrangements generate stronger levels of institutional 
confidence than others. The study finds patterns of fluctuation in support which 
is suggested reflect the public's overall evaluation of the performance of the 
political leaders and more generally, the ability of the administration to handle 
the economy (Norris 1999: 218). The more institutions succeed in meeting 
public expectations, the more they generate diffuse support towards the political 
regime in general, while no single (political, economic, cultural) variable is 
responsible for shaping overall attitudes of confidence in institutions (ibid). Over 
a long period of time the constitutional arrangements can be expected to shape 
our general orientations towards the political regime and be reflected in diffuse 
support for the system.(ibid: 219). For example if citizens feel that the rules of 
the game allows the party they endorse to be elected to power, they are more 
likely to feel that the legislature is representative and it performs well.
But contrary to Lijphart's (1969) consociational democracies thesis which he 
believes would produce higher levels of institutional trust by maximising the 
number of winners compared to majoritarian arrangements (winner-take-all), 
empirical analysis of trilateral democracies carried out by Norris (1999: 221) 
indicates that confidence is greater in countries with majoritarian rather than 
proportional electoral systems. Moreover institutional confidence is most likely 
to be highest in parliamentary democracies characterised by plurality electoral 
systems, two party or moderate multi party system and unitary states (ibid) and
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confidence in the performance of political parties influences confidence in 
legislative performance.
5-6 Conclusion:
The focus on trust in advanced legislative institutions raises the question of 
whether low confidence levels should be seen as a threat to the legitimacy of the 
political system in general. The concept of legitimacy moves the analytical focus 
beyond specific support for particular parties, politicians, incumbents or certain 
institutions towards the measurement of legitimacy and improving democratic 
quality in advanced democratic systems. Trust and satisfaction in legislatures is 
not a sole measure of legitimacy but can be considered as a measure of 
legislative performance and its responsiveness to popular demand.
As the framework for legislative performance (figure 5-1) illustrates, legislative 
performance itself is linked not only to satisfaction of the legislature's 
democratic functions but also satisfaction with the efficacy of the legislature in 
doing its job right. In order to improve responsiveness, legislatures must enhance 
the performance of their main functions in a balanced way. Maintaining 
responsiveness and the right balance between functions at the same time is a 
challenge for all developed legislative institutions. For example some may argue 
that the legislature, instead of worrying about making the majority happy, should 
focus instead on facilitating government to carry out policies for the future 
benefits to the system, but a sudden drive towards increasing efficacy of the
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legislative system may come at the price of reducing accountability or even 
representation which could cause further dissatisfaction and trust.
The depiction of active legislative performance (figure 5-1) places emphasis on 
an important theme that is crucial in the analysis of performance: political trust 
and confidence must be understood as a multi-dimensional phenomenon related 
to the ultimate goal of system support and is distinct from social trust or support 
(Easton 1965, 1975, Putnam 1993, Norris 1999). Easton's analytical framework 
(1965, 1975) distinguishes between support for the community, and support for 
the regime and authorities. In this conception the regime constitutes the basic 
framework for governing the country. People do not pick and choose between 
different elements of the regime, approving of some parts while rejecting others. 
The consequence of such a system is that if the regime does not perform well in 
any of its functions, then support is lost. In other words regime support could 
only be maintained once all elements leading to it are maintained satisfactorily.
According to Dalton, 'It is clear that contemporary democracies face new 
challenges and their future depend on the nature of the response...democracy 
must adapt to survive' (Dalton 1988: 73). The problem for the relationship 
between the political system and the citizens is not in the emergence of these 
new demands but in the extent of responsiveness. In order to solve this problem 
and meet the demands of citizens, developed political institutions have oriented 
toward service providing organisations adopting frameworks of performance 
measurement to meet the requirements of service delivery.
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System legitimacy is generally defined on the bases of democratic norms and 
values. Thus democracy as a cultural value is the standard by which democracy 
as a structure of institutions is evaluated by the citizens (Putnam 1993, Fuchs 
2007). The prerequisite of a successful legitimisation process is the citizens' 
acceptance of democratic values. Thus a political system is more legitimate, the 
more stable it is and the more congruency that exists between the structure and 
the culture (Easton 1975, Almond and Powell 1978, Fuchs 1989, 1995). 
Empirical analysis of Western European Democracies show that, despite marked 
cultural difference among countries, there is extremely high levels of agreement 
with the idea of democracy indicating no such decline in legitimacy and system 
support, whether in the past three decades or in the foreseeable future (Fuchs et 
al, 1995: 350-1). Democracy is not under threat in developed democracies, rather 
as Inglehart (1999: 236) argues, the rise of the more critical and demanding 
citizen in post-modern societies have subjected authority figures and hierarchical 
institutions to more searching scrutiny than before, making governance more 
difficult than it used to be. This is not a threat to democracy but rather creates 
short-term dissatisfaction with the way politics works.
Unlike non-consolidated democracies in which the social and political 
components are not clear and conceptually distinct, citizens of developed 
democracies do distinguish between the two which is why they are able to show 
dissatisfaction with the representative political institutions such as parliaments, 
bureaucracies, legal system and the police but maintain a high regard for 
democratic regime. Whereas in less developed or developing democracies such 
dissatisfaction is potentially a cause for crisis, in democratic societies even at
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time of economic pressure, political confidence could wane but even so, it would 
not contribute to a decline in the support for the way democracy works in 
general. Instead such decline in confidence would add to a healthy democracy by 
the creation of more critical citizens which aids gradual reform and improvement 
of the democracy.
In advanced democracies as governments have expanded their economic and 
welfare role into all sectors, mass support for all public institutions, including 
parliaments, is becoming increasingly dependent on how the public evaluates the 
performance of these government-led programmes. Evaluations of support for 
institutions are usually equated with institutional performance and are based on 
measures such as public opinion surveys. Performance evaluation of legislatures 
using these measures is more subjective and may involve factors that are not 
directly related to the performance of the institution itself (such as inflation, 
unemployment or immigration).
On the other hand finding objective measures of legislative performance like all 
institutions is quite challenging but none the less, necessary for performance 
measurement to succeed. One possible way of evaluating institutional 
performance which is supported by empirical evidence in organisational studies 
suggests a strong link between staff satisfaction and commitment with client 
satisfaction of the institution which inevitably increases citizen trust and 
confidence in the institution itself (Schneider 1993). Thus to improve legislative 
performance, and improve confidence in the institution, improving the 
satisfaction and commitment of members and staff to institutional performance is
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crucial. The next chapter will discuss the challenge further and take a closer look 
at how performance measurement frameworks such as the Balanced Scorecard 
has been incorporated into legislative systems to improve on their performance.
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Chapter 6: How Parliaments Assess Their Performance
6-1 Introduction: Overriding Functions for Assessment
This chapter will study the assessment of performance in the developed 
legislatures of consolidated democratic systems. Previous chapters show that 
only developed legislatures above this threshold have managed to incorporate the 
two separate concepts of excellence and democracy and have reached the 
potential for measuring democratic performance while other legislatures are still 
strengthening these concepts and have yet to relate the two systematically. The 
term excellence often used in performance management terminology, implies 
superior performance, usually built on merit. Thus excellent performance will be 
the distinctive quality of legislatures above singularity (catastrophe model, 
chapter four), separating them from the performance of lesser developed systems 
(in terms of democratic capacity building) of a similar kind. Although 
democracy denotes equality, and all things within the system to be treated 
equally, the concept does not appear to have the same weight among countries 
on the two separate sides of singularity.
As shall be discussed in this chapter, democratic quality and performance of 
developed legislatures are synonymous in democratic governance systems and 
legislatures are the medium through which political discourse starting from civil 
society is funnelled (Habermas 1996). Thus, if democratic quality can be 
assessed in a system, then so too can legislative performance and this chapter
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intends to look into existing frameworks whereby performance management 
techniques are used to assess legislative organisational performance 1 .
Chapter four also recognises the fact that democracy cannot be spoon-fed to 
nations on the assumption that globalisation or humanitarian intervention will 
bring about a spill over effect on individual countries around the world. The 
foundations of democracy must be established well before any such move can 
proceed successfully. Even with the democratic institutions in place, there is no 
guarantee that such institutions would perform the same as the models they have 
been taken from.
The fundamental aim of legislatures in the area above the democratic threshold is 
to maintain stability in their systems (or system maintenance and keeping 
democratic governance at an equilibrium state) while continuously trying to 
excel. In other words, democratic performance in developed political systems 
must include continuous improvements in all layers of active society and 
maintain a high level of participation, alleviate all forms of poverty and maintain 
legitimacy in the democratic system as well as create the ground for continual
It should be emphasised again that even to assume all legislatures can assess performance using 
the same indicators would be a big error of judgment and contrary to the catastrophe model in 
chapter four. The gap in governance is so too great that even to assume that the same functions 
are carried out by similar institutions and bear similar performance outputs for all their citizens 
would be a miscalculated assumption. Unfortunately this gap in governance is getting larger in 
some parts of the world despite legislative institutions in place and economic growth and in 
some cases, particularly resource rich developing countries, growth has outstripped development 
making it harder to justify the lack of democratic development. Chapter four is only an attempt to 
limit the number of legislatures for performance measurement purpose, but also show that these 
discrepancies exist and should be addressed.
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growth in human development. To do this legislatures need to maintain and 
improve performance of the political system by increasing their own 
performance in regards to their functions of representation (legitimating the 
political system and maintaining trust and credibility); oversight (increasing 
accountability and transparency and professionalism) and accessibility 
(improving information and education)2 . This chapter will consider some 
particular cases of legislative performance management.
One major difficulty in comparative assessment of performance in legislatures in 
established democracies relates to the different styles of legislative organisation. 
Undoubtedly measuring performance will depend on each particular legislature's 
institutional design and constitutional structure, as well as taking into 
consideration political and cultural differences. A presidential system will not 
perform with the same variables of a parliamentary model and a parliamentary 
system that uses a proportional representation electoral model will not bear the 
same outcomes as a first past the post style voting system. To reduce 
complication, any comparative performance framework will inevitably be 
narrowed down to consider the overriding and most common functions of all 
legislatures in maintaining and gradual improvement of democratic governance. 
Since democratic legislatures above singularity are becoming more similar in 
sharing common goals and democratic values due to impacts such as 
globalization and regional cooperative treaties, it could be argued that factors
2 This study has assumed that developed legislatures already have mechanisms to improve 
performance and enhance the quality of their budgetary function
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such as geography, culture, economic growth and historical issues could become 
secondary with regards to performance measurement.
In dealing with legislative performance measurement it must be reemphasised 
here that 'legislative capacity' and 'legislative performance' are separate 
concepts. Such stress is necessary to avoid confusion of mistaking legislative 
strength or its potential power with its performance or systematic output (Alter 
2006a: 245). Thus, policy power is not definitive of legislative performance and 
what is at stake is not if the legislature has the power to make or influence 
political decisions but rather how it can optimize its already existing potential 
and maximize outputs and whether it is performing successfully in delivering the 
outputs. The final assessment will be on the performance of the legislature in 
terms of maintaining and improving the system it has been created to support.
This chapter consists of two parts. The first part will inquire about the 
mechanisms available to political systems above the consolidated democratic 
threshold that allows them to perform with the certain degree of observable and 
distinct democratic quality. The emphasis is on the role of legislatures, as 
complex democratic organisations, improving their democratic quality. 
However, as legislatures interact within a system, there is no escape from the fact 
that their immediate and non-immediate environments must be included in any 
type of legislative performance framework. It is important to include all actors, 
the assessors and the assessed, in the process of performance measurement in 
order to increase the likelihood of the final outcome 'the maintenance and 
improvement of the legitimacy of the democratic system'.
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Once the intrinsic values are in place, it is possible to quantify or apply metrics 
and the prospects of democratic performance measurement models in legislative 
systems become achievable. The second part of this chapter consists of case 
studies which assess the attempt to incorporate performance measurement into 
legislative institutions. It must be noted that any attempt to assess the ultimate 
success of legislative performance will be dependent on how such frameworks 
are implemented requiring a certain amount of organisational change, which will 
take time and dedication. Thus, the cases studied in the second part of this 
chapter cannot be representative for all legislative assemblies in mature 
democracies, but may be demonstrative of how certain performance models have 
been applied and what kind of implications may be expected as a result.
6-2 Part I: Active Democratic Performance
Using insights from institutional theory, performance has generally been defined 
when elites dominate an organisation; a high degree of professionalism exists; 
and the organisation pursues a technical function where its outputs can be 
measurable. However, as Meyer and Zucker (1989, 11-12) have argued, 
performance will be construed much more broadly if:
'[T]he norm of participative democratic governance operates, sometimes 
in the formal structure or rules of the organisation [;]...the interests of multiple 
constituencies are given recognition [;]... the organisation's functions are non- 
technical and outputs elude measurement'
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This argument conflicts, to a degree, with the perceived definition of 
performance measurement. But its significance is in the emphasis it places on a 
distinct corporative view in performance management and the fact that, to 
perform well all organisations3 are dependent on the interests and values of 
multitude stakeholders. It is important to create a balance between various 
stakeholders as tilting towards one constituency or group of stakeholders will 
reduce the chances of any organisation to meet the objectives of its other 
stakeholders and this would in effect reduce the chances of performance reaching 
the long-term goal of system survival. Stakeholders in political systems above 
democratic consolidation will more or less share common values which as a 
result reduces interest options. Nevertheless a variation of interests will still 
exist. An optimising performance management system in such circumstance will 
be required to bring about consensus among stakeholders as democratic 
performance cannot be reduced to a zero-sum assumption of power from the 
central authority (government) but rather a cohesive governing unit that acts to 
improve performance of the system as a whole4 .
3 As already mentioned in previous chapters, the terms 'organisation' and 'institution' are used 
interchangeably in this work
4 According to Etzioni (1968: 352-372), there are three type governance relationships between 
the political unit (state) and its subunits. The first type is coercive power relation which leads to 
regulation put into place. The second kind is utilitarian power which is usually in the form of 
economic incentives. The third type is normative power in which governance is achieved through 
the means of information giving. Normative power requires the citizens to have the knowledge 
and awareness to recognize the parallel interests between themselves and the government. 
Citizens will allow themselves to be governed because they approve of the measures taken as a 
matter of principle. An example of normative power is the legislation to ban smoking in pubs 
and restaurants in the UK in 2007 (also being implemented in EU member states) which was 
widely accepted even by smokers but which would not have been so easily implemented in 
political systems below the democratic threshold.
To be more specific, countries on the top right hand side of the cusp catastrophe diagram in 
chapter 4 have met the requirements for an active democratic society as Etzioni's vision of 
'active society' (Etzioni 1968) require authority from the centre rather than a weak government. 
These countries have managed to control and secure 'Responsiveness' to the needs of their active 
citizens and the involvement of the majority in political decision making. Responsiveness is 
considered as the most important indicator in maintaining legitimacy for the system and reducing
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The active democratic system illustrated in the previous chapter provides the 
state with unique powers in society (as in the legislature, the executive and the 
judicial powers) while at the same time becoming more and more dependent on 
its social actors. As represented in figure 5-1 (previous chapter), for a state to 
maintain political authority, it needs to rely on the efficacy and satisfaction of its 
citizens to the responsiveness of its democratic institutions. A government that is 
unable to raise the resources necessary to maintain its commitments of public 
policy would potentially weaken the likelihood of achieving satisfaction of the 
system (Rose 1979). The Legislature needs to ultimately perform so as to 
strengthen the effectiveness of the government and consent for effective 
government performance will indicate a strong and effective legislature.
A state-centric model of governance in modern parliamentary democratic 
societies above singularity does not in any way imply authoritarian rule or 
centralisation as it would for countries below the democratic threshold. The 
central role of governments include 'goal setting' and 'steering' which can only 
be implemented in a somewhat consensual and cooperative settings in order to 
avoid potential vetoes or blockages towards the overall mission of the state. As 
mentioned before in an active society, people rule by having the power to make 
and influence decisions through their representatives and the channels that are 
clearly open and active. As a result, the citizen's active involvement enhances 
the legitimacy of the state and simultaneously raises democratic governance. The
the level of alienation by bringing about a balance between the society (the political organisation) 
and its subunits including citizen, interest groups and other forms of political expression, (ibid).
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rise in the quality of governance influences the prosperity of a democracy to 
survive.
In this view, democratic institutions will perform best if they are able to 
reconcile the twin goals of central authority and broad inclusion. In order to 
maintain the legitimacy of the central state authority, the legislature would have 
to convince the society of its responsiveness (democratic performance) by 
keeping a high record of its accountability, efficacy, equality and 
representativeness. This type of governance is similar to the 'Responsive Party 
Government Model' presented by Walter Bagehot (1867) and later versions of 
Democratic Centralism5 . hi non-democracies, features such as a single party 
control over legislation and sovereignty signals authoritarian regimes or 
dictatorships. However in active democracies above the consolidation threshold, 
the mechanisms of electoral accountability ensure that any period of one- party 
rule or coalition rule is in the public interest and will focus on getting the job 
done and maximizing responsiveness.
6-2.1 Performance in Parliamentary and Presidential Systems
Parliamentary systems by virtue of their fusion of the executive and legislative 
functions in a single body facilitate political decision making and help to bring 
about a more cooperative and consensual style system as it is not possible for a
5 Bagehot had given five functions for the House of Commons which included: to supply the 
Government; to express the minds of the people on all matters that come before it; to teach the 
nation on what it does not know; to inform the public; and to legislate (he also implied a financial 
function). Bagehot (1867) The English Constitution' (London: Fontana 1993): 152-156. For 
instance of democratic centralism see Ranney, A (1962) 'A doctrine of Responsible Party 
Government: Its Origins and Present State' (Urbana: University of Illinois Press)
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serious and enduring division to spring up among the major actors (the prime 
minister, the cabinet and back benchers). Such organisation encourages a more 
corporatist style of government which is less compatible with top-down 
conceptions of governance and offers a closer link with society as compared to 
traditional pluralist democratic models of governance6 . The social actors in the 
corporatist model are effectively co-opted into the realm of the state which in 
turn strengthens the state's decision making power (Pierre and Peters 2001, 35).
Whereas in presidential systems, the existence of two separate institutions of the 
legislature and the executive with overlapping powers yet different 
constituencies in addition to (sometimes) different electoral cycles and partisan 
composition often leads to unnecessary blockages (vetoes) which prevents 
consensus building and cooperation, or decisions taken by a sole constitutional 
authority that brings about either efficiency concerns or legitimacy problems and 
concerns about the quality of democracy. In such an environment, it is easy to 
see why presidential bodies tend to favour a hierarchical model of governance or 
one where there is little formal organisation at all (Blondel and Manning 2002). 
Inclusiveness of the public tends to follow top-down pluralist models with 
government being quite autonomous from interest groups and society is treated
6 However, in the case of Westminster which Lijphart (1999) considers as the strongest 
plurality style parliamentary model in legislatures, as the electoral system rests on the votes of a 
few electors in swing districts, party leaders take people's opinion very seriously and test the 
public opinion carefully before taking any initiative and is claimed to have a populist style of 
leadership oriented toward pleasing the electorate rather than serving long term interests (Hart, 
1992) similar to market policies of strengthening consumer power. As the society becomes more 
active, citizens make the judgment of choosing long-term interests over short-term measures 
(such as protecting the environment or fair trade) which provides a more corporatist style 
governance and allows politicians to change their strategies in line with serving long-term goals 
and maintaining satisfaction, trust and enhanced performance.
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as a largely disorganised and incoherent set of groups with little systematic 
impact on policy (Pierre and Peters, 2000: 34).
Studies of system survival have also shown that parliamentary democracies have 
a higher rate of survival than presidential democracies which will allow them to 
implement long-term strategy and assess performance. Stepan and Skach have 
used the levels of economic development as an indicator of system survival and 
have shown that parliamentary democracies have a rate of survival that is three 
times that of presidential democracies (Stepan and Skach 1997: 10-11). 
Przeworski and his colleagues have also analysed the survival rates of 
democracies using economic indicators and have concluded that 'a democracy's 
life expectancy under presidentialism is less than twenty years while under 
parliamentarism it is seventy-one years' (Przeworski et al, 1996: 39). The 
relative longevity and sustainability of the parliamentary systems allows 
continuity which is necessary for long-term performance frameworks to succeed.
Foweraker et al (2005) rather than relying on system survival, have measured 
democratic quality using different variables of constitutional design, such as 
democratic accountability, representation, constraint, participation, political 
rights, civil rights and minority rights, in presidential and parliamentary 
democracies7 . They find that parliamentary systems again perform better than 
presidential systems by measures of participation and of political, civil and 
minority rights (Fowerker et al, 2005: 55-56). They also show that established
7 In Foweraker, Joe; Landman, Todd and Harvey, Neil (2003), Governing Latin America. 
Although the research is limited to Latin American countries, they have provided comparative 
analysis with some other presidential and parliamentary democracies
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democracies outperform the new democracies in the same variables used and the 
wealthier the democracy, the better it performs by measures of constraint, 
participation, political rights, civil rights and property rights. This study 
concludes that the difference in performance of the more established wealthy and 
'European' democracies is created more by their 'rights' measures than by 
'institutional' measures8 (ibid: 58).
These studies all seem to suggest that the parliamentary systems that perform 
well in the quality of their democratic governance have opted towards 
maintaining a balance between pluralism and corporatism in their relations with 
the society9 . They have become more pluralistic in the sense that their 
governance models have become more representative and participatory by 
involving as many actors as possible. These legislatures have become more 
corporative by connecting democracy with excellence and giving all actors 
legitimate status (based on merit) for influencing political decision making. This 
kind of structure forces all participants in the process to confront each others 
demands and to negotiate the priorities and the coordination that is central to 
governance (Pierre and Peters 2001: 35). Society becomes more active and the 
legislature becomes more responsive and flexible to political change. Ultimately, 
such cooption provides the means for 'the creation of public solidarity and the 
legitimatisation of the representativeness of the government' (Selznick 1966: 
260).
ibid: 58 (emphasis added) 
9 As also suggested in Olsen (1987)
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6-2.2 Performance in Centripetal and Pluralistic Systems
Cooperation between the legislature and society is a core procedural 
phenomenon of democratic governance in Western European democracies 
(especially Scandinavian political systems). In Lijphart's article on 
consociational democracies, he has argued that all homogenous and stable 
democracies should also be referred to as 'Centripetal' (Lijphart 1969: 224-25) 10 . 
This argument was made about four decades ago, though the case for 
centripetal democratic systems becomes even more plausible today regardless of 
whether the system is homogenous (as in the Anglo-American models or the 
Scandinavian working democracies) or conscociational (European hybrid 
democracies). However, it should be emphasised again that centripetalism in 
established democracies is very different to centrifugal systems in less developed 
and developing democracies. In the former democracies, central authority under 
centripetal systems would not lead to autocratic rule but a 'collegial style of 
policy deliberation' and 'a cooperative style of decision making among various 
bodies' (Gerring and Thacker 2008: 63) which enhances smooth performance in 
the system and continuous growth and development, while at the same time 
improving the broad levels of social inclusion.
The similarity between systems in this regard can be the source of empirical 
comparative studies. The link between system performance and political
10 While distinguishing centripetal from centrifugal democracies which he identified as unstable 
democracies and fragmented democracies of continental European in addition to non-democratic 
state, Lijphart has mentioned that many centripetal democracies have some extent of 
consociational features and that the stability of centripetal democracies not only depends on an 
essential homogenous political nature, but also consociational devices (Lijphart 1969).
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legitimacy could be measured using outputs of the legitimacy process of 
governance sub-systems. The sub-system which this study is interested in is of 
course the legislature whose performance is directly linked to the quality of 
democratic performance of the political system as a whole. However it should 
be noted that centripetal cooperation in parliamentary systems without proper 
accountability would weaken the parliamentary system in terms of viscosity as 
compared to presidential style legislatures (Blondel 1969) which could 
ultimately reduce the quality of governance in a polity. Centralised political 
authority should be compatible with the inclusion of diverse interests and not 
reduce the role of opposition parties which one backbench MP compared to 
'heckling a steamroller' (Mitchell 1995: 201). Even for liberal democracies, at 
least two-thirds of a parliamentary government's proposals will be enacted into 
laws (Rose 1979: 69).
For the reason stated above, accountability and scrutiny of the government is 
usually considered at the apex of legislative performance (along with other 
channels such as special committees and commissions, corporate-style 
government consultations, benchmark reports by ombudsmen) and is responsible 
for the strength of the popular legitimacy or the persuasive powers of a state. But 
the reality of some parliamentary systems shows that power is often perceived as 
performance within a predominantly behavioural (and pluralistic) framework and 
the focus is usually on the individuals and their tactics rather than the ideologies 
and structures of the institution that may frame outcomes. Despite power being 
observable and as a result measurable, its relationships with the legislature and 
executive takes the form of zero-sum games rather than cooperation where the
253
winner is usually the executive, not the parliament. Thus to understand 
performance it is crucial to see the interrelationships and to base power on 
dependency rather than the dominance of the executive while at the same time 
maintaining this balance between government effectiveness and consent. 
According to Philip Norton (1983: 55) such a perception of legislative 
performance would require an attitudinal shift among the politicians involved in 
the process in addition to including factors such as the structure, culture, and 
historical context of the institution as well as resources and the 
professionalisation of actors (parties and individuals).
Better administrative performance under centripetal style administration is said 
to grant the government the liberty and flexibility to engineer administrative 
details in a manner suitable to the contingencies of the policy and to adapt to new 
circumstances and ideas as the case may warrant (Gerring and Thacker 2008: 
83). This requires managerial as well as political accountability on the part of the 
legislature as it would have to make systematic and comprehensive changes in 
procedures and processes as the actions of the government need to become 
transparent at every stage. A more professional parliamentary scrutiny results in 
a more responsible and transparent executive and will inevitably produce better 
quality policy. But without the commitment to such reforms (as a result of 
political pressure from the executive or parties), accountability will suffer and so 
will the performance of parliament itself. This is evidently the case in the 
increasing cartelisation of party politics in the section below.
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6-2.3 Performance and Professionalism at a Threat to Representativeness
A result of legislative development has been the rise of professionalisation which 
according to Best and Cotta (2000: 495) can be fitted into the wider conceptual 
framework of modernisation theory with the trend becoming more synchronised 
in European politics than ever before (Cotta and Best 2007: 21). The analysis of 
recruitment patterns in developed legislatures indicates the rise of professional 
career politicians (Norris 1997, Best and Cotta 2000, Katz and Mair 1995) along 
with declining demand for direct representation by disadvantaged classes of the 
society. The recruitment of professional politician follows supply and demand 
models of electoral recruitment comparable to recruitment models of other 
professional occupations (Patzelt 1999).
Talcott Parsons, considered to be the father of contemporary sociology, 
recognises that commitment to social rather than self-interest marks the 
distinction of professions from business occupations. He distinguishes 
professionals as having to do with the institutional alignments that favour social 
responsibility, whereas business-interests are based on micro-level individual 
altruistic motivations (Parsons 1949: 203). Parsons characterised the privileges 
and freedoms of professionals as a functional exchange for which the society 
receives the technical competence it needs to achieve critical ends. He also 
places the university at the centre of the 'professions complex' as a source of 
technical training and knowledge, as well as a channel through which cultural 
values can be communicated to individuals who take up important social roles 
(ibid). Education brings a certain degree of autonomy which for the
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representative serves as a portfolio of resources and a competitive edge with 
regards to other individuals in the field and empowers the representative with 
authoritative views in the legislative arena.
The change in specialisation of representatives from law degrees and 
backgrounds to degrees in economics and public administration and management 
is not only a sign of the business orientation of legislatures but of the changing 
specialisation of parliaments from law-making bodies to developed 
representative professional bodies of public scrutiny and accountability 11 . In 
most cases professionalisation has become institutionalised within the political 
and social structures, institutions and normative patterns which define the 
legitimate and expected modes for recruitment. According to Parsons 'A fully- 
fledged profession must have some institutional means of making sure that such 
competence will be put to socially responsible uses' (Parsons, 1968: 536). In 
parliamentary democracies, the power of selecting professionals lies within the 
party organisations who act as strong intermediaries between the individual 
candidate and the electorate (Best and Cotta 2000: 12).
Studies conducted on a cross country basis in European political systems reveal 
degrees of convergence and divergence among the systems as a whole. However 
the professionalism of representatives seems to follow broadly convergent 
patterns towards common models of professionals sharing a number of
" In a study by Gaxie and Godmer on European legislators found that a majority of them had 
university law degrees in the second half of the 19th century which has now reduced and 
replaced by deputies holding university degrees in public administration, economics, social 
science and other humanities apart from law. Gaxie, D and Godmer, L(2007) 'Cultural Capital 
and Political Seceltion: Education backgrounds of Parliamentarians' in Cotta, M and Best, H. ed. 
Democratic Representation in Europe: diversity, Change and Convergence: 106-134
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standardised features (Cotta and Best 2007). First of all, there is a rise of 
representatives entering their new roles having previously served in the public 
sector (Cotta and de Almeida 2007) which is advantageous in their professional 
oversight of government policy and (possibly) their ability to use performance 
information effectively but may also become disadvantageous as some countries 
have shown an increasing domination of the bureaucratic state over society (ibid: 
55). The problem with the rise of professionals in the public sector stems from 
the nature of professional work in which it is acceptable for professionals to 
work for the public but not so much with the public. Furthermore the social 
trustee view in which specialised knowledge and skills are invested in 
professionals by the larger society, maintains that the professional role may only 
be judged by fellow professionals not the society at large (Dzur 2008: 75). This 
may pose a threat to democracy and the loss of legitimacy, participation and 
connection with the society at large.
Finally, there is the rise of political party control over the process and 
professional recruitment, also termed as the 'Cartelisation of party polities' (Katz 
and Mair 1995) that seems to provide more or less homogeneous patterns of 
organisational change and development among the parties and may effectively 
enhance performance measurement at the price of damaging democratic 
representation. The cartel party is a characteristic of centripetal systems in which 
the state becomes the institutional structure that absorbs and supports political 
parties. The political parties in return change from being 'simple brokers with the 
civil society and state' into delegates of the state and eventually turning to 'semi- 
state agencies' (ibid: 16). The effect of the inclusiveness of parties would be that
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they are all included in the governing process, would no longer require 
competing for their survival, and have access to state resources 12 .
Politics is definitely regarded as a profession in cartel politics and there is an 
emphasis on managerial skills even though efficiency is contained within the 
system. Parties compete for the opportunity of their leaders to occupy 
government offices and to take responsibility for government performance at the 
next election (ibid: 21). As a result the performance of the legislature is often 
dependent on a watered-down performance of the government and the degree to 
which voters can punish parties is reduced due to the similarities between parties 
and policies. Democracy becomes a means of achieving social stability rather 
than change (which is not a problem in established democracies) and there is the 
risk of weakened representativeness in the absence of performance systems 
aimed at holding government accountable. Performance information, usually in 
the form of benchmarks is vital as feedback for the government to lower costs as 
well as achieve acceptability for their policy.
One way of reducing the damaging implications of the cartel system as Katz 
(2001: 227) suggests is perhaps to democratise the candidate selection process in 
parties while maintaining control from the centre. Democratic performance of 
legislatures in such systems is directly related to the democratic performance of 
their parties and it is probably unrealistic to expect improvements in legislative 
performance without improvements in party behaviour. This study does not
12 Katz and Mair mention that Westminster shares characteristics with cartel parties as the 
opposition parties have access to 'the spoils of the state', some share of patronage appointments 
and unaffected media access. (1995, 17)
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intend to look at party performance but assumes that because of such 
interactions between the legislature and parties in open democratic systems, 
improved performance of one area is bound to have improving effects to the 
performance of the other 13 . To improve performance under pressure of a cartel, 
the legislature must maintain autonomy to maximise accountability and 
transparency of the government and the scrutiny processes while staying 
responsive and representative to the people which in management terms is 
usually seen as 'closeness to the customer'.
An advantage of the cartel party system is that it allows politicians to pursue 
long-term careers in politics working up from the bottom and to regard their 
opponents as fellow professionals rather than adversaries. The emphasis will be 
on efficiency and getting things done rather than blocking proposals from the 
other side on the basis of partisanship. A result of such an atmosphere created 
through increased professionalisation in developed legislatures brings forward 
the need to utilise professional corporate management techniques for the 
enhancement of performance. Furthermore, the setting of standards and measures 
to boast the effectiveness of performance outputs will be necessary to gain value 
for money and strengthening information technology and the quality of 
responsiveness (outcome measures). These goals will be the aspiration for all 
professionals working within professional legislative institutions.
13 In contrast, improved performance of one part will have a reverse effect on the performance of 
another part of closed, mechanical systems and will come at the price of deteriorating the 
efficiency and effectiveness of that part. In less democratic systems cartel parties are usually 
means the domination of an overpowering executive in the name of political parties or they are sc 
strong that the legislature do not have any autonomy to perform without their influence.
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This part established a link between the rise of professional legislative 
institutions in the developed democracies and the use of performance 
management to improve on legislative performance and democratic quality. In 
the next part of this chapter, case studies will be developed where performance 
measurement tools have been employed to carry out assessments of legislative 
performance. These case studies intend to show the value of legislative 
performance measurement towards improving actual performance of the 
legislative system and how much of an influence can be made to enhance 
democratic quality in general.
6-3 Part II: Case Studies
The second part of this chapter illustrates instances where performance 
measurement frameworks have been applied to developed and developing 
legislatures and assesses the overall usefulness of the methods to the 
performance of the legislature as a whole. In the first instance a study of the 
House of Commons Services is conducted which highlights the evolution of 
House Services and their adaptation of the balanced scorecard approach to 
improving performance of services to the House. Although this framework is 
still in its infancy and requires time to assess its full impact, this case study 
provides an initial assessment and offers comparisons to similar experiences 
carried out in a few developed legislatures. It is important to stress here that any 
meaningful assessment of performance in legislatures should first and foremost
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assess the management structures that allow the legislature to manage its 
democratic functions (administrative performance).
The study into the performance of House Services in Parliament is followed by 
another study which assesses the performance of the British Parliament in 
general and in particular the effectiveness of its modernisation agenda and 
reform programmes. It must be emphasised that the British Parliament is a 
unique case and will not be definitive of all democratic legislatures (as no 
legislature can) but certain trends and reforms, especially in administrative 
functions, is of definite value for comparative legislative performance research. 
Although the performance of the House Services is distinct from the 
performance of the House of Commons, not only in its functions but also in the 
use of methods and tools specifically designed for performance measurement 
and management there is a definite link between the two and as the study shows, 
the improvements in performance in the first study has surely influenced the 
performance of the second, in other words the overall performance of 
Westminster.
Finally in order to illustrate the argument made in the previous chapters in which 
expecting too much from performance management of legislatures below the 
democratic threshold is immature, a case of performance measurement in the 
Iranian legislative system will be presented at the end of this chapter. This was 
not an ongoing programme at the time of implementation and the balanced 
scorecard framework was merely applied to show the shortcomings and 
difficulties involved in performance measurement, not only in this instance but
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(to a certain extent) all legislative systems below the consolidation threshold. It 
is important to stress again that this study does not intend to take one specific 
case and generalise to a whole set of legislative systems, but to argue that 
developed legislatures may also expect to have promising results from the 
implementation of performance measurement frameworks whereas those 
legislatures below consolidation should not expect to gain much from such 
frameworks and would be better off focusing their resources on strengthening the 
foundations for democratic consolidation.
6-4 Case Study I: The House of Commons Services
The role of the House Services Committee is to ensure that members of the 
Commons are provided with the type and quality of services that enables them to 
perform their functions with excellence in addition to continuously improving 
the performance of services to the House, hi comparison to the very long history 
of Parliament, the history of services, as a distinct operational arm of the 
legislature is relatively new. In 1965 the Select Committee of Westminster 
(appointed in the same year) recommended a House of Commons Services 
Committee to advise the Speaker of the Commons on the control of the 
accommodation, powers and services (Rush and Shaw 1974: 33) 14 . At the time 
the Services Committee had four subcommittees in charge of catering, the
14 Before 1965 the supreme control of the services and facilities of the Palace of Westminster had 
been vested in the Lord Great Chamberlain who delegated responsibility for the part of the 
accommodation of the House of Commons, when the House was sitting, to the Sergeant at Arms, 
acting on behalf of the Speaker (ibid).
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library, the administration and the accommodation and housekeeping, but as 
Rush and Shaw argue, these arrangements did not provide a clear line of 
responsibility and authority; no single person was in charge of services and 
facilities; and there was in practice a substantial degree of decentralisation in the 
hands of the these departments. The role of the Services committee was 
principally to advise and make recommendations and it lacked executive power 
apart from certain restaurant facilities (ibid: 34-35).
In 1972 five independent departments of House Services were established which 
were: the Department of the Clerk of the House; the Department of the Sergeant 
of Arms; the Department of the Speaker; the Library; and the Administration 
Department 15 . These changes were not considered as a major expansion to the 
services and facilities provided to members in their duties, but were generally 
perceived to be in satisfactorily. The absence of empirical methods to assess 
member satisfaction at the time would have meant that members could only 
express dissatisfaction with the services either by informal means such as 
speaking to a member of the staff in the departments, or writing to the head of 
the Committee or the Speaker.
15 The Department of the Clerk of the House consisted of the Clerk, Clerk Assistants, Committee 
Office, Overseas Office, Private Bill Office, Table office. Clerk Administrator, Higher Executive 
Officers and clerical and secretarial staff. The Department of the Sergeant of Arms consisted of 
the Sergeant of arms, Deputy Sergeant of Arms, Assistant and Deputy Assistant Sergeants of 
Arms, Admission Order Office, Doorkeepers, Office keepers, Attendants and Cleaners. The 
Department of the Speaker consisted of the Speaker's Private Office, Official Report (Hansard), 
Vote Office and Sales Office. The Library consisted of a Liberian, Deputy Librarian, a 
Parliamentary Division and a Research Division. The Administrative Division consisted of a 
Clerk administrator, Personal Secretary, Fees Office and Establishments Section. The total 
number of employees in these departments was 384 in 1972 (Rush and Shaw 1974, 36-7)
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The changes at the time would probably be considered more piecemeal than 
pragmatic. The slow change in the provision of services to the House over this 
period was perhaps more related to the confusion over the true nature of the role 
of MPs rather than the lack of resources to accommodate them in their roles, hi 
1971 a survey conducted in Parliament by the Boyle Committee had found that 
almost seventy-percent of backbenchers, had part-time occupations outside the 
House of Common (their role as an MP was only part-time) and the time they 
spent on jobs outside of Parliament could be anything up to thirty hours a weeks 
(HC 1971). The 1978 Procedure committee, following up on the 
recommendations of the Boyle Report, moved towards clarifying this ambiguity 
by claiming the role of the Member of Parliament as a full-time profession and 
stating that the previous part-time notion of MPs and their duties was indeed 
inconsistent with current parliamentary practice and obligations. Full-time 
professional MPs were expected to ensure the responsibility of monitoring, 
influencing and criticising government policies and administration through select 
committee service 16 .
Gradual changes to the role of Members of Parliament brought with it a 
continuing need to accommodate them in their professional roles. According to 
Menhennet and Palmer (1969: 97) the Palace of Westminster was:
16 HC (1978) 'Minutes of Evidence ' First Report of the Select Committee of procedure, Session 
1974-75. House of Commons Report 588-11. (London: HCSO). The Boyle report on the salaries 
of MPs had previously drawn a distinction of their parliamentary work by mentioning that 'most 
Members must be considered as working on a full time basis and we consider that the level of 
remunerations should be considered accordingly (Boyle Report 1971: para. 25). This report was a 
major step in professionalizing the job of an MP as it made clear that they should no longer 
regard their job as only one of their occupations. The Boyle Report is better known as the 
'Ministers of the Crown and Members of Parliament: First Report' Review Body on Top Salaries 
(chairman: Lord Boyle of Handsworth), Cmnd 4836, Dec, 1971
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'[A] building designed in an age when the sphere of parliamentary activity was 
much smaller than it is now, when most legislators were part-time and when the 
urgency of public events was less pressing'.
Compared to developed legislatures Parliament (being the oldest legislative 
building) lacked purpose built accommodation for their entire members and staff. 
One MP has been quoted to explain the situation as:
' When I came here in 19501 was given a key with a locker which was no bigger 
that the one I had at school. That was the only accommodation, the only amenity 
I had in the building'. 17
Despite a general theme of excellence in the quality of services provided by the 
Clerk Office and the Library, Parliament at the time had a lower standing in 
terms of support, services and facilities provided to MPs compared to a number 
of democracies such as the United States Congress, The Japanese Diet and the 
German Bundestag.
17 Quoted in Hill, A and Whichelow, A (1964) What's wrong with Parliament, pp. 84-85
265
6-4.1 Corporate-style Services
The House of Commons Administrative Act of 1978 (which had replaced the 
House of Commons Offices Act of 1812) was the cornerstone in the 
organisational development of services of House Services and set new directions 
in the management of Parliament. Although it did not present any immediate 
changes in the actual services provided for members or the way those services 
were organised at the time, it did establish a body of members independent of the 
government or the party whip, which had the power to employ full-time staff of 
the House and lay estimates before the House of costs of their employment and 
of any other expenses incurred for the services of the House of Commons 
(Bolton 1991).
Most importantly the Act established a basic framework for administrative 
decision-making which for the first time took account of the concerns of 
members and reflected the separate traditions and interests of the different House 
departments. By this time there were six departments of the House and of the 
Speaker's Office which were directly employed by the Commission of the House 
and were involved with dealing with the growing demands of the Members of 
Parliament and their staff. The independence and interdependence of the six 
departments of the House was demonstrated by the common membership of 
department heads to a Board of Management. This Board was chaired by the 
Clerk of the House and was set up to consider issues effecting services of the 
House as a whole.
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In 1990 the Commission appointed Sir Robin Ibbs to examine the feasibility of 
an autonomous coordinating decision making structure of Services 18 . The Ibbs 
Report recommended that the Commission should be the body responsible for 
decision making and that the Management Board should enhance its corporate 
role and be responsible for providing advice and support to the Commission, as 
well as the Accounting Officer and the Finance and Services Committee of the 
House. The report also recommended that overall management responsibility 
should be given to the Clerk of the House acting in the capacity of the Chief 
Executive of the Management Board (Ibbs 1990). This delegation of 
responsibility from the Commission to the Clerk gave more transparency to the 
process of managing House Services. Bolton describes the Commission before 
this transition as a 'relatively private body' and the minutes of their meetings 
were so private that they were not even communicated to the heads of 
departments (Bolton 1991: 7). The executive role of the Board not only signalled 
more coordination between the departments involved in Services, but also more 
transparency about the management of Services to the House itself.
In 1999 the Commons Commission asked Michael Braithwaite to review the 
status of the management of House Services, which had been set up following 
the Ibbs report of 1990, and to give recommendations on the way forward. The 
report provided a thorough and comprehensive review of the current status of 
services, in addition to new recommendations, and their expected benefits for the 
House. The corporate nature of management of the House set by Ibbs was
18 At the time responsibility for the management and services of the House of Commons and its 
facilities was divided among the Commission of the House, The Select Committee on House of 
Commons (Services), the Department of the Environment and the Leader of the House (Tebbit 
Report, Annex 4)
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further emphasised with recommendations for the Commission to approve a 
'strategic plan', covering policies and goals, long term resources and priorities 
(Braithwaite 1999: 15). The Board of Management was proposed to give 
monthly reports that provided strategic information to aid the Commission on the 
direction and supervision of this strategy (ibid), in addition to improving the 
communication of decisions between the Commission and all customers and 
stakeholders (not just key officials). The terms 'Stakeholder' and 'Customer' 
were used instead of members of parliament and other interested parties to give 
a business dimension to service provision and link performance to outcomes 
(customer/stakeholder satisfaction) rather than focus on departmental outputs.
This report recommended that the Office of the Clerk should press ahead with 
the corporate agenda that had started with the Ibbs report and that the 
Management Board 'fully adopts corporate behaviour' (ibid: 4) with members of 
the Board to receive training in financial and management skills in order to be 
able to 'handle issues within a corporate framework' (ibid: 15). The improved 
quality of general management would benefit the use of techniques of 
performance measurement and monitor of performance targets (ibid) and 
benchmarks. The focus of these targets should include measures of cost 
efficiency and value for money, customer satisfaction, improved quality and 
speed of service delivery added to the previous goals of accountability and 
efficiency of House Services.
The Braithwaite report had taken a holistic approach to the provision of the 
services to Parliament as a whole and proposed cooperation between the House
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of Commons and House of Lords with a view to reduce costs incurred to the 
legislative system and to improve performance. This is especially noticeable in 
the considerations of information technology (IT) services to be carried out with 
close consultation with the authorities of both Houses of Parliament (ibid: 25). 
The systems approach is also apparent in the recommendation for a 'foundation 
period' of 'cross posting' to different departments for new staff (ibid:, 29) with 
the intention of giving the new recruit a systemic understanding of House 
services.
Following the recommendations of the Braithwaite report and as a result of 
collaboration with legislative bodies in the British Isles that had applied (or were 
in the process of adopting) corporate strategic plans for their services, the House 
of Commons Commission adopted a Strategic Plan for the Commons 
Administration in July 2005. This plan stated the purpose of House Services 19, 
alongside its objectives20 and goals and the values21 of House Services for the
19 The purpose of the House Services is to : [a] support, inform and record the work of the House 
of commons as an elected parliamentary chamber in accordance with the decisions of the house 
and the House of Commons Commission [b] make its work and information about that work 
widely accessible to the general public [c] contribute to parliamentary democracy by sharing its 
knowledge with parliaments and assemblies worldwide [d] maintain the heritage of 
parliamentary buildings and documents in trust for the public and future generations (HC 2005)
20 The primary objectives in the Strategic Plan were: 1- To provide the advice and services that 
enable the House and its committees to conduct their business effectively. 2- To provide the 
advice and services that enable individual members (and their staff) to perform their 
parliamentary duties effectively. 3- To promote public knowledge and understanding of the work 
and role of Parliament through the provision of information and access.
These three primary objectives are supported by six supporting objectives (tasks): 1-To provide a 
skilled and motivated workforce; giving recognition to and reward for achievement and ensuring 
that all staff realise their full potential regardless of level of background; and promoting 
diversity. 2- To provide a healthy, safe and secure physical environment in which the business of 
the House can be effectively conducted; this includes accommodation, office services, catering 
and security. 3- to plan and manage all the house's resources to a high standard, achieving value 
for money and matching current public service standards including in the areas of risk and 
change management and environment protection. 4- To maintain the heritage and integrity of the 
Palace of Westminster and other buildings, objects and documents for the benefit of future 
generations. 5- To ensure that information is well-managed in pursuit of the primary objectives, 
in part by exploiting technology effectively. 6-To maintain a good working relationship with the
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next five years (2006-2011). The strategy plan in effect set out targets for the 
Board of Management to achieve in all departments and was obliged to provide 
reports by the end of each consigned period. With the implementation of these 
goals and values, the departments are able to develop a large range of individual 
output-based (efficiency-based) measurements which were presented every 
month to the Board of Management. The Management Board was left with the 
(confusing) task of integrating individual department measures and converting 
them into outcome-based measures within the core objectives of the strategy 
(performance). The problem of performance measurement of services to the 
House was intensified amid some evidence of, perhaps unintended, competition 
between the Departments and overlapping activity (HC 2007: para 93). In 
addition, the proposed method of benchmarks only provided a set of past 
performance measurement and needed to be put into a strategic context if they 
were to give a picture of current performance and help manage future risk.
house of Lords, particularly in the provision of shared services; and to share information and 
best practice with other parliaments and to co-operate with other organisations that can assist the 
House Services in its work, (ibid)
21 The values of House Services are: 1- serving with honesty, probity and political impartiality 2- 
striving to achieve high ethical standards, value for money and professional excellence in all that 
it does. 3- Seeking to be responsive to changing requirements. 4- As an employer, House 
Services is committed to maximising the personal development of House staff, valuing diversity 
and the contribution of all individuals and equal opportunity (ibid)
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6-4.2 The Balance Scorecard in House Services
In 2006 amid the growing trend of performance measurement techniques in the 
administration of public sector bodies as well as the administration divisions of 
performance driven legislatures such as the Irish Orieachtas and the Swedish 
Rikstag, the Commission of the House commissioned Sir Kevin Tebbit, the 
architect of the Balance Scorecard in the Ministry of Defence in 2002, to review 
the management and Services of the House of Commons. The Tebbit Report was 
published in June 2007 and its legacy has been a change and renewal of a more 
structured management of House Services based on the Balance Scorecard 
(BSC). The use of this management tool would in theory bring about a more 
balanced performance measurement by simultaneously integrating all aspects of 
House Services which inevitably affects the way Parliament works.
The Tebbit report is in line with the Strategic Plan for the House of Commons 
Administration 2006-2011. It has looked at the performance of House Services 
by examining the implementation and consequences of the Braithwaite's 
recommendations; the extent that House services has become more complex and 
the challenges it faced since the publication of the report; and the results of a 
2006 survey of Member satisfaction with the services arrangements. The Tebbit 
report has also been helped by the evolution of professionalism in Parliament 
and the adoption of a generic job description for MPs by the Senior Salaries 
Review body published in 2001. The body recognises the job of an MP as to 
'Represent, defend and promote national interests and further the needs and
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interests of constituents wherever possible >22 . Thus the role of House Services 
in relation to the MP becomes clear as providing services to them in their 
activities designed to assist the passage of legislation and holding the Executive 
to account (core responsibility) and their promotion or defence of the interests of 
their constituencies (representative responsibility). The report praises past 
achievements by endorsing the Commission of the House as the overall 
supervisory and policy-making body with an annual strategic plan, resources and 
with expert knowledge of the House which gives them the authority and 
professionalism to implement effective performance measurement. Praise is also 
given to the Commission's work on governance and management in carrying out 
the primary objectives of the House's strategy plan 2006-11 23 .
The Tebitt report proposes a management structure that includes three main 
bodies (composed of MPs) namely, the Speaker and the House of Commons 
Commission; The Finance and Services Committee; and the Administration 
Committee. These committees all have an advisory role and the report does not 
suggest change but that they adopt a performance management system which
22 HC (2001) 'Senior Salaries Review Body', House of Commons Commissions Report, Cm 
4997-11. According to this document the principle accountabilities of the MP are to: 1- Help 
furnish and maintain Government and Opposition. 2- Monitor, stimulate and challenge the 
Executive to influence (or change) government action in ways that are considered desirable. 3- 
Initiate, seek to amend and review legislation so as to help maintain a continually relevant and 
appropriate body of law. 4- Establish and maintain a range of contacts throughout the 
constituency, and proper knowledge of its characteristic so as to understand affecting issues and 
further their interests. 5- Provide appropriate assistance to individual constituents to progress and 
where possible help resolve their problems. 6- Contribute to the formulation of party policy to 
ensure that it reflects view and national needs that are relevant and important. 7-Promote public 
understanding of party policies in the constituency, media and elsewhere to facilitate the 
achievement of party objectives.
23 The commission has managed to work on the main indicator of success, satisfaction, as also 
indicated in the Braithwaite Report. It has successfully carried out a survey of the members of 
Parliament and their staff as customers of House services. They have published their findings 
according to which thirty-nine percent (out of forty-five percent respondents to the survey) had 
thought that house services have become more effective. Only ten percent had found the new 
services ineffective and the rest (fifty-two percent) did not see significant change (HC 2007: 17).
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would express strategies and objectives in a more concrete form than the present 
Corporate Business Plan. The report predicts that such a change would allow 
them to focus on priorities and enables progress to be measured much more 
effectively (ibid: para 83).
The establishing of an impartial management board has been essential in the 
structure of the House Services and it is essential that the Members of Parliament 
are recognised not only as customers receiving the service, but also as 
stakeholders of the services of the House. So it is important that the Commission 
establishes a management board which could operate independently from the 
political domains of Parliament. According to the Tebbit Report the challenge is 
to:
'Construct an orderly system which preserves the principle of the customer 
as governor, while meeting the demands of the public accountability and 
transparency, effectiveness and value for money'
(HC 2007, 10)
The transfer of executive power to the Clerk of the House as Chief Executive of 
the Management Board (recommended in the Braithwaite report) had to be 
reinforced in order to enforce capability for corporate policies, decisions and 
performance (ibid, 21). The structure of the Management Board is unlike other 
organisations who hire an external management consultant to coordinate overall 
performance. The Tebbit report does not suggest any change to the current 
arrangements within the Management Board despite acknowledging that the
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'single most beneficial reform' would be to appoint a Chief Executive from 
outside to run House services in a more business-like manner (ibid: para 84). 
One reason for not recommending change to the current structure of the 
Management Board could be the political nature of the Commons that would 
impose constraints on what they would regard as an institutional change. 
Another reason may reflect the actual power of the Chief Executive in 
Parliament and the fact that it is the Speaker who has the power of 
administration not the Chief Executive, whose powers remain advisory (to the 
Commission and the Speaker) and whose executive power only covers the 
Management Board and the departments involved. The Tebbit report only 
proposes that the Chief Executive must have good experience of management 
systems and preferably spent time working outside of Westminster. Instead the 
report proposes that two 'external advisors be appointed to the board as non- 
executive directors with the expectation of improving its performance 
management' (ibid, 71). This recommendation has been partially carried out in 
2008 with the appointment of one external member, Alex Jablonowski, to the 
board (HC 2009).
The rationale for the business-like manner of the management of House 
Services according to this report is based on the reputation, responsiveness and 
resource considerations or the 'three Rs' of the House. 24Following this rationale,
24 The three Rs include (HOC 2007, 22):
- The Reputation of the House of Commons as a self-governing institution, able to withstand 
detailed scrutiny of governance and management
- Responsiveness to the needs of the Members and staff for services of a quality that meet 
recognized standards of best practice
- Resource considerations and the need to ensure that the budget available is used rigorously in 
support of the Houses defined objectives and priorities, as distinct from individual Departments
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the Tebbit Report has recommended that a new Office for the Chief Executive be 
established for the purpose of controlling the BSC and to indicate the objectives, 
measures and targets for the implementation of the strategy for House Services. 
The BSC framework below is the BSC framework for House Services proposed 
by the report and is an adaptation from the BSC framework for the Ministry of 
Defence. This Framework illustrates the task of House Services and consists of 
four boxes, each representing one of the four perspectives of BSC in the original 
Kaplan and Norton BSC model. The order of the perspectives has been adapted 
for non-financial organisations with the customer perspective placed on top of 
the framework (replacing financial perspective in the original Kaplan and Norton 
model) which is to show that the main aim is customer satisfaction. However, as 
customers and stakeholders are the same in Parliament, the top perspective is 
called the 'purpose perspective' and is allocated to all stakeholders or the House 
in general (Members, staff and Parliament as an entity). This box does not 
include the public or any other group as customers since the services are 
exclusive to the internal environment of Parliament.
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Are we fit for today's challenges and ready for tomorrow's tasks 7
Are we using our resources 
to best effect7
Purpose (stakeholders-what do they went
From us? How will we know we are providing it?)
A House: To provide advice and servicesto the
House and its Committees 
B Members: To provide advice and services to
individual Members and their staff 
C: Parliament To promote public knowledge and 
understanding of the work and role of Parliament
Resources (what do we want
With our resources? How will
we knowwe are using them
effectively and efficiently?)
D People: Ensure we have a
skilled and motivated workforce
We need 7
E Finance Manage resources 
to a high standard and achieve
value for money
F Estate: Maintain the heritage
and integrity of the Palace of
Westminster and Other buildings,
objects and Documents forme
benefit of future generations
G Repute ton; Help people to
understand the wo rk of
Parliament
What is our urge*?
Supporting democracy
through Parliament
and representing the
United Kingdom
population
Are we bunding for future success 7
Are we a rugn performing Organisation''
I nabling Processes ( What do we
need to do to deliver what our 
Stakeholders want? H ow do we know
we are delivering this?)
H People Management Manage and
invest on our people to give off their best
I Health and Safety: Provide a healthy.
safe and secure environment for
M embers, their staff. house staff ,
contractors and visitors 
J support services: manage supporting
Services so that they enable the 
business of the House to be effectively
conducted
L Partnerships: M aintam a good
working relationship with the House
o f Lords
Potential (What stall ^technologies do we need to improve
our delivery? How do we know we are doing this? 
M People Development Develop the skills and professional
expertise we need for torn orro w
N Efficiency and Change: Develop flexible and efficient 
organisations and processes to support the House of commons 
O Information: Manage information and technotogyeffectrvely
Figure 6-1: Balanced Scorecardfor the Management of Services of 
The House of Commons (Source: HOC 2007: 30)
This recommended framework, unlike business models, does not have a separate 
financial perspective since Parliament does not have budget concerns like other 
organisations. 'Finance' (E) is included as one of the objectives to the 
'Resources' perspective and only implies maximising value for money outputs 
for increased quality. The 'People' (D) objective refers to recruitment and 
manpower and is similar to the Ministry of Defence Scorecard (most terms are 
common between the two frameworks as they were design by Sir Kevin).
The primary objective of the innovations and growth perspective is to 'Develop 
People' (M) which in this context is to provide adequate skills and training for
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MPs, their staff and House staff. Efficiency and Change (N) is about developing 
flexible and efficient organisations and processes to support the House25 . The 
quadrant 'Enabling Processes' refers to processes that are required by 
stakeholders/customers from the House in order to become a 'high performing 
organisation'. These procedures include people management, health and safety, 
support services, business management, and partnerships with the House of 
Lords26 . For this area of performance, Sir Kevin has suggested an activity and 
functional costing system together with benchmarking against 'peer' 
organisations and areas (ibid: para. 107) which is currently in collaboration with 
other parliaments and assemblies in the British Isles to identify common 
benchmarks that could improve effectiveness in resources and cost efficiency.
In the centre of this proposed framework is the target or vision 'Supporting 
democracy through Parliament and representing the United Kingdom 
population'. The vision in BSC is a statement that has to balance the interests of 
all groups and perspectives and present a future that will lead to a win for
25 The Ministry of Defence BSC has a very similar, if not the same, objective in its innovations 
and growth perspective (with the difference that the term 'House' changes to 'Armed Forces'). 
Since this bottom perspective in the BSC is all about growth and learning most frameworks put 
efficiency and change along with the perspective that deals with processes. However as long as 
the framework can be implemented effectively and balanced out successfully, it should not create 
problems for overall performance.
26 Here again this perspective closely resembles the 2005 Ministry of Defence BSC apart from 
the slight differences in the wording of the objectives (e.g. the Defence BSC uses 'personnel 
management' instead of people management, 'health and safety' which is the same in both 
organisations, and 'logistics' replaces support services in the framework above. The only 
variation in the layout of the two frameworks is that the Defence BSC has 'business 
management' instead of 'partnership' in the framework above, despite having the same nature). 
The 2005 Defence Scorecard can be found in Annex 9 of the Tebbit report (HC 2007)
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everyone involved (Niven 2002: 88). This target must be acceptable and 
desirable by everybody involved in the process and affected by it (by consensus). 
This framework, as it is only a recommendation, has left out the strategy which 
is more complex and involves the goals rather than targets which identify 'what 
to do' and 'what not do' to get to the target. Goal setting will involve the 
identification of performance indicators, tasks and the risks involved in 
achieving targets.
The report does not indicate any performance indicators and only mentions the 
problems involved in identifying them, regular sampling and measuring output 
performance due to the nature of the tasks in Parliament that are often demand- 
led, unpredictable and may involve political concerns (since performance 
measurement leads to increased transparency and accountability). The report also 
stresses the need for inter-parliamentary contact to find common measures and 
benchmarks to aid comparative performance measurement. The proposal to 
adopt a performance management system based on a Balanced Scorecard was 
approved in principle by the House of Commons Commission in December 
2007 and the facility to accommodate such decision (the Office of the Chief 
Executive) was setup in early 2008.
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Figure 6-2: Balanced Scorecard Dashboard - Performance Management2 '
CSF1: Members impressed by our services
Past Current Future(s-t) Future(l-t)
CSF2: Public impressed by our services
Past Current Future(s-t) Future(l-t)
CSF10: Staff feel valued and positive
Past Current Future(s-t) Future(l-t
CSF1 1 : Skills base meets current and future
Past Current Future(s-t) Future(l-t
CSF12: Inspiring leaders and competent senior 
management
Past Current Future(s-t) Future(l-t
CSF13: Innovation part of our culture
Past Current Future(s-t) Future(l-t
Members Capability 
and Public
Services Money
I!SF3: New key projects delivered on time and to 
mdget
Past Current Future(s-t) Future(l-t)
ISF4: Improvement in priority areas
Past Current Future(s-t) Future(l-t)
!SF5: Performance of core services
Past Current Future(s-t) Future(l-t)
27 This is a copy of the dashboard used by the Manage ment Board of House Services to assess 
risk. The Office of the Chief Executive has kindly provided this copy and permission to use in 
this research.
CSF6: Demonstrable improvement in VFM
Past Current Future(s-t) Future(l-t
CSF7: Our budgets are on track
Past Current Future(s-t) Future(l-t
CSF8: Our budgets are spent on priorities
Past Current Future(s-t) Future(l-t
CSF9: Parliament is environmentally sustainabl
Past Current Future(s-t) Future(l-t
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The House Services BSC has not been published but interviews with individuals 
involved in the process indicate that despite the framework not being a carbon 
copy of the one proposed by the Tebbit Report, it has adapted many of his 
original recommendations to the particular circumstances of the House Services. 
For instance the Purpose quadrant in the adapted version, answers to Sir Kevin's 
'What do they [MPs] want from us?' (as above). The indicators also follow Sir 
Kevin's suggestion, and have been determined using the findings of the Survey 
of Services that had asked MPs to name three top services which are most 
important to them. The adapted framework has been updated to include a 
separate framework that incorporates risk management (third generation BSC).
The Tebbit report has emphasised that improved member satisfaction with House 
Services is a key performance indicator of the BSC framework which should be 
measured on a regular basis and should be inclusive of all those receiving 
services of the House by seeking the views of a representative cross-section of 
Members' staff in addition to Members (ibid: para. 264). Since the approval of 
this recommendation, FDS International (surveying company) and the Commons 
Services have conducted regular surveys to assess member and staff responses of 
House services and its results have been included in the reports of the Board of 
Management. Response rates have gone up compared to the previous year and 
significantly since the first survey of Services in 2003 and the overall feedback 
has been generally positive28 .
28 The response rate in the House of Commons Commission Report 2007/8 reported a response 
rate of 52% (45% Members and 54% Member's paid staff) during a three-week field work period 
as compared to 45% the previous year (HC 2007, 17). Only 5% of the respondents thought that 
House Services had become less effective (compared to 10% in the previous year) whereas 37%
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The House of Commons Commission Reports that are published since the report 
have included most of Sir Kevin's recommendations. The reports focus on the 
primary and supporting tasks of the 2006-2011 House Services Strategy (which 
is reassessed every year in the House of Commons Corporate Business Plan) and 
assesses the success of benchmarks set out by the Management Board with the 
help of measurements from Member satisfaction surveys and targets set by 
consensus among the four heads of Services departments, the Director of PICT 
(or Parliamentary Information and Communication Technology, established in 
July 2007 to provide a joint service to both Houses) and the Chief Executive.
Benchmarks are naturally tools to review and enhance performance as outputs 
and increase the transparency of the performance system which is exactly what 
the annual Commission reports intend to do. Although there is a tendency to 
exclude unsuccessful benchmarks (or at least highlight the more successful 
results), the BSC framework should provide information on different 
perspectives simultaneously and combine the separate elements of an 
organisation's agenda into the report, and all interacting aspects of performance 
must see an improvement before performance of the whole can improve. For 
benchmarks to contribute to overall performance, they need to become outcome 
oriented and mix measurable outputs with subjective feedback reports which are 
what the Management Board does through the Office of the Chief Executive. 
The Office insists that it not only uses benchmarks and indicators such as 
Member satisfaction, but also bellwether services to indicate future trends in the
thought that it had become significantly more effective and 58% had not noticed significant 
change from the previous few years. ( HC 2008)
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performance of House Services (not yet apparent from the published annual 
reports). Even though the House Services BSC does not measure outcomes at 
present, it intends to do so in the future. The framework is becoming increasingly 
recognised and supported by the Members of Parliament and has gained full 
support from the management of the House29 which is a promising sign of future 
success.
In September 2008 the House Service BSC was produced by the Strategy, 
Planning and Performance Team in the Office of the Chief Executive following 
consultation with the Management Board and departments of House Services. 
This framework has been based on the five goals that had been set out in the 
Commons Corporate Business Plan 2009-10 (HC 2009a)50 which include:
To make Members feel they are receiving an excellent service from all
parts of the House Service
To deliver continuous and measurable improvement in the services we
provide
To ensure that we have the capability to deliver the services required
now and in the future
To make all staff feel that they are valued and work for a first-class
organisation
To increase and demonstrate the value for money and the environmental
sustainability of the services we deliver
29 This was mentioned by the Head of the Office of the Chief Executive, Philippa Helme in an 
interview
30 HC 'Corporate Business Plan 2009/10', Management Board, Office of the Chief Executive 
(March 2009) p. 5
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This framework is in line with the Tebbit Review and by the Commons own 
admission is the first time that business plans of the House have been clearly 
linked to its financial plans (HC 2009b)31 . The BSC has been described by the 
Commission as only a 'monitoring' tool in the hands of the Management Board 
to constantly check past, current and expected performance which would enable 
it to identify the resources that should be directed towards areas of greatest 
priority in services to the House (ibid).
However, off paper and in an interview with a senior Board Member, the 
expectations are somewhat downgraded and the BSC is described as 'A 
performance management tool to help institutionally create mechanisms for 
learning and development and eventually lead to cultural change in Parliament'. 
Perhaps the role of the Balance Scorecard in House Services is deliberately 
downplayed32 due to scepticism that exists in among some Members who favour 
traditional methods of quality control instead of a strategic approach to 
performance measurement. An assessment of the success of this framework 
follows below.
31 HC 'Thirty-First Report of the Commission, and Report of the Administration Estimate Audit 
Committee 2008/09', House of Commons Commission, HC 912, July 2009. p. 34
32 In the 31 st annual Report of the Commission (HC 2009b) the role of BSC has been downplayed 
to look as if it is only a tool for the third supporting task of the House Services which is To plan 
and manage all of the House Resources to a high standard, achieving value for money and 
matching current public service standards including in the areas of risk and change management 
and environmental protection'. However, the framework has been designed to include all the 
areas which the Management Board is involved in which will include all primary objectives and 
supporting tasks.
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6-4.3 Evaluating Use of BSC in House Services
In order to analyse and assess any BSC framework, a definite implementation 
period is necessary. Norton and Kaplan (1996, 2001), the architects of BSC, 
recommend that the framework be applied at least four years before any 
meaningful evaluation can be achieved33 . The House services BSC was accepted 
by the Commission in 2008 and is still in its infancy, which probably explains 
why not much about the framework has been published in the annual reports of 
the House. The framework, being in its early stages, has still to receive full 
recognition and endorsement by the Members it serves. Thus any assessment 
will have to rely on the views and interviews of those who are involved in the 
implementation or comparisons with performance measurement frameworks 
used for this purpose in other legislatures.
Before any assessment it is worthwhile to indicate why the BSC has become the 
chosen method of performance measurement in many organisations around the 
world. The BSC has been predicated on the idea that better alignment of an 
organisation's strategy and its performance measures lead to better performance 
(Norton and Kaplan 2001). It puts the organisation's vision and its strategy 
towards that vision (not control) at the centre of its measurement system and 
emphasises the cause and effect relationships (Kaplan and Norton 1992). The 
other advantages of BSC, as mentioned in chapter three include:
33 In the case of the House Services BSC, a minimum implementation period of 4-5 years was 
stressed by the Head of the Executive Office
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The framework provides information on all four perspectives 
simultaneously, so as to combine the disparate elements of an organisation's 
agenda in one report34.
- The framework limits the number of measures, preventing information 
overload and concentrates on the few success factors only.
- The framework guards against sub-optimism as managers consider all key 
operating measures together and how improvement in one area may be at the 
expense of another. Thus supporting strategic communication and 
information flow.
The framework is forward-looking. Unlike other methods which rely on past 
data, BSC looks at present data in order to make predictions about future 
performance.
The framework necessitates teamwork and involvement of all operational 
managers facilitating cross-functional integration and is consistent with 
continuous improvement35 (Norton and Kaplan 1992, 1996, 2001)
The difficulty of using the balanced scorecard approach for non-profit 
organisations and public services is defining a clear strategy36 . Kaplan and
34 These groups have been identified by Norton and Kaplan as: Financial, Customer, Internal 
Processes and Learning and Growth.
35 It should be emphasised that the linkages made between performance measures and the 
objectives of each unit of the organisation must be forged by consensus among all managers of 
that unit. Failure to have consensus on each strategic linkage and decided measure will result in 
the strategy map becoming redundant and the measures would become similar to those of earlier 
performance evaluation models. The measures must also link immediate measures (or leading 
measures), such as customer satisfaction for example, with non-immediate or lagging measures 
such as long-term returns even if they may not always be positively related.
36 The original balanced scorecard model was based on a strategy of increasing financial gains. In 
their later revisions of the model, Kaplan and Norton resolved the problem of strategy by stating 
that a strategy is not only what an organisation intends to do (or not to do) financially, but also 
non-financial decisions on how such decisions can improve and what measures are linked to their 
success (Kaplan and Norton, 1996, 2001)
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Norton have suggested that since these organisations also follow an operations 
excellence theme, they would improve performance by taking their current 
mission as given and then try to excel by working more effectively, efficiently, 
reduce costs, incur fewer defects and save time (Norton and Kaplan 2002: 134). 
From this perspective the BSC framework acts similar to other quality models 
and performance measurement methods used in industry, notably the Japanese 
Kaizen (Imai 1986) despite being more forward looking. The House of 
Commons has its own budget and its priority has not traditionally been to reduce 
costs but to maintain costs within its budget. Performance measurement in 
Parliament has the advantage of limiting itself to cost efficiency (not reduction) 
and there is no need to sacrifice the quality of services as cost reduction is 
deemed as an added advantage not a requirement.
However, as strategy in such non-profit institutions is not necessarily focused on 
product leadership or customer intimacy, scorecards usually resemble more 
traditional auditing methods of finding key performance indicators (KPI) rather 
than true measures 7 . In these instances providing long term planning in the 
processes leading to strategy building becomes more difficult to achieve. Non- 
profit organisations may not have precise measures to use as indicators and there 
may not be any consensus on the information about the indicators and their 
relevance. In the case of House Services, the current strategy is made from the 
five goals mentioned earlier in the Corporate Business Plan 2008/09 in the form
37 For example, the BSC framework used by the Canadian Parliament Centre on legislative 
budgetary performance relies on the KPIs rather than balancing performance measures, which is 
more similar to measurement approaches such as the Total Quality Method (TQM) and Malcolm 
Baldrige Awards (chapter 3).Strategy making in cases where indicators are used usually involves 
relying heavily on cause and effect patterns and can become complicated to follow.
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of four Core Tasks and five Supporting Tasks. These tasks have been agreed 
internally among members of the Board and each department has been assigned 
a number of KJPs that will be audited against the tasks every four months and 
assessed every year published in the annual Commission Report and Corporate 
Reports. At this stage of implementation it is difficult to say assess the measures 
chosen for the KPIs or how well the measures blend into the measurement 
framework.
The KPIs for each department along with the annual budget that has been 
allocated in the five-year Commons Corporate Plan is available in the yearly 
Corporate Business Plan also with the name of the person who is responsible for 
the performance of the department. This has the effect of creating transparency 
and accountability for performance of the Services in line with their 
commitments to their goals. However the more traditional methods of auditing 
KPI has not been replaced by performance measurement practices used in the 
Balanced Scorecard and this raises the problem of the framework not giving 
proper assessments of current and future measures of performance. The 
framework used in the House Services is closer to the performance measurement 
framework that has been used by the Swedish Rikstag in its design, though not 
implementation.
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- Assisting the work of Members in the Rikstag 
Chamber and Committees
- Assisting Members and Parties in the Rikstag
- Informing Citizens about the work of the Rikstag
- Maintaining and Preserving the building and 
Documents
- Being a Good employer
- Making the Administration Green
Box 6-1: Core Tasks of the Rikstag Administration - Source: Rikstag 
Administration Annual Report 2008 (Rikstag 2009)
To provide the advice and services that enable the House and its
committees to conduct their business efficiently
To promote the advice and services that enable individual
Members (and their staff) to perform their parliamentary duties
effectively
To promote public knowledge and understanding of the work
and role of parliament through the provision of information and
access
To maintain the heritage and integrity of the Palace of
Westminster and other buildings, objects and documents
Box 6-2: Core Tasks of House of Commons Commission 2008/2009 (HC
2009bf8
38 As the two boxes show, the first four tasks of the Rikstag are roughly similar to the core tasks 
of the Commons Commission 2006-2011. The last two core tasks of the Rikstag are the same as 
the first two supporting tasks of the Commons Commission. The task of making the 
Administration Green has just been adopted as a core task by the Rikstag and it is in the process 
of introducing an environmental management system. It is quite possible that this would also be a 
core task of the House Services in next year's report too. The Core tasks of the Commons 
Commissions in the 2008/09 Corporate Business Plan had also changed from the initial 
Corporate Plan 2006-2011 (Footnote 19) which only has three core tasks with the fourth core 
task mentioned only as a supporting task (HC 2009b).
288
This problem of linking external accountability to internal assessment is further 
exacerbated by the fact that it is usually very difficult to secure a consensus from 
all sides of the board on what the output or objectives of the organisation is and 
then to measure performance. The management board in charge of the BSC must 
have consensus on the performance measurement and the chief executive of the 
board must have power of execution and be held responsible for the decisions of 
the board. The Commons Corporate Business Report 2008/09 provides some 
extent of accountability and transparency as all the people responsible for the 
decisions are named and measures of departmental targets are published in the 
annual reports of the Commission. However the nature of House Services in the 
Commons as a supportive body, not executive, makes responsibility rather 
ambiguous. House Service departments can support the business of the House 
but are not held accountable for key issues of quality and quantity of legislation 
passed and the success in holding the executive to account, in debating, securing 
redress for constituencies and in securing high voter turnout in elections. 
Because there is no political constraint on House Services due to their apolitical 
nature, it is perhaps hard to move the attitude of the MPs and political parties in 
favour of the idea of leadership and management, even for House Services, 
coming from the administration.
As already mentioned in chapter three the BSC is a very flexible and needs-led 
approach to performance measurement. It is neither an audit-led, nor a model-led
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approach and can only be successful if there is internal consensus among the 
management within the organisation. For this Kaplan and Norton (1996) propose 
facilitators or management consultants on the management board in order to 
provide the lead and to ensure consensus from inside the organisation. These 
facilitators must encourage the managers in the implementation of their strategy 
by constantly focusing the board on two main questions: 'What is the main 
objective to be achieved?' and 'How to achieve it?' The facilitators must also 
maintain internal consensus for each of the perspectives in the framework and on 
the operational goals of the institution. As mentioned the House Commission 
has moved in this direction and has recruited an external member to the 
Management Board in 2008 to facilitate and maintain internal consensus on 
decisions at board level as well as focus on goals rather than tasks (as was 
previously the case). This step should eventually help change the orientation of 
services from outputs indicators towards outcomes and bring about a stronger 
sense of leadership and control within the Management Board.
The key issue in promoting performance measurement within Parliament 
concerns the receivers of services or the Members of Parliament and their staff. 
The House Services does not like to use the terms 'Customers', which is the term 
used in performance management to define those who receive a service, and they 
are not keen to use the term 'Stakeholders' either and have opted to use just 
'Members' instead. Within the rational choice tradition, legislators are 
considered to be in pursuit of self-interest and strive to optimize their individual 
careers. They may often have limited interest in specific areas of performance 
management, and what contributes to suitable outcomes for the whole
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organisation. Hence the House Services may be tempted to choose short-term 
indicators of customer satisfaction in the interest of boasting performance.
However in the case of the BSC this is not possible as there has to be a balance 
in all parts leading to the performance of the whole organisation. Even though 
the perception of the external environment is essential to the successful 
implementation of any performance related model, it is essential that the BSC is 
formulated from the inside with a view to the outside. According to Douglas 
Millar the measures must relate to the 'key practical work or the House' and not 
merely to 'MP standards' 39 . It is vital that performance measures do not take 
customer satisfaction as the only performance indicator since customers usually 
take no interest in services when things go well but are quick to acknowledge 
dissatisfaction during crisis which could undermine the performance of the 
system if only satisfaction is measured.
The annual reports of the Commons Commission along with the Corporate 
Business Plan published by the Executive board constitute a means of assessing 
the performance of House Services and are only a snapshot of how well the 
legislature performs its functions. Since the current House departmental structure 
was only established in January 2008 and the BSC adopted seven months after 
that, the performance figures in the Commission Report of 2008 cannot be the
39 In an interview with Douglas Millar, Director General of Chamber and Committee Services, he 
explained some MPs are rather impatient and assess performance of Services badly if they come 
across a printer that is running out of ink, not by practical measures concerning the House. He 
gave light anecdote of MPs expecting personal service from the House by saying some MPs 
measure the performance of clerks not by how well they manage committees and write reports 
but no whether they are able to get them train tickets for a certain time. Such an anecdote is not 
specific to MPs but can be general to all customers who usually express dissatisfaction rather 
than satisfaction and would feel satisfied when a service is directed to them personally.
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basis to evaluate House Services or the BSC framework. However, there are 
signs that a more integrated approach to services has reduced costs and improved 
performance. The most obvious example is better performance as a result of 
integrating services between the Houses of Commons and Lords in areas such as 
computing (PICT established as a joint department) as well as some other areas 
such as security, estates, archives and records, broadcasting, outreach, education 
and visitor services and tours (HC 2009a). Performance has improved in terms of 
service delivery which has resulted in a thirty million pound reduction in the 
costs of Parliament , despite an increase in costs to opening the new visitor 
centre in Parliament earlier in the year.
In terms of supporting the functioning of the House and its committees, the 
2008/09 report (HC 2009a) shows House Services have achieved or surpassed its 
performance targets in many instances. For example the Public Bill Office 
achieved a 100% rate in processing and printing government bills in accordance 
with instructions from parliamentary counsel; the Library produced 200 Debate 
Packs (an increase of 7% compared to the previous year) in advance of non- 
legislative debates and also exceeded target for answering enquiries within a 10- 
day deadline despite an 18% increase in overall enquiries; the Vote Office 
provided papers immediately to support the Houses' work 99.99% of the time; 
and Hansard surpassed its targets of accuracy in recording the debates of the 
House with one typological error in 22 columns (target: one error in 13 
columns).
40 BBC 'Cost of Running Parliament Falls' Wednesday, 19th August 2009. BBC News Website. 
http://new.bbc.co.Uk/l/hi/uk politics/8208590.stm
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In terms of improving outreach, in 2008 House Services launched a YouTube 
channel and podcasts, photograph collections on Flickr in addition to an internet 
highlights service on Twitter, the Parliament website was redesigned with a 
significant addition of new content (launched in April 2009); and new web pages 
were launched in 2008 to replace the Explore Parliament website including a 
revised version of he film You've got the Power and a new film called 
Democracy? You decide that were added to YouTube (ibid). All of the above 
achievements point to a consistent improvement in terms of services to the 
House and to democracy. The majority of services are ongoing whereas a 
minority are new. While it may be relatively easy to monitor each service 
separately they have to be built into an overall framework and integrated in order 
to show the whole contribution that Services make to the performance of 
Parliament.
While these examples and other instances in the 2008 report shows improvement 
in the performance of services in the House, it does not give any assessment of 
the performance measurement framework compared to other service 
organisations within developed legislatures. Most developed democracies have 
some form of performance management system for parliamentary services but 
only a few have adapted the BSC framework for performance measurement 
purposes. This study has identified the administration of the Rikstag and 
Oireachtas as being successful in blending the performance management ethos, 
and the BSC in particular, into their services division.
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In the 2007-09 Strategic Plan of the Houses of Oireachtas Commission entitled 
'Excellence in Parliamentary Service' the Commission sets out by its own 
admissions, a very ambitious Vision Statement: 'A world class Parliament, 
enabled by excellence in parliamentary services' (Oireachtas 2007: 6). This plan 
uses the BSC framework and provides a clear Purpose, Mission, Vision and 
Value statements along with its core commitments (termed as 'core tasks' in the 
House of Commons Strategic Plan) within the framework of four managerial 
divisions which must interact together and be responsible for the 'indicators of 
successful delivery' of the Commission (ibid).
To serve the sitting of both Houses 
To serve the Members and provide them the 
services required to do their work 
promoting Parliament and public 
understanding of the work it does 
Delivering better management systems to meet 
public service and best International Standards 
and Practice
Box 6-3: The Core Commitments of the Commission of the Oireachtas. Source:
(Oireachtas 2007: 7)
The Oireachtas Commission is like a parliamentary agency for both Houses of 
Dail and Seanad, and its fundamental purpose is:
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'To serve the sittings and businesses of both houses and members in the 
performance of their constitutional roles as public representatives' (ibid)
The Commission oversees the Office of the Commission which is in charge of 
the management of four departments responsible for Services to the Oireachtas. 
The Commission is composed of 11 members including the Chairmen from the 
Dail and Seanad and the Secretary General of the Commission Office who is also 
the Chief Executive of the Commission41 . Thus the Secretary General of the 
Commission Office has executive power and the impartiality of the Commission 
is maintained as neither of the speakers nor members from the two Houses have 
the executive power of the Commission. Apart from impartiality, the core values 
of the Office of the Oireachtas are: professionalism, responsiveness, honesty and 
integrity (ibid: 8).
The performance framework used to measure performance of the Commission's 
duties is a balanced Scorecard with details of performance indicators for each 
commitment set under each commitment with the tools to measure success also 
identified (targets are not included in the Strategy plan and must be approved 
internally within the divisions). The Houses of Oireachtas 2008 Report has 
assessed the progress of these strategic commitments towards the delivery of 
services and includes a surveying of members, staff and officeholders who are all
41 The 11-member composition of the Commission of Oireachtas are: 
The chairman of the Dail 
The chairman of the Seanad
The secretary General of the Office of the Houses of Oireachtas 
A member of one of the Houses of Oireachtas appointed by the Minister for Finance 
4 ordinary members of the Dail 
3 ordinary members of the Seanad
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referred to as 'customers'. Measurement is audit-led which may produce 
difficulty in measuring future performance as well as integrating the various 
measures into the framework. However, the report gives plans of a pilot project 
for an 'Executive Dashboard' to start in 2008 which is an interactive BSC tool 
that provides simultaneous performance measurement information in four key 
areas of financial (pay and other expenditure); operational (activity and output 
levels); reach (progress in achieving corporate and strategic targets); and 
customer satisfaction (results from surveys and interview) performance. The 
success of this project would undoubtedly signal a new era of performance 
measurement in the administration of legislatures42 .
The Rikstag Administration is the authority within the legislature which is 
responsible for supporting the Acts of the Rikstag; providing services and 
information to the public; and supplying the necessary resources for the smooth 
functioning of the work of the chamber, the parliamentary committees and other 
Rikstag bodies (Rikstag 2006). Like the House of Commons Services, this 
division is led by a management board (or the Rikstag Board) but unlike the 
former, this board is chaired by the Speaker of the Rikstag. The Speaker only 
chairs the board and the board's overall executive responsibility lies with the 
Secretary General of the Rikstag Administration (chief executive) as well as the
42 The 2008 Oileachtas Commission report indicates that the Executive Dashboard project has 
been developed following detailed project work with staff and CEOs from neighbouring 
assemblies in the UK, Northen Ireland, Scotland and Wales and involves benchmarking 
approaches to reporting on performance and developing the best practice model with assistance 
from external consultants. (Oileachtas 2008, 50). This will help comparative studies of 
legislative performance and it will be interesting to see whether these benchmarks will evolved 
into performance measures as the project advances. Interviews with managers from the House 
Service Departments in the Commons confirm that the House Services has begun to use a 
'Executive Traffic Lights' which like the Dashboard is interactive and should provide a 
simultaneous and constant monitor of how indicators perform.
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Administration Division43 that is responsible for performance measurement. The 
main goal of the Division is to enhance the performance of the Rikstag by: 
supporting the decision-making process (effectiveness); providing adequate 
services and administration (efficiency); providing information to the public 
(openness, accessibility and increase public interest); and supporting 
international activities (development commitment of the Rikstag). These goals 
are supported by the tasks and are benchmarked regularly and published in an 
annual report of the Rikstag Administration.
The overall performance framework presented in these reports is very similar to 
the work of the Commons Commission Reports and confirms a remark from a 
researcher in the Commons Executive Office about very close collaboration with 
its Swedish counterparts. The Rikstag Administration seems to have adapted the 
BSC framework only as a monitoring tool to assess overall performance of the 
Administration. But for each division, it has simply used guidelines (or goals) 
and tasks and measures performance by regular benchmarking of the task 
indicators44 . The performance measurement system of the Rikstag 
Administration fulfils its promise of efficiency and transparency and is helped by 
the nature, functions and size of the legislature and the longevity of its 
performance management system.
43 The Administration Office of the Rikstag changed its name to 'Administrative Division' in 
2008 (Rikstag 2008)
44 In response to an enquiry to Lena Ulhin, Senior Advisor to the Director General, about the 
application of BSC framework in Rikstag, she affirmed that 'the Administration has not used 
BSC but its own method'. There is no publication in English to confirm this statement, but the 
Rikstag Administration annual reports seem to suggest that performance measurement has been 
simplified to benchmarking for KPIs and the BSC is used as a tool for integrating the 
performances into one report.
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The Commons Services framework is more performance-oriented that the 
Rikstag in description but is perhaps not as successful because of its function, its 
authority (the executive power of House Services does not lie in its Management 
Board and is subject to political considerations) and the size of the British 
Parliament. The performance of services of the Houses of Parliament may lag 
behind the services of the Houses of Oireachtas for the same reasons mentioned 
above and also due to the existence of two distinct departments for services 
within the House of Commons and the House of Lords (despite recent successful 
efforts to join some of services provided to both Houses) which adds to 
inefficiencies in all areas of performance and the duplication of services.
Despite the issues mentioned above, the evaluation of the Commons Services 
using the only set of standard benchmarks for ranking democratic legislatures 
receives excellent results. The Benchmark for Democratic legislatures (CPA 
2006) is a 13-page document published by the Commonwealth Parliamentary 
Association in association with the UNDP, World Bank, European Parliament 
and National Democratic Institute for International Affairs45 . The Framework 
consists of ninety-seven separate benchmarks, ten of which are directly to the 
administration division of legislatures. The House of Commons Services 
receives top scores for all its relevant benchmarks which conclude that the 
organisation is certainly befitting of a world-class institution.
45 CPA (2006) 'Recommended Benchmarks for Democratic Legislatures: a study group report', 
The Commonwealth Parliamentary association in association in association with UNDP, WBI, 
European Parliament and National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (London: CPI). 
Downloaded from CPI website in January 2009 at:
www.cpahq.org/uploadedfiles/information services/Publications/Publicationa/CPA Electronic 
Publications/Recommended%20Benchmarksy(20for(7f2QDemocratic'7( 20Legislatures.pdf
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6-5 Case Study II: Evaluation of the House of Commons Performance
The study that follows is an attempt to evaluate the impact of the performance of 
the House of Commons' reforms programme, following New Labour's 
Modernisation Agenda and the establishment of the Modernisation Select 
Committee in the House of Commons in 1997. In order to do so, this study first 
takes a chronological look at this the ongoing reform programme and then 
identifies the strengths, weaknesses and effects of such managerial reform in 
relation to the accountability and democratic legitimacy of Parliament as a 
whole.
It is very important to stress from the start that any analysis of legislative 
performance and its impact on reforms has to be analysed within the framework 
of the functions of the specific institution and its constitutional context. Hence, 
Parliament must be analysed within the framework of a 'policy influencing' 46 
legislature (as opposed to policy making) which does not have the capacity to 
make laws of its own and can only amend or reject the policy brought before it 
by the government (Norton 1993: 50-1). The core defining function of 
Parliament is its legitimisation or 'assent of measures of public policy given on 
behalf of a political community that extends beyond the government elite 
responsible for formulating those measures' (Norton 1990: 1).
Since Government governs through Parliament, it is enticing to assess the 
performance of Parliament through the performance of the Government it assents
1 Policy influencing legislatures are also termed as 'reactive' (Mezey 1979)
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to. However, apart from legitimising the government and its measures, the House 
of Commons performs other duties and functions which may conflict with 
government efficiency and effectiveness. The most important of these roles are 
noted as (Norton 1981):
  Providing the personnel of government
  Scrutinising and influencing the measure and actions of the 
government
  Providing representation
  Providing and sustaining a forum of debate for government and 
opposition parties
As Philip Norton argues in Strengthening Democracy (Norton 2000) as well as 
some overlap, there is indeed a degree of conflict between some of the Commons 
functions especially in respect to providing a sustainable government and 
ensuring assent to its policies with the scrutiny of government policy and 
ensuring that the concerns of citizens are met. There is a common tendency in 
studies of the House of Commons reforms only to concentrate on one function, 
usually scrutiny, in isolation and give a verdict on the performance of Parliament 
as a whole. Even though scrutiny does have a direct impact on accountability of 
the system, the performance of the House of Commons would depend on the 
balance of all its functions in relation to one another (and in a desirable way to 
all those concerned in the process).
Secondly as Norton also points out in Does Parliament Matter (1993) scrutiny 
has different forms, each of which embodies a range of consequences for
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parliamentary reforms. In addition to administrative scrutiny, the House of 
Commons is responsible for the scrutiny of government policy at different stages 
of its legislative process as well as to the effects of the law upon implementation. 
Each stage must be evaluated separately with its own set of measures before the 
overall impact of Parliament's scrutiny function can be established. Moreover, 
there is the added complexity of generating indicators and criteria for 
performance measurement's sake, which should be approved by consensus 
among those involved in the process. These measures must then be incorporated 
with other measurements of parliamentary functions to get a full evaluation of 
performance of Parliament. No study of this scale can give a full empirical 
assessment of performance in Parliament and this study only provides a 
qualitative look at modernisation reforms within Parliament and how they have 
affected performance in the institution to date.
6-5.1 Modernisation and Reform in Parliament
Over the years, modernisation and reform in Parliament has meant different 
things. Traditionally these two terms were considered as separate issues. 
Modernisation has meant practical and procedural changes to update Parliament 
and bring it more in tune with the day-to day businesses but not in such a way as 
to inflict any kind of institutional change. Whereas reform was understood as a 
conscious decision made by the executive and legislature to institutionally 
change the structure or behaviour of the institution and as a result move the
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balance in the distribution of power between parliament and the government. 
The difference is shown in a debate on procedural reform given by Richard 
Crossman, Leader of the House in 1966:
7 would call into attention one confusion which is always recurring in 
our discussions of Parliamentary reform. There is a great deal of talk about the 
need for modernisation, for equipting the House with a more efficient voting 
system, for improving our libraries, for improving our physical accommodation 
even on occasions for television. I would not decry for one moment the 
modernisation of this kind and I shall have something to say about it. But there is 
a difference between modernisation and parliamentary reform. One can for 
example be in favour of introducing loudspeakers into the House of Commons or 
improving the library system and yet be opposed to every proposal for adapting 
our procedures to modern conditions. Equally one can be in favour of 
parliamentary reform and yet determined to preserve tradition where it does not 
destroy efficiency.
The pace of both modernisation and reform were slow in the first half of the 
twentieth century and, as the previous study also shows, modernisation took 
precedence over reform in the latter half of the century as measures were carried 
out to improve working conditions and facilities in the Palace of Westminster, 
improve the qualifications and professional qualities of MPs and the resources 
available to them in general. Philip Norton believes that once modernisation 
starts to take pace, a ratchet-like effect is created that is not possible to simply 
reverse (Norton 2000). As modernising changes came into place, the clock
47 Hansard (1966) Debates 14th December, volume 738, column479
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could not be turned back and Parliament had to carry on looking for innovative 
ways of modernising the system further. These substantial changes inevitably led 
to reforms or at least brought about the conditions for increased debate on 
reform. Hence a reform can be considered as the result of a system adapting 
itself to modernisation.
In the nineties, the coverage of managerial change expanded greatly in academic 
books on public policy in the United States and Britain (Pollitt 1990, Masey 
1992). Li public management studies reform is usually seen as a step-by-step 
process and is a kind of change that is beneficial to the system. Modernisation 
and reform became acceptable as two sides of a coin and both were necessary to 
deliver results. At this time the public sector was already going through 
systematic reforms aimed at improving performance and suggestions were made 
for parliament to step up its reform policies to keep afloat of changes48 .
Within the House of Commons, despite the introduction of significant reforms 
such as the departmental select committees in 1979, the Special Standing 
Committees in 1980 and the creation of opposition days in 1982, such reforms 
had not kept up with the growth of modernising changes which were initially 
intended to improve Parliament's communication role with the public (such as 
improvements in media coverage and various other services to inform the public
48 For instance the Joplin Committee during John Major's Government gave some reasonable 
reform proposals aimed at altering Parliament's sitting patterns during the week more use of 
special Standing Committees (Ryle 1996). In 1993 a report from the Hansard society's 
Commission on the legislative process, Making the Law (also known as the Rippon Report) gave 
reform proposals such as the introduction of timetabling of Bills and developing better 
techniques for scrutiny of proposed scrutiny; a more systematic examination of Bills by the 
Select Committees, both at pre-legislative and post-legislative stages of the process; and the 
establishing of a Business Committee to manage the legislative process in Parliament (Hansard 
1993, 123, 150).
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of the work of Parliament alongside the growth of constituency role of MPs) 
which had resulted in increased responsiveness, professionalism and influence 
among the backbenchers. Moreover, the executive's management of reforms in 
the House of Commons restricted the implementation of Parliament's scrutiny 
function which resulted in the weakening of accountability. The House of 
Commons was not only limited in exerting significant influence on the 
government, but also on the institutions of the European Community in its policy 
making power (Norton 1993).
Such instances prompted a revision of how Parliament could be strengthened to 
enhance its performance. In the 1990s the Labour party which had been in 
opposition for a long time began the campaign for rigorous reform of Parliament. 
Tony Blair's opening speech at a CharterSS seminar on parliamentary reform in 
1996 stated the necessity of reforms and changes to protect the rights of the 
backbenchers, strengthen the accountability to Parliament, and bring Parliament 
closer to the people49 . During this time the two main opposition parties, Labour 
and Liberal Democrats collaborated in a joint consultative committee chaired 
jointly by Robin Cook and Robert Maclennan. The report (known as the Cook- 
Maclennan Agreement) was published in March 1997 and suggested areas of 
parliamentary reform that a new government should prioritise with the 
establishing a select committee for modernisation. These areas included (Cook 
and Maclennan 1997: paras 66-72):
49 Blair, T. 'Opening Remarks', Charter 88 Seminar on the Reform of Parliament, 14May, 1996.
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To programme parliamentary business to ensure fuller consultation, more 
effective scrutiny of bills and better use of MPs time
- To improve the quality of legislation by better pre-legislative consultation 
and use of mechanisms such as special Standing Committee procedure 
where evidence is taken before legislation is passed
To change Prime Minister Question Time to make it a more genuine and 
serious means holding government to account
To overhaul the process for scrutinising EU legislation so that decisions 
from the EU are more transparent and Parliament's role is more clearly 
defined
To strengthen the ability of MPs to make government answerable for its 
actions
To enhance the role of Select Committees in ensuring the accountability of 
departments50
In 1997 the New Labour Government came into power upon a manifesto that 
claimed Parliament is 'in need of modernisation' (Labour Party 1997: 33) and a 
promise to modernise it. It got to work on its promise straight away and 
established the Modernisation Select Committee (MSC) in June of that year 
with a remit to, 'consider how the practices and procedures of the House should 
be modernised'. Apart from a reform agenda, the Government also brought with 
it an unprecedented high turnover of fresh members (240 new MPs) including a 
large number of women MPs. Many of the new members had experienced
50 Cook, R and Maclennan, R (1997) 'Report of the Joint committee on Constitutional Reform, 
reprinted in Cook, R and Maclennan (2005) 'Looking Back, Looking Forward: The Cook- 
Maclennan Agreement 8 years on', (London: New Politics Network)
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modernisation and reforms in their previous professional backgrounds and were 
expecting to see quick and effective reform in Parliament. The following section 
takes a closer look at the reform agenda since the inception of MSC.
6-5.2 The Modernisation Select Committee
Despite aligning modernisation and reform in pre-election campaigns to show 
both a willingness to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of parliamentary 
functions, it seems that after establishing the MSC, the Government reverted to 
the traditional sense of bringing more efficiency to how the Commons processes 
the business of the executive rather than focus on effectively holding the 
government to account. Of course this is to be expected of any government that 
has been out of power for some length of time to be voted back on a popular 
mandate and with a raft of proposals and policy to pass through Parliament amid 
high expectations from the electorate (62 Public Acts were passed in the first 
year alone).
In the first few years, it has been argued that the total effect of modernisation 
reforms was to make it easier for the Government to pass through its legislative 
programme (Stuart 2009). Critics of the modernisation plan often claim that 
since this Committee is chaired by the Leader of the Commons (not a 
backbencher like other select committees) who is a member of the cabinet, it is 
bound to side with the government and ignore strengthening the legislature itself. 
However, this argument could also be turned around to enhance the strength of
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MSC and lessen the possibility of a government veto to reform as the 
chairmanship of the late Robin Cook clearly shows.
The first Chair of MSC, Ann Taylor, while serving as shadow leader of the 
House, had been a long advocate of a modernisation road map for Parliament. 
She had announced a set of reform proposals in the previous year to make 
ministers more accountable; improve the quality of legislation; enhance Select 
Committees and set up a modernisation select committee; support opposition 
parties financially; and make better use of parliamentary time. 51 In setting out the 
agenda for the first four years of the Committee, she stated that 'Government 
should not seek change for change's sake' but to pay attention to certain aspects 
concerning:
The handling of legislative proposals on which the order establishing the 
committee instructs it to make an early first report 
The means by which the house holds ministers into account 
The impact of the house's procedure and practices on the working lives of 
members 
- The style and format of proceedings52
It has been argued that the package introduced by MSC in July 1997 contained 
very little that was novel but included procedures that had already existed but not 
carried out. The new measures had been examined before and recommended in
51 Taylor, A 'New Politics, New Parliament, Charter 88 Seminar on the Reform of Parliament, 14 
May, 1996
52 Modernisation Select Committee of the House of Commons The legislative Process' HC 190, 
23 July 1997, appendix 1, para.l
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previous select committee reports as well as successive reports from the Hansard 
Society and other authoritive sources but were side stepped by the previous 
government (Kennon 2000: 3 Blackburn et al 2003: 752). According to Ryle, the 
first reform package looked as though it had not been thought through well 
enough and that the Government appeared not to have decided how their 
objectives for reform be achieved in practice (Ryle 1999: 134).
Although the proposals seemed to be a watered-down version of the reform 
agenda proposed earlier, it is important to note that Parliament as the nation's 
arena requires all organisational players (corporately, the government, the 
opposition front bench and the backbenchers) to operate in coherent and 
responsive way to any executive reform proposal and there should be consensus 
for the modernisation initiative before it becomes a binding measure of reform. 
In its first year, MSC produced seven reports which led to some changes, 
including a manageable conduct of the chamber, scrutiny of European Business, 
a more comprehensible Order Paper, the carry-over of bills (only implemented 
that year) and changes to the hours of sitting of the House. If more radical kinds 
of change had been introduced then perhaps none of these proposals would have 
passed through the House in November 1997: By Parliament's standards as an 
institution that acts with restraint and caution, this must have been a good start.
In terms of strengthening the legislature, the proposals had less impact on 
Parliament's power to scrutinise the executive, rather than strengthen another of 
the main functions of the House of Commons which is to support and assist the 
government to pass legislation. For instance changes to the timetabling of issues
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before the House which were designed not to allow the opposition to abuse the 
debating system by calling Commons divisions on the most trivial or non- 
legislative matters and keeping government up late into the night without 
resolution (Cowley 2002) may also be seen as 'automatic guillotines' and a 
threat to accountability53 (Cameron 2009). The case for programming and 
timetabling of bills which was initially intended to decrease time wasting to 
avoid the guillotine motion on bills has not been successful in eliminating this 
problem and the guillotine motion was used four times on three major bills in the 
1997/08 session (Gay 2005: 372). The executive intervened in the programming 
phase to ensure that it was carried out on the Government's terms and did not 
apply to all legislation (Seaton and Winetrobe 1999) which tilted the balance of 
the legislature and the executive towards the latter.
Many of the proposals included measures that are desirable to both the 
legislature and the executive. For instance the proposal intended to ensure better 
pre-legislative scrutiny of bills, recommended that the government publish a 
number of bills in draft for the select committees to examine before they are 
introduced to Parliament and allowing the relevant select committee or joint 
committee to scrutinise policy before a bill's legislative stage. This option is 
desirable for the Government too as a public and parliamentary scrutiny of the 
draft will lead to a better bill being introduced and allows smooth passage of 
legislation, saving time in the legislative process. Moreover it is arguably easier 
for ministers to make changes at this stage than when the government's prestige 
is engaged as the bill goes through the formal legislative process (Blackburn et al
' Cameron, D (2009) 'A New Politics: Democratic Accountability' The Guardian, 25 May
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2003: 624-5). However, in the case of presenting draft bills for legislative 
scrutiny, within the implementation of the MSC reforms, only two bills were 
prepared in draft form in 1997/08 session. Despite the steady rise in the numbers 
of published draft bills over the years, they remain relatively small compared to 
the number of primary and secondary legislation and are of a selective nature54 .
The main reform that did get through (with government backing) was the change 
to the parliamentary calendar and the introduction of Thursday morning sittings 
in favour of freeing up Fridays for constituency work (striking a better balance 
between the MPs' Westminster and constituency duties with their commitments 
to family life). Even though this proposal did receive initial negative reaction 
within the Commons as a government initiative to reduce scrutiny, it has been 
more beneficial for strengthening the constituency role of the MP, another of the 
functions of the Commons. In terms of connecting Westminster with the public, 
the Committee made some improvements by instigating changes to a few archaic 
rituals such as the practice of wearing top hats during points of order as well as 
the spying on strangers' ritual .
The change in Prime Minister's Questions Time from two fifteen-minute slots 
on Tuesdays and Thursday to one thirty-minute slot on Wednesday has been 
criticised as a sign of MSC caving in to the Prime Minister's demands and giving 
him the opportunity to spend less days in Parliament and answerable to it.
54 See reports on pre-legislative scrutiny for the House of lords Constitutions Unit. Although it 
must be said that the some of the initial blame for such a small number of draft bills probably lay 
on the management structures within Whitehall itself, as anyone who had watched the BBC 
series of Yes Minster and Yes Prime Minister would agree!
55 These two reforms for dated rituals were presented in the Modernisation Select committee of 
the House of Commons Report 1997/08, HC 600.
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However, this decision does not have to do with the MSC and the arrangements 
were made by the Prime Minister before the Modernisation Committee was set 
up and as Biffen notes, '[a] Prime Minister with a large majority does not need to 
be too accountable to the Parliament' (Biffen 2005: 231). In terms of time 
management of the House bi-weekly Prime Minister's Question Time lasting 
fifteen minutes each is less efficient than a thirty minute session being held once 
a week as it takes up too much attention and time that could be effectively used 
for other parliamentary functions. This session wrongly receives most of the 
media attention as a theatrical political battle scene between the Prime Minister 
and the Opposition who show off their rhetorical skills and is mainly responsible 
for the increasing presidential style politics in Westminster56 rather than 
strengthening the functions of Parliament.
What is often neglected in assessments of MSC and its reform agenda is the need 
to improve the effective and efficient management of procedures of the 
Commons, rather than place too much emphasis at the scrutiny and 
accountability of Government. During Margaret Beckett's leadership of the 
House, the balance in the modernisation development agenda moved towards 
better management of procedures that not only support legislation, but also 
parliamentary business and its members. Beckett has often been regarded as a 
Leader of the House who was unwilling to compromise her Cabinet loyalty when 
chairing MCS and was tied in bitter public exchanges with the Liaison
56 After retiring as an MP, Paddy Ashdown mentions in an interview about the functions of the 
House of Commons that 'the only function it performs tolerably well is that of providing circuses 
for the people to watch on Television. The theatre is excellent but there it finishes' (Morrison 
2001,415). Surely he is referring to Prime Minister's Question Time which usually provides very 
amusing viewing even to a person who is unfamiliar with politics.
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Committee, following its publication of Shifting the Balance, which sought to 
strengthen the role of select committees in relation to the government by 
removing the influence of party whips, enhance the committees' resources and 
promote the select committee system as an alternative career path for 
backbenchers 7 . The fact that the proposals for reform were made by senior 
government backbenchers (chairs of select committees) and the Government 
rejected all of its proposals, is itself an indication of the imbalance between the 
House of Commons collectively and the Executive. The Liaison Committee 
responded to the Government's rejection of its proposals with disappointment 
and surprise:
'We found it surprising that the Government which has made so much of 
its policy of modernising Parliament should apparently take so different a view 
when its own accountability and freedom of action are at issue.....We believe 
that in its reply the Government has missed an opportunity of reforms which 
would have been greatly to its credit. It is strange that the expressions for 
support for increasing the effectiveness of the Select Committees are not matched 
by the things that make a real difference....The re has been much discussion 
about shorter sitting hours and more family-friendly scheduling of business in 
the House. This may all be very well; but any real modernisation of Parliament 
must provide better accountability and tougher scrutiny of the government of the 
day' 5 *
51 Liaison Committee 'Shifting the Balance: Select Committees and the Executive' HC 300,
Session 1999/2000, 3 March 2000
58 Liaison Committee, 'Second Report: Independence or Control?' HC 301, 20 July 2000. Paras
3,77
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During Beckett's two- year tenure, the MSC produced just as many reports as it 
had in its first year alone (the committee met only once a week bringing the total 
of meetings in the two-year period to forty-two, whereas MSC held sixty-seven 
meetings in the 1997/08 session). These reports centred on pro-executive and 
non-controversial reforms about the programming of legislation, sitting hours, 
parliamentary calendar and sittings at Westminster Hall (parallel debating forum 
to the chamber), which were all approved and implemented. The output of the 
committee was increased as all recommendations were agreed upon, 
implemented or made permanent. Modernisation was making progress in 
bringing about more efficiency of Parliament but according to Tony Wright 
modernisation as effectiveness was still absent from discussions of political 
reform (Wright 2000) which was damaging to the accountability of Parliament 
and Government.
A reason for Becket's focus on procedural management may be the coinciding of 
her chair with the publication of the Braithwaite Report (1999) which prioritised 
administrative reform, and gave proposals on the corporate management of the 
Commons (discussed in the previous case study) focusing on the need to 
accommodate MPs and modernise IT facilities in the Commons (as well as 
provide online publications of parliamentary business and information on the 
administration of the House). Her priority was not only to assist legislation, 
allowing it to pass as smoothly as possible, but also to reform the management of 
the House. But as Gay claims, in her attempts to raise the efficiency of the House 
in terms of legislation programming has been 'passed from being a consensual 
planning instrument to the refinement of the guillotine so deplored by
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parliamentary reformers' (Gay 2005: 374). The only positive reform that has 
been noted to support legislative debate and scrutiny in a constructive way was 
to make the sittings of Westminster Hall permanent.
The result of the first phase of the reform programme was a general sense of 
dissatisfaction about the direction of reforms which necessitated a change of 
course on the modernisation debate from how procedural matters should be 
conducted to the main issues of parliamentary reform and how Parliament should 
be strengthened to address the existing imbalance in its relationship with the 
government. Parliament not only needed to become efficient, but also effective 
in its functions. Surely modernisation was essential for Westminster to lose its 
connotations of an 'unwelcoming 19th century gentleman's club', earning the 
nickname 'Hogwarts-on Thames' 59 , but an image change alone would not make 
Parliament fit for purpose and enable it to maintain legitimacy, let alone improve 
the quality of democracy. At this time two major reports on Parliamentary 
reforms were published challenging the existing modernisation programme and 
proposing further changes to the system.
The report Strengthening Parliament was published in July 200060 . This report 
was an initiative from the Conservative Party (in the position of the 
government's main opposition party and keen for change), which set up a
59 Referring to charter 88, Unlocking Democracy, Strategy Document which states The fact that 
the customs and traditions of the UK Parliament are based on those of a 19th century gentleman's 
club sends a clear message to the public, "We are not like you and you are not welcome here'". 
The phrase 'Hogwarts-on Thames' is a reference to the fictional Hogwarts wizardry school in the 
famous Harry Potter stories. It has been depicted to show Parliament is technically and culturally 
not in line with the modern UK society. I am not sure who first used the name but it appears in 
Morrison (2001, 412)
60 Conservative Party 'Strengthening Parliament: The Report of the Commission to Strengthen 
Parliament' (Chaired by Lord Norton), 10 July 2000
314
commission to strengthen Parliament chaired by Lord Norton. The academic 
background of the commission chair ensured a thoroughly investigative and non- 
political approach to Parliamentary reform that first looked at the problem from 
all angles before making close to 100 recommendations on changes towards a 
more efficient and effective institution fit for the challenges of the 21 st century. 
This report rather than debating the value of reform for reform's sake provided 
the means, or tools, for realising the goals of reform. In other words, the report 
set out the conditions that must exist for achieving successful reform to enhance 
the performance of the system. The proposals and recommendations in this 
report have become a baseline for MSC programmes since the chairmanship of 
Robin Cook up to present-day committee proposals.
In addition to proposing a change of attitude by members to reform, Lord 
Norton's report also proposed a change of attitude to the way recommendations 
for reform were made to Parliament by introducing a 'Big Bang' approach. This 
approach calls for an extensive and implementable package of reforms to be 
introduced by MSC in one go rather than proposing for one single big change61 
(Norton 2000: 7). The interaction of several achievable and coherent targets 
would make compromise and the realisation of the main goal more successful. 
This approach was used during the tenure of the late Robin Cook as Leader of 
the House which has been said to be a major factor for his success as chair of 
MSC62 (Power 2007).
61 Norton, P (2000) 'Reforming parliament in the United Kingdom: The Report of the 
Commission to strengthen Parliament' The Journal of Legislative Studies, 6 (3): 1-14
62 Power, G (2007) The Politics of Parliamentary Reform: Lessons to be Learned from the 
House of Commons 2001-05'
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The next report Making Government Accountable was the work of a 
commission set up by the Hansard Society and chaired by Lord Newton who was 
a former Leader of the House. The Hansard commission report was similar to the 
commission on strengthening Parliament, both in composition and their method 
of investigation since both comprised of a broad membership from inside and 
outside Parliament and produced authoritative reports after a period of 
consultation and investigation. Though unlike the previous report that took a 
holistic view to performance as an interaction of different parliamentary 
functions, the Hansard report only considered ways of enhancing Parliament's 
scrutiny of the Government.
According to Norton three conditions are usually necessary for significant 
reforms. First of all there must be a window of opportunity that usually comes 
after a general election. Second is a set of coherent proposals that MPs can unite 
behind. Finally there needs to be strong leadership, usually from the Leader of 
the House to carry through the proposals (Norton 2000: 13). Apart from the 
window of opportunity, the two other conditions were not so strong in this phase 
of reform as even desirable proposals such as the carry-over of bills from one 
session to the next got little result during this period. There was now a platform 
for Parliamentary reform and pressure on the Government to take notice. The 
Government had also won the second general election and the window of 
opportunity was provided for again. What was missing in the previous term was
63 Hansard Society 'The challenges for Parliament: Making Government More Accountable' 
The Hansard Society report of the Commission on Parliamentary Scrutiny (chaired by Lord 
Newton) June 2001,
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a strong leadership and management of MSC to pull reforms through which 
seemed to appear when the late Robin Cook became leader of the House.
In his state of the Union lecture at the University College London Cook had 
stated that, 'If the Commons wants to earn more respect it needs to adopt a 
business-like approach which reveal a chamber more concerned with the public 
interest and less motivated by party'64 . He admitted that such an approach would 
require reform to parliamentary procedures and select committee structures but 
these reforms can only come about if MPs' attitude to Parliament changes and 
'Members really see scrutiny as the prime requirement of their job description' 
(Robin Cook 2001). As mentioned in the previous case study, the Senior Salaries 
Review Body of the House of Commons had made the Leaders' job easier by 
providing a generic job description for the MP (footnote 28) that specifically 
included the monitoring and challenge of the executive for influencing desirable 
outcomes, as one of the main responsibilities on members. The Leader of the 
House was also aware of directing reform so that parliament becomes less 
marginalised by the media and more relevant to the public especially the younger 
generation (ibid).
Realising that modernisation required a clear vision rather than a mixed bag of 
unrelated reforms, Robin Cook set about to provide the goals around his vision 
of making Parliament more effective and relevant, before presenting the raft of 
measures for reaching these goals. The package of reforms had been facilitated
64 Robin Cook (2001) 'A Modern Parliament in a Modern Democracy' State of the Union 
Lecture by Rt Hon. Robin Cook MP, Leader of the House, the Constitution Unit, University 
College London, December 2001.
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by the publication of the two Reports by Lord Norton and Lord Newton as most 
of the first package used adaptations of recommendations in these reports. The 
measures proposed centred around the improvement of the legislative process 
(scrutiny and procedure); carry-over of bills (becoming routine); and making 
Parliament more accessible and welcoming to public and media. To improve the 
legislative process, he recommended the publication of more pre-draft bills 
(stopping short of setting targets); rational and accessible sitting hours 
(modernising working hours); and flexibility in procedures (which meant that 
exchanges in the chamber would become more topical and relevant to issues at 
the time).
These reforms all had certain advantages not only to the efficiency of Parliament, 
but also to its effectiveness. For instance when bills are carried over from one 
session to the next, it prevents the creation of a 'tidal wave' of legislation and 
allows for a manageable distribution of bills, time and resources that will lead to 
better scrutiny (Cook 2003a: 11). Modern working hours not only makes sense in 
energy efficiency, but also encourages a more equal distribution of women MPs 
who would probably be put off by the idea of having to continue debate into the 
early hours of the next day65 . Also providing better facilities for the media to 
access Parliament would bring more coverage and connect Parliament with the 
public. Cook believed that creating more interest about the functions of 
Parliament as a whole and lead to higher participation and turnout in election and 
would in turn improve the quality of democracy (Cook 2003b).
65 The extent of the problem is apparent in the comment of Anne Campbell MP: 'It is far easier 
to buy a drink at Westminster at 2 am that it is to send a fax to a constituent' (Quoted in Morrison 
2001,413).
318
Robin Cook's tenure as Leader of the House is usually noted for his changing of 
the working hours. However, perhaps the most important feature of the Cook 
reforms which provides the means for performance analysis in the House of 
Commons was the strengthening of the position of select committees in different 
stages of the legislative chain and introducing core tasks or functions which 
would provide measures to assess their performance. Hence an assessment of the 
core tasks of select committees would provide a good snapshot at the 
performance of the Commons in terms of holding Government into account and 
improving the quality of legislation66 . The idea of core tasks was brought up in 
by the Hansard Society Commission on Parliamentary Scrutiny report which 
argued that to make scrutiny more systematic:
'The select committees should be given a set of core duties. The 
committees should retain the freedom to initiate inquiries according to the 
interests of the committee or to respond to emerging issues....these objectives 
might include: balancing inquiries between administration, finance and policy of 
their department; monitoring all departmental reports, business plans and 
performance indicators; conduction a regular cycle of work on activities of the 
regulators, executive agencies, quangos and other associated bodies within their 
department's purview; and review the progress of the department following the 
committee's previous reports' (Hansard Society 2001: paras. 25, 26)
66 In Strengthening Parliament, Norton argues for committees having a stronger role in pre- 
legislative scrutiny of bills which would result in better legislation as 'What government loses in 
the short term (speed of passage) will be off-set by what it will gain (better quality legislation) in 
the long term' (Conservative Party 2000, 32)
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Allocating core tasks to select committees offered them an opportunity to 
improve their own effectiveness; the effectiveness of the House (by 
compensating for the modernisation programme which was aimed mostly at 
efficiency); and the effectiveness of Government. So it must be a highly 
desirable step. MSC presented its recommendations or core task or the 
'illustration of what we would regard as the principal objectives of departmental 
select committee' 67 for debate in February 2002 and in June of that year the 
Liaison Committee agreed and published ten core tasks based on the 
recommendations made by MSC report. Even though the approved core tasks 
were watered down and less prescriptive than the original recommendations of 
MSC, in theory the performance of the scrutiny function of the House of 
Commons could be assessed using the core tasks as well as well as enhancing 
scrutiny and improving the image of Parliament and its members in the eyes of 
the Public. Following the implementation or core tasks in the first year, the 
Liaison Committee report in 2003 stated:
'The discipline of assessing their work against core tasks has encouraged 
committees to ensure that they monitor the widest possible range of departmental
67 Select Committee on the Modernisation of the House of Commons (2002), 'Select 
Committees', 12 February HC 224 Session 2001/02: para. 34. The report proposes 11 core task:
- To consider major policy initiatives
- To consider Government's response to major emerging crisis
- To propose changes where evidence persuades the committee that the present policy 
requires amendment
- To conduct pre-legislative scrutiny of draft bills
- To examine the report on main estimates, annual expenditure plans and annual 
resources accounts
- To monitor performance against targets in the public service agreements
- To take evidence from independent regulators and inspectorates
- To consider the reports of Executive agencies
- To consider, and if appropriate report on, major appointments by a secretary of State 
of other senior ministers
- To examine treaties within their subject areas
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activity; it also allow the public and the media to appreciate more easily the 
comprehensive examination of Government which committees undertake'68
To enhance the businesslike approach to select committee performance and 
encourage the committee membership as an alternative career path for MPs to 
serving Government, incentives had to be introduced which made committees 
viable alternative career option for MPs rather than competing for the 
frontbench. Cook's package also proposed better funding for the select 
committees and extra remunerations for select committee chairs; two-term 
sessions for select committee chairs; increasing the membership of the select 
committee; and to make committee nominations independent of the whips69 . 
The Liaison Committee approved the first two recommendations but the 
Committee did not accept to limit chairmanship to two parliaments and not to 
change its structure by increasing membership. The final proposal in the package 
was defeated in the chamber. Tony Wright MP (2004: 370) states:
'When the Leader provided MPs with an opportunity to decide on a free vote 
whether they wanted the composition and chairs [of select committees] chosen 
by whips...or themselves, they voted for the former option'
As this comment shows not all opposition to reform could be attributed to 
Government or the lack of reforms blamed on the power imbalance between the 
Commons and the Government. The proposals coming from the Leader of the
68 Liaison Committee (2004) 'Annual Report 2003' HC 446 Session 2003/04: Para 10
69 Modernisation Select Committee, 'Select Committees' HC 224, Session 2001/02
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House, a cabinet member, must have had Government approval; but the prospect 
of reforms was lost due to opposition from members themselves and their 
attitudes to reforms. The problem according to Wright is down to the fact that 
parliament does not act as a collective entity with a common set of values but 
members see reform from the prism of their party rather than how a reform 
would strengthen Parliament as a whole (ibid: 507-8). This view was also shared 
by Cook and Maclennan (1997, 2005) who believed that politics has become 
too disciplined and adversarial which is disconnecting Parliament from the 
public.
Of course opposition to reforms from the Commons does not diminish the fact 
that the Government genuinely dislikes reforms that are designed to limit its 
power. In response to the fast pace of the reform packages presented by the 
MSC, the Government created a Cabinet Sub-committee on Modernisation. 
Although this committee was chaired by the Leader of the House, according to 
Greg Power, it was designed to ensure that the Leader consults with his 
colleagues before presenting a package to Parliament and would be kept in line 
by the Cabinet Office secretariat that serviced the committee (Power 2007: 501). 
The effect of such body would be to slow down reforms and add to the 
frustration of negotiating each reform in the package. It has been suggested that 
the frustration over Cooks attempts to reform the House of Lords with the 
introduction of a substantial elected element which was resisted by the Cabinet 
and Prime Minister may have contributed to his resignation from Government 
over the Invasion of Iraq (Thomas 2005: 250).
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Before his resignation, Cook had announced that the next MSC investigation 
would look at how Parliament could engage more with the public. The pace of 
Commons' reform slowed down significantly but as Power argues he had 
deliberately insisted on a slower pace as the result of a realistic political 
assessment of how much change was further achievable as well as reflecting the 
mood in the Commons of a lack of appetite for any additional sources of division 
(Power 2007: 503-4). The change of direction and speed of reforms must have 
also been in the interest of creating a balance in the performance of the different 
functions of Parliament and not overstressing on one aspect but creating a 
balance among the competing priorities of Parliament, government and society at 
large. Under the Leadership of Peter Hain, the MSC changed direction towards 
reforms that would promote widespread support rather than increase divisions.
The MSC 2004 report, Connecting Parliament and the Public, set out a series of 
practical recommendation designed at making the Westminster building more 
accessible and welcoming to constituents; making greater effort to engage with 
young people; and encouraging better use of information and communications 
technology70 (HC 2004, 11). The recommendations in this report (such as the 
radical upgrading of the Parliamentary website, including youth engagement 
section on the website and constant review of digital broadcasting) could be 
more effectively implemented since the Leader of the Commons is also a 
member of the House of Commons Commission (previous case study), the result 
being the publications the Commissions Strategy Plan in 2005. These measures
70 House of Commons Modernisation Select Committee (2004) 'Connecting Parliament with the 
Public: First report' HC 368, session 2003/04
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were not given the adversarial treatment as previous measures of MSC reports 
had and only fourteen members voted against the measures in January 200571 .
This change of direction could also be related to the fact that subsequent 
appointees to the post of Leader of the House had mostly been promoted to the 
post (except for Jack Straw) and were expecting further promotions in their 
political careers by remaining loyal to the Cabinet, whereas Robin Cook had 
been politically demoted as Foreign Secretary to the post and didn't feel he 
would lose much from pushing the Government to the limits of reform. Though, 
however one speculates the reasons for a change of direction of reforms it must 
be emphasised that such a change in the direction of reforms is necessary for the 
sake of creating a balance among the different roles Parliament. What is 
important is the fact that the foundations for reform were set. Despite some 
setback to some of the reforms such as the House voting in January 2005 to 
return Tuesdays to its past working hours, the nature of the House necessitates 
that the pace of reforms be set internally by consensus.
The Labour Manifesto of 2005 reiterated its commitment to improve scrutiny 
and its relationship with the public. The focus of reforms in the 2005/06 session 
was scrutiny of bills in the legislative stage. A common criticism of the Standing 
Committees responsible for the legislative stage is that while they provide the 
opportunity for line-by-line scrutiny of bills, backbenchers are often discouraged 
from participating and so the amendments put forward by anyone except the
71 Out of the opponents, 13 MPs were from the Tories and 1 MP from Liberal Democrats. The 
Public Whip website at: http://www.publicwhip.org.uk/division.php?date=2005-01- 
26&number=49
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government is rarely accepted and the Government is rarely defeated at this stage 
(Riddell 2002: 11-12, Whitaker 2006: 696). The programming of bills introduced 
in this stage of the legislative cycle received adversarial tension and has been 
abandoned. The main limitation that has been argued is that it is not possible to 
accurately anticipate the time needed for adequate consideration and time may 
run out before major parts of the bill can be adequately scrutinised (Brazier 
2004, 16). Despite better means pre-scrutiny of bills, and more use of special 
Standing Committees and Joint Committees, it was obvious that the current 
system did not contribute to stronger scrutiny of the Government.
This problem was addressed during the Jack Straw's of the House. In its first 
report for session 2005/0672 , MSC announced not only that Special Standing 
Committees should become the norm for all Government bills replacing all 
Standing Committees (HC 2006: para 58), but also to avoid confusion all such 
arrangements (special standing committees) were to be renamed as 'Public Bill 
Committees' with individual committees being designated by the name of the 
bill allocated to them (ibid: para 65). This was not only a cosmetic change to the 
name and appearance of the Committees, but also provided the new committees 
with the ability to receive written evidence and the means for better scrutiny and 
lessening of partisan division.
Another reform toward the systematic improvement of scrutiny in Parliament is 
the Government's publication of the Draft Legislative Programme in July 2007.
72 House of Commons Modernisation Select Committee (2006), First Report , Session 2005/06, 
HC
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The draft provided a summary of the Government's intentions for the next 
parliamentary session in advance of the Queen Speech. Although the programme 
was first presented as part of the Government initiative 'Governance of Britain 
Agenda', it has now become part of the MSC reform programme and 
consultations are currently underway to improve the effectiveness of the 
programme. The present Leader of the House, Harriet Harman and her two 
predecessors have taken a more consultative role as the Chairman of MSC and 
(as the previous study suggests) integrated reforms of the House within the 
management of the Commons to create a more effective corporate structure of 
how business is managed within the House.
6-5.3 Evaluating Parliamentary Reform
Parliamentary reform in Westminster follows a pattern of cautious evolution. 
Unlike newer, developing parliaments that cherry pick and adopt new structures 
and behaviour from effective models of legislative scrutiny previously designed 
and tested out by established democracies, Westminster must find a way of 
adapting reforms to its unique institutional framework without changing its 
policy influencing nature and to make reforms compatible with its already 
established structures, resources and behaviour which could at times be 
painstakingly slow. Reforms in Westminster have been a non-stop and 
continuous process, though the pace of reforms has perhaps not moved as fast as 
the demands for democratic accountability from the society. But, as Day and 
Klein (1987) suggest the purpose of democratic accountability is not only
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concerned with efficiency but also effectiveness of government. Accountability 
becomes an essential means of determining both whether maximum government 
effectiveness and efficiency is reached and encouraging further improvement. To 
achieve this end it is crucial that scrutiny systems in Parliament use performance 
information and measurement systems to manage government accountability.
The debate on parliamentary reform today has evolved from the conception of 
accountability as effectiveness in the proper use of resources and clear 
management objectives for the Government to reform in the context of sensible, 
prudent and wise policy making which requires effective mechanisms for 
scrutiny and accountability by Parliament. It is generally perceived that this latter 
concept of accountability has not kept pace with the former and the tools and 
mechanisms necessary to make this change need updating and change. What 
Parliament needs to do to avoid creating a vacuum in public accountability is to 
meet the rising professionalism of the public sector with professionalism from 
the legislative system (Hogg and Jenkins 1999, 145). Failure to reform in this 
way would not only cause a loss of respect for Parliament but the inability to 
maintain or improve legitimacy for the political system as a whole.
Although this study cannot provide a full evaluation of reforms in Parliament 
since a complete evaluation would require a thorough investigation of the 
performance of both Houses of Parliament, it has examined reforms to the 
procedures and practices of the House of Commons since the modernisation 
agenda of 1997. In order to evaluate reforms it is necessary to assess them
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against a set of criteria of parliamentary functions. The core functions of 
Westminster and other policy influencing- legislatures are (Norton 2000, 6):
- To create a sustainable Government
To ensure that the business of government is carried on (through giving
assent to government bills
To facilitate a credible opposition
- To insure measures and actions of Government are subject to Scrutiny
- To ensure voices of citizens are heard
These five functions provide the core elements with which reforms should be 
assessed. An overall assessment of reform would require a holistic approach 
with regard to the balance of all of the core elements. It is clear that most 
developing legislatures below singularity would struggle to maintain balance 
among these functions which is necessary for system stability (marked by the 
absence or very weak presence of the last three functions). As for Parliament, its 
scrutiny role has never been very strong compared to some other political 
systems in Western Europe (Norton 1998). This is despite the fact that in recent 
years there has been a significant rise in the volume of legislation compared to a 
decline in the number of Government Acts which means that Parliament has 
devoted more time and effort to better scrutiny of Government bills73 . What has 
become dominant in discussions about reforms is not so much about the capacity
73 For instance in 1992, 55 Acts passed Parliament with a total of 1288 pages of law. The 
number of pages in 2004 had increased to 3470 despite a fall in the number of primary legislation 
to 38 Acts. Taken from House of Commons Library (2006) 'EV 77 and Act and Statutory 
Instruments: Volume of UK legislation 1950-2005' House of Commons Library Standard Note 
SN/66/2911, January 2006
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of the system to scrutinise government policy, but the lack of scrutiny tools for 
improving accountability. Since its establishment, the Modernisation Committee 
has been given the task of introducing the tools necessary to modernise the 
practices and procedures of Parliament. The creation of the Committee alone 
should be seen as a new phase for parliamentary reform in the House of 
Commons.
Most assessments of the modernisation reform programme instead of holistically 
evaluating the impact of reforms on the performance to the House of Commons 
tend to reduce individual issues in terms of efficiency and effectiveness and 
conclude that since most reforms have helped the efficient passing of legislation 
(government output) there is a diminished impact on effectiveness in terms of 
scrutiny. This outcome together with recent poll results that show 85 percent of 
the population does not feel represented by parliament (Hansard 2009: 29) and 
provides an image of a declining ability of Parliament to manage its reforms. 
However, performance as the mass of efficiency and effectiveness taken together 
should be assessed from the inside of the institution with a view to the outside 
(such as satisfaction surveys of members as in previous case study) not vice 
versa, and definitely not at times of global economic crisis.
In terms of legislative scrutiny, the Commons has improved its status as a policy- 
influencing chamber. The most significant measures can be summarised here as: 
(1) Receiving more policy information in the form of green papers and 
consultation from the Government working with clear guidelines;
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(2) Receiving pre-draft of bills allowing for more policy influence and better 
consideration of policy from the Government before the bill is formally 
introduced to parliament74 ;
(3) The pre-publication of Government policy set forth in the Queen Speech 
(coming into effect in 2007) and a renewed Government commitment to publish 
as many bills as possible for legislative scrutiny along with that publication75 ;
(4) The structural change in pre-legislative scrutiny of bills by Joint Committees 
allows for more in-depth scrutiny of bills and a good degree of bipartisanship in 
the committee' approach to inquiries (HL 2004);
(5) The carryover of bills not only enhances pre-legislative scrutiny but allows 
for a more organised distribution of parliamentary resources and time;
(6) The application of programming and timetabling carried on a consensual 
basis within Parliament, offers the chance for greater scrutiny and flexibility to 
consider topical issues of public interest. Without consensus, timing is often 
regarded as the government's effort to control the legislative process;
(7) Westminster Hall has become a parallel debating chamber providing extra 
opportunity to debate on backbench issues, hence optimising parliamentary time;
(8) The establishment of Public Bill Committees have provided more in-depth 
and flexible scrutiny of legislation by taking a seminal approach to legislative 
scrutiny and allowing evidence from individuals and bodies from outside 
Parliament to influence and improve the legislative process;
74 This measure has been carried out on an adhoc basis and as mentioned does depend on the 
personality of the Leader of the House. For instance in the 1997/98 and 2003/04 sessions 42 bills 
were published in pre-draft and this figure has gone down to only five bills in 2004/05 session. 
The decision of which bills should be published sill lies with the Government, nevertheless the 
practice serves as a great tool for strengthening Parliament and the with time is bound to 
improve in terms of efficiency and effectiveness.
75 Office of the Leader of the House of Commons (2007) The Governance of Britain: The 
Government's Draft Legislative Programme', 11 July 2007, cm 7175. The MSC has since given 
recommendations on the better timing of this practice to ensure maximum effectiveness.
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(9) The introduction of Core Tasks not only provides select committees with a 
generic job description, but the setting out of the committees' scrutiny roles 
enhances and defines their tools for performance measurement. The role of 
legislative scrutiny is not only confined to pre-legislation and legislation stages, 
but also the scrutiny of government performance in the post-legislative stage;
(10) Select committees have become more resourceful and specialised and their 
membership is seen as a viable alternative career path to frontbench positions for 
aspiring politicians;
(11)Parliament provides adequate resources, information and training to 
committee members and MPs in order to boast their performance as scrutineers 
of the government and engagers with the public;
(12) Changes are underway to simplify the language of parliament, not only in 
terms of making the institution less alienating76 but also a measure of facilitating 
scrutiny;
(13) The Prime Minister is scrutinised directly by the Liaison Committee twice a 
year (each session lasting two and a half hours) and held accountable on a whole 
range of issues77 .
The reforms mentioned above are only some of the changes to the performance 
of Parliament since the start of MSC and it is clear that each of these main issues 
resulted from the transaction of other reforms and changes. Although the success 
of MSC is usually seen in its ability to apply efficiency related changes, such as
76 The Hansard report, Parliament in the Public Eye (2005) had stated that 'Parliamentary 
language is often obsure and confusing, reinforcing the view the Parliament is relevant only to a 
bygone age' (Hansard 2005, 63).
77 Although this was not a recommendation of MSC but an initiative of Tony Blair (Riddell 
2002) it is included in the list since it is a reform towards effectiveness in Parliament
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parliamentary time and calendar, rather than improve scrutiny, the above shows 
that the House of Commons is potentially improving its performance by 
becoming both efficient and effective in terms of its ability to influence policy 
and provide effective scrutiny.
One of the results of the modernisation agenda is that Parliament has adapted 
patterns which associate it with working parliamentary models that provide a 
parallel and democratic audit of government business. If Parliament is to go 
down this route then it will sooner or later need to establish a business committee 
that takes the control and management of parliamentary business out of the 
hands of the Government and into the control of elected representatives. The 
MSC had proposed such a committee in 2002 but was made (under pressure 
from the cabinet) to change its proposal to a vague commitment to collective 
consultations with the parties on the broad shape of the legislative year (Russell 
and Paun 2006: 11). However as mentioned before such a centripetal style would 
require less adversarial politics and for more cooperation and ultimately an 
attitude change within Parliament which remains a challenge.
The management of parliamentary business still carries through 'the usual 
channels' which is a term used to define the informal and bilateral negotiations 
predominantly between the whips of the two main parties. However, these usual 
channels open only after behind the scenes negotiations between the government 
chief whip and his or her private secretary and the government usually gets its 
way (ibid: 6-7). The House of Lords Constitution Committee, under the 
chairmanship of Lord Norton, produced a report on Parliament and the
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Legislative Process , in which it stated that 'Westminster was an outlier in 
comparative terms to the level of Government domination of the timetable' (HC 
2004: para 116). The report conducted comparative studies of legislatures with 
business committees and concludes that such structures do not prevent 
governments from getting business through but rather ensures greater openness 
and time for proper scrutiny (ibid: para 118) and proposes such a committee to 
be established within Westminster. This proposal was given a negative response 
by the Government at the time and the debate for such a committee still 
continues today.
Another criticism made of MSC is that its functions overlap and undermine the 
functions of the Procedure Committee. Kelso believes that the reason MSC 
exists is to shape House procedures so that they most benefit the Government 
rather than the Commons and minimise accountability of the executive. By 
shaping of procedures, the MSC has usurped the Procedure Committee making it 
a redundant body (Kelso 2007). However, had this been the case MSC 
recommendations would not have been overturned by the procedure committee 
such as the reversal to previous hours on Tuesday. It would be fairer to say that 
had there not been MSC, then even the reforms that some regard to be small 
would not have managed to get through. As mentioned the MSC not only had the 
problem of dealing with government but also a Parliament that were not so keen 
to change. Despite facing friction from the Government and Parliament, the 
MSC has managed to make considerable changes to the way policy is scrutinised
78 House of Lords Constitution Committee (2004) 'Parliament and the Legislative Process: 14th 
report of session 2003/04' (chaired by Lord Norton) HL 173-1
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which often fails to get recognised perhaps due to a culture of cynicism and 
negative press.
If the procedure committee has become redundant, then maybe it is time for the 
committee to start considering the order of the business and procedures of the 
House toward optimal efficiency and effectiveness of the House (similar to a 
business committee). Such a change could come at the next election with the 
new government poised to making improvements in the way Parliament carries 
out its own business. While one would predict much more positive changes 
towards making the House more efficient in its business in the coming years 
(which is inevitable due to the ratchet-effect of reforms), there shouldn't be too 
high expectations since system change will definitely not be on the agenda of 
either party. Changes will mainly be less radical in content and aimed at 
maintaining the balance among the core functions of Parliament.
A final remark about the impact of the modernisation reforms on Government 
accountability has been the enabling of select committees (as stated in their cores 
tasks) to systematically assess performance metrics in the form of Public Sector 
Agreements (PSA) and provide systematic scrutiny of the public service 
sector79 . Performance information has become crucial in realising the 
transparency and accountability of Governments despite claims that the practical 
applications of the PSA system falls short of the rhetoric (James 2004). In an 
analysis of how select committees have adapted to their core task, Johnson and
79 According to the liaison Committee report (2003) the sixth task of select committees is 'to 
examine the department's Public Service Agreements, the associated targets and the statistical 
measurements employed and report if appropriate'. Liaison committee (2003) 'Annual Report 
2002' HC 558, para 13
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Talbott (2007) have found that there is a difference of view among select 
committees and their members regarding the way information is used as well as 
the practical value of performance management using specific measurement and 
targets as provided in PSAs. The results of their questionnaire to select 
committee members at the time showed relatively strong scepticism in the value 
of performance measurement among MPs and implied that instead of Parliament 
becoming more of a challenge to the Executive, it has been more challenged and 
overwhelmed by amount of performance reporting (ibid). The authors have 
pointed out that since no comparative evidence from other countries using 
similar policies to PSA (e.g. Japan, USA and France) exist it is too early to 
assess the Parliament's success in managing government performance. 
Improvements in the system in time will undoubtedly change how Government 
scrutiny is managed and link its performance to the Performance of Parliament 
(and its scrutiny function). The foundations for the change in the way 
Government accounts to Parliament and the public have been laid and it is 
interesting to see what impact this has on parliamentary performance in future 
studies.
6-6 Case Study III: Performance Measurement of the Majlis Research 
Centre
The case study below provides an example of a legislature in a political system 
below the consolidation threshold. This study provides a summary of findings
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into the use of performance measurement for legislatures below the consolidated 
democratic threshold. Due to the author's background, this study was conducted 
in the Majlis Research Centre (MRC) which is the research arm of the Majlis 
Shoura Islami, or the Islamic Consultative Assembly of Iran80.
Apart from the familiarity of the author with the workings of the Majlis, relative 
access to sources of information and fluency in Persian, the main reason for 
choosing the Iranian Majlis as a case for an unconsolidated legislative system is 
the fact that in terms of structure, procedures, resources and budget, research 
facilities and staff the Majlis is comparable to many of the developed legislatures 
above the consolidation threshold. The Majlis was built in 1906, has 22 
permanent commissions (or select committees) and on paper the legislative 
process is similar to the French legislature81 . However the legislature is volatile 
and small political changes or tensions in the environment can create large 
swings in institutional behaviour that can not be seen in consolidated 
democracies. The Islamic revolution was in itself a case of an extreme 
catastrophic change and since then the political systems has gone through 
smaller scale catastrophes (due to an improvement in the control factors 
mentioned in chapter 4) with each change resulting in the stunting democratic 
development in the movement toward democratisation and consolidation.
80 The choice of the Iranian Legislature is partly due to the author's background and experience 
having previously worked there as a researcher. The choice of MRC also allowed the author a 
fair amount of help and access which could not have so easily given in other developing 
legislatures due to their strong bureaucratic framework and dislike for researchers from outside.
81 The constitution of the Post-Islamic Revolution of 1979 was drafted on the French (fith 
republic) political system with a strong executive and weak parliament. However the drafters 
added a number of articles including the doctrine of Velayat-e-Faquih (supreme Islamic 
jurisprudence) which has thoroughly undermined the logic of the French original and has 
introduced contradictions to the system which is the source of tensions in today's Iran.
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The MRC was set up in 1991 with the aim of providing:
- Research and expert advice on all proposals and bills of the Majlis
Collective decisions and critiques from a broad field of researchers,
academia, executive bodies and institutions, political parties, groups and
organisations, and public opinion
Research into the implementation of laws and the oversight power of the
Majlis, the provision of expert analysis and advice on the alleviation of
certain barriers in implementation
Information and data required by commissions and individual legislators
- Topical projects and case studies as required by the management board of 
the Majlis and individual legislators
Running of a library and data base, in conjunction with the Main library 
of the Majlis
- Publishing the results of research in the form of books, journals and 
papers 82
82 ' Rules and Regulations of the Research Centres of the Majles: the role of the Majles 
Research Centre', Majes Shoura Eslami, 3 rd revision, 1380 [2000], p.2
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Figure 6-3: Organisational chart of the Majlis Research Centre84
The organisational structure of the MRC is illustrated in figure 6-2. As the chart 
shows the organisation is quite significant in size and has the potential to cover 
for all the research requirements of the Majlis and their members85 . The 
management structure of the MRC consists of an executive board which is 
chaired by the speaker or leader of the Assembly who is the leader of the 
majority party in the Majlis. Other board members include the director of the 
MRC, managers of the two main subdivisions and heads from certain research
84 This chart is taken with permission from the MRC website at: http://www.majlis.ir/chart/EN- 
chart-2.htm
85 The research wing of the MRC consists of nine research departments: Legal Affairs, 
Infrastructure, Energy, Mines and Industry, Economics, Budget, Politics, Culture and Social 
affairs, and Technology. The MRC library and publications department are also covered by the 
research directorate. The Majlis has a separate library on site.
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departments86 . The administrative wing of the MRC includes offices for finance, 
administration and information technology (IT). There is an inevitable overlap of 
tasks with some departments in the Majlis itself, However the MRC being a 
public body (receives public funding) acts independent of the Executive and its 
departments.
The exercise of building the BSC framework for the MRC and applying 
measurement to the framework took up an intensive four-week period of lunch- 
time meetings or workshops with up to four meetings a week87 . These meetings, 
which lasted twenty-nine hours in total, covered a period from the initial 
introduction of the framework to deciding on the measures and later agreeing on 
a plan for performance measurement88 . Over this time the team managed to get 
to consensus on the main mission, values, strategy and targets for their 
performance framework. The final draft of the framework was approved by the 
executive board and the MRC research council, before measures were discussed
86 The executive board members are reinstated every four years which coincides with the 
elections of the Majlis. As the board is in charge of indicating the centre's policy, budget and the 
direction of parliamentary research and oversight into the executive branch, it is obviously 
lacking the fundamental requirement of a legislative research centre which is to be politically 
neutral.
87 The BSC framework was initially proposed by myself as a continuation of an earlier joint 
project between the MRC and UNDP entitled 'Strengthening the Iranian Parliament'. This 
project was carried out between 2002-2005 and I was involved in its implementation up to 
September 2003. During this time comparative legislative techniques were carried out to 
strengthen the procedures of legislation and committee powers. I had first handed in a proposal 
to improve the organisational performance of the MRC in October 2005 which was subsequently 
accepted by the executive board in December 2006.1 started work in April 2007 and got my first 
assessment results in March 2008.
The project was carried out with a team from seven MRC departmental heads (which included 
legal, political affairs, cultural and social issues, economics, infrastructure, and budget ) and the 
collaboration of the top management of the Centre (including the active involvement of the heads 
of research and administrative departments during most of the meetings and all decisions). All 
decisions were taken with the consensus of all members and updates were published in the 
weekly MRC newsletter in order to inform legislators and research staff and receive feedback 
from them.
88 Since the people working in the group had more experience as independent researchers and in 
addition to cultural reasons were not really accustomed to team work and brainstorming sessions, 
it was very hard to get at decisions by consensus and for this reason, twenty-nine hours of 
meetings (April-May 2007), may have probably not been enough to initiate such an exercise.
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and applied by consensus. Some of the points raised in the mission statement of 
the MRC was already stated in the codebook for 'regulations and conduct' of the 
MRC. The final version of the mission statement which was approved by 
consensus is as follows:
Our mission is to provide expert advice and opinion on all proposals and 
bills in the Majlis and to respond to the various needs and requests of 
Commissions and individual legislators in addition to providing information on 
the results of all our research. We are always looking for new and innovative 
methods of effective and efficient use of our human, financial and technological 
resources to improve the quality of our consultations with the Majlis.
Increasing the value of our services to our customers and stakeholders is among 
our greatest goals. This can only be achieved through proper and effective 
information collection, documentation processes and maintaining the 
satisfaction and trust of the Majlis and the wider society. The product of our 
services must satisfy legislators to the extent that they do not want to use any 
other service. Finally we see ourselves responsible for the achievement of the 
higher goal of strengthening the rule of the people by keeping people informed of 
all decisions and activities of the Majlis and to making the institution more 
accessible to the public'.
As these two paragraphs show, the true mission of the MRC is rather difficult to 
state. The management team felt under pressure to include all the dimensions 
above, thus rendering a clear and concise balance scoreboard extremely difficult
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if not impossible. The lacking of a clear single performance goal would further 
complicate the development of a clear cut strategy and performance measures. 
However this was the only way to get consensus on the scoreboard.
Following the mission statement, the group went on to list a number of values 
which it considered as essential to the achievement of the mission. The most 
important values that the group decided by consensus is:
- Political neutrality
- Credibility and trustworthiness
- High work ethics
- Defend the rights of the nation
- Maintain religious values and virtues
- Fight against corruption
It is important to note here that although the management of the MRC all agreed 
that the most important value is political neutrality, the MRC is not politically 
neutral since the leader of the majority in the Majlis (whether the leader of the 
biggest political party or coalition) is the MRC chairman and makes key 
decisions and appointments (as a result all managers in the MRC are either 
appointed by the majority party or somehow related to them). Therefore it is 
extremely difficult, if not impossible, to develop a clear balanced scorecard for 
the MRC. Incidentally one of the managers taking part in the exercise did raise 
the issue by asking about the point of devising a framework that will only last the 
current administration as under the circumstances there was no guarantee that the
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following management board of the MRC would agree on the BSC approach to 
improving performance and approve of resources allocated to its continuous 
usage.
By general agreement, the strategy of the MRC was the specific actions that will 
be decided by consensus to reach the desired goal of strengthening a knowledge- 
based Majlis and providing the research requirements of the legislature. The 
common strategy of the MRC as chosen by the group can be summarised as 
follows:
Increasing the active presence and continuous involvement of the MRC
in the Majlis
Becoming more attractive, reputable and providing advantageous
employment opportunity in order to inspire resourceful staff and lower
turnover
Developing IT systems and effective data collection, processing and
dissemination
Developing the knowledge and skills necessary for providing efficient
service to legislators
Maximising the productivity of MRC research activities in the decision
making processes of Majlis
Making sure that all expert advice from different stakeholders are used
in policy making and legislation
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Are we maximising 
our resource potential 7
Are our customers nappy with our services 7
Purpose Improving performance of the Legislature
(Howdo the Legislators see us?) 
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B: High Quality: Provide high quality services to
legislators
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to fulfil our purposes and
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facilities 
E Reputation: Building satisfaction
among public and external 
Researchers using our service
Vision: Support the Majlis
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quality of our research.
providing tmely advice,
helping the legislature to hold
government accountable, and
realise more fully the needs
of the society
How are we to attan future growtn 7
Are we a rtgn performing Organisation~>
Development and Growth: (Are we investing in learning?) 
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expertise for future grovXh and reducing turnover
G Information: Manage information and technology effectively
And make sure personnel and legislators have good degree of
knov/edge of relevant techniques
Internal Processes. (Are we increasing
the productivity of our research
activities and enhancing our
decision making strength?)
H Increased interaction; Develop 
Stronger interactive ties betv<een l.t RC
and academia and research bodies 
J support services: Making sure the 
vievfi and opinions of a vast spectrum of 
Knowledge from society is incorporated
The results of our papers 
L Partnerships: M amtain a good
vcnVing relationship v/th 
Majles regardless of political inclinations
Figure 6-4: Balanced Scorecardfor the management of performance in the
Majlis Research Centre
Each of the four perspectives here serves one objective (the question written on 
top of each quadrant). In order to achieve each perspective, a number of strategic 
goals were devised which had to be assessed using certain measures. The 
strategy map of the MRC gave a picture of the organisation's performance 
through a small number of inter-connected measures (indicating a cause and 
effect linkage between measures).
The group of participants in this workshop decided that unlike most BSC 
frameworks, the allocation of resources is the most important factor for 
performance and have placed it below growth and learning in their strategy map 
(figure below). The group firmly believed that no performance can improve
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without first ensuring the right resources are in place and disagreed that learning 
will take precedence over resources. They argued that perhaps this is one feature 
that needs to be addressed in designing performance models for developing 
countries.
Customers (legislators)
V
Gathering correct 
and timely Needs assessmentIdentifying needs of legislators
for researdh purpose
evetopng 
and interactive 
System
acfltatmg m 
Between MRC and 
Academia and other 
sarch insttution
Internal Processes
internal trailing:
making sure 
everybody has right 
ski la/ knowledge
evebp strategic mm King 
in the organisationsLearning and Growth (Knowledge Management)
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Figure6-5: MRC Strategy Map
Performance measures are not only used to quantify performance indicators, but 
also to help gather information on the indicators which aid decision makers 
analyse and implement the performance strategy. The list of performance 
measures that the management group at the MRC decided upon, following 
agreement on the strategic objectives of MRC, are brought together below and
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have been grouped according to the four perspectives of the balanced scorecard 
model.
1- Customers (legislators)
Improving the performance of the Majlis
- How much trust do legislators have in MRC reports? (What 
percentage of bills and proposals passed through the Majlis has used 
MRC reports) 
Timely response to requests from legislators
- What percentage of legislator's responses was made in time? 
High quality of reports and responses
- How well do legislators regard MRC reports ?(How well does 
the research committee of the MRC regard the reports from the 
MRC?)
2- Internal processes
Timely and correct information collection and analysis
- What is the ratio (percent) of total responses to the total requests 
for information?
- What is the ratio (percent) of the quality of responses to the 
legislators' expectations of good quality? 
Knowledge management
- What percentage of expert meetings is actually held compared to 
the number of meetings anticipated?
- What is the ratio (percent) of experts attending the meetings to 
the number of invitations sent out?
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Identifying research needs
- What is the number of research titles identified in the initial 
evaluation phase?
- What is the ratio (percent) of actual written reports to the 
number of titles identified in the initial evaluation phase? 
Continuous control of the research processes
- What is the ratio (percent) of actual documented research 
undertaken in MRC to the total number of research proposed?
- What percentage of reports is prepared in accordance to 
guidance sent forth by the committee for improvement?
Enhancing collaboration and interaction among MRC staff, academia
and other research institutes
- What is the total number of joint projects undertaken during the 
evaluation period? 
Development of IT and communication systems
- What is the increase in the number of MRC website users during 
evaluation period (measured by number of hits on the MRC 
website)
- How much rise is there in usage of MRC links during this 
period?
- What is the satisfaction rate with users of MRC website and 
services? 
Productivity
- What is the ratio (percent) of finalised reports to the total 
number of research undertakings?
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- What percentage of reports is prepared on time?
- What is the ratio (percent) of actual costs for each project to the 
initial prediction of costs?
3- Learning and Growth
Teach and train legislative knowledge and skills
- What percentage of training courses initially proposed is 
actually held? 
Attract and recruit the right people
- What parity (percent) is there between the job description and 
the knowledge and work experience of staff? 
Motivate and retain staff
- Percentage of resignations due to unsatisfactory conditions?
- What is the level of job satisfaction (percent)?
- What percentage of researchers from outside are not interested 
to collaborate with the MRC? 
Institutionalise strategic thinking in the organisation
- What percentage of the workforce is aware of MRC's 
organisational performance programme and their role within it?
4- Resources
Increase financial capacity of the MRC
- How much increase (percent) of stakeholder credit share is there 
in joint projects? 
Allocate more spending on infrastructure, improvement
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- Is the MRC improving on its infrastructural and technological 
facilities (percent)? 
Increase in human resources of the MRC
- What percentage of new recruits at the MRC fit their job 
description?
- How much has the MRC improved its reputation as a providing 
free and fair research analysis (percent)?
6-6.1 Statistical Analysis of BSC Measures for Implementation in the MRC:
Following internal consensus of the Balanced Scorecard framework and 
measures, statistical tests were carried out to show the validity and reliability of 
the model in its application to the Majlis Research Centre. For this purpose a 
questionnaire was distributed among a random sample of thirty MRC managers 
and legislators. The questionnaire consisted of twenty six questions about the 
cause and affect relationships among the four chosen perspectives in respect to 
the main purpose of the model which is aiding the improvement of legislative 
performance. For the sake of homogeneity, all questions were multiple choice 
and respondents had to answer among five responses (very strong, strong, 
medium, weak, and very weak). The twenty six questions in this questionnaire 
are stated in appendix 6. The Cronbach's Alpha test was used to show the 
internal consistency of the questionnaire. The correlation, among the questions 
(using SPSS) is 0.86 which shows that the questionnaire is reliable and the 
questions are consistent.
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The questionnaire needs to establish that the measures are consistent to an 
external standard in order to be valid. This cannot be done as easily as to date 
there have not been external standards for measures of the balanced scorecard. 
One way of testing the validity of the questionnaire is to compare it with similar 
questionnaires in existing literature on BSC or to consult experts in the balanced 
scorecard approach which this study has done.
Another way of testing the questionnaire's validity is using the Chi-Square 
goodness of fit test to see whether the responses to the questions (distribution of 
frequencies) are careless and biased or whether the questions are answered 
thoughtfully89 . The first chi Square test looked at the relationship between 
resources and learning and growth. The first six questions in the questionnaire. 
The null hypothesis or HO states that all five answers are of equal frequency, 
indicating no relationship between learning and growth and resources. Naturally 
HI states that there is a strong relationship between the two perspectives. The test 
shows F'-Value = 0.000, therefore there is definitely a strong relationship 
between the two as was recognised in the answers9 .
If it can be shown that the frequency of distributions are not very unequal (the smaller the p-value of the 
test, the better the fit), we may conclude that the questionnaire is valid as to there being a large degree of 
homogeneity among respondents. This would further indicate that the respondents accept the cause and 
affect linkages between the four perspectives of the BSC making the case for BSC in legislative 
performance measurement valid.
The same sample size of 30 people has been used for these tests which is statistically considered as large. 
Each test allows for four degrees of freedom (df= 4), with the critical range a = 0.05 and square value r = 
9.488. Each possible answer, out of the five multiple choice answers, has been given a number in the 
following order: l=very weak, 2=weak, 3=medium, 4=strong, 5=very strong.
90 Chi-Square goodness of fit test for cause and effect relationship between purposes (customer focus) and 
internal processes of MRC (minitab):
Replies
1
2 
3 
4 
5
Observed (O)
2 
5 
18 
61 
94
Proportion
0.2 
0.2 
0.2 
0.2 
0.2
Expected (E)
36 
36 
36 
36 
36
Sum
X2=£(£-0)VE
32.111 
26.694 
9.000 
17.361 
93.444
178.611
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The second test determined the relationship between the stakeholders (as MRC 
staff, researchers and experts collaborating with MRC). Using responses to the 
following seven questions, the test shows that there is a very strong cause and 
effect relationship between stakeholders and internal processes as the P- 
Value=0.000 indicating a perfect goodness of fit 106 .
The third test was carried out to estimate the relationship between internal 
processes and learning and growth, using fourteen questions (9-22) in the 
questionnaire. Once again the P-Value=0.000 indicating a definite strong link 
between the two perspectives 107 . Finally the last four questions in the 
questionnaire were tested to show the relationship between resources and 
learning and growth in the MRC. Here again the P-Value= 0.000 which again 
confirms a very strong link in the minds of those questioned leaving out the
P-Value = 0.000
106 Chi-Square goodness of fit test for cause and effect relationship between stakeholders and internal
processes (minitab):
Replies
1 
2 
3 
4 
5
Observed (O)
3 
2 
13 
17 
25
Proportion
0.2 
0.2 
0.2 
0.2 
0.2
Expected (E)
12 
12 
12 
12 
12
Sum
X2=£(E-0)VE
6.750 
8.333 
0.083 
2.083 
14.083
31.333
P-Value = 0.000
Chi-Square for cause and effect relationship between internal processes and learning and growth
Replies
1
2 
3 
4 
5
Observed (O)
11 
17 
131 
158 
103
Proportion
0.2 
0.2 
0.2 
0.2 
0.2
Expected (E)
84 
84 
84 
84 
84
Sum
x*=£(E-0)'/E
63.440 
53.440 
26.297 
65.190 
4.297
212.667
P-Value = 0.000
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possibility that the answers were given randomly and strengthening the validity
91
of the responses .
6-6.2 Implementing the Balanced Scorecard in the Majlis Research Centre:
Upon approval and validation of the cause and effect linkages, the BSC model 
enters its implementation stage92 . After agreeing on the set of measures by 
consensus, the group had to decide on the length of time for the evaluation of the 
BSC framework. The group agreed that the evaluation period would be 10 
months (from 10 May, 2007 to 10 March, 2008 to include one whole Iranian 
fiscal year) and to publish the results and analysis in the summer edition of 
Majlis va Pajuhesh, (MRC's journal of parliamentary affairs). This final decision 
by the executive board meant that the subject would not be treated lightly and the 
heads of the departments were responsible to sit with their staff and work 
towards the targets that were set by them.
In order to set targets, the managers were asked to set doable targets towards the 
decided strategy and the measures. These targets (target column on right of table
Chi-Square goodness of fit test for cause and effect relationship between resources and learning and 
growth
Replies
1
2 
3 
4 
5
Observed (O)
6
4 
14 
45 
51
Proportion
0.2 
0.2 
0.2 
0.2 
0.2
Expected (E)
24 
24 
24 
24 
24
Sum
x==£(£-o) 2/E
13.500 
16.667 
4.166 
18.375 
30.375
83.083
P-Value = 0.000
92 It should be emphasised here again that all the measures, values and strategy were decided 
upon by consensus of the managers and senior researchers in the centre. My role as a facilitator 
was merely to organise the points mentioned by the group in the frameworks above and the table 
below had no effect on the decisions taken or the targets reached.
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6-1) mostly in percentage indicate the desirable performance goal for each of the 
perspectives decided by consensus. The group were also asked at the time they 
set targets to indicate their proposed plans for reaching such a goal. The plans 
and targets are shown in the table below, along with the real measurements 
assessed by the group at the end of the trail period.
Table 6-1: MRC Balanced scorecard and Performance Measurement
Perspective
Customers (legislators)
Internal Processes
Strategic Goals
High quality
Producing timely 
responses
Improving 
performance of the 
legislature
Developing IT 
systems and 
improving 
interaction
Facilitate 
collaborations 
between MRC and 
academia/ research 
institutes
Continuous control 
of research process
Performance 
Measures
How well does 
research committee 
regard MRC reports?
How well do 
legislators regard 
MRC reports?
Percentage of timely 
responses to all 
applications to MRC
Percentage of bills 
and proposals passed 
through the Majlis 
using MRC reports
Percentage of bills 
that do not pass as a 
result of MRC 
research
How much trust do 
legislators have in 
MRC reports?
Satisfaction rate with 
use of MRC services
Rise in number hits 
on MRC web pages
Increase number of 
users of MRC web 
services
Number of joint 
projects carried out 
in the trail period
Reports meeting the 
guidelines set by the 
research 
improvement 
committee
Ratio of reports 
documented by 
control system to all
Assessed
70%
55%
70%
43%
62%
61%
60%
25%
10%
30
70%
60%
Target
85%
70%
80%
60%
70%
70%
75%
40
30%
60
100%
90%
Proposed Plans
Evaluation of the MRC's 
performance throughout 
the process of 
legislation
Enforcing a legislative 
time frame for the 
analysis of all bills and 
proposals and reports 
prepared for official use
Attaching satisfaction 
slips to all reports
Installing an evaluation 
system on MRC website 
for all users to rate our 
reports and services
Develop and improve 
MRC website making it 
more user-friendly and 
improving the languages 
options for visitors
- Finding MRC's 
strengths in legislative 
and policy research 
- Supporting all 
academic research 
dissertations
- All offices must 
regulate their finances 
under the control system 
- No report will be 
finalised unless it has 
been documented in the 
control system and 
approved by the
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Learning and Growth
Resources
Assessing 
legislators' research 
needs
Knowledge 
Management
Gathering timely 
and correct 
information
Higher Productivity
Attract right people 
for job
Teach/train 
legislative 
knowledge/skills
Motivate and retain 
staff
Institutionalise 
strategic thinking in 
organisation
Increase financial 
capacity of MRC
Allocate more 
spending on 
infrastructure and 
improving service
research carried out
Research titles 
proposed during trail
Ratio of written 
reports to all titles 
proposed
What percent of 
meetings anticipated 
were actually held?
What Percentage of 
participants attended 
meetings
What percent of 
request for 
information are 
responded to 
satisfactorily?
What is the actual 
costs per project 
compared to initial 
estimate (percent)?
What percent of 
reports are prepared 
on time?
What percent of 
research projects are 
finalised?
What is the parity 
between job title, 
knowledge and 
experience?
What percent of 
training courses 
initially proposed 
were actually held 
during trail period
Researchers not 
willing of continue 
their collaboration 
with MRC?
What is the level of 
job satisfaction 
among staff?
What percent of staff 
are aware of the 
organisation's 
performance . 
programme and their 
roles in it?
How much increase 
have stakeholders 
had in credit share of 
joint projects?
What recent 
improvements have 
there been in 
infrastructure and 
services (percent)?
What percent of new 
recruits match their 
job description
Has MRC's
200
30%
30%
58%
70%
120%
70%
75%
50%
30%
10%
47%
40%
11%
20%
65%
70%
250
50%
60%
70%
85%
100%
80%
85%
75%
50%
5%
70%
60%
25%
60%
100%
85%
improvement committee
- MRC office in Majlis 
to become more active 
- Requiring researcher to 
be present at 
commission meetings 
and prepare minutes
Documentation of all 
meetings held inside and 
outside MRC
Providing a 
documentation 
subsystem within the 
process control system
- Aim to finalise all 
reports
- All activities in MRC 
to be treated as potential 
projects
Transferring staff to 
offices that match their 
expertise and skills
Providing on the job 
training sessions that are 
required to upgrade 
MRC's capability
-Letting staff participate 
freely in any MRC 
project 
- distribute 
questionnaires to all 
involved to evaluate 
satisfaction with MRC
- Preparing staff 
evaluation forms based 
on strategy 
- Encouraging strategic 
thinking in staff 
meetings... etc
Improving lighting 
inside building and 
ventilation system. 
Providing a PC per 
research staff
Give research managers 
more power in recruiting 
personnel
Questionnaires to
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Increasing human 
resources of MRC
reputation for free 
and fair research and 
analysis been 
improved?
members of Majlis, and 
organisations regularly 
dealing with our reports
To have a successful balanced scorecard approach to measuring performance in 
an organisation, it is necessary that all those involved in the process have the 
skills to analyse and learn from the results generated by the performance 
measures. It is no good that only the management has the knowledge and they do 
not cascade it down to all those who affect the way the organisation performs. 
Thus in order for this exercise to succeed, the staff must receive relevant 
training94 and time and energy must be invested from the top. As a result, unless 
there is a political will to improve, and the means (technical support and 
training) to do so, the BSC approach cannot improve performance, but instead 
become a hindrance to development in the organisation. Once the BSC 
framework has been approved by the group and they have reached consensus on 
the strategy involved for performance measurement and the measures required to 
reach their targets, the matter is put into the hands of those working within the 
organisation that are willing to improve and see change. The framework and the 
measures do not mean much outside the context that they have been referred to.
Equally, the assessment carried out by internal consensus, will only be correctly 
interpreted and used if all those who chose the measures stay committed to their 
implementation. The MRC group met again in March 2008 to compare results 
and discuss performance. The overall assessment of the performance of MRC
94 I prefer to use the term 'training' rather than education (sometimes used in BSC related texts) 
since the method is not difficult to pick up and only requires a change in attitude and a dedication 
to learn.
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was reckoned as satisfactorily as there was a modest improvement in all 
measurements collected by the group during the trial period. The figures had 
been provided by the group who had seemed happy with the results although 
none of the results actually reached the proposed target.
However, the group were not prepared to go into all the details about the 
assessed measures and methods of data collection (it could not be done in the 
limited duration of the meeting and no more time was given for that purpose). 
There was also a sense that not everybody had been committed to the method 
from the start and had been dragging their feet to prepare reports of progress. 
The MRC executive board were only half-heartedly supportive of the idea of 
performance measurement throughout the implementation of the BSC and this 
was echoed at all structural levels of the organisation. Despite a strong 
appreciation of, and understanding of the cause and effect linkages of the BSC 
model, commitment waned in stages of implementation. It seems the MRC was 
not prepared to realise the benefits of the BSC as a performance measurement 
tool and with the change of administration and a turnover of new management, 
the study seemed to fall out of favour with the executive board and was 
discontinued.
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6-7 Conclusion
The case studies in this chapter fits in with the rest of this work which suggests 
that legislatures in countries below the threshold of democratic consolidation 
have not yet built the democratic foundations to systematically benefit from 
performance measurement frameworks to improve performance. Although none 
of these case studies have actually reached a stage were conclusive assessments 
may be made about their actual performance, the first two studies provide much 
evidence of a systematic approach to the whole idea performance management 
and a profound sense of commitment from those involved to improving 
performance (despite the lack of consensus on some issues). By contrast the third 
study has only strengthened the idea mentioned earlier in this study that, 
Developed legislatures with more management capacities have the ability to 
perform better than legislatures with less developed management capacity and 
thus their assessment using performance measurement techniques further 
enhances the quality of democracy rather than reduces it.
However as Day and Klein have argued (1987: 29) democracy itself does not 
ensure effective performance and control of the services concerned which is the 
necessary condition for completing the circle of accountability. It is essential that 
Parliament develops and improves the tools that enhance the effectiveness and 
efficiency of its functions before performance measurement bears fruit. The two 
case studies provide evidence and shows that the House of Commons has 
managed to evolve its services and functions towards this goal even though the
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process are slower than some would like, due to formal and informal restrictions. 
The House of Commons has steadily adopted a more business-like approach 
motivated to providing excellence in its core tasks and is acquiring effective 
tools towards this end. Although the influence of party control remains strong 
and would never break down, Parliament has the flexibility to maintain balance 
and achieve reform. The non-written nature of the British Constitution gives 
Parliament its flexibility and should be regarded as an advantage to making 
changes and yet maintaining balance which performance systems are all about.
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Chapter Seven: Conclusion
7-1 Introduction: Summing up the research
This research highlights the importance of performance measurement systems in 
legislative institutions, not only as tools for legislators to assess performance in 
other bodies, but also to improve on their own performance and enhance the 
legitimacy of the political system as a whole. The first half of this research 
investigated the hypothesis that developed democracies culturally characterised 
through efficacy, meaningful and engaging work are associated with higher 
performance and that strong mission-based cultures perform better than those 
without or with a weak sense of mission (Putnam 1993, 2000; Brewer 2005). 
This research extends on the proposition of sociocultural changes linking general 
public satisfaction with the performance of organisations and argues that active 
democratic societies with strong mission-based cultures are more articulate in 
their evaluations of legislative performance. The challenge for developed 
democracies to enhance legislative performance becomes more prevalent with 
rises in human development and public expectations that demand political 
institutions to perform better or face the loss of confidence and trust.
Chapters four and five also proposed that developed legislatures in active 
democracies are more inclined to focus on outcomes rather than procedures and 
tend to have more of an external orientation as opposed to the internal orientation 
of such institutions in developing democracies. Since such active democracies
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are also participative and deliberative in nature 1 , their legislatures tend to 
perform better and increase the quality of democracy compared to passive 
legislatures in non-consolidated democracies. However as Inglehart (1990, 1999) 
has argued, further advancement in human development in developed 
democracies has led to the weakening of elite-directed participation such as 
voting in elections and party loyalty but has not weakened active citizen 
involvement in politics. The rising of demands from the postmaterialist public on 
governments could led to growing dissatisfaction with the performance of 
political institutions as they lose their ability to keep up with public demands.
Since performance in all institutions is related to their institutional capacity (the 
analysis of capacity sets the stage for understanding performance) it is essential 
to first distinguish between developed legislatures, with higher democratic 
capacity and a decentralisation of political control, from the less developed 
ones. Because capacity is both a qualitative and quantitative notion, chapter four 
first embarks on a qualitative model to demonstrate how political systems with 
different capacities may behave with changes to a political system's capacity of 
democratic growth and the balance between political decentralisation. This 
model is followed by a statistical analysis to categorise political systems (for 
comparative purposes) and illustrate the incompatibility of legislative 
performance measurement tools for political systems on either side of the 
proposed threshold for consolidated democracy. The nature of democratic
1 Though it must be emphasised that a representative democracy need not be excluded in this 
regard as in modern democracies, both elements of participation and representation exists. What 
should be emphasised is the balance between the two. If the balance is not right, there may be 
consequences on the quality of democracy, which as Judge argues would result in the 
delegitimation of the system. See Judge, David (1999).
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capacity in political systems situated above this threshold varies significantly 
from those systems below it. While legislatures below the threshold can benefit 
more greatly from legislative capacity building methods, legislatures in 
consolidated democracies would benefit more from using performance 
measurement and evaluation tools. 2
Since the nature of performance is both absolute and relative, it has to be 
assessed qualitatively in relation to the organisation's capacity as well as 
quantitatively, thus saving the performance framework from criticisms of non- 
generalisability and subjectivity (although these criticisms cannot be excluded 
entirely). In chapter five the causal relationship linking active citizen 
performance and legislative performance is shown using a framework focusing 
on the maintenance and improvement of responsiveness which leads to the rise 
in democratic quality and the legitimacy of the system. The framework suggests 
that any legislative performance model for developed legislatures must focus on 
achieving responsive outcomes while at the same time maintain democratic 
quality with regards to its democratic mission.
This framework also suggests that any absence or lack of responsiveness from 
legislatures could lead to a downward trend in their performance and may result 
in active citizens withdrawing their voluntary compliance with the system which 
would signal the loss of legitimacy for the political system as a whole. Though as
2 The definition used for democracy in this work has been given by Jon Elster (1993: 98) as 'Any 
kind of effective and formalised control by citizens over leadership or policies'. The existence of 
democracy does not depend on whether it is deliberative or representative, or based on a broad or 
narrow electorate. Democracy requires an active society (i.e active citizens, civil society and a 
responsive state).
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Klingmann and Fuchs (1995: 7) have argued, a crisis in legitimacy in developed 
democracies is not eminent due to there not being a credible alternative to 
democracy and legitimation at the structural level which provides a significant 
buffer making political systems (in western democracies) less likely to suffer 
severely from a shortfall of performance at the process level. This argument 
however, cannot be taken for granted since legitimacy is dependent on variables, 
not all of which may be controlled.
The emphasis on democracy and responsiveness is not a new subject3 and this 
study has used the responsive rule only to propose that the most vital 
characteristic of democratic systems above the consolidation threshold is to 
achieve responsive outcomes in relation to their evolving environments. Put in 
another way, all procedures employed by democratic systems should be geared 
towards the continual maintenance and growth of their responsive outcomes. 
Hence, if democratic responsiveness could be measured, it would imply that the 
quality of democracy can be improved and performance can be measured in 
terms democratic output (institutional outcome).
Legislatures, in addition to being the first in line to legitimising other political 
institutions, are regarded as the liaison or link between citizens and executive 
institutions, as well as becoming the place to address citizen grievances and 
demands. So it is not only crucial for parliaments to maintain and improve on 
their own legitimacy by constantly remaining responsive and improving on the
3 Some of the scholars who have written on the relationship between responsiveness and 
democracy include Etzioni (1968) Upset (1969), May, (1978), and Saward (1998)
361
legitimacy of other institutions, but also to maintain and increase the legitimacy 
of the political system as a whole. In order to achieve dual legitimacy, 
legislatures must also stay one step ahead of potential challenges and changes in 
the environment (while maintaining their identity) regardless of the growing 
need to focus outward. So instead of looking at legislatures as ordered 
organisations with predictable, stereotypical behaviour that do not adapt to their 
environment and are unresponsive, they should be regarded as complex and 
adaptive systems that are explicitly tuned on to their environment and constantly 
learning from it. Only adaptive organisations have the power to effectively 
change the environment by being responsive, and to be changed by their 
environment while maintaining the state of equilibrium as a result4.
However, recent events show that legislatures are taking the responsive rule for 
granted and instead of maintaining or improving the levels of responsiveness in 
line with the evolving environment, are becoming less responsive, resulting in a 
loss of legitimacy5 . The Voice of the People survey conducted by Gallup 
International in 2006 painted a gloomy picture of democratic citizens' political 
trust and satisfaction in democratic institutions. Only 28 percent of people in 
Italy; 26 percent of people in France; and 18 percent people in Germany thought 
that their countries were governed by the will of the people (Gallup International, 
2006). Moreover, a previous Gallup survey carried out on forty-seven countries 
found that across the world, the principal democratic institution, the legislature,
4 Complex adaptive organisations are able to co-evolve with their environment. This definition is 
taken from Dawkins, R (1989), The Selfish Gene, Chapter 12,
5 One such example is the parliamentary decisions to go to war with Iraq in 2003, coming from 
the two of the most advanced legislatures (the United States Congress and the United Kingdom 
Parliament). In both cases legitimacy and the representative notion of the legislatures have 
suffered.
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is the least trusted out of 17 global institutions tested (including financial 
companies)6 .
The problem for advanced democracies seem to be that increasing distrust in 
political institutions has led to increasing disinterest, mass apathy and 
disengagement among citizens. For instance the Audit of Political Engagement, a 
joint survey conducted annually by the Hansard Society and the Electoral 
Commission throughout the United Kingdom, has found that while political 
knowledge in the United Kingdom is relatively high7 , only a third of the public 
believe that they could change the way the country was governed by getting 
involved in politics and one in four of the population regards activeness as a 
waste of time (Hansard, 2007). The same survey, indicates that only a third of 
the respondents rated the performance of the present system in the United 
Kingdom as 'working well', or 'mainly well' (Hansard 2007: 6). Though this is 
not to say that mass participation levels have fallen, but participation has taken 
more active forms such as discussions and petitions rather than voter turnout. 
These post-material forms of participation if designed at increasing demands on 
government, may also contribute to distrust if political institutions cannot adapt 
their performance (Inglehart 1999).
As mentioned in chapter five, the decline in trust and confidence in public 
institutions along with a parallel decline in civic engagement and democratic
6 This survey was carried out by Gallup International in 2002. The reports were announced in a 
press release at the World Economic Forum in Davos, 2003. Available at: 
http://www.globescan.com/news-archives/Trust_survey.pdf
7 According to the 2007 report, 67% of respondents, chosen from random members of the public, 
passed the survey's 'political knowledge quiz' (Hansard, 2007)
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participation across developed democracies is a common theme among many 
scholars despite no factual accounts of a genuine decline in trust in the political 
system of consolidated democracies. However, this paradoxical rise in human 
development and the fall of elite-led activeness among citizens and trust in 
political institutions, including parliaments, in such systems brings a sense of 
urgency to the issue of legislative performance measurement. Improving 
parliamentary performance becomes a crucial factor if legislatures are to succeed 
in producing the outcomes that lead to the rise in the quality of democracy and 
increase the existing levels of trust between them and the people. Unlike 
developing nations which have not yet built the necessary democratic capacity of 
legislatures above the threshold of consolidated democracies, developed 
legislatures can improve performance by taking advantage of performance 
measurement frameworks, most notably the Balance Scorecard, to improve 
performance, which will lead to an increase (or maintenance) of the quality of 
democracy in the system.
There is empirical evidence in organisational studies suggesting a linkage 
between staff satisfaction and commitment with client satisfaction in political 
institutions which inevitably increases citizen trust and confidence. In 
management literature, this linkage is called the 'satisfaction mirror' (Schneider 
1993). Thus to improve legislative performance, and improve confidence in the 
institution, it would seem natural to start by improving on the satisfaction and 
commitment of members and staff to institutional performance. Moreover, data 
analysis from the American customer satisfaction Index which measured citizen 
satisfaction with the federal government in the United States between 1999 and
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2002, suggests that there is a causal relationship between service and confidence, 
but not vice-versa (Fornell 2002). The above study has concluded that the lack of 
trust in institutions does not lead to dissatisfaction with services, whereas 
satisfaction with government services could lead to higher levels of trust (ibid). 
In other words, overall trust in legislatures, despite being a product of 
satisfaction with the public perception of performance of the political system, is 
more largely effected through its role in service delivery and responsiveness. 
This in turn is largely affected through internal satisfaction and commitment.
The case study into the performance of House Services in the UK illustrates this 
first phase of legislative performance measurement. The provision of services 
provided to MPs, parliamentary staff and the public has raised their satisfaction 
levels as surveys results indicate. Such employee and service satisfaction 
constitutes a 'virtuous circle' where the increase in one element can help 
generate an increase in the other and vice versa. The result is a build-up of trust 
and confidence in the institution which ultimately leads to an increase in the 
quality of democracy and enhances the legitimacy of the political system.
The second case study which looked at the performance of the House of 
Commons in general, and in particular since the instigation of the Modernisation 
Committee and reforms presented since, shows that performance measurement 
cannot be as easily implemented due to the conflicting nature of the two most 
important parameters of legislative performance in advanced democratic 
societies: Accountability and Efficacy. These parameters will be elaborated
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further below to see whether there is a case of performance measurement 
dysfunction or not.
7-2 The Incompatibility of Accountability and Efficacy?
As mentioned in this work, performance measurement and reporting is a 
management concept that has been used by elected officials and managers to 
address the issues of efficacy (productivity) and accountability. Continuing 
pressure for greater accountability, better value for money and improved 
performance have prompted elected officials, especially towards the end of the 
twentieth century, to consider and endorse the use of performance measurement 
with a view to improving institutional legitimacy in all areas of public 
administration and services (Alien 1996, Halachmi 1996, Pollitt 1993, Radin 
2000). As a public management concept, the quest to enhance accountability and 
efficacy in institutions has usually taken the form of data collection and analysis 
of the inputs, outputs and in some cases the measurement of outcomes. 
Performance measurement is not a new concept in management studies, but 
rather the methods used for measuring performance have changed over the 
decade or so which allow measurement in a more balanced and sustainable way.
Why is a balanced approach to performance measurement in legislatures 
necessary? It is very important that legislative performance measurement uses a 
balanced approach since two of the main criteria for advanced legislatures are 
greater accountability and efficacy that are sometimes regarded as contrasting or
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incompatible elements8 . Efficacy is more to do with a continuous and free flow 
of processes based on new insights; whereas accountability is more about 
playing it safely and involves internal scrutiny and a relatively rigid use of 
institutionalised standards and rules. Parliaments, particularly in parliamentary 
systems, are political bodies responsible for both of these inherently 
contradictory roles. First of all they have to support and sustain the 
democratically elected executive to sustain the executive and secondly they must 
hold the executive to account. The managerial reforms in legislatures have 
generally helped them perform the first task rather well, but at a cost of loosing 
touch with the accountability function which has resulted in their vulnerability 
toward critical dissatisfaction.
In other words managerialism in politics, especially over the past two decades, 
has tilted the balance between these two criteria in favour of efficacy which may 
have been partly responsible for the loss of trust in democratic institutions. 
According to Gray (1994: 65) the implications of managerialism in politics and 
on accountability has been 'a shift in emphasis from democratic accountability to 
economic accountability: a concern with the public as economic actors rather 
than citizens'. As a result accountability has in some instances been conflated 
with responsibility and as Giddings (1997: 50) has noted, 'the process of scrutiny
8 Halachmi (2006: 261) has noted the differences between accountability and productivity as:
1- Accountability is living up to performance standards that existed when the use of resources 
and authority was authorised; whereas productivity related to progress, innovation and change.
2- Accountability is primarily about relationships: Who is superior to whom? Who is 
answerable? Who decide? Whereas productivity relates to progress, innovation and change.
3- Accountability is about staying within the four comers of the contract; while productivity is 
about management, adaptation, creativity and breaking away from the past.
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is mixed with that of discrediting government', rather than improving the 
legitimacy of the government.
Putnam, Pharr and Dalton (2000: 22-3) suggest two alternatives for states to deal 
with the parameters of performance or the dilemma for governance facing 
developed democracies today: The first option is to acknowledge that democracy 
is not about making citizens happy but about facilitating good government 
through efficacious policy making whether citizens approve or not. While the 
second option would be to acknowledge that citizens' collective judgements are 
the ultimate criterion for a democracy which has to be respected through 
increased accountability and limiting the power of the executive (and also the 
power of parliament to support the executive). Thus whatever contextual 
priority the legislature takes in advanced democratic societies, it seems that the 
possibility of some tension between the two parameters of legislative 
performance are unavoidable but nevertheless manageable through creating 
tradeoffs and balances between accountability and efficacy or as Flinders (2001: 
346) argues, 'channelling power and making its exercise more effective and 
legitimate'.
7-3 The measurement Dimension of performance in legislatures:
Another difficulty in evaluating legislative performance is determining what to 
measure and how to measure it. For instance as argued in chapter five, improved
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legislative performance leads to improved democratic quality and the quality of 
services provided by the legislature to its members, staff and citizens (as argued 
in chapter six) is of pivotal importance for evaluating its performance. However, 
it is well recognised that measuring quality is extremely difficult and the use of 
indicators such as satisfaction surveys may only provide a broad and subjective 
view of whether quality of a service has changed from the past. Customer 
satisfaction surveys are generally acknowledged to have certain drawbacks and 
limitations due to the limited information of customer service in some cases and 
the customer's impaired judgement. Assessing the quality of non-tangible 
concepts such as democracy would be even harder since democracy cannot be 
summarised to certain tangible goods and services.
As discussed, citizens may lose confidence in political institutions for reasons 
that are unrelated to the quality of policy making or the work of the officials. 
Confidence and trust in political institutions is not usually measured by 
considering institutional performance records but takes into consideration the 
complex relationship between the citizen demands and their expectations from 
institutions. Thus even if performance has not deteriorated, any unbalanced 
increase in expectations could cause a decline in public confidence which is 
sometimes mistaken for weak performance. Furthermore, the loss of confidence 
could be the result of errors of public judgement and information which is why it 
is important for a performance measurement system to communicate and make 
information easily available.
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Despite empirical evidence to suggest that advanced legislatures in developed 
democracies are performing more efficiently and effectively than before, there is 
considerable literature which link the decline of public confidence to poor 
institutional performance, hence a decline of legislatures. In short performance 
measurement of political institutions, such as legislatures, are usually linked to 
the public's perceptions of performance. When the public have high expectations 
of how they think a legislature should perform and they do not perceive that it is 
performing to their expectations (either through misinformation, misjudgement, 
or general cynicism and usually at times or economic and social difficulty) there 
is increasing dissatisfaction about the performance of that institution. In addition 
to this fact, it has also been noted that public trust in political institutions similar 
to all institutions is closely correlated with the public's perception with the ethics 
and morality of those running them (Lipset and Shneider 1987: 74-79). For 
instance in the United states, Black and Black (1994: 107) note that the 
American public rate their representatives and senators near the bottom of 
professions on honesty and ethics, even less than lawyers! A recent instance of 
damaged trust could be the impact of the media publication of MP expense 
claims at Westminster in 2009. It is without doubt that the media handling and 
exposure of MP expense claims (which are minuscule in comparison to other 
legislatures and legislators in the world) has done more to damage the public 
perception of Parliament's performance at a time when evidence shows that the 
House Services is managing performance better than before.
Since rising expectations in post-material society usually grows at a faster rate 
than performance which also requires information and resources to match the
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need for improving accountability and efficacy, it is very likely that performance 
can never catch up with the growing demands and expectations of the complex 
external environment of legislatures. Performance measured through public 
perception and opinion surveys cannot effectively show the reality of 
performance in developed legislatures. Thus what is necessary is to base 
performance measurement on the perceptions of the representatives of the public 
from within the institution who are oriented to the views of the public but also 
have an understanding of the processes and indicators of performance that are 
required for its continuous responsiveness and growth.
7-4 The Relativity of Measuring Outcomes:
Any evaluation that links outputs to outcomes would no doubt come under 
questions about the reliability of its measures. The use of quantitative targets 
alone cannot be used to indicate the success of a legislature to implement its 
desired goals. As mentioned in chapter two, outputs alone cannot be indicative of 
how good or badly the legislature has performed unless there is a frame of 
reference with which to estimate the performance of a certain function.
The most common way of assessing performance of a particular decision, policy 
or function of institutions, is to compare the results achieved after a certain 
change with those before it by comparing them to standards, benchmarks or 
yardsticks. But as mentioned performance measures or indicators measured 
before and after the change may not be referring to the same thing, thus
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comparisons of this kind should not be considered as flawless. One way to deal 
with this problem is, as Pollitt suggests, using appropriate measures of the 
impact of new policy programmes by assessing where the organisation is at 
present compared to where it would have been if it had continued developing as 
it had prior to reform (Pollitt 1993: 144). However, this method requires a great 
deal of speculation since when measuring results of outputs it is very difficult (or 
even impossible) to know how much would have been achieved if the 
programme had not existed.
Furthermore, judging the success of any system cannot be done by simply 
assessing the success of each of the component parts and then aggregating the 
results. The merits of the system as a whole should be considered by assessing 
how responsive the system is despite changing societal preferences and political 
tides as discussed in chapter five. However measuring tasks such as legislative 
adaptiveness and political responsiveness will no doubt be a big challenge. This 
brings a second question into light: Can accountability and efficacy be made 
more compatible?
In addition to looking at the relationships between democratic performance and 
responsiveness, this study has looked thoroughly at performance measurement 
and the methods used in measuring organisational performance. At a conceptual 
level, the benefits of performance measurement in legislatures are obvious. By 
holding members accountable for their performance, accountability is raised, 
individual performance may be recognised and processes are improved leading 
to better decision making. However, in addition to the problems already
372
mentioned here, there is the additional downside to performance measurement 
which includes high costs in some cases and an increase in potential dysfunction 
(and exploitation) of the system. Thus it is important that a balanced approach to 
performance is used before measurement is applied and everybody believes in 
the system in addition to understanding that the measurement criteria used is an 
incentive to growth (not an impediment).
Because dysfunction is defined with respect to the organisation's intensions, it is 
important that the performance measurement system indicates what is intended 
from the measurement system in the first place. The system needs to establish 
whether the goal of measurement is to motivate members or to provide 
information about (long-term) improvements in organisational processes. 
Motivational measures, by definition, are intended to cause behavioural reactions 
in the people affected, whereas informational measures are less likely to change 
behaviour and more likely to be representative of the actual events. As these two 
measures may be incompatible to the final outcomes, it is necessary to make 
clear the purpose of the measurement system before performance measurement 
is used. The next section offers a suggested framework for performance 
measurement in advanced legislatures based on improved responsiveness and 
leading to the maintenance and improvement of legitimacy of the political 
system in general.
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7-5 A Suggested Balanced Scorecard of legislative performance
Since the purpose of legislative performance is not to encourage compliance with 
a prescribed plan of action but to improve performance in a legislature by 
functioning more efficiently in terms of its stated goal (or goals as complex 
adaptive systems cannot have a single goal, but are regarded as having multiple 
goals) then it must be realised from the beginning that legislative performance 
measurement must be informational and not prescriptive. An informational 
performance measurement would imply that 'numbers could be assigned to 
represent qualities' (Campbell, 1957: 267). Norton and Kaplan (1992: 72) use 
the analogy of an airplane cockpit to explain informational performance 
measurement systems and compare the dials (indicators) that help the pilot 
navigate as measurements that provide him with information summarising the 
current and predicted environment. With this in mind, a performance 
measurement framework could be designed using the Balanced Scorecard 
approach to enhance responsiveness in advanced legislative systems leading to 
the maintenance and improvement of democratic quality and legitimacy of the 
political system. Because the balanced scorecard is able to give a balanced and 
flexible approach to the improvement of all elements involved in the 
performance of the legislature, it avoids the risk of losing accountability at the 
price of raising efficacy. A further advantage of using this type of framework is 
that it requires less financial and time resources than most performance 
measurement systems (chapter two) despite its theme of continuous
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improvement.
Customers and
Stakeholders
(i.e. constituents,
party, media,
groups...): How can
the legislature become
more representative
and fairer in its 
responsibilities and 
obligations (internal 
and international)?
Relationship Focus
Mission: How can the
legislature increase
the quality of democracy
through the maintenance
and continuous improvement
In its legitimacy?
Performance Focus
Vision: 
esponsivenes
Processes: What
processes must the
legislature excel in
to become more
accountable and
transparent?
Activity Focus
Learning and Growth: How can the
Legislature improve its efficiency and 
effectively prepare its legislators and 
Staff for future challenges facing the
vision? 
Future Focus
Source: Norton and Ka, 
2001 BSC model
Figure7-l: Suggested Balanced Scorecard of Legislative Performance
With these issues in mind, it probably is easier to see why the Balanced 
Scorecard suggested in this chapter is focused on how the legislature may 
increase the quality of democracy through the continuous improvement of trust 
and legitimacy as the long term goal for legislative performance in countries
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above the consolidation threshold in chapter four9 . Figure 7-1 is an illustration of 
this suggested framework. It is appropriate to use the term 'suggested' here as it 
simply refers to a potential framework for performance measurement. Whether 
this framework (which requires organisational change) is acceptable or 
implementable is not a question that can be answered here but requires political 
decision making by consensus from those who are involved in the performance 
of the institution from inside.
This research is not an attempt to promote the balanced scorecard to legislative 
performance. Rather, it advocates the idea of a balanced approach to 
performance measurement in legislatures. Such an approach requires legislative 
institutions to assume corporate identities in their structures and behaviour so 
that they can look at the threats and risks to their performance, such as political 
disengagement, in a holistic way. For instance if opposition parties in the 
legislature think that disengagement is due to a lack of support for the ruling 
party, then it would be difficult to get consensus on performance measures let 
alone the idea of performance management. All stakeholders involved must first 
agree that disengagement is a formidable threat to the political system as a whole 
and not just the political future of some of the stakeholders involved.
The figure above is an adoption of a later version of the Balanced Scorecard 
model for public sector organisations by Norton and Kaplan in 2001. This 
version places a lot of emphasis on learning and growth as the future focus of the
9 In countries below the threshold or singularity, there is usually a legitimacy crisis or imposed 
legitimacy in authoritarian regimes. While countries above singularity do not suffer from a 
legitimacy crisis, there is the danger that the quality of democracy does not improve with the 
growing needs of the environment.
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organisation. It indicates that without adequate learning and growth in the 
direction of the organisation's vision, the mission cannot be fulfilled. Thus for 
legislatures to become more responsive, they must first invest more on research 
(independent research capabilities), and training for legislators and staff in skills 
that would prepare them for the challenges facing them in targeting their 
corporate vision and reaching out to the citizens (customers). The case study into 
the performance of House Services shows that Parliament is taking learning and 
growth seriously as a priority for future development which is obviously a step in 
the right direction.
In order to maintain and improve trust in legislatures, legitimacy must evolve 
alongside the evolving environment, and legislatures must be seen as 
accountable, transparent and efficient in their processes (which would also 
include cost-effectiveness even though the focus of this framework is not 
financial). For parliaments to improve and develop their internal processes as a 
result of responsiveness (through feedback to the system) they may decide to 
become innovative and design a number of initiatives or they may take 
advantage of comparative studies of legislative systems and decide to carry out 
initiatives which are carried out elsewhere. The purpose of this study is only to 
spell out possibilities and the choice of initiatives will obviously depend on the 
institution itself.
Whatever method of performance measurement and management a legislature 
decides upon, it would definitely need to have some form of performance control 
system in place. Performance control has been defined as 'the process of
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monitoring performance, comparing it with some standards and then providing 
rewards and adjustments' (Ouchi 1977: 97). Such control is usually regarded as a 
managerial process and is seen from the perspective of managers. However, 
since legislatures do not have a hierarchical management structure as 
corporations do, performance measurement in legislatures, as mentioned earlier, 
should not intend to assess the performance of the whole institution but a certain 
aspect of the whole which this study recognises as having the most impact on the 
quality of democracy. However, it must be stressed that improvement in one part 
of an open system will inevitably cause improvements in other parts.
The type of performance control and monitoring proposed here that is consistent 
with the balanced scorecard to enhance legislative performance can only be 
successful if it is implemented by all the agents or groups of actors in the 
organisation taking responsibility of their own performance (not a management 
board as in corporations). In legislatures, the controllers and the controlled are 
not separate agents or entities so the chance of finding credible outcomes from 
inputs and measures become much higher. Hence there is a higher chance to 
detect, correct and learn from errors and negative feedback resulting in better 
performance control. In other words, legislatures do not need to monitor their 
performance through a hierarchical system of management control as legislators 
themselves are in a better position to monitor performance measurement and 
improve growth through learning from feedback loops from outside.
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7-6 Conclusion: Comparative legislative Performance
Kenneth Shepsle writing on the assessment of comparative legislative research 
predicted that political scholars will in the future continue to write the way they 
do by commenting and interpreting existing legislative events and regularities 
rather than speculating about how things will play out (Shepsle 2002: 394-395). 
This thesis has taken the latter and less conventional of Shepsle's research routes 
and has presented the idea of a single framework for performance measurement 
compatible for advanced legislatures while also speculating on whether such 
measurement systems could be implemented in developed legislatures in order to 
enhance the quality of democracy. To make the idea of comparative legislative 
performance work, legislatures had to be narrowed down to comparable types. 
Chapter four made it acceptable to divide legislatures into two groups of 
comparable legislature and non-comparable legislatures in terms of performance 
measurement. 10
The study of comparative legislatures today still bears the limitations mentioned 
by Jean Blondel in 1969 when comparing systems of government. Blondel 
indicated that the common problem was working out comparative research based 
on a large pool of individual country studies which is still an apparent problem in 
comparative legislative studies today. Much of the research into comparative
10 Although this has been emphasised before, I would like to make clear again that the statistical 
analysis of the cusp catastrophe model which placed countries below and above a point of 
singularity intends to show that the performance measurement system proposed may be used in a 
comparative perspective for countries above singularity. It does not intend in any way to show 
that comparative studies of countries (or certain aspects of counties) below singularity with 
counterparts above singularity is not doable. One may argue that countries that lie to the lower 
edge of singularity are unfairly judged. However, it is important to say that without some sort of 
categorisation, it would be impossible to have a comparative performance measurement system 
of legislatures at all.
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legislatures is in fact individual country studies in an effort to generalise and 
identify relationships between a certain legislature with another. Following 
historical trends in the performance of one legislature provides limited evaluative 
judgement since it does not answer to the question of whether the institution is 
performing as effectively and efficiently as it should.
A more reliable way of evaluating legislative performance is to compare the 
performance of a legislative system with other like systems in a chosen area of 
performance measurement. In this case developed legislatures in advanced 
democracies are considered as like systems. It could be possible to include this 
group of legislatures in a comparative performance measurement framework 
since they share common values, performance goals and performance feedback 
from the environment. By comparing how each of these legislatures have 
progressed toward their common objectives over the same period of time, it is 
possible to make evaluations of the most and least successful legislatures in 
regards to performance and reach tentative conclusions about the performance of 
each legislature in particular.
However, this method of assessment is not flawless, especially considering the 
fact that legislatures are different in their functions and the processes and 
conditions for performance measurement vary from one country to another 
which would be related to their particular political systems in general. Though it 
is not impossible, since postmaterialist democracies are more or less dependant 
on their responsiveness to maintain and improve legitimacy to their active 
citizens, to assess the performance of these legislatures by their responsive
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function only and evaluated them on how they manage to improve the quality of 
democracy through their responsiveness.
This research takes a slightly different view from David Arter who bases 
legislative performance on a 'broad notion of... various measures of legislative 
outputs' (Arter, 2006b: 463). This study believes that for performance sake, to 
include all measures of legislative outputs or even a broad notion of measures 
under one framework will not work and to include multiple goals and 
measurements will lead the system to dysfunction. While it is true that 
performance measurement systems would become more accurate and objective, 
if they take more measures into consideration, but the nature of political 
institutions such as legislatures will inevitably include subjective measures 
which is difficult to quantify, but too important to ignore. Furthermore including 
too many measures for each dimension of legislative performance would create 
complications at the implementation stage rather than facilitating it. What is 
important for the success of a performance measurement framework is that only 
the most important aspects that affect performance (in the long term) and 
approved by consensus of those involved in the performance measurement 
framework need to be considered. Naturally, an improvement in one aspect of 
performance in a system will lead to other intervening processes to improve too 
which will improve the overall performance of the system as a whole.
Continuing from the suggested model in this chapter, two distinct methods of 
comparative legislative performance may be proposed. The first method is based 
on the idea of causality which is at the heart of management theory. Causality in
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organisations suggests that a change or improvement in one management activity 
will cause a subsequent change or improvement in organisational performance 
(subject to a causal relationship). If legislative scholars were to consider a 
balanced scorecard framework such as the one illustrated in this chapter and look 
at the causal linkages between different perspectives, they could seek out 
relationships between the different aspects of performance which would have 
significant implications for evaluation. The balanced scorecard approach would 
let scholars determine how well the system performs in terms of maintaining and 
improving the quality of democracy, whether in a single case study or on a 
comparative basis including different legislatures.
The second type of study would involve statistical analysis and the creation of a 
pooled time-series data set (such as the Polity dataset but only including 
legislatures the consolidated democracy threshold). This data set could examine 
measurements on a periodic basis and show how changes in the performance (of 
responsiveness programmes) in one legislature would compare to changes in 
others and how certain ratios can be explained using certain variables. If all the 
legislatures in this dataset adopt the balanced scorecard method, then the 
flexibility of the method would essentially create new variables by simply 
comparing year to year changes. While such a database cannot make predictions 
in future performance trends, it could say how much these performance 
measurements conflict (reflecting conflicting goals) and how certain 
organisational factors contribute to enhance performance. Of course this would 
be a continuous project requiring time, money and a dedicated team of
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researchers, but the long-term impact could be huge especially in terms of 
improving democratic quality and overall satisfaction with democracy.
As a final remark, it is important to look back at the intentions of this research 
and whether it has been successful in achieving its goal. This thesis started out as 
a possible enquiry into the use of performance measurement systems in 
comparative legislative studies. A performance measurement of such requires an 
organisational approach to legislative institutions as open systems based on a 
continuous flow of feedback into the system from the environment and an 
emphasis on the maintenance of structural stability or the state of equilibrium. 
But as systems theory is holistic, it has not been favoured in political and 
legislative studies 11 . Thus performance assessments of legislatures in the past 
have mainly been based on auditing methods using evaluations of past 
performance to identify inefficient trends, especially in budgeting and resource 
allocation. Strategic decision making within institutions have mainly been 
ignored. This study takes more interest in recent performance measurement 
tools such as the balanced scorecard and whether such methods could be adapted 
to create a balanced general framework of performance management of 
legislatures and the continuous improvement of democratic quality in the 
political system.
11 Legislative scholars also have problems dealing with the concept of equilibrium as it is used in 
open adaptive systems and prefer equilibriums that would only be acceptable in closed systems 
which have no interaction with the external environment. Furthermore, scientists find a 
reductionist approach, easier to apply and control in terms of results.
383
However due to differences in the level of democratic growth and development, 
not all legislatures can benefit from performance management tools and 
frameworks in the same way. Using Catastrophe theory, this study devised a 
model to show political systems below a certain threshold of consolidation do 
not have the capacity to improve legislative performance using performance 
measurement frameworks whatever level of democratisation they seem to be 
facing. The legislative performance pyramid illustrates that a legislature can 
perform well if it manages to maintain the lower goals or benchmarks of 
governance or the foundations of democracy.
The challenge thus is for developed legislatures to implement performance 
measurement frameworks by taking advantage of system maintenance and 
improvement or in other words legitimation and improving the quality of 
democracy. Although as the literature suggests the consolidated democratic 
system is stable and not facing crisis, but this is not to say that constant 
improvement is not required. The first two case studies looks at the efforts made 
by a developed legislature to incorporate performance management into its work 
to improve on the quality of democracy and the legitimation of the political 
system in general and concludes that the value of performance management is 
not only in helping to maintain efficacy of the mission set out by the legislature 
but also legitimacy which is desirable to all developed political systems. Thus 
the suggested framework presented here indicates one way in which performance 
measurement may be used not only to assess but also to improve on the 
performance of the democratic system as a whole.
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Appendix 4-1: Country rankings of Press Freedom Index, HDI and Behavioural 
Type
Country
Norway
Iceland
Australia
Ireland
Sweden
Canada
Japan
United States
Finland
Netherlands
Switzerland
Belgium
Austria
Denmark
France
Italy
United Kingdom
Spain
New Zealand
Germany
Hong Kong
Israel
Greece
South Korea
Slovenia
Portugal
Cyprus
Czech Rep.
*Kuwait
Hungary
Argentina
Poland
*Bahrain
Chile
Estonia
Lithuania
Slovakia
Uruguay
Croatia
PFIx
2
0.5
9
0.5
4
4.5
12.5
13
0.5
0.5
2.5
4
4.5
5
9
9.9
6.5
10
5
5.5
14
12
8
7.75
3
3
7.5
0.75
17
3
17.3
14
28
11.6
2
6.5
2.5
13.7
13
HDIy Cat
0.965 1
0.96 1
0.957 1
0.956 1
0.951 1
0.95 1
0.949 1
0.948 1
0.947 1
0.947 1
0.947 1
0.945 1
0.944 1
0.943 1
0.942 1
0.94 1
0.94 1
0.938 1
0.936 1
0.932 1
0.927 1
0.927 1
0.921 1
0.912 1
0.91 1
0.904 1
0.903 1
0.885 1
0.871 3
0.869 1
0.863 2
0.862 2
0.859 3
0.859 2
0.858 1
0.857 1
0.856 1
0.851 2
0.846 2
Country
Romania
Bosnia
Mauritius
Libya
Russia
Macedonia
Belarus
Brazil
Colombia
Albania
Thailand
Venezuela
Saudi Arabia
Kazakhstan
Lebanon
Ukraine
Armenia
China
Peru
Ecuador
Philippines
Jordan
Tunisia
Fiji
Paraguay
Turkey
Sri Lanka
Dominican Rep
Iran
Georgia
Maldives
Azerbaijan
El Salvador
Algeria
Jamaica
Turkmenistan
Cape Verde
Syria
Indonesia
PFIx
14
5
8
62.5
52.5
11.5
57
17.2
44.7
18
33.5
29
76
41
27
26.5
25.5
94
28.2
15.2
51
27.5
53.7
14
18.2
25
50.7
12.5
90.8
21
51.2
47
10
40
5.5
98.5
11.5
63
26
HDIy
0.805
0.8
0.8
0.798
0.797
0.792
0.794
0.792
0.79
0.784
0.784
0.784
0.777
0.774
0.774
0.774
0.768
0.768
0.767
0.765
0.763
0.76
0.76
0.758
0.757
0.757
0.755
0.751
0.746
0.743
0.739
0.736
0.729
0.728
0.724
0.724
0.722
0.716
0.711
Cat
2
2
3
3
3
2
3
2
2
2
2
2
3
3
2
2
2
3
2
2
2
3
3
4
2
2
4
2
3
2
3
3
4
2
2
3
4
3
4
Country
South Africa
Tajikistan
Morocco
Gabon
Namibia
*India
Cambodia
Botswana
Comoros
Laos
Pakistan
Bhutan
Ghana
Bangladesh
Nepal
Sudan
Madagascar
Cameroon
Uganda
Swaziland
Togo
Djibouti
Lesotho
Yemen
Kenya
Zimbabwe
Mauritania
Haiti
Gambia
Senegal
Eritrea
Rwanda
Nigeria
Guinea
Angola
Tanzania
Benin
Ivory Coast
Zambia
PFIx
11.2
30
24.8
28.5
6
26.5
27.2
13
22.5
67.5
70.3
25
8.5
48
73.5
48.1
15
28.2
29.8
40.5
15
33
16
54
30.2
50
17.5
19.5
54
17.5
97.5
41
32.2
27.5
21.5
19.8
5.5
25
22.5
HDIy
0.653
0.652
0.64
0.633
0.626
0.611
0.583
0.57
0.556
0.553
0.539
0.538
0.532
0.53
0.527
0.516
0.509
0.506
0.502
0.5
0.495
0.494
0.494
0.492
0.491
0.491
0.486
0.482
0.479
0.46
0.454
0.45
0.448
0.445
0.439
0.43
0.428
0.421
0.407
Cat
2
3
3
3
4
1
4
4
4
3
3
4
4
4
4
3
4
4
3
3
4
3
4
3
4
3
4
4
3
4
3
3
4
4
3
4
4
4
4
385
Latvia
*Qatar
Seychelles
Costa Rica
*UAE
Cuba
Mexico
Bulgaria
Panama
Trinidad
Malaysia
3
18
24.5
6.6
17.5
95
45.8
9
9.5
5
22.2
0.845
0.844
0.842
0.841
0.839
0.821
0.821
0.816
0.809
0.809
0.805
1
3
2
2
3
3
2
2
2
2
2
Vietnam
Kyrgyzstan
Egypt
Nicaragua
Uzbekistan
Moldova
Bolivia
Mongolia
Honduras
Guatemala
Equ. Guinea
67.2
34
46.2
15.5
71
19.2
4.5
19.2
14.5
21.2
48
0.709
0.705
0.702
0.698
0.696
0.694
0.692
0.691
0.683
0.673
0.653
3
4
3
4
3
4
2
3
4
2
3
Malawi
Mozambique
Burundi
Ethiopia
Chad
Central Africa
Guinea-Bissau
Burkina Faso
Mali
Sierra Leone
Niger
25.5
11.5
39.8
75
35.5
14.5
14.5
16
9
26
24.5
0.4
0.39
0.384
0.371
0.368
0.353
0.349
0.342
0.338
0.335
0.311
4
4
3
3
4
4
4
4
4
4
3
Appendix 4-2: Normalised Country Data of PFI and HDI
Country
Norway
Iceland
Australia
Ireland
Sweden
Canada
Japan
United States
Finland
Netherlands
Switzerland
Belgium
Austria
Denmark
France
Italy
United Kingdm
Spain
New Zealand
Germany
Hong Kong
Israel
PFIx
-1.053
-1.119
-0.741
-1.119
-0.964
-0.942
-0.586
-0.564
-1.119
-1.119
-1.03
-0.964
-0.942
-0.919
-0.741
-0.701
-0.853
-0.697
-0.919
-0.897
-0.519
-0.608
HDIy
1.402
1.375
1.375
1.353
1.326
1.320
1.315
1.309
1.304
1.304
1.304
1.293
1.287
1.282
1.276
1.266
1.266
1.255
1.244
1.222
1.195
1.195
Cat Country
1 Romania
1 Bosnia
1 Mauritius
1 Libya
1 Russia
1 Macedonia
1 Belarus
1 Brazil
1 Colombia
1 Albania
1 Thailand
1 Venezuela
1 Saudi Arabia
1 Kazakhstan
1 Lebanon
1 Ukraine
1 Armenia
1 China
1 Peru
1 Ecuador
1 Philippines
1 Jordan
PFIx
-0.519
-0.919
-0.786
1.637
1.193
-0.63
1.393
-0.377
0.850
-0.341
0.348
0.148
2.238
0.681
0.059
0.036
-0.008
3.038
0.116
-0.461
1.126
0.081
HDIy
0.530
0.503
0.503
0.492
0.487
0.482
0.471
0.46
0.449
0.416
0.416
0.416
0.378
0.362
0.362
0.362
0.329
0.329
0.324
0.313
0.302
0.285
Cat
2
2
2
3
3
2
3
2
2
2
2
2
3
3
2
2
2
3
2
2
3
3
Country
South Africa
Tajikistan
Morocco
Gabon
Namibia
*India
Cambodia
Botswana
Comoros
Laos
Pakistan
Bhutan
Ghana
Bangladesh
Nepal**
Sudan
Madagascar
Cameroon
Uganda
Swaziland
Togo
Djibouti
PFIx
-0.639
0.192
-0.039
0.125
-0.875
0.036
0.072
-0.564
-0.141
1.860
1.984
-0.03
-0.764
0.764
2.126
0.997
-0.475
0.116
0.183
0.659
-0.475
0.325
HDIy
-0.298
-0.303
-0.368
-0.407
-0.445
-0.526
-0.679
-0.75
-0.826
-0.842
-0.919
-0.924
-0.957
-0.968
-0.968
-1.044
-1.082
-1.098
-1.12
-1.131
-1.158
-1.164
Ca
2
3
3
3
4
1
4
4
4
3
3
4
4
4
4
3
4
4
3
3
4
3
386
Greece
South Korea
Slovenia
Portugal
Cyprus
Czech Rep.
*Kuwait
Hungary
Argentina
Poland
Bahrain
Chile
Estonia
Lithuania
Slovakia
Uruguay
Croatia
Latvia
*Qatar
Seychelles
Costa Rica
*UAE
Cuba
Mexico
Bulgaria
Panama
Trinidad
Malaysia
-0.786
-0.795
-1.008
-1.00
-1.00
-1.10
-0.386
-1.00
-0.372
-0.519
0.1035
-0.103
-1.053
-0.853
-1.03
-0.528
-0.564
-1.00
-0.341
-0.052
-0.844
-0.363
3.083
0.895
-0.741
-0.719
-0.919
-0.15
1.162
1.113
1.102
1.069
1.064
0.966
0.890
0.879
0.846
0.841
0.824
0.824
0.819
0.813
0.808
0.781
0.753
0.748
0.743
0.732
0.726
0.715
0.645
0.617
0.590
0.552
0.552
0.530
1
1
1
1
1
1
3
1
2
2
3
2
1
1
1
2
2
1
3
2
2
3
3
2
2
2
2
2
Tunisia
Fiji
Paraguay
Turkey
Sri Lanka**
Dominican R
Iran
Georgia
Maldives
Azerbaijan
El Salvador
Algeria
Jamaica
Turkmenistan
Cape Verde
Syria
Indonesia
Vietnam
Kyrgyzstan**
Egypt
Nicaragua
Uzbekistan
Moldova
Bolivia
Mongolia
Honduras
Guatemala
Equ. Guinea
1.250
-0.519
-0.328
-0.03
1.117
-0.572
2.900
-0.208
1.1397
0.9484
0.948
-0.697
0.637
-0.897
-0.63
1.659
0.0146
1.851
0.370
0.9173
-0.452
2.015
-0.288
-0.942
-0.283
-0.497
-0.194
0.992
0.285
0.274
0.269
0.269
0.258
0.236
0.209
0.193
0.171
0.155
0.155
0.116
0.111
0.089
0.078
0.046
0.018
0.008
-0.014
-0.031
-0.052
-0.063
-0.074
-0.085
-0.091
-0.134
-0.189
-0.298
3
4
2
2
4
2
3
2
3
3
4
4
2
2
4
3
4
3
4
3
4
3
4
2
3
4
2
3
Lesotho
Yemen
Kenya
Zimbabwe
Mauritania
Haiti
Gambia
Senegal
Eritrea
Rwanda
Nigeria
Guinea
Angola
Tanzania
Benin
Ivory Coast
Zambia
Malawi
Mozambique
Burundi
Ethiopia
Chad
Central African
Guinea-Bissau
Burkina Faso
Mali
Sierra Leone
Niger
-0.43
1.259
0.205
1.081
-0.363
-0.275
1.259
-0.363
3.194
0.681
0.290
0.081
-0.186
-0.261
-0.897
-0.03
-0.141
-0.008
-0.63
0.628
2.193
0.437
-0.497
-0.497
-0.43
-0.741
0.014
-0.052
-1.164
-1.175
-1.18
-1.18
-1.207
-1.229
-1.246
-1.349
-1.382
-1.404
-1.414
-1.431
-1.463
-1.513
-1.523
-1.562
-1.638
-1.676
-1.73
-1.763
-1.834
-1.85
-1.932
-1.954
-1.992
-2.014
-2.03
-2.161
4
3
4
3
4
4
3
4
3
3
4
4
3
4
4
4
4
4
4
4
3
4
4
4
4
4
4
3
Appendix 4-3: Country Rankings of Normalised Data after Rotation
Country
Norway
Iceland
Australia
Ireland
Sweden
Canada
Japan
United States
Finland
PFIx'
-0.086
-0.157
0.150
-0.169
-0.054
-0.038
0.257
0.272
-0.196
HDIy'
1.115
1.128
0.908
1.110
1.002
0.985
0.786
0.769
1.069
Cat Country
1 Romania
1 Bosnia
1 Mauritius
1 Libya
1 Russia
1 Macedonia
1 Belarus
1 Brazil
1 Colombia
PFIx'
-0117
-0.467
-0.356
1.666
1.292
-0.237
1.449
-0.037
0.984
HDIy'
0.093
0.289
0.216
-1.121
-0.882
0.113
-1.005
-0.044
-0.726
Cat
2
2
2
3
3
2
3
2
2
Country
South Africa
Tajikistan
Morocco
Gabon
Namibia
*India
Cambodia
Botswana
Comoros
PFIx'
-0.672
0.021
-0.208
-0.091
-0.949
-0.232
-0.285
-0.856
1.121
HDIy-
-0.534
-0.994
-0.922
-1.044
-0.528
-1.096
-1.243
-0.954
-2.359
(
2
2
T
1
4
1
4
4
4
387
Netherlands
Switzerland
Belgium
Austria
Denmark
France
Italy
United Kingdm
Spain
New Zealand
Germany
Hong Kong
Israel
Greece
South Korea
Slovenia
Portugal
Cyprus
Czech Rep.
*Kuwait
Hungary
Argentina
Poland
Bahrain
Chile
Estonia
Lithuania
Slovakia
Uruguay
Croatia
Latvia
*Qatar
Seychelles
Costa Rica
*UAE
Cuba
Mexico
Bulgaria
Panama
Trinidad
Malaysia
-0.196
-0.121
-0.071
-0.056
-0.040
0.106
0.133
0.007
0.131
-0.061
-0.054
0.247
0.172
0.006
-0.029
-0.213
-0.231
-0.067
-0.370
0.191
-0.336
0.179
0.053
0.565
-0.045
-0.406
-0.241
-0.393
0.012
-0.032
-0.407
0.148
0.384
-0.281
0.114
2.959
1.113
-0.271
-0.273
-0.440
0.191
1.069
1.020
0.975
0.958
0.941
0.839
0.808
0.891
0.797
0.909
0.879
0.649
0.698
0.768
0.732
0.840
0.812
0.698
0.779
0.321
0.653
0.277
0.353
-0.002
0.398
0.627
0.513
0.606
0.308
0.304
0.543
0.173
0.006
0.435
0.163
-1.785
-0.609
0.265
0.221
0.331
-0.109
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
3
1
2
2
3
2
1
1
1
2
2
1
3
2
2
3
3
2
2
2
2
2
Albania
Thailand
Venezuela
Saudi Arabia
Kazakhstan
Lebanon
Ukraine
Armenia
China
Peru
Ecuador
Philippines
Jordan
Tunisia
Fiji
Paraguay
Turkey
Sri Lanka
Dominican Rep
Iran
Georgia
Maldives
Azerbaijan
El Salvador
Algeria
Jamaica
Turkmenistan
Cape Verde
Syria
Indonesia
Vietnam
Kyrgyzstan
Egypt
Nicaragua
Uzbekistan
Moldova
Bolivia
Mongolia
Honduras
Guatemala
Equ. Guinea
-0.031
0.545
0.378
2.105
0.794
0.274
0.255
0.200
2.748
0.301
-0.188
1.134
0.250
1.229
-0.258
-0.101
0.149
1.102
-0.323
2.567
-0.042
1.073
0.904
-0.493
0.620
-0.675
2.784
-0.458
1.440
0.048
1.579
0.328
0.777
-0.381
1.678
-0.255
-0.808
-0.261
-0.463
-0.240
0.694
-0.100
-0.478
-0.368
-1.545
-0.706
-0.365
-0.353
-0.356
-2.025
-0.429
-0.121
-1000
-0.441
-1.082
-0.121
-0.231
-0.394
-1.032
-0.124
-2.050
-0.360
-1.117
-1.026
-0.156
-0.891
-0.069
-2.335
-0.224
-1.507
-0.628
-1.643
-0.850
-1.164
-0.431
-1.793
-0.540
-0.191
-0.556
-0.475
-0.687
-1.428
2
2
2
3
3
2
2
2
3
2
2
3
3
3
4
2
2
4
2
3
2
3
3
4
2
2
3
4
3
4
3
4
3
4
3
4
2
3
4
2
3
Laos
Pakistan
Bhutan
Ghana
Bangladesh
Nepal
Sudan
Madagascar
Cameroon
Uganda
Swaziland
Togo
Djibouti
Lesotho
Yemen
Kenya
Zimbabwe
Mauritania
Haiti
Gambia
Senegal
Eritrea
Rwanda
Nigeria
Guinea
Angola
Tanzania
Benin
Ivory Coast
Zambia
Malawi
Mozambique
Burundi
Ethiopia
Chad
Central Africa
Guinea-Bissau
Burkina Faso
Mali
Sierra Leone
Niger
1.183
-0.505
-1.137
0.326
1.266
0.288
-0.964
-0.478
-0.434
-0.042
-1.006
-0.339
-0.971
0.436
-0.448
0.284
-0.939
-0.877
0.397
-1.017
1.941
-0.173
-0.506
-0.690
-0.931
-1.559
-1.559
-0.855
-0.989
-0.899
-1.449
-0.414
0.856
-0.622
-1.448
-1.460
-1.425
-1.698
-1.074
-1.202
1.121
-2.491
-1.392
-1.017
-1.989
-2.624
-2.055
-1.280
-1.618
-1.673
-1.943
-1.344
-1.787
-1.373
-2.308
-1.735
-2.215
-1.446
-1.513
-2.367
-1.565
-3.541
-2.183
-1.978
-1.877
-1.758
-1.418
-1.418
-1.925
-1.928
-2.033
-1.738
-2.454
-3.371
-2.423
-1979
-1.997
-2.066
-1.914
-2.342
-2.414
-2.359
'
'
'
-
4
4
4
4
4
4
3
388
Appendix 4-4: Comparison of Polity IV Scores and Data from Appendix 4-3
Country
Albania
Algeria
Angola
Argentina
Armenia
Australia
Austria
Azerbaijan
Bahrain
Bangladesh
Belarus
Belgium
Benin
Bhutan
Bolivia
Botswana
Brazil
Bulgaria
Burkina Faso
Burundi
Cambodia
Cameroon
Canada
Central
African
Chad
Chile
China
Colombia
Comoros
Costa Rica
Ivory Coast
Croatia
Cuba
Cyprus
Czech Rep.
Denmark
Dominican
Ecuador
Egypt
El Salvador
Equ. N Guinea
Eritrea
Estonia
Ethiopia
Fiji
Finland
France
Gabon
Gambia
Georgia
Germany
Ghana
Greece
Guatemala
Guinea
Guinea-Bisuo
Haiti
Honduras
Hungary
India
Indonesia
Iran
Ireland
Israel
PFI'x
-0.031
0.62
-1.021
0.179
0.2
0.15
-0.056
0.904
0.565
1.266
1.449
-0.071
-0.855
-1.137
-0.808
-0.856
-0.037
-0.271
-1.698
0.856
-0.285
-0.434
-0.038
-1.46
-1.448
-0.045
2.748
0.984
1.121
-0.281
-0.989
-0.032
2.959
-0.067
-0.37
-0.04
-0.323
-0.188
0.777
-0.493
0.694
-0.173
-0.406
-0.622
-0.258
-0.196
0.106
-0.091
-1.017
-0.042
-0.054
0.326
0.006
-0.24
-0.931
-1.425
0.397
-0.463
-0.336
-0.232
0.048
2.567
-0.169
0.172
HDI'x
-0.1
-0.891
-1.757
0.277
-0.356
0.908
0.958
-1.026
-0.002
-2.624
-1.005
0.975
-1.925
-1.017
-0.191
-0.954
-0.044
0.265
-1.914
-3.371
-1.243
-1.673
0.985
-1.997
-1.979
0.398
-2.025
-0.726
-2.359
0.435
-1.928
0.304
-1.785
0.698
0.779
0.941
-0.124
-0.121
-1.164
-0.156
-1.428
-2.183
0.627
-2.423
-0.121
1.069
0.839
-1.044
-1.565
-0.36
0.879
-1.989
0.768
-0.867
-1.758
-2.066
-2.367
-0.475
0.653
-1.096
-0/628
-2.05
1.11
0.698
Category
2
2
3
2
2
1
1
3
3
4
3
1
4
4
2
4
2
2
4
3
4
4
1
4
4
2
3
2
4
2
4
2
3
1
1
1
2
2
3
4
3
3
1
3
4
1
1
3
3
2
1
4
1
2
4
4
4
4
1
1
4
3
1
1
DEMOC
7
1
1
8
6
10
10
0
0
6
0
10
6
0
9
9
8
9
2
1
3
1
10
6
1
9
0
7
4
10
5
7
0
10
10
10
8
6
0
7
0
0
7
3
6
10
9
0
0
5
10
7
10
8
1
5
1
7
10
9
8
4
10
10
AUTOC
0
4
4
0
1
0
0
7
7
0
7
0
0
8
0
0
0
0
2
1
1
5
0
0
3
0
7
0
0
0
1
0
7
0
0
0
0
0
6
0
5
7
1
2
1
0
0
4
5
0
0
1
0
0
2
0
3
0
0
0
1
1
0
0
DEMOC 
minus AUTOC
7
-3
-3
8
5
10
10
-7
-7
6
-7
10
6
-8
9
9
8
9
0
0
2
-4
10
6
-2
9
-7
7
4
10
4
7
-7
10
10
10
8
6
-6
7
-5
-7
6
1
5
10
9
4
-5
5
10
6
10
8
-1
5
-2
7
10
9
7
3
10
10
389
Country
Italy
Jamaica
Japan
Jordan
Kazakhstan
Kenya
South Korea
Kuwait
Kyrgyzstan
Laos
Latvia
Lesotho
Libya
Lithuania
Macedonia
Madagascar
Malawi
Malaysia
Mali
Mauritania
Mauritius
Mexico
Moldova
Mongolia
Morocco
Mozambique
Namibia
Nepal
Netherlands
New Zealand
Nicaragua
Niger
Nigeria
Norway
Pakistan
Panama
Paraguay
Peru
Philippines
Poland
Portugal
Qatar
Romania
Russia
Rwanda
Saudi Arabia
Senegal
Sierra Leone
Slovakia
Slovenia
South Africa
Spain
Sri Lanka
Sudan
Swaziland
Sweden
Switzerland
Syria
Tajikistan
Tanzania
Thailand
Togo
Trinidad
Tunisia
Turkey
Uganda
Ukraine
UAE
UK
Uruguay
PFI'x
0.133
-0.675
0.257
0.25
0.794
0.284
-0.029
0.191
0.328
1.183
-0.407
0.436
1.666
-0.241
-0.237
-0.478
-1.449
0.191
-1.074
-0.877
-0.356
1.113
-0.255
-0.261
-0.208
-0.414
-0.949
0.288
-0.196
-0.061
-0.381
1.121
-0.69
-0.086
-0.505
-0.273
-0.101
0.301
1.134
0.053
-0.231
0.148
-0.117
1.292
-0.506
2.105
1.941
-1.202
-0.393
-0.213
-0.672
0.131
1.102
-0.964
-1.006
-0.054
-0.121
0.021
0.021
-1.559
0.545
-0.339
-0.44
1.229
0.149
2.784
0.255
0.114
0.007
0.012
HDI'x
0.808
-0.069
0.786
-0.441
-0.706
-2.215
0.732
0.321
-0.85
-2.491
0.543
-2.308
-1.121
0.513
0.113
-1.618
-1.738
-0.109
-2.342
-1.513
0.216
-0.609
-0.54
-0.56
-0.922
-2.454
-0.528
-2.055
1.069
0.909
-0.431
-2.359
-1.877
1.115
-1.392
0.221
-0.231
-0.429
-1
0.353
0.812
0.173
0.093
-0.882
-1.978
-1.545
-3.541
-2.414
0.606
0.84
-0.534
0.797
-1.032
-1.28
-1.344
1.002
1.02
-0.994
-0.994
-1.418
-0.478
-1.787
0.331
-1.082
-0.394
-2.335
-0.353
0.163
0.891
0.308
Category
1
2
1
3
3
3
1
3
4
3
1
4
3
1
2
4
4
2
4
4
2
2
4
3
3
4
4
4
1
1
4
3
3
1
3
2
2
2
3
2
1
3
2
3
3
3
4
4
1
1
2
1
4
3
3
1
1
3
3
4
2
4
2
3
2
3
2
3
1
2
DEMOC
10
9
10
2
0
8
8
0
1
0
8
8
0
10
9
7
6
4
6
0
10
8
8
10
0
6
6
1
0
10
8
4
4
10
0
9
7
9
8
9
10
0
8
7
0
0
8
5
9
10
9
10
7
0
0
10
10
0
2
3
9
1
10
1
8
0
7
0
10
10
AUTOC
0
0
0
4
6
0
0
7
4
7
0
0
7
0
0
0
1
1
0
6
0
0
0
0
6
0
0
5
0
0
0
0
0
0
5
0
0
0
0
0
0
10
0
0
4
10
0
0
0
0
0
0
1
6
9
0
0
7
3
1
0
3
0
5
1
9
0
8
0
0
DEMOC
minus AUTOC
10
9
10
-2
-6
8
8
-7
-3
-7
8
8
-7
10
9
7
5
3
6
-6
10
8
8
10
-6
6
6
-4
10
10
8
4
4
10
-5
9
7
9
8
9
10
-10
8
7
-4
-10
8
5
9
10
10
10
6
6
-9
10
10
-7
-1
2
9
-2
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-4
7
-9
7
-8
10
10
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Country
Uzbekistan
Venezuela
Vietnam
Yemen
Zambia
Zimbabwe
PFI'x
1.678
0.378
1.579
-0.448
-0.899
-0.939
HDI'x
-1.793
-0.368
-1.643
-1.735
-2.033
-1.446
Category
3
2
3
3
4
3
DEMOC
0
6
0
1
3
0
AUTOC
9
0
7
3
2
7
DEMOC
minus AUTOC
-9
6
-7
-2
1
-7
Appendix 4-5: VTS, PEPSi, PEPS2 and HDI'x scores for 144 countries
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
Country
Norway
Iceland
Australia
Ireland
Sweden
Canada
Japan
United States
Finland
Netherlands
Switzerland
Belgium
Austria
Denmark
France
Italy
United Kingdom
Spain
New Zealand
Germany
Israel
Greece
South Korea
Slovenia
Portugal
Cyprus
Czech Rep.
*Kuwait
Hungary
Argentina
Poland
Bahrain
Chile
Estonia
VTS
73%
91%
84%
67%
78%
55%
56%
49%
77%
78%
38%
89%
74%
84%
72%
85%
58%
74%
62%
73%
84%
89%
71%
72%
70%
78%
59%
7%
56%
80%
63%
  
73%
47%
PEPSJ
7.31
9.08
8.38
6.72
7.78
5.46
5.65
4.93
7.68
7.81
3.78
8.88
7.38
8.35
6.46
8.49
5.76
7.38
7.25
7.26
8.45
8.90
5.70
7.23
7.01
7.76
5.85
-7.00
5.58
6.36
6.26
-7.00
6.55
2.32
PEPS2
7.31
9.08
8.38
6.72
7.78
5.46
5.65
4.93
7.68
7.81
3.78
8.88
7.38
8.35
6.68
8.49
5.76
7.38
7.25
7.26
8.45
8.90
6.12
7.23
7.01
7.76
5.85
-7.85
5.58
6.95
6.26
-8.50
6.78
2.27
HDI'x
1.115
 
0.908
1.11
1.002
0.985
0.786
 
1.069
1.069
1.02
0.975
0.958
0.941
0.839
0.808
0.891
0.797
0.909
0.879
0.698
0.768
0.732
0.84
0.812
0.698
0.779
0.321
0.653
0.277
0.353
-0.002
0.398
0.627
391
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79
80
81
82
83
84
85
86
87
QSoo
89
90
91
92
93
Lithuania
Slovakia
Uruguay
Croatia
Latvia
^OtitQrV^alal
Costa Rica
*ITAFt_l jVl-j
Cuba
Mexico
Bulgaria
Panama
Trinidad
Malaysia
Romania
Mauritius
Libya
Russia
Macedonia
Belarus
Brazil
Colombia
Albania
Thailand
Venezuela
Saudi Arabia
Kazakhstan
Ukraine
Armenia
China
Peru
Ecuador
Philippines
Jordan
Tunisia
Fiji
Paraguay
Turkey
Sri Lanka
Dominican Republic
Iran
Georgia
Azerbaijan
El Salvador
Algeria
Jamaica
Turkmenistan
Syria
Indonesia
Vietnam
Kyrgyzstan
Egypt
Nicaragua
Uzbekistan
Moldova
Bolivia
Mongolia
Honduras
Guatemala
55%
79%
95%
74%
54%
64%
60%
72%
76%
69%
50%
62%
80%
69%
85%
81%
83%
83%
100%
70%
47%
0
71%
74%
72%
 
79%
79%
69%
49%
56%
78%
53%
75%
78%
65%
86%
65%
61%
38%
64%
46%
 
 
86%
74%
30%
89%
64%
67%
97%
69%
49%
5.45
7.12
9.47
5.20
4.35
-10.00
6.42
-8.00
"7 (V\
- 1 .UU
4.80
6.49
6.87
6.95
0.98
4.97
7.96
-7.00
4.82
7.65
-7.00
6.63
3.05
7.00
6.31
2.80
-10.00
-6.00
5.16
3.59
-7.00
7.07
4.73
5.52
-3.02
-4.44
3.65
4.21
5.00
4.49
5.23
2.46
3.59
-7.00
2.67
-3.36
4.14
-9.00
-7.00
5.87
-7.00
-3.26
-6.00
7.10
-9.00
5.10
5.32
9.70
4.80
3.92
5.45
7.42
9.47
5.93
4.44
-10.00
6.42
Q r\r\
-y.uu
s sn
-o. JU
5.00
6.71
7.13
6.95
1.46
5.22
7.96
8 sr>. JU
5.38
8.00
-0.37
7.28
2.86
8.00
6.51
2.62
-10.00
-0.89
5.88
4.67
-8.50
7.36
5.88
5.90
-1.09
-1.52
5.25
4.26
6.00
5.85
5.53
5.14
4.02
-2.38
2.31
-0.12
4.10
-9.50
-8.50
7.07
8 Cf\. J\J
0.93
-4.96
7.87
-9.50
5.38
5.65
9.70
5.36
3.90
0.513
0.606
0.308
0.304
0.543
0.173
0.435
0.163
1 TQC
- 1 . IOJ
-0.609
0.265
0.221
0.331
-0.109
0.093
0.216
-1.121
-0.882
0.113
-1.005
-0.044
-0.726
-0.1
-0.478
-0.368
-1.541
-0.706
-0.353
-0.356
-2.025
-0.429
-0.121
-1.00
-0.441
-1.082
-0.121
-0.231
-0.394
-1.032
-0.124
-2.05
-0.36
-1.026
-0.156
-0.891
-0.069
 
-0.994
-0.628
-1.643
-0.85
-1.164
-0.431
-1.793
-0.54
-0.191
-0.56
-0.475
-0.867
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s^
95
96
97
98
99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111
112
113
114
115
116
117
118
119
120
121
122
123
124
125
126
127
128
129
130
131
132
133
134
135
136
137
138
139
140
141
142
143
144
U.LJU. vjujuca
South Africa
Tajikistan
Morocco
Gabon
Namibia
*India
Cambodia
Botswana
Comoros
Laos
Pakistan
Bhutan
Ghana
Bangladesh
Nepal
Sudan
Madagascar
Cameroon
Uganda
Swaziland
Togo
Djibouti
Lesotho
Yemen
Kenya
Zimbabwe
Mauritania
Haiti
Gambia
Senegal
Eritrea
Rwanda
Nigeria
Guinea
Angola
Tanzania
Benin
Ivory Coast
Zambia
Malawi
Mozambique
Burundi
Ethiopia
Chad
Central Africa
Guinea-Bissau
Burkina Faso
Mali
Sierra Leone
Niger
64%
86%
41%
55%
62%
65%
83%
42%
33%
 
41%
65%
75%
76%
55%
55%
74%
100%
29%
60%
77%
39%
50%
49%
61%
64%
41%
100%
75%
100%
53%
65%
36%
87%
59%
60%
70%
89%
63%
47%
33%
89%
96%
5.75
-3.14
-6.00
-4.00
3.73
5.89
1.50
3.78
1.31
-7.00
-5.00
8 r\r\ -UU
3.52
4.52
-6.24
-6.00
3.82
-4.45
-4.00
-9.00
-2.00
-0.13
4.81
-2.23
3.15
-7.00
-6.00
-2.39
-5.00
3.29
7 nn
- / .uu 
-3.00
2.99
-1.00
0.59
3.88
 
-0.92
5.08
3.57
-0.20
-2.30
 
-1.37
-1.06
1.96
4.44
3.85
5.89
2.06
-3.93
-1.52
4.22
6.05
4.34
3.70
0.27
-8.50
-3.43
-9.00
4.46
5.53
-0.42
3.96
-1.52
0.42
-9.50
4.00
-1.10
5.01
1.67
2.93
-3.52
-3.07
0.05
-1.06
3.12
8 sn. j\j 
3.50
4.47
4.50
-6.50
1.31
4.47
 
-0.91
8.00
3.94
1.50
1.00
-
0.76
-0.31
1.27
6.38
6.62
- 1 .*tz,o
-0.534
-0.994
-0.922
-1.044
-0.528
-1.096
-1.243
-0.954
-2.359
-2.491
-1.392
-1.017
-1.989
-2.624
-2.055
1 98
- 1 .Zo
-1.618
-1.673
-2.335
1 ^441 . J'T'T
-1.787
-2.308
-1.735
-2.215
-1.446
-2.367
-1.565
-3.541
2 1 fi"3. 1 O J
-1.978
-1.877
-1.758
-0.757
-1.418
-1.925
-1.928
-2.033
-1.738
-2.454
-3.371
-2.423
-1.979
-1.997
-2.066
-1.914
-2.342
-2.414
-2.359
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Appendix 4-6: Data from World Bank Government Effectiveness and Political Stability 
Indicators and HDI'x
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
OECD +EU
(2006)
Australia
Austria
Belgium
Canada
Cyprus
Czech Republic
Denmark
Estonia
Finland
France
Germany
Hungary
Iceland
Ireland
Italy
Japan
South Korea
Latvia
Lithuania
Luxembourg
Malta
Mexico
Netherlands
New Zealand
Norway
Poland
Portugal
Slovakia
Slovenia
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
Turkey
United Kingdom
United States
Government Political 
Effectiveness Stability
1.94
1.62
1.64
2.03
1.22
0.01
2.29
1.17
2.08
1.20
1.52
0.71
2.13
1.53
0.38
1.29
1.05
0.73
0.82
1.73
1.21
0.16
1.86
1.94
2.10
0.49
0.95
0.91
1.11
1.05
2.00
2.13
0.23
1.83
1.64
0.85
1.04
0.74
0.94
0.44
0.75
0.84
0.78
1.47
0.46
0.83
0.48
1.60
1.16
0.28
1.11
0.42
0.81
0.89
1.51
0.01
-0.40
0.77
1.27
1.21
0.22
0.85
0.85
1.05
0.33
1.13
1.40
-0.65
0.46
0.31
HDI'x
0.908
0.958
0.975
0.985
0.698
0.779
0.941
0.627
1.069
0.839
0.879
0.653
1.128
1.11
0.808
0.786
0.732
0.543
0.513
1.113
1.069
0.909
1.115
0.353
0.812
0.606
0.84
0.797
1.002
1.02
-0.394
0.891
0.786
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